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I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. A Brief History of Cigarette Regulation 
Cigarette smoking causes over 420,000 deaths annually in the United 
States, roughly twenty percent of all U.S. deaths, 1 making cigarettes the single 
greatest preventable cause of death in this country.2 Indeed, tobacco kills more 
people every year than alcohol, i l licit drugs, automobile accidents, violent 
crime, and AIDS combined.3 And not only are cigarettes deadly to smokers; 
they kill nonsmokers as well. According to a recent report from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the .. sidestream" or .. passive'" smoke 
from cigarettes-so-called environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)-is responsible 
annually for approximately 3000 lung cancer deaths, between 1 50.000 and 
300,000 lower respiratory ailments in children, and approximately 37,000 heart 
disease deaths.4 
Considering the staggering social costs imposed by cigarette smoking, an 
outside observer might find it odd that cigarette production and consumption 
in this country are, to a remarkable extent, unregulated. It is true that selling 
I. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS .. SMOKll'G ASD HEALTI! I� TI!E A'IERICAS 106 
( 1992) (reporting an annual smoking-death rate of approx1ma1ely -134.000); C1garr1te Snwkmg·A1tr1burublr 
Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-United States. 1990. 42 MORBlOIIT & MORTALIIT WKLY REP 
645, 645-49 ( 1993) (reporting an annual smoking-death ralc of nppro�1ma1cly -120.000. which "'"lb 
approximately 20% of all United States deaths in 1990); see a/lo RICHARD Pero ET AL. MORTAUTI" FRO\t 
SMOKING IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1950-2000, at A. 7 & tbl.I (I 99-1) (discussing lhc: worldwide: hc:ahh 
effects of cigarettes and estimating thal smoking kills two m1lhon people: each year in de:, eloping counln.:5 
alone). 
2. See AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES-1997, al 23 (1997). cf Carl E. 
Bartecchi et al., The Human Casts of Tobacco Use (pt. I), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED 907. 907-10 ( 199-1) 
(noting many adverse heahh con>equences of smoking); Polly A. Newcomb & Paul P. Carbone. The Health 
Ca11sequences af Smaki11g: Cancer, 76 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 305. 311-24 (1992) (dcta1hng lhc \"llflOU5 
types of cancer caused by cigarene smoking); Nicholas J. Wald & Allan K. Hacbhaw. C1garr1te Smoking 
An Epidemiological Oven•iew, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL 3, 3 ( 1996) (>ummanzmg the: hc:ahh problems cau.scd 
by smoking). 
3. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of C1garc:ttc:5 and Smokc:IC5S Tobacco To 
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44.398 (1996) ('Tobacco alone: kills mon: people: 
each year in the United States than acquired immunodeficiency >yndrome (AIDS). car accidents. alcohol. 
homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and tires. combined."); J. Michael McGanms & Wilham H. Foc:gc:. Ac111a/ 
Causes of Death i11 the U11ited States. 270 J AMA 2207. 2208 (1993). For a general summary of the 111· 
health effects of cigarettes, see Graham E. Kelder. Jr. & Richard A. Daynard. Tlte Role af Lmgatwn 111 the 
Effective Camral of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63. 6-1-65 ( 1997) For a 
detailed summary of all the known or suspected 111-heahh con>equencc. of >mo�ing as of 1989. sec OFACE 
ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTil & HUMAN SERVS .• REDLCISG ntE HEALTII 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 37-101 (1989) [hen:inafter SURGEOS GE. ... ERAL'S 
PROGRESS REPoRT). 
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY. R-.SPIRATORY HEALTII EFFECTS OF PASSIVE S\tOKISG 
LUNG C' ANCER ANU OTHER DISORDERS 3 (1992) (hen:inaftc:r EPA. PASSIVE S�IOKISG). US E."vn... 
YRC',....- 'TION AGENCY, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: SECOSDHAND SMOKE IS A PREVE.'-"TABLE HEALTII 
RISK 1, 44 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, SETTING TI!E RECORD STRAIGHT); su also Ehzabc:th T.H . Fontham 
et al., Envirarmenral Tobacco Smoke and lung Cancer m No11s111okmg \Vomen, 271 JAMA 1752, 1759 
( 1 994) (confirming the EPA's 1994 conclusions in the large�t case-control study ever conducted on the 
subject). 
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cigarettes to minors is i llegal in every state.5 It is also true that a number of 
states and municipalities have passed laws and ordinances restricting the right 
to smoke in various public domains-from government buildings and health 
faci l i ties to, in some cases, private workplaces.6 And if one compares these 
levels of regulation to the level of regulation imposed on, say, bubble gum 
consumption, cigarette smoking seems fairly heavily regulated.7 If, however, 
one compares c igarettes with other products that are considered dangerous but 
are comparatively less costly to society, such as heroin or cocaine,8 the level 
of c igarette regulation seems inadequate. After all, adult smoking is legal in  
a l l  fifty states. Likewise, if one compares the hands-off approach to regulating 
c igarette companies with the hands-on approach to regulating, say, 
pharmaceutical companies (many of whose products treat or even cure, rather 
than cause, serious health problems), tobacco companies appear to be 
essentially unregulated. Of the tobacco regulations that do exist, many turn out 
to be industry-friendly.9 On top of all this, unti l  very recently i t  appeared that 
5. See Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Imlttstry: New 
Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 727 n.114 (1997). 
6. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcemellf, 
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 69-70 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen 0. Sugammn 
eds., 1993) [hereinafter SMOKING POLICY]. 
7. But cf Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Burning Questions: Tobacco Pact's Limits-am/ /ts 
Loopholes-Presage Fierce Debate, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at A I (arguing that cigarettes receive "less 
government oversight of [their] contents and marketing than ice cream"). 
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
9. Each of the two most significant prior efforts to regulate cigarette manufacturers-through warning 
requirements and advertising bans-turned out to favor the cigarette industry. See Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 
(1994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Tobacco companies fought against the warning requirements 
imposed by Congress but ultimately used the warnings as an effective shield against some types of tori 
suits. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-31 (1992) (plurality opinion); Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986) ("It is ironic that the legislation which the tobacco 
company sought so hard to defeat now serves to substantially immunize it from liability . . . .  "); Margaret 
Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 9 (1997) 
(explaining that Cipollone stands for the proposition that federal Jaw preemption provisions may apply to 
state tort Jaw claims). When cigarette advertising on television was banned in 1971, see Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act § 6, 84 Stat. at 95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335), manufacturers 
quickly shifted their advertising to other media without any significant harm to their business. One of their 
strategies was to place their brand imagery in key places for televised sporting events, thus ensuring 
continued TV exposure-without the antismoking ads that had previously been coupled with their own TV 
spots (pursuant to the "fairness doctrine" promulgated by the FCC in 1967). See Capital Broad. Co. v. 
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 589 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) ('The result of the legislation was 
that as both the cigarette advertisements and most anti-smoking messages left the air, the tobacco 
companies transferred their advertising budgets to other forms of advertising such as newspapers and 
magazines where there was no fairness doctrine to require a response."), af 'd mem., 405 U.S. IOOO (1972). 
The ban also had the effect of making entry more difficult for potential competitors. Finally, the ban 
"ma(de] it nearly impossible for states and municipalities to restrict or ban the tobacco industry's 
promotional activities." Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 68. On net, the advertising ban appears lo have 
been to the clear advantage of the industry. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. For a di�cu�sion of the 
inefficacy of previous attempts to regulate cigarette advertisements, see RICHARD KLUGER, ASllES TO 
ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASllED 
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 279-80, 298-99 ( 1996). Cf Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, al 63 (observing 
that "the industry takes an active part in trying to pass weak, industry-friendly, tobacco control legislation 
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cigarette companies, unlike most product manufacturers, were effectively 
immune from regulation by tort Jaw. 10 
How can this be? A good case can be made that the cigarette industry 
owes its privileged, l ightly regulated status largely to the perseverance and 
ingenuity of its lawyers and to an unprecedented level of industry cooperation 
and solidarity. By amassing an immense lobbying war chest, 11  by developing 
a uniquely aggressive public relations and advertising approach, 12 and by 
adopting a self-described "General Patton" litigation strategy, 11 the cigarette 
industry has gained a reputation as unbeatable both in the courtroom and in the 
public policy arena. 
Consider, for instance, the industry's extraordinary ability for many years 
to avoid paying a penny to any tort plaintiff. Until very recently, the vast 
majority of decided cases and other legal authorities were hostile to the notion 
of c igarette manufacturer liability. Cigarette companies had managed not to 
pay damages (or to settle for a substantial payment) in even a single case 
brought against them by smoking plaintiffs, notwithstanding two "waves" of 
tort suits during the fifty years that scholars refer to as the "products liability 
revolution."14 Until very recently as well, cigarette plaintiffs could find liule 
at the scace level 1hroughou1 the count!)' chai would preempt the auchont)' of local go' emmcnt' to control 
the sale and use of tobacco"). 
IO. See infra notes 1 4, 779, and accompanying texl. 
1 1 . Senator Edward M. Kennedy said in 1 979 of the tobacco mdu,tl) ""Dollar for dollar. thc)°n:: 
probably the most effective lobby on Capitol Hill." Roben Pear. A Neu &af; No .... tire Ard1enem1n N.:ed 
Each Other, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1 997. at D I .  Indus!!)' lobbying cffon' were cspcc1ally intcn:>e in 1 997. 
including expenditures of over $30 million and the employmenl of 'uch pohucal hcav)'" c1ght5 a5 Howard 
Baker, George Mitchell, and Ann Richards. See Maureen Do\\d. lntegnt\' Cleara11ce St1le. NY TIMES. 
Dec. 20, 1 997, at A l 3. For an excellent summary of the numerou' wap in \\ htch the tobacco industry has 
historically employed its lobbying prowess to us benefil. sec Kelder & Daynard. supm note 3. at 66· 7 1  
See also supra note 9 (summarizing several failed anempts to regulate the c1garc1tc industry J .  111/m note 
20 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's reluctance to regulate the crgarctte industry) 
1 2. See PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRl'lll BEHIND TIIE TOBACCO l�Dl'STRY COVER-UP 17 · 
1 8  ( 1 996) (describing the tobacco industl)''s public rclauons :mad. on studies connccung smoking and 
health risks); KLUGER, supra nole 9, at 23. 7 1 .  292-93, 443 (deta1hng tobacco-mdustl)' markcung strategics. 
from packaging and labeling techniques to advertisements that appeal to consumer demand for ) outhful 
vigor and social and professional success). For a brief sample of the industl) 's advcmsing strategic,, sec 
infra notes 58, 69 1 ,  and accompanying texl. 
1 3. An anomey for R.J. Reynolds (RJR) descnbed the strategy (in an internal memo) a5 follo\\ s 
The aggressive posture we have taken regarding dcpos1 11ons and d1,,.;o\el)· in general conllnUC"> 
to make these cases extremely burdensome and expcml\e for plaintiff,· hm)crs. pamcularly 
sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Panon, the way we won these c� Wa5 not by 
spending all of [RJR's) money, but by making that other >On of a buch >pend all ht• 
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 8 1 4  F. Supp. 4 1 4, 42 1 (D.N.J 1 993) <quoting J �hchacl Jordan) Very 
recent evidence suggests 1hat, in anticipation of possible hab1ht) ,uus against their clients. some tobacco 
lawyers may have stepped outside of professional ethical boundanc,. Su Milo Ge)'chn. IA>nen Shield 
Tobacco Finns, Papers Show, WALL ST. J.. Aug. 7. 1 997. at A3 (reponmg that "law)'crs an: said to have 
cunailed research inlo the safety of cigarenes. cleared the rcle� of 1nforrnauon about health •tud1� and 
even suggested the destruction of unfavorable poll re'ult' about smoking and health"> 
1 4. E.g., Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3. at 7 1 -72. The first \\a\'e of tobacco la\\>Ull> began in the 
1 950s, resulted in major decisions throughout the 1 960,. and tapered out in the 1 970. s .... Robcn L Rabin. 
/nstit111ional and Historical Perspecm·es 011 Tobacco Tort ue1lnlm·. 111 S\tOKl'G POI.ICY. mpra note 6. at 
1 1 0, 1 1 0. For the mos! pan, the first wave was decided in negligence reg1m� s .... rd at 1 1 4 There 
followed a lull in the 1 970s, when few tobacco suit> \ \Crc brought The �ond "a'e commenced in the 
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reason for hope in the more general trends in products liability law. Whereas 
the 1 960s and 1970s were characterized by an extraordinary expansion of 
liability, reflecting the then-prominent theory of enterprise liability, that trend 
largely ended in the mid-1 980s. Since then, there has been a substantial retreat 
from enterprise liability in the courts. 15 In addition, one of tobacco plaintiffs' 
most promising legal theories, generic product liability, 16 has lost viability. 
Courts that were moving toward generic product liability, condemning outright 
particular products as unreasonably dangerous (despite the best possible design, 
construction, and warnings) and therefore subjecting them to strict liability, 
have been repeatedly overridden by their state legislatures. 17 Moreover, the 
reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts18 squarely rejected generic 
products liability. 19 
Similarly, for most of this time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
avoided any challenge to the nonregulatory status quo. That decision was due, 
not to a perceived lack of jurisdiction, but to a bureaucratic instinct for self­
preservation. In the words of former FDA Commissioner David Kessler: 
"There was a sense among many within the agency that you couldn' t  pull it 
off, and the last thing you wanted was to tackle something you couldn' t  pull 
off and have the agency get killed."20 
1 980s, see id. at 1 1 0, after the passage of legislation mandating warnings on cigarette packaging und 
advertising, see Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -222, 84 Stut. 87; Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, and after most jurisdictions had adopted 
strict liability, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A ( 1 965) (imposing strict liability for physical 
harm caused by defective products that are unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer). At 
the same time, however, considerable public outcry and scholarly opinion began to emerge against strict 
liability. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform. 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 70 1 ,  70 1 -02 
( 1992). 
Only a few years ago, cigarette manufacturers fended off another major attack and successfully 
maintained their perfect record of products liability victories. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-3 1 (plurality 
opinion) (holding that the labeling acts preempted the plaintiff's claims based on a failure to warn, but not 
claims based on express warranty. some types of fraudulent misrepresentation, or conspiracy). In Cipollone. 
the industry managed to exhaust a plaintiff and a sizeable law firm that had invested large amounts of 
money in the futile effort. See Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.B.A. J .. Feb. 1 993, at 30, 30. 
1 5. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolmion in Proc/11cts Li11bility: 
An Empirical St11dy of Legal Change, 31 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481 ( 1 990) (noting the increasing perccntuge 
of decisions favoring defendants); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning 11nd the Possible Encl of the Rise of 
Modem American Tort law, 26 GA. L. REV. 60 1 ,  647-48 ( 1 992) (observing a recent judicial retreat from 
broad liability rules). 
1 6. This theory also goes by the terms generic product risk. categorical liability, and product category 
liability. See Carl T. Bogus, The Third Revollllion in Products Liability. 72 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 ( 1 996). 
1 7. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the Americt1n Products lit1bility 
Fro111ier: The Rejection of Lit1bility Witho11t Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1 3 1 5  & n. 1 95 ( 1 99 1 ); Joseph 
A. Page, Liability for Unret1s01wbly t1nd Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine f/c1ve 
t1 Role To Play?, 72 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 87, 1 08 & n.95 (1996). 
1 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). 
1 9. See id. § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note at 94-97; see also Henderson & Twerski, s11prt1 note 17 at 1 314-
1 5  ("[P]roduct-category liability is not now the governing law in any jurisdiction."). Biii see Bogus, s11pm 
note 1 6, at 1 1 - 1 7  (noting strong academic criticism of the new Restatement). For an important recent series 
of articles on generic products liability, see Symposium 011 Generic Products Lillbility, 72 Cltl.-KENT L. 
REV. 3 ( 1 996). 
20. Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. The concern was well-founded. as Kessler was later to discover 
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Because of the dominant public sentiment regarding smokers and cigarette 
manufacturers, the prospect of altering this essentially laissez-faire market has 
long seemed remote. Indeed, the inhospitable legal environment reflects-and 
is, to some extent, the product of-the traditional American values of self­
reliance and individualism, as well as pervasive public hostil i 1y toward 
smokers (the usual plaintiffs).21 For a long time, there has been a strong sense 
among many scholars, commentators, and members of the public that smokers 
who die prematurely get what they bargained for (and. perhaps. what they 
deserve) and should not be heard to complain. much less be compensated. 
when smoking causes its predictable results.�� 
Whatever the explanation, cigarette manufaclurers have enjoyed substantial 
immunities from many of the regulatory mechanisms to which almost every 
other product manufacturer is subject. Bui, as anyone who reads 1he newspaper 
knows, the story does not end there. In the last 1wo or 1hree years. there has 
been a partial shift in public sentiment, leading 10 the beginning of a powerful 
political backlash against the industry.�' Part of the exp lanai ion for this 
backlash l ies in recent revelations regarding the addictiveness of smoking (and 
the extent to which tobacco companies not only knew 1hat smoking is 
addictive, but also altered the degree of cigarettes' addictiveness by controlling 
nicotine levels)24 and regarding the cigarette manufacturers ' marketing 
strategies (targeting children)25 and public relations stralegies (denying the 
when his job and the role of the FDA were threatened b) the Republican bacl.l;i,.h 10 the: FDA'' 1m11al 
regulatory steps. See Jeffrey Goldberg. Nexr Targer: N1co1111e. N Y Tl�lf:S. Aug -l, 1 996, § 6 1!1-lagazrnc:). 
a! 22 (describing the harsh responses of leading Rcpubllcam. including Hou>e Spc:al..c:r Xc:\\t Gmgnch and 
presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole. 10 Kc"ler\ aggrc"l\c: pu'h 10 rc:gulale 1oba.:co, among olher 
produc!S). 
2 I. Cf David M. Engel, The 01·e11 Bird's So11g: !trmlers. 0111s1den. mttl Perw11t1/ ln1ur1e1 111 <111 
America11 Communiry, 1 8 L & Soc'y REv. 551. 558-59 1 1 98-11 (finding. rn a '!Ud) of a rural county m 
Illinois, strong noons of individuali'm and ,e1f.,uffic1ency running coumc:r 10 nom1' that tend lo promote 
litigiousness). 
22. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman. Enemies of Tob11<"Co Pou Tlte1r 01rn Rub, ('111 TRI O , Apr 2-l, 
1 997, at 1 9; Richard A. Epstein, Big Tob11cco's Btg Mts111ke, NY Tl\!ES, June 25. 1 997, at A l9, Robert 
Samuelson, \Vito \Viii Finance rite Tobacc0 Se11leme1111. Clll. TRIO. Apr. 25. 1 997, a! 3 1 .  <1 RCSTATE.\IE.'T 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § -l02A cmt i ( 1 965) (noting !ha! "good tobacco " nol unrc..,,onably dangerolb Jnd 
therefore producers arc no! liable for the hann' cau,cd b) 1i''l l11c: public', general a1111ude IO\\ ard Jnal 
lawyers, and !he unfavorable anention !ha! produc1' llugauon h;i,. rc:cc:1vc:d from conunc:n!alor. and pohucal 
leaders, especially in Republican campaigning \mcc 1he 1980,, h;i,. con1nbu1c:d 10 the: mho>pllablc: chma!e 
for all products liability plaintiffs. See Carl T. Bogu,, \for on rlt.- Cm1111w11 um ni.- Srmi:i:le t11 1lte Ce111er 
of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L REV. I ( 1 995 J; Ste\ en P C'rolc) & Jon D Hanwn. n1e Stmp<'< u11wn 
Costs of Accide11ts: Pai11-a11d-S11ffer111g Damage> 111 Tort um. 1 08 llAR\' L RH 1787. 1 787-89I 1 995) 
23. See Glenn Frankel. Money Is 1ippmg Big Tobacu}s Swl.-1. WASH Po:-1. Apr 27. 1 997. at Al 
(describing a "massive public backlash agam'I the mdu,1ry"). Pnncc:Jon Sune) Re-.:arch A�'>OCJJI� 
Telephone Poll, Apr. 1 9-25. 1 996. m·111lable 111 WESTLAW. POLL Da1aba>C, Que,uon ID :-lo 
USPSRA.05 1 396 R30E (indicating !ha!, of 1 75 1  re'pondcnb. 75q. de,cnbcd 1hc:ir opinion of tobacco 
companies as either "mostly unfavorJblc" or "vcl)' unfavorJble") 
24. See infra notes 1 44. 1 6 1 .  2 1 9. 
25. See Kelder & Daynard, supra no1e 3. a! 66 ("(T]he tobacco mdu'll) Jemc:' 1ha1 11 1arge1, nunor. 
in its promotional campaigns, but evidence garnered from internal mdu,try Jocumcnh point' 10 1hc 
contrary."). For a descnption of the most recent document' 10 come 10 hgh! md1ca11ng 1ha1 at Jc:a.,I one 
manufacturer, RJ. Reynolds, aggre,sively 1arge1cd adolc.ccnb. 'cc John Mmlz & Saundra Tol'T). /ltremul 
R.J. Reynolds Docume/l/s Derail Cigarelle Marketmg A1111.-d 11t Cl11ldt"r'11, WASH POST. JJn 1 5. 1 998. al 
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health effects of smoking despite knowledge of the enormous risks).26 
Partially as a cause and partially as a consequence of these revelations, an 
immense third wave of tobacco litigation has emerged,27 which, unlike either 
of the first two waves, appears to pose a considerable threat to the cigarette 
industry.28 In addition, in August 1 995, after more than fifty years of opting 
not to regulate,29 the FDA finally asserted its jurisdiction over tobacco 
products and announced plans to regulate tobacco as a drug.3° For the first 
time ever, cigarette manufacturers now face a substantial threat of regulation. 
A l .  
26. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 7 7  ("(The evidence] makes clear . . .  that the industry was 
well aware of the pharmacologically active, addictive, and harmful nature of its products and that it took 
active steps to hide this i nformation from its customers as well as the public at large."); illfra notes 144, 
1 6 1 ,  2 1 9. 
27. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 70-88 (describing litigation as an effective alternative to 
legislative and administrative regulation of tobacco). 
28. Previous suits had been brought primarily by smokers themselves. The plaintiffs in those suits 
alleged that cigarettes caused their i l lnesses and injuries, allegations that rang hollow for many judges and 
juries who apparently concluded that smokers had no one to blame but themselves. See Robert L. Rabin 
& Stephen D. Sugarman, Overview, ill SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 3, 1 6; Gary T. Schwartz, 
Tobacco Liability ill the Courts, ill SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 1 3 1 ,  143; illfra note 68 and 
accompanying text. The 1 990s approach avoids that pitfall: New plaintiffs, such as secondhand smokers 
and public health insurers (representing the general population of premium payers) have brought suit. These 
plaintiffs have been injured by cigarettes, but cannot easily be said to have chosen to assume the risk. And 
the smokers who sue today have newfound evidence suggesting that cigarette manufacturers concealed the 
addictiveness of their products, significantly reducing the extent to which smokers can plausibly be said 
to have assumed the risks. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 77; see also illfra notes 144, 1 6 1 ,  2 1 9  
(discussing evidence that cigarette manufacturers knew o f  cigarettes' addictiveness and even manipulated 
the levels of nicotine in cigarettes). 
Nevertheless, even the most promising third-wave doctrinal theories are, at best, untested, and their 
success seems closely tied to the perceived economics of cigarette smoking. See Bob Van Voris, AG Claims 
Mere Smoke?, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 28, 1 997, at A l  (describing the significance of the economic issues). 
Economic theory appears to be gaining in influence in other debates over tobacco policy. See, e.g., Kenneth 
E. Warner et al., Criteria for Determillillg all Optimal Cigarette Tax: The Ecollomist's Perspective, 4 
TOBACCO CONTROL 380, 380 ( 1 995) (describing a 1 993-1 994 debate regarding whether to increase cigarette 
taxes and explaining that "(a]lthough political considerations undoubtedly predominated, the debate was 
marked by an unusual emphasis on economic theory and analysis"). 
29. See Saundra Torry, Duel ill a Country Courthouse, with Tobacco Regulatioll at Stake, WASll. 
POST, Aug. 1 8, 1 997, at Fl. 
30. Jurisdiction was based on the conclusions that the "nicotine in tobacco products is highly addictive, 
causes other psychoactive effects, such as relaxation and stimulation, and affects weight regulation" and 
that those "responses to nicotine are effects on the structure or function of the body within the meaning 
of the Act." Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction over Nicotine-Containing 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 4 1 ,453, 4 1 ,464 ( 1 995) (referring to the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2 1  U.S.C. § 301 ( 1 994)). Based on that jurisdiction, the FDA promulgated 
new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products, on tobacco marketing and advertising, and on product 
labeling. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To 
Protect Children and Adolescents, 6 1  Fed. Reg. 44,396 ( 1 996) (codified at 2 1  C.F.R. pis. 801 ,  803, 804, 
807, 820, 897 ( 1997)). The new regulations attempt to stop the sale of tobacco products to minors by 
requiring manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to comply with a variety of packaging, advertising, 
marketing, and sales restrictions. See id. The tobacco industry has challenged these restrictions in federal 
court. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1 374 (M.D.N.C. 1 997) (invalidating some of the new 
regulations). The Fourth Circuit is currently deciding the case. There now appear to be doubts not only 
about the regulations' legality, but also about the FDA's jurisdiction altogether. See Torry, supra note 29; 
Bob Van Voris, Tobacco: Alld Now the Appeal, NAT'L L.J., May 1 2, 1 997, at A l .  
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Consequently, the tobacco companies perceiYe the threat as real. The once­
unified industry and its take-no-prisoners litigation strategy have given way to 
defection in the ranks, historic senlement talks, senlements, and a host of 
unprecedented federal legislative proposals.11 By far the single most important 
development has been the proposed tobacco senlement reached by state 
attorneys general and the tobacco industry last June and now being considered 
by federal Iawmakers.32 Although the negotiations giving rise to that proposed 
settlement seemed rushed, and earlier anempts to regulate have yielded only 
modest gains, those active in the process promise that, this time, the 
regulations will have teeth.33 This Article is motivated in part by our concern 
that this promise will not be kept and that the regulations may fail to address 
the problems that sparked them in the first place. More specifically, it is 
motivated by the sense that the current debates over smoking policy have 
omitted from consideration a type of regulation-ex post incentive-based 
regulation-that may well be superior to those being considered. 
B. An Introduction to Incentive-Based Regulario11 and Emerprise Liability 
Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists sometimes distinguish 
among three types of regulation: command-and-conrrol rules; performance­
based standards; and incenrive-based systems. Loosely defined, command-and­
control rules impose specific requirements on regulated firms. For instance, a 
polluter might be required to adopt a particular type of technology designed to 
3 1 .  See. e.g., Placing Re•tra1ms on Tobacco\ Endangcnnent of Cl11Jdren and Teen' A,t. S 1530. 
105th Cong. (1997); Healthy and Smokcfree Children Act. S 1-192. J05th Cong ( 19971. L'm\C:l">.11 Tobacco 
Settlement Act, S. 1415. 105th Cong. (1997); see also Judy Fahy,. lltz1d1 L'111e1ls folmno Btttrle Plan, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., NO\. 13,  1997. at A9 (pr0\1dmg a bnc:f O\cn1e\\ and compamon of th� three b1ll>J 
One key to the tobacco mdustry's deci•1on to con,1dcr a nauonal .cnlcmcnt '"'' the dcfccuon of 
Liggen Group, Inc., which senled separately with 23 •late• Sa Bob Hohler. :u Ask 711111 fobacw Pact 
Spare Liggetr, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14. 1997. at AIO l'ndcr Cl11cf Exccull\C Benne!! S LcBo". Lagge!! 
has admitted that cigarenes cause health problc1m and that the mdu,try'' mari.cung 'tr.ucgy targeted 
children. See 1d. Many state anorneys general •cc the L1ggcn ,culcmc:nt a. crucial to the more general \\ar 
against tobacco. As Mmnesota Attorney General Hubcn II Humphre) 1 1 1  put 11. ·1111, 1' .i linlc: like bu,ung 
a drug dealer to get at the Colombian cancl." Id 
32. See Tobacco Se11/eme111 (v1,11cd June 25. 1997 I <Imp"""" u.atoday (OJn/nc" "'mol.c:/ 
smokeO 1.htm>. 
33. Massachusetts Anorney General Scon Har..hbargcr. for c:\.tmplc. \\a. lughl) '>Clf<ongratulatory 
Twenty months ago, when the,c Jaw,u1b began. nobod) \\ould ha'c dreamed that 20 month, 
later we would have big tobacco on II• h•-eb. lx'Conung the mo't regulated mdu,U)' 111 th1> 
country. [paying] billion• for children·, health and the public health 
This . .. is a hi,tonc breaJ,.through. And I thmJ,. an) body "ho "ant> to que,11011 u ha. the 
burden of proof to •how what ehe could ha\'c Ix-en done to change the \Cl') nature of th1, 
industry without banning [c1garenc•] . 
Morning Edition (NPR radio broadca.l. June 2-1. 19971. <llm/ablr 111 LEXIS. Sc"' Library. :-IPR File 
(Transcript No. 97062402-210): see also 1d. (•tatcment of M1"1"1pp1 Auorne) General �lake �loon:) Some 
policymakers who were not 111\'0l\'cd 111 the nego11a11om \\en: appan:ntl) pcr.uaded b) 'u'h ilC(oUnt• For 
example, Senator Orrin Hatch. c11111g the prop<hal'> public health effect" urged Congr�' to "'>CllC upon 
[the Attorneys' General] i11111ative. to improve 11 . "11hou1 JC:Opard111ng an) of 11, ba." component>.'' 
and to pass implementing legblation quickly. 143 Co'G R!:r S 12.579 lda1l) c:d So' 13, 19971 
1 174 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63 
limit the quantity of pollution. Perfonnance-based standards tell finns what 
they must accomplish but leave them to decide how best to do so. Such a 
standard, for example, might specify the maximum quantity of pollution that 
a firm may produce without specifying the means by which the firm is 
required to comply. Finally, incentive-based systems force firms to internalize 
the total costs of their activities, leaving finns to decide what, if anything, to 
do about those costs.34 
Over the past two decades, the clear trend in regulation has been away 
from command-and-control rules and toward incentive-based (or, as they are 
sometimes referred to, "market-based") systems.35 That trend is consistent 
with, and largely the result of, an emerging scholarly consensus that incentive­
based regulatory systems are often the superior approach because they harness 
the power of the market to generate efficient outcomes and do not rely on 
regulators to attempt to identify and mandate those outcomes. As Susan Rose­
Ackerman explains, an incentive-based system attempts to ensure only that all 
appropriate costs are internalized and then permits the decentralized, 
independent choices of individuals and businesses to shape policy outcomes.36 
If the institution responsible for administering the incentive-based system can 
determine the marginal cost associated with the underlying product (and that 
is a big "if'), then it can charge a fee equal to that marginal cost and let the 
manufacturers respond.37 This approach arguably avoids the costly and 
imperfect process of creating fully specified command-and-control rules or 
performance-based standards, yet it ensures that the party with the best 
information-the manufacturer-is left with an incentive to self-regulate. Put 
differently, command-and-control and performance-based regulations seek to 
prohibit or discourage certain market outcomes, while incentive-based 
34. For further discussion of the three types of regulation, see infra Part IV. 
35. See E. Donald Elliott, Recipe for Industrial Policy: Blending Environmentalism and /111emC1tiom1/ 
Competitiveness, 1 9  CAN.-U.S. L.J. 305, 3 1 3  ( 1 993) (remarking on the worldwide trend toward "mnrket­
based and incentive-based" approaches to regulation). Moreover, there is a growing consensus among 
economists and other policy analysts that the movement toward incentive-based regulation is desirable, 
especially in the context of dealing with the external costs of pollution. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 27 1 ( 1 982) ("Given the difficulties with standard setting, many economists 
have urged the use of taxes or other incentive-based systems to deal with spillover problems."); Bruce A. 
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmen/Cll Law: The Democratic CClse for Market 
/ncenrives. 1 3  COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 7 1  ( 1 988) (making the case for the use of incentive-based 
regulations). President Clinton endorsed the trend in a recent executive order on regulatory review: "Each 
agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic 
incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing 
information upon which choices can be made by the public." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 
( 1 994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 ( 1 997). The Supreme Court has also encouraged the use of this sort 
of regulatory approach by upholding the constitutionality of user fees charged by the Department of 
Transportation. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 2 1 2  ( 1 989). The fees were designed to 
internalize the costs of administering federal pipeline safety standards. 
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look Cit Reg11/e1tory 
NegotiCllion, 43 DUKE L.J. 1 206, 1 2 1 5  ( 1 994). 
37. As we detail below, there are a variety of types of incentive-based regulation. See infm Part V. 
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regulations seek to eliminate the underlying market failures that give rise to 
undesirable outcomes. 38 
Enterprise liability, which holds manufacturers liable for all the ha1 ms 
caused by their products, is one possible ex post incentive-based regime.19 In  
other work,40 we have argued that enterprise liability is ,  on efficiency 
grounds, the most desirable products liability regime. This type of regulation, 
we have argued, may be particularly appropriate when a product's 
characteristics make consumers undeterrable-that is, where tort law can do 
very little directly to give consumers incentives to take efficient precautions 
beyond adjusting their activity levels.41 In this Article, we focus on two 
general sources of consumer undeterrability. First, consumers may be 
undeterrable if they are optim1st1c with respect to-that is. if they 
systematically underestimate-the risks posed by products. Second, consumers 
may be undeterrable if they are able to externalize product risks to third 
parties. With respect to the latter, we distinguish between two types of 
38. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oale•. E111·1ronme111t1I Enmu11110 A Sun n .  30 J Eco-. 
LITERATURE 675, 699-700 { 1 992) {claiming 1hat mccntl\ e-b� pohc1e' can contnbute to cffecll \e  
regulation); Robert W.  Hahn, Eco11omic Prescrrprwns for Ei11·rrm1111mral Probl.-r1u I/oh rlr.- Pt1r1011 
Followed rite Docror's Orders, 3 J. Ecos. PERSP. 95. 95 ( 1 9891 <Je.cnbmg comrnand-Jnd-conlrul 
regulation as an approach in which the .. regulator 'pec1fic, 1hc 1echnology a linn rnu•t u..: to comply w11h 
regulations"). 
39. As we explain i11fra Part IV, enterpri'e hab1h1y •• one of >.e\erJI po"1ble fonn. of rncenll \ e·bJ.>.Cd 
regulation. Although we conclude in that part thal 'ornc 1ype of (\·1c11111-1n111a1ed ex PQ'll rncenu•e·ba>.ed 
regulation of cigarelles is likely the mosl desm1blc regulatory approach. "e ad.no" ledge lhJt enlerpn..: 
liability may not be as effective as other incenuvc-ba.ed regulatory opuon•. Ne,enhcle''- for lhc "'l..e ul 
simplicity and ease of exposition, we focu' i11fra Pan' II-Ill on an 1deahzed enterpn..: hab1l11> regune t \Vc 
assume, for instance, that enterprise liability I> co,llc" 10 adm1m,ler and tluu cao.auon que,uun' du not 
pose a problem for courts. We relax both of tho'e a.'urnpuon• wfm Pan V and compan:: d1lfcrcnt 
incentive-based regulatory approaches in more rcali>l1c 1cm1• l Hence. "e orge the reader to remember lhJt 
enterprise liability serves only as a simple and convenient placeholder for lhe more general concept ul e' 
post incentive-based regulation. 
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue. The F1rsr-Pan1 lrrrnrci11c.- £11enwlm An l:t mw1111< 
Justificatio11 for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. I �9 ( 1 990) [hen:rnafter Hanwn & Logue. Tire 
First-Parry illsura11ce E.rrernality); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D Logue. Towartl Placing Pruduch L1Jb1lrt) 
in Context: The Effect of Non-Tort System• of Dclcrrence and Olher Source' of L'nde1errab1 lrl) 2 l -t2 10c1 
1 996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the fole Lall" Jmmw/) [hereinafter Hanwn & Logue. Pruducl• 
Liability in Context); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, Towartl Placing Tort La" rn Cunle\l T.ikmg 
Non-Tort Systems of Deterrence Seriously {Oct. 1 996) (unpublr>hed manu'>Cnpl. on lite \\ 1lh lhe fole Lm 
Journal) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue, Tort Law rn Conte\!); ,..,. also Jon D llanwn. Kyle D Logue & 
Michael Zamore, Smokers ' Compensariotr: Tuiwrd <l Bluepr1111 for Federal R.-g11l<11wr1 of C1�<1r.-11e 
Ma11ufacrurers, 22 S. ILL U. L.J. {forthcoming Spnng 1 998) [here111after Han,on cl al ) . Crole) & llanwn. 
supra note 22; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Han>on. Rl.'srnmg rlre Rewlu1w11 111e R.-• " ed Ct11e fur 
E11rerprise Liabi/iry, 9 1  MICH. L. REV. 683 ( 1 993) [heremafler Crolc) & Han.on. Emerpme l.J<1b1/m ]. 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Han•on. \Vlwr Lwlnl11.• Crms ' r\11 Alrenwrn e £<plwu11w11 fur Raefll E• .. 111, 
in Producrs Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. I ( 1 99 1  l [heremafh:r Crole> & Han,on. ll"/1111 Lwb1lm Cm1s '). 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, A Defen,c of Pam-and-Suffenng Damage- and Some ·111uugh1' on lhc 
Empirical Side of Law-and-Economics Scholar.hip (No' I .  1 9961 (unpublr,hed manu">Cnpl. on lile " 11h 
the Yale law Journal) [hereinafter Croley & Han>on. A Defcn•e of Parn-and-Suffonng Damage-) 
4 1 .  For a more complele discussion of the concepl of .. undeterrnb11rt>."" >.ee Han.on & Logue. Product> 
Liability in Context, supra note 40. al 2 1 -42. Ahhough we did not !hen u..: the lenn ··undelerr.ible:· \\e 
first discussed the idea in Hanson & Logue. Tire F1rsr·Pt1rl\ /11s11ra11c.- £<rern<1/m . rnpra nolc -10. al 1 59· 
68, in which we described how the firsl-party insurance c�temalrl> produce• nonopmnal cJrc Jc, cl' ilnd 
activity levels in consumer product market,. 
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externalization: insurance externalities, which occur when consumers have 
imperfect first-party insurance for at least some portion of the risks posed by 
consumer products, and noninsurance externalities, which occur when a 
product causes harm to a third-party bystander. 
Insofar as consumers are undeterrable, tort law should place 
product-accident costs on manufacturers. Because tort law cannot, by 
hypothesis, influence consumer decisionmaking, consumers will take too few 
precautions, will fail to demand efficiently safe products from manufacturers, 
and will consume too many inefficiently unsafe products.42 Shifting all the 
costs to manufacturers, however, would internalize the relevant costs to the 
manufacturers; they, in turn, would pass these costs along to consumers. This 
would lead to optimal manufacturer care levels and optimal activity levels. 
To see why that is the case, consider as a stylized example an individual 
consumer faced with the choice of buying and smoking a pack of cigarettes or 
not. If the consumer decides to smoke the cigarettes, she faces the following 
costs: $2.00, equaling the nominal price or the purchase price of the cigarettes 
(reflecting the production and marketing costs),43 plus another $2.00, equaling 
the present value of the future health-related costs to herself and to others 
associated with smoking those cigarettes. Ideally, the consumer would purchase 
a pack of cigarettes if and only if she valued a pack at $4.00 or higher. 
Assume, however, that she does not internalize the health-related costs of 
smoking-that is, the additional $2.00 of costs has no effect on her decision 
to smoke. In that case, even if she valued the cigarettes at only $3.00, she 
would purchase and smoke the cigarettes. Further suppose that the cigarette 
manufacturer could completely eliminate the $2.00 per pack risk by investing 
an additional $ 1 .50 per pack in safety measures. Obviously, the efficient 
outcome would be for the manufacturer to make the investment, thereby 
eliminating the risk associated with the cigarettes.44 Assuming consumer 
undeterrability and the absence of manufacturer liability, however, the 
manufacturer would not invest the $ 1 .50 in risk reduction because doing so 
would cause the manufacturer to lose customers. Consumers would not 
perceive the $2.00 reduction in risks associated with the additional cost and 
would instead purchase cheaper and less safe brands. 
Those results would present at least two deterrence-related problems. First, 
too many packs of cigarettes would be purchased; in other words, activity 
42. By "efficiently safe products," we mean products for which manufacturers have made ull co�t­
justified investments in safety. "Inefficiently unsafe products" are those for which not all such inve5tment� 
have been made. 
43. We are assuming for purposes of this example that the market for cigarettes is competitive und 
that manufacturers enjoy only normal profits. 
44. To put this conclusion in terms of Learned Hand's famous formula, see United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 1 59 F.2d 1 69, 1 73 (2d Cir. 1 947), because the burden of preventing the accident ($1 .50) is 
less than the expected accident cost ($2.00), which amounts to the probability times the magnitude of the 
loss, efficiency requires that the accident be prevented. 
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levels would be too high. Second, manufacturers would invest too little in 
accident prevention; that is, manufacrurer care le1·els would be too low.�� The 
economic case for enterprise liability and other forms of ex post incentive­
based regulation, therefore, is that they would force manufacturers. and in tum 
consumers, to internalize the total costs of cigarettes. As a consequence. both 
activity levels and manufacturer care levels would be pushed in the efficient 
direction. Because the nominal price would equal the total real price. 
consumers would purchase the efficient quantity of cigarettes.�� There would. 
in short, be no welfare loss associated with the wedge between consumers· 
valuation of cigarettes and the total social cost of cigarenes in the market 
Our previous work analyzing these dynamics. like much of the efficiency­
oriented products liability scholarship, was written at a considerable distance 
from real-world examples and implicitly assumed that all consumer products 
are alike.47 One goal of this Article, therefore. is to begin to examine the 
breadth of the case for enterprise liability by analyzing a specific consumer 
product. For a number of reasons, cigarettes are especially worth studying. In 
addition to the fact that cigarette-caused harms have become the most salient 
products liability topic of the decade, if not of the century.�� cigarenes present 
45. A third problem is that con>umers would lacl. mccntl\C> to tal.c dfic1ent lc\cb or care m u'mg 
products. As we explain mfra Part> 11-111.  howe"er. there ma) be hnlc that ton kl\\ can or need do .ibou1 
consumer care levels, especially m the c1garene context 
46. Our consumer, who valued the next pacl. at onl) $3 00. \\ ould no1 bu) bccau"' lhc pnce " ould 
be S3.50. 
47. This tendency may reflect the influence of 1he �-cononuc anal) >!> of la\\ . \\ luch cnt1c' da1111 100 
often bases sweeping policy generalizations on >1mph>t1C model> Or pcrhap> 11 " a con"'<jucnce of the fact 
that products liability law has expenenced >C\'er..il dramatic tr..1n,fonnat1on> m the pa>! lift) ) Cars. 
transfonnations that make it difficult for >eholars to do any1hmg bu1 pa1n1 \\ 1th a broad bru>h :"e' erthcl�'· 
it seems to us thal 100 little attention h.u. been paid 10 " hethcr and prcc1..:ly ho\\ ' an.111om aero'' pro<luci­
affecl !he analysis. Moreover, the specific e\ample> U>ed are oflen <jUllc e�cept1on.1I pro<luch Su <' � • 
Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?. supra note 40. al 84-90 td1>eu»mg a \ ancl) of produci. and 
services, including vaccine>, that pose c.u.e->pec1fic 1»ue» 
48. The legal literature 1s by no means lacl.mg m article> on c1garelle manuf.1ctun:r h.1b1ht) �l.1ny 
of the law review article> favonng cigarette manufacturer hab1ht) ha\c been doctnnal 111 n.1turc For 
example, there have been numerous articles e\anumng the pn:cmpt1\e effect of the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act. See. e.g . . Richard C Au>nc». Cigarerr.- ('0111pa111 Lw/11/m Prremp1w11 
Public Policy, and Altema1i1·e Compe11sa11011 S1·stems. 39 S' RAC'l Sc L RI:\' 897 ( I  988J [hcrernafter 
Ausness, Cigarerre Compa11y Li11bil11y] (arguing !hat the federal cigarette labc:hng l;m ,hould not be: read 
to preempt state products liability claim>); Peter F Rile) .  Nole. 77r.- Prm/110 Lwbrlrn of rlre fobat w 
lndusrry: Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group Fma/11 Pran·cl rlre Cig111· .. 11.- .\lt11 11/m ruren · ,\urn of 
/nvincibiliry?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1 1 03 ( 1 989) (d1>cu»1ng the po»1b1hty that C1pol/011e \\OUld O\ ercorne the 
industry's theretofore seemingly invincible federal preemption argument) In add111on. there ha\c been 
efforts to fashion new theorie> for holdrng cigarette compame> hablc S.-.-. .- � . Bogu,. mpra note 22 . .11 
46-59 (arguing for the application of gencnc producl hab1lny to c1garelle' I.  Kelder & Da> nard . mprn noic 
3, at 64 (arguing that, notwithstanding federal labeling la11. >UCCc»ful product> hab1hl) clJ1rt1' .1ga111,t the 
cigarette industry are becoming incre;u,ingly hl.ely �-cau,e of >e' crJI factors. rndudrng lhc Jr...:°' Cf) or 
internal industry documents detailing 1.nowledge of the dc>truct1 1 e  propcmc' of na.olrnc. mdu'lf) cflort' 
to manipulate nicotine, and the unavailability of a>>umpllon-of· ml. dden�, 111 c;1"'' riled b) \lalc-J. Irene 
Scharf, Brearhe Deeply: Tire Torr of Smokers · Bcmen . 32 Hot s L RE\· 6 1 5. 660-K7 1 1 995! huggc,ung 
the use of a battery claim against cigarette compame> a' a meam of c1rcum' enung �'urnpuon-of ·n>k. 
defenses); Alex J. Grant, Note, New Theories of Ctgar.-11.- Lw/11/m lltc Rc.1atemcn1 !llurdJ of Ton' 1111d 
rlre Viability of a Design Defee/ Cause of Ac1w11, 3 COR�EU. J L & PL B Po1.· , 3-13 ! l <)<).1 1  !argurng th.it 
the Resratemellt (T/iird)'s reversal of the pre>umed unmumt) for cigarette compame' and the c"'tence of 
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an especially attractive subject of study because of an abundance of relevant 
empirical data. And because of a number of important recent developments, we 
regard this as an ideal moment to reevaluate the economic case for regulating 
cigarettes and for comparing alternative regulatory regimes.49 
C. The Absence of Incentive-Based Regulation in the Proposed Settlement 
Despite the growing popularity of incentive-based regulation among 
scholars and policymakers, the proposed tobacco settlement agreement is 
largely devoid of incentive-based regulation. Instead, the proposal relies almost 
entirely on command-and-control and performance-based regulations.so This 
omission likely has something to do with the composition of the team that 
negotiated the settlement. Lawyers for the plaintiffs and defendants and some 
public health experts were present,s1 but no economists or academic policy 
analysts participated. Public health advocates have long believed that the 
market for cigarettes is deeply and dangerously flawed and that the deceptive 
low-tar alternative cigarette designs provide a basis for bringing design defect claims against high·tar 
cigarette manufacturers); Bradley M. Soos, Note, Adding Smoke to the Cloud of Tobacco litigCllion-A New 
Plaintiff: The Involuntary Smoker. 23 VAL. U. L. REV. I I I ( 1 988) (arguing in favor of allowing passive 
smoke victims to bring enterprise liability claims against cigarette companies). And some commentators 
have-as we do in this Article-employed the tools of economic analysis to argue in favor of eilhcr some 
form of absolute cigarette manufacturer liability or an alternative no-fault regime thal would place costs 
on manufacturers. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An 
Alternative to Strict liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. ! 085 ( 1 990) [hereinafler Ausness, Compensation) 
(proposing a no-fault compensation system on corrective justice grounds); Donald W. Gamer, Cigcm!lles 
and Welfare Refonn, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 ( 1 977) (providing a prescient argument in favor of making 
manufacturers liable to welfare agencies that bear some of the costs of cigarettes); Frank J. Vandall, 
Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Ma111ifc1clllrers, 52 
OHIO ST. L.J. 405 ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing for absolute cigarette manufacturer liability on co�t-intcrnalizution 
grounds). 
49. Specifically, there have been three significant developments. First, on a theoretical level, numerous 
scholars have begun to employ efficiency analysis to argue in favor of the Matus quo and against holding 
cigarette manufacturers liable. See, e.g., WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEAJ.:rtl 
HABITS ( 1 99 I ); ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING ( 1 992); W. 
KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION ( 1 992); Schwartz, supra note 28; Gregory P. Taxin, 
Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigare/le-Related Injuries: "Smokers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS 
LIAB. 22 I ( 1 994). More generally, an anti-tort and anti-generic-products-liability sentiment has come to 
dominate the products liability literature. See generally Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 
40, at 7 1 3-67 (summarizing the products liability literature). Second, on a practical level, a great deal of 
new evidence has come to light regarding the practices of cigarette manufacturers and the effects of 
nicotine and cigarette smoke. For some examples of that sort of evidence, sec infra notes 64, I 04, 144, 1 6 1 ,  
2 1 9, and accompanying text. Finally, o n  a legal level, a third wave o f  cigarette litigation has emerged, see 
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, and dramatic new federal regulation of the tobacco market is 
now under consideration, see infra Part VI. As n result of those three developments. this is an opportune 
moment to reconsider whether cigarette manufacturer liability or alternative forms of regulation might be 
justified on economic or policy grounds. 
50. See infra Part VI (reviewing and criticizing relevant aspects of the proposal). Given the propo�al's 
exclusive reliance on command-and-control and performance-based regulation, it is no surprise that the 
debates over the proposal have centered on whether the performance-based standards arc properly calibrated 
and whether the mandatory command-and-control prohibitions and requirements arc too draconian or 
whether, instead, they contain too many loopholes to be effective. 
5 1 .  See Saundra Torry, Anny of Capital Lobbyists Has Drawn $8 Million on Tobacco Fight, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 1 1 ,  1 997, at A4. 
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practices of manufacturers, coupled with the devastating health effects of 
smoking, are evidence enough that the underlying market ii. in need of 
substantial regulation.52 Perhaps because most public health advocates arc not 
economists, however, these specialists have overlooked the potential market­
correcting role of incentive-based regulation. They recognize that there is a 
disease but seek to treat only its symptoms.53 
In contrast to public health advocates, most of the economists or 
efficiency-minded legal scholars who have considered the issue have concluded 
that the cigarette market functions well and is in no need of regulatory 
oversight.54 These scholars have therefore not reached the next question, 
which no doubt would have been pertinent to the settlement talks: Assuming 
that there are problems with the cigarette market, what regulatory mechanisms 
should be implemented?55 Thus, economists have provided little in the way 
of relevant guidance. 
In this Article, we hope to bridge the void that separates economics and 
public health with respect to tobacco regulation and, by doing so, to suggest 
a means of improving the imminent resolution of the long-term struggle 
between the cigarette industry and those who would regulate it. We offer a 
substantially refined version of the public health diagnosis: The unregulated 
market cannot be relied upon to produce the efficient level of safety in 
cigarette design and manufacturing or the efficient amount of smoking and is 
in need of significant regulation. Our prescription, however, ii. informed by 
economics: Some form of incentive-based regulation is the best cure for the 
underlying disease. 
D. Overview 
In the most general terms, this Article attempts to answer two questions: 
Should the cigarette market be regulated? If so, how?56 Parts I I-III arc 
52. Interview with Richard Daynard. Chair of the Tobacco Product> L1ab1ht) Project. :\orthc.,,,tcm 
University School of Law, in Boston. Ma>>. (Dec. 19. 1 997); cf Bnon J. Fox & Stanton A Glantl. TI1c 
National Tobacco Deal Compared with Pubhc Health 2-6 ( 1 997) (unpubh>hcd manu..:npt, on lilc " uh the 
Yale law Journal) (outlining various public health benchmark> that \\ ere c>tabh,hc<l before the pro�<l 
tobacco settlement was announced). 
53. There are, of course, "public health" economt>I> " ho behe\ e that the .:1garenc marl.ct ., llJ\\C<l 
and in need of regulatory intervention. See. e.g .. Jeffrey E. Ham>. 7iu111g T11r m11/ N1w1111r. 70 A\t Eco' 
REv. 300, 300 ( 1 980). 
54. See. e.g .. MANNING ET AL., Sllf'rll note 49; TOLLISO' & WAG,ER. lllJ'Tcl note .jl). \'l!>Cl \I, "'I'"' 
note 49; Schwanz. Sllf'T<l note 28; Taxin. Sllf'ra note 49 For an o\ ef\ te\\ of that htcrJturc. � 111/r11 
Subsection III.C. I .  
55. Arguably, an answer to that que>tion t> nnphcu 111 much of the econom1c " orl. .t"unung th.it " 
Pigouvian tax--<Jne of several po>sible type> of mcentm:·b:bcd 'Y'tem'-" oul<l be the JppropnJtc 
regulatory approach. See infra notes 436-439 and accompan)·111g text 
56. This Article leaves a number of 1,sue> for U> to addre" m future \\Ori. For c�ample. "e <lo not 
discuss in detail the distributional effects of our propo,e<l e� po't mcenu,c-� rcgunc :\or <lo \\C 
addre>s the international ramificauons of our propo.al l n>tcad. tht> Amde t> lmutcd to the cltic1cnc) 
concerns that are relevant to the que,tion> of whether and ho" to regulate the .:1garene marl.ct m the 
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devoted to the first question, and Parts IV-VI are devoted to the second. For 
the reader who needs to be convinced that the cigarette market requires 
government intervention of any kind, Parts II-III will be essential. For the 
reader who already holds the view that government intervention is warranted, 
those parts could be skimmed or even skipped, and attention focused on Parts 
V-VII.57 
In Part II, we respond to the argument that consumers are adequately 
informed of the risks of smoking. We conclude that when consumers are 
making the decision whether and how much to smoke they do not (and perhaps 
cannot) fully take into account the risks that cigarettes pose. We also point out 
how an ideal enterprise liability system could respond to that problem. Part III 
then observes that, even if smokers were well-informed of the risks of 
smoking, they would still ignore many of those risks because they could 
externalize those risks onto third parties either through imperfectly risk­
classified first-party insurance arrangements or through the effects of passive 
smoke. 
It is worth highlighting one of the most interesting challenges we face in 
Part III: providing a response to the economists' arguments that cigarettes do 
not, on balance, impose negative external costs on society but instead produce 
a windfall social gain because of the savings resulting from cigarette-induced 
premature deaths-savings mostly in the form of smokers' unclaimed pension 
and nursing home entitlements. Thus, the economists' argument goes, cigarette 
consumption should not be deterred, but should be subsidized. In Part Ill, we 
offer both an economic and a noneconomic critique of that position. Whereas 
some economists have concluded that cigarettes create a net social benefit of 
$0.32 per pack, we conclude-using those economists' data but changing a few 
key assumptions-that cigarettes (at the current level of production) produce 
almost $7.00 per pack of net social cost. After doing so, we demonstrate how 
ex post incentive-based regulation can respond to that problem of negative 
externalities. 
Part IV looks more generally at potential regulatory responses to the 
market failures detailed in Parts II-III. Borrowing from and building upon the 
l iterature in the economics of regulation, Part IV describes the advantages of 
incentive-based regulation over command-and-control and performance-based 
regulation in dealing with the deterrence problems associated with cigarettes. 
Specifically, we explain why one type of incentive-based regulation-victim-
United States. 
57. A word of caution is in order here, however. In our experience, many people believe that markers 
fail and that regulation is therefore necessary, but do not idenrify the precise ways in which markets fail. 
Thus they do not provide any useful basis for comparing regulatory responses. See Croley & Hanson, 
Enterprise Liability, supra note 40, at 736-67 (making this point with respect to several prominent products 
liability scholars). We offer an extended treatment of market failures because doing so is, in our view, u 
necessary condition for offering worthwhile regulatory proposals. 
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initiated ex post incentive-based regulation-is generally superior to its 
alternatives, including ex ante incentive-based approaches such as Pigouvian 
taxes. 
Part V then turns to several potential ex post incentive-based regimes and 
suggests their strengths and weaknesses. We then provide a very rough outl ine 
of a particular type of ex post incentive-based regime. which we call smokers · 
compensation. We also introduce the idea of the cigarerre card. a technological 
innovation that would improve the effectiveness of any regime for regulating 
cigarettes, including enterprise liability and smokers' compensation. Part V also 
provides a brief discussion of some of the difficult issues that would arise 
when planning a system of ex post incentive-based regulation. In particular. we 
seek to address two potential transition problems. first by limiting liabil ity for 
manufacturers to the particular amount of harm they caused (including. to the 
extent it is politically possible, the harm they caused already), and second by 
suggesting solutions to the problem of judgment-proof defendants. We also 
briefly discuss the problems of widely dispersed harm and poorly informed 
defendants as challenges to an ex post incentive-based regime. 
Finally, Part VI applies the analysis of this Article to the proposed tobacco 
settlement agreement. We conclude that the proposed agreement is almost 
exactly the opposite of what should be implemented. If comprehensive and 
preemptive federal legislation is truly on the horizon, we recommend that 
Congress reject the current proposal in favor of a strong form of ex po�t 
incentive-based regulation. At the very least, we recommend that Congress not 
eliminate products liabil ity Jaw, as it is the only existing serious deterrent that 
cigarette manufacturers face. If forced to choose. we would favor the status 
quo over the proposed settlement. 
IL THE FIRST SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY : 
IMPERFECT INFORJ\IATION 
A. Current Views of Consumer Risk Perceptions 
Most of the debate over how. if at all, cigarette manufacturer� �hould be 
regulated has boiled down to a debate over who knew what when about the 
risks of smoking. The widely held view today, among both the public generally 
and legal economists specifically, is that the vast majority of consumers are 
well aware of those risks. It follows (at least for the legal economists ) that 
regulation of the cigarette market is unwarranted. except perhaps on 
paternalistic grounds. 
From the early years of this century through the 1 950s, cigarette 
manufacturers frequently made advertising claims that would seem astonishing 
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today, claims that their products were innocuous or even beneficial.58 
Although l iterature on the ill-health effects of smoking began to appear in the 
1 950s,59 it was not until the 1 960s that such research came into public focus 
with prominent government reports.60 Those reports established the basic 
links between smoking and disease that have been reinforced and elaborated 
ever since, giving rise to the first efforts to regulate the market for 
cigarettes.61 Unfortunately, those regulatory efforts did little to reduce the 
popular incidence or acceptance of smoking.62 They did serve, however, to 
create a widespread perception that consumers were informed of the risks 
associated with smoking. Indeed, it was that perception that made it difficult 
for smokers to win lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers: Despite the advent 
58. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 37. Not all of the claims could be explained by honest naivete 
about the dangers of smoking. Professor Schwartz notes that, as early as the 1 930s, the hazards of cigarettes 
were referred to in popular discourse, suspected by many physicians, and at least tentatively indicalcd by 
medical research. See id. ; see also Marc Z. Edell, Cigarel/e Lirigation: The Second lVcive, 22 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 90, 97 ( 1 986). In that 20-ycar interim, tobacco companies also did little or no research on the possible 
causal connection between their products and cancer. See Edell, supra, at 97-98. 
Tobacco industry advertising may have contributed to consumer confusion. According to Richard 
Kluger, for example, even after the 1 955 Federal Trade Commission (FfC} promulgation of advertising 
guidelines, cigarette companies could advertise with language that suggested that their brands were heulthy 
and safe while explicitly lauding their products' taste and Havor. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 1 85. 
59. See, e.g., ALTON OCHSNER, SMOKING AND HEALTI! ( 1 959) (discussing early evidence ugninst 
smoking); see also Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 37 (surveying the early literalure on the heulth effecls of 
smoking). 
60. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE 5-7 ( 1 964) (hereinafter 1 964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]; ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS 
OF LONDON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON ON 
SMOKING IN RELATION TO CANCER OF THE LUNG AND OTHER DISEASES I ( 1962). The history of medical 
and public health reports has been reviewed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, No 
SMOKING 1 -5 ( 1 989); SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5- 1 0; see a/so ALBERTA 
0. BERTON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ( 1 980) (providing a bibliography 
of sources). 
6 1 .  The Surgeon General's watershed 1964 report, for example, contributed directly to changes in U.S. 
advertising regulations and to federally mandated package and advertising warnings. See Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended al 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1 33 1 - 1 340 ( 1 994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 ( 1 965) 
(codified as amended at 1 5  U.S.C. §§ 1 3 3 1 - 1 340). Ironically, it was these very warnings that the induwy 
later used to fend off tort liability. See supra note 9; see also KLUGER, supra note 9, at 290 ("(W]hile the 
labeling law did not explicitly preclude state liability suits from being filed, it came close to providing the 
industry with an ironclad defense . . . .  "). 
62. Per capita sales of cigarettes to Americans over 1 8  actually rose for the first three years after lhe 
1 969 Act. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 377. There are severnl plausible explanations for the apparent 
failure of lhe warning requirements and advertbing restrictions. Some argue that tobacco companies met 
the new restrictions on advertising with great creativity, devising new marketing campaigns. such as the 
"lifestyle" campaigns featuring the rugged, individualistic "Marlboro Man." See id. at 377, 444. Moreover, 
the restrictions freed the industry of antismoking advertisements that had been required by lhe fairness 
doctrine, which was then in effect under the rules of the Federal Communications Act. See id. at 332-35; 
supra note 9. Another hypothesis is that consumers were already well-informed of the risks, und the 
additional warnings were redundant. Yet another hypothesis is that the advertisement warnings and 
information did not inHuence even uninformed consumers because of the nature of their information 
problems. See infra Section Il.B. 
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of strict liability, juries almost invariably treated smoker-plaintiffs as wholly 
responsible for their actions in starting to smoke and maintaining the habit.63 
As a general matter, the risks of smoking are not seriously contested 
within the medical and scientific communities. The weiglzr of evidence about 
adverse health effects of cigarettes continues to increase. and confidence in the 
conclusion that smoking poses numerous particular health risks-including 
various risks of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and chronic obstructive Jung 
disease-is greater now than ever.64 
The general public appears to be getting the message. In 1 986, for 
example, more than 70% of all adults agreed that '"any amount" of smoking 
is hazardous to health; most of the other 30% acknowledged that '"heavy 
smoking" is hazardous.65 Smokers. too, are apparently aware of the hazards. 
In a 1 985 Gallup poll ,  90% of current smokers and 96% of former smokers 
reported believing that "[c]igareue smoking is harmful" to health.61' Although 
terms such as "hazardous" and "harmful'" are somewhat imprecise,67 it is 
quite clear that the vast majority of consumers have not assumed that smoking 
is riskless (at least not in the recent past). Moreover. most lawmakers, courts, 
and juries apparently perceive consumers to be well-informed of the risks.M 
63. See, e.g., Rabin & Sugarman, mpra note 28. at 3, 1 6; Sdm anL, s11pm note: 28, at 1 3 1 ,  143 .  Glc:nn 
Collins, Cigarerre Makers \V111 Verdier 111 S1111 b.1 " Smoker s Fam1ll . N Y. Tl\ll:S, Aug 24. 1 996. al 8 
(describing the response of the JUry in one 'uch ca,e); cf mfrtl note: 6!1 tde,,.;nbing phunurr,· 'tratc:g1� to 
avoid juries' blame). 
64. See supra notes 1 -4  and accompanying teAt. A rc:cent international 'tUd) by the: Jmpc:nal Caru:c:r 
Research Fund goes beyond the earher one-count!) . hmuc:d-pc:nod report:. S<'<' Pt:.TO l::r At. , mpru note: 
I .  This study compiles data on smoking monahty ''"cc 1 950 m de1 clopc:d countnc:• around the: "' orld. 
seeking the total picture of the worldwide health effects of 'moking and e't1111atmg the: 1111pac1 of •mol..mg 
on developing countnes. Peto and his colleague' e,umatc that, m developed countne• alone:, 'mol..ing l..1lh 
two million people each year, see 1d. at A.7 & tbl . I . and that tobacco 11 111 have: figured in the: death' of 
approximately 60 million people bem een the years of 1 950 and 2000. see 1d. at A 8 10 9 & tbl 2 
Estimating total monality. the authors compute that half a b1lhon of the \\orld"• 5 5 b1lhon people: "' 'II die 
of smoking-related illness. See id. at A. I 03. 
65. SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. s11pm note 3. at 1 82 tbl 4 
66. Id. at 203 tbl . 1 4. 
67. See VJSCUSI, supra note 49, at 48. 
68. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Hear Is On. A .B .A . J .  Sept . 1994, at 60 (quoting a Ph1hp �lorn' 
defense counsel's opinion that the fundamental flaw 11 1th plamuff>" c�> I> that ei c:r)onc: undc:r>tand.. that 
tobacco is risky, and thus cigarettes arc not dangcrou' bc) ond c:xpc:c1at1on,) lndc:c:d, the: dc:timng •lrateg) 
of third-wave cases is to escape the consequence> of th" pc:rcc:puon F1r>t. •U•h ha1c: bcc:n brought on 
behalf of panies who did not choose to smoke cigarette> 111 an) 'en><:, but \\ho \\ere ne1 c:nhdc:" miurcd 
See, e.g., Butler v. R.J. Reynold' Tobacco Co .. 8 . 1  Tobacco Prod• L111g. Rep. 3 I 1 �"'' Cir Ct 1993>  
(complaint) (involving a suit over secondhand >moke ); Brom 1 Ph1hp �lorn' nie Clt1SJ A.-11011 011 8<'ht1/f 
of Currenr and Former F/ig/11 Aue11da111s /np1red !JI £ipos11rt' w Second l/a11d Smoke 111 Atrlme 
Cabins-Se11/e111enr Agreemem (vi,ued Dec. 1 1 .  1 997) <http.//" ww.km>c:lla.corn/brorn/>c:ttagrcc: html> 
(same). These suits may blaze traib for other plainti ff, 11ho": health ha> hkcl) bcc:n affected by pro"nlll) 
to smokers, either in the workplace or m the home. 
Another group of panics that bears the co't' of 'mokmg 11 ithout any cho1c-c: " 'talc: go,c:rnmc:nt• and 
health care providers that pay for medical care for chrome in June:,. man) of " h1d1 arc hnl..c:d to •mol..mg 
Suits by state attorneys general were led by Moore 1 Amenrn11 Tobtlcco Cu . 9 2 Tobacco Pnxh L111g 
Rep. 3.35 (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23. 1 994). m which the Attorney General of �!""'"PP' .c:c:b to n:co,c:r 
Medicaid expenses. The ca'e wa> ba>ed on theone> of unJu't c:nnchmc:nt and kno\\ rng .:on•p•r.u:) to 
merchandise an unreasonably dangerou> and addictive product to adult' and minor;, 1a rd . and " "-' >c:ttlc:d 
for $3.366 billion over the next 25 years. set• Miss. Eip<'rts Etpnr Tobacco F11m/s flus ,\/o111h S/7-1 
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Just as the public has come to perceive tobacco consumers as well­
informed, so too have efficiency-minded legal scholars. As a consequence, 
these scholars argue, cigarette manufacturers' virtual immunity from tort 
liability should continue.69 Of those scholars, however, W. Kip Viscusi is 
perhaps the only one to have studied carefully the nature of consumer 
information regarding cigarettes' risks.70 Drawing on "detailed analysis of 
large bodies of empirical evidence, not . . . conjecture or anecdotal 
evidence,"71 Viscusi rejects the conclusion that "individuals are . . .  ignorant 
of the hazards they face . . .  [or,] if they are aware of the risks, [that] they 
ignore them when making their smoking decisions."72 He refers to the 
conception of uninformed consumers as the "stylized smoker" model.73 
Contrary to that model, Viscusi argues, the evidence suggests that "smoking 
rates [do not] greatly exceed what would prevail in a fully informed market 
context."74 In other words, the evidence is more consistent with what he calls 
the "fully rational" smoker model than with the stylized smoker model.75 
Million in Settlement Coming, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 2, 1 998, at A l 2. 
A second general strategy is to stage a frontal attack on the premises of the assumption-of-risk 
defense while continuing to represent traditional, firsthand, "elective" smokers. Under this strategy, 
plaintiffs attempt, first, to challenge tobacco manufacturers' professed naivete about the health effects of 
smoking, both currently and in the past. This requires unearthing evidence that manufacturers know, und 
knew, that cigarettes can be lethal, and perhaps concealed the information, or even sponsored studies geared 
to show the opposite. The second prong of the attack, already tried during the second wave, see Rabin, 
supra note 14, at 1 23-1 25; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28, at 1 6, is to highlight the youth of beginning 
smokers and the role of addiction to i l lustrate the lack of free choice involved in  starting and maintaining 
the smoking habit. The two prongs can even be combined by showing that cigarette manufacturers were 
aware of the addictive properties of nicotine and quietly developed the technology to manipulate nicotine 
levels, at least partly to encourage addiction. It was one of these third-wave cases, based on a novel cause 
of action alleging a willful tort, that helped lead to the unprecedented March 13 ,  1 996, Liggett settlement. 
See Castano Settlemem with Brooke Group Ltd. and Liggett Group Inc. , 1 1 .2 Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep. 
3. 1 47 (E.D. La. Mar. 1 2, 1 996). Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1 044 Section "B," 1 994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7426 (E.D. La. 1 994), was filed on March 29, 1 994, on behalf of all nicotine-dependent 
persons against the five largest tobacco companies. See also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-
1 044 Section "B," 1 994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 3438 (E.D. La. 1 994) (denying a motion to dismiss); cf. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 996) (defining a class of all Florida 
citizens, and their survivors, who have or had a medical condition or disease caused by addiction to 
smoking). 
69. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 56-57 (concluding that strict liability doctrines "turn out 
to have no obvious application to cigarettes-products whose hazards (however extreme) are both inherent 
and reasonably well known by consumers"); Epstein, supra note 22 (arguing that because consumers arc 
well-informed of the risks of smoking, "individual smokers should own up to the consequences of their 
actions" and "the tobacco industry's liability for smoking-related i l lnesses should be zero"), 
70. See V1scus1, supra note 49. 
7 1 .  Id. at 1 39. 
72. Id. at 144. 
73. Id. at 1 39. 
74. Id. at 144. 
75. Id. Viscusi imagines a third possible model: the "smoker with cognitive limitations," who is subject 
to certain well-recognized cognitive biases. Id. at 1 39. In his view, the fact that consumers overestimate 
risks is consistent with that model. Thus, the evidence does not adequately distinguish between the fully 
rational smoker model and the smoker-with-cognitive-limitations model. Either way, according to Viscusi, 
there is not too much smoking. See id. at 144. 
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Viscusi bases his conclusions about consumers' risk estimation primarily 
on the results of a study "commissioned by the defense Jaw firms in support 
of tobacco l itigation efforts."76 As part of that study. over 3000 subjects in 
a nationally representative telephone sample were asked a number of questions. 
including the following: "Among 1 00 cigarette smokers. how many of them 
do you think wil l  get Jung cancer because they smoke?"n The average 
response was that forty-three of the smokers would get lung cancer. leading 
Viscusi to conclude that consumers consider smoking to have a 43% chance 
of causing lung cancer.78 He observes that this perception substantially 
exceeds what he estimates to be the actual lung cancer risk of between 5% and 
1 0%,79 as well as his estimates of total mortality risk to the smoker 
(excluding danger to others from smoking-related fires. etc.) of 16% to 
36%.80 In short, "[t]he potential hazards of smoking are not a closely guarded 
secret, and if anything risk perceptions for some smoking risks. such as lung 
cancer, may be too high."81 
If one takes Viscusi 's figures as to the actual lung cancer mortality risk of 
smoking as accurate, the survey respondents do appear on average to be 
pessimistic with respect to the risks of cigarettes. A tentative inference that 
consumers judge smoking to carry with it a 35% to 45% risk of fatal lung 
cancer seems, in the abstract, plausible.82 Based on such an inference. Viscusi 
implies that there is no useful role to be served by tort liability.8J 
Just because consumers are aware that smoking has some risk. however, 
does not imply that consumers are fully informed of those risks. In the 
remainder of this part, we use Viscusi's thoroughgoing empirical research as 
our foil as we challenge the conventional wisdom that consumers are 
adequately informed. Among other things. we argue that the issue of consumer 
information is far more complex than is commonly understood. For 
76. Id. at 84 n.6. Viscus1 emphasizes that the underly mg ">ur. ey design wa.> quue wund" and lhat. 
in any event, he ''undenook a variety of sensit1v1ty te,t>."" mcludmg rephcatmg lhe enlln: >Ur.ey on a 
sample of North Carolina residents. Id. at vi. "All these effon> corroborated the >urvey rouhs .. Id. 
Although Viscusi explains that ''[r]eaders wishing to validate the >Ur. ey can readily do >O \\ Uh the aid of 
a telephone," id . •  we have opted in this Article to accept V1>eu>1°> e\·1dence at face ' alue llta1 1>. \\C 
assume that the questions on the survey were asked of a rJndom1z.cd national sample and 1hat the responses 
that Viscusi reports are accurate. A> we bncfly indicate below. howe\ er. there appear to ha\ c: been several 
significant defects in the design of the sur.·ey 11>elf. See mfra nolc> 795. 82-1. 
77. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 55. 
78. See id. at 68. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 70. 
8 1 .  Id. at 145. 
82. Cf. id. at 7 (stating that, from the survey respon>cs. "the: c:nure populauon a.>!>C>!>C> tht> ml. at -13. 
and even current smokers have a substanual nsk pcrccpuon of .37"'). 
83. Jn his discussion of possible policy responses. Vi>CU>I doc> not e'en con>1der a role: for Ion law 
That is consistent with his view that ton law should be employed only m circumstances where consumer.> 
underestimate risks. See \V. KIP VJSCUSI, REFORMll'G PRODL'CT'S LIABILITY 6-1-65 ( 1 99 1  ). su alw Croley 
& Hanson, E111erpr1se Liability. supra note -10. at 7-13-5 1 (>ummanzmg a sub>tanual pomon of Vi>eus1"s 
products liability scholarship). 
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unregulated markets to work well, we conclude, consumers must be much 
better informed than they now appear to be. 84 
B. A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom 
As the previous section indicates, there are two sorts of informational 
arguments to which we need to respond: Viscusi's somewhat technical and 
survey-specific arguments and the loose common-sense notion that everyone 
knows smoking is dangerous. We therefore offer two types of responses. The 
first type is directed solely at the surveys on which Viscusi relies and the logic 
that he employs in drawing policy conclusions. Because the responses of the 
first type are survey-specific, we have opted to place them in an appendix. The 
thrust of the arguments in the appendix is that the survey and survey data on 
which Viscusi relies are misleading and that, in any case, Viscusi's 
interpretations of that data are, at best, dubious. In this section, we provide a 
second type of response, which is of more general significance. That is, we 
seek to rebut the view that cigarette smokers are adequately informed. We do 
so by exploring a number of different ways in which consumers may lack full 
information relevant to their individual decisions about whether to smoke. In 
particular, we focus on four areas of potential distortion: first, the "third-person 
effect" whereby consumers may fail to apply generalized perceptions of risk 
to themselves; second, the absence of brand- or type-specific risk information; 
third, the underestimation of cigarettes' riskiness relative to other products and 
choices; and fourth, information problems related to cigarettes' addictiveness. 
1 .  The Third-Person Effect 
Although consumers appear to overestimate the health risks of smoking 
when responding to survey questionnaires, it is not at all clear that these same 
consumers apply their overinflated risk perceptions to themselves. Indeed, 
social psychologist Martin Fishbein has criticized the use of general questions 
in smoking surveys (like those in Viscusi's work) on just those grounds.85 
Distinguishing between personal beliefs and general beliefs, Fishbein notes that 
it is beliefs about the risks to oneself, not generalized notions of risk, that 
affect people's behavior: "Although a person may believe that 'Smoking 
increases the chances of lung cancer,' this will have little influence on his or 
her smoking decision if he or she also believes that 'My smoking is not 
84. Moreover, as we argue infra Part III, consumer information levels are by no means the only 
relevant factor in deciding whether manufacturers should be liable for cigarette-caused harms. 
85. See Martin Fishbein, Social Psychological Analysis of Smoking Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCllOLOOY 
AND BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 1 79, 1 83-84 (J. Richard Eiser ed., 1 982). 
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increasing my chance of getting lung cancer. "'s6 We refer to this 
phenomenon, well-known in survey research,87 as the "third-person effect." 
Viscusi concedes that there may be "a discrepancy between the perceived 
risk to others and the perceived risk to oneself,''88 bur he ultimately dismisses 
the possible influence of such a third-person effect by pointing to evidence that 
·'risk assessments influence smoking behavior."89 His point is that because 
smokers overestimate smoking's risks by less than nonsmokers do, smokers' 
risk perceptions partially explain their decision to smoke.90 The third-person 
effect, however. refers to how people calculate personal risks and nor to 
whether or not they respond to those risks they perceive. 
Viscusi seems to assume that, if the third-party effect were present, 
consumers' personalized beliefs would be that smoking is risk-free, but this is 
not a necessary implication.91 Suppose, for example, that personalized risk 
assessments tend to be, on average, one-twentieth of consumers' generalized 
risk assessments. Under that assumption, Yiscusi's survey evidence would 
imply that consumers significantly underestimate the personal risks of smoking 
at the same time that his evidence regarding risk perceptions could still be said 
to influence smoking behavior. Because Yiscusi does not disentangle the 
influence of the third-person effect from other factors. he may wel l  be 
overstating dramatically consumers· personalized assessments of smoking'!> 
risks. 
Recently published survey results by Michael Schoenbaum strongly 
suggest that at least some smokers believe the personalized risks of smoking 
are significantly lower than the general risks of smoking.9� In Schoenbaum's 
study, adults ranging from fifty to sixty-two years old were asked to assess 
their chances of reaching the age of seventy-five.9' Schocnbaum compared 
86. Id. at 1 84. 
87. See, e.g., Ralf Schwarzer. Op111111sm. 1'11/11aabill/\. mu/ Sdf-Bdt<""fs cu ll<""alrb-Rdau.J Cm:1111w11• 
A Sysremaric Oi·en•iew. 9 PSYCHOL. & HEALTII 1 6 1 .  1 62-63 ( 1 99- H  1de..:nb10g P•)Cholog1cal phenonu:n.i 
of ''defensive optimbm"' and 1he .. ,oc1al compamon b13':· \\h1ch g1'e n-.: 10 belief, •uch '"· ··�t) fcllo" 
smokers might gel lung cancer one day. but n ., le" hl.cly 1ha1 1h1' " ould happen 10 me·· J. Joop \'an Der 
Pligt. Risk Perceprion and Self-Prorecm·e Belwiwr. I Et R PsH-llOLOGlST J.I, 36 1 1 9961 l ""(A)hhough 
people seem quite aware of the relam·e ml. of 'pcc11ic acll\ ll1c' or beha\1on., 1h10p lend 10 change \\hen 
this knowledge is applied 10 their own behavior. For 10'1ance. man) •mol.en. accept the a'.-<x:1a11on bet\\ccn 
smoking cigareues and dbe3'e, bul do not behc' e 1hcm,ch c' 10 be pcn.onall) al ml ·· 1 
88. V1scus1, srcpra note 49. al 64. 
89. Id. al 64; see also id. al 1 1 0  (expla1010g 1ha1 ml. pcrcepuon' do appear 10 pla) a 'hgh1 role 10 
people's propensity to smoke). 
90. See id. at 1 1 0. ll is worth noung lhal V1'cu'1·, C\ 1dencc 'ugge'l> 1ha1 ' af) 10g ml pcrcep110n, pla) 
a de minimis role. See id. (reporting that 'mol.cn. pcrcc1'e a lung cancer ml. of 37� . \\hKh ., onl) 6� 
less than the average perception of the full 'ample. and charac1c:nz10g the: d1..:rc:panc) "" ··nol •larl.." l. ct! 
al 1 1 4 (calling lhe discrepancy a ··mmor d1spamy" ) 
9 1 .  Cf infra notes 252-253 and accompanymg le\l 1c:xpla1mng ho\\ the . .,,t ) l lL<:d •mold" model. 
which Viscusi concludes i' incon'i'lenl w11h the C\ 1dc:ncc. ma) be a ,1r.1" man bccau.c of the e'treme 
assumptions underlying 11). 
92. See Michael Schoenbaum. Do Smokers U11denraml rii<"" .\forra/11\ Eff<""< t• of S1110J.11u: '  f.> tdou r 
from rlze Health and Rerireme111 Sun-e\. 87 A\t. J. Pl B HEAi.TI! 755 1 1 997 1 
93. See id. al 756. 
1 1 88 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63 
those assessments of perceived survival chances with epidemiological 
predictions for such individuals, controlling for smoking status. In doing so, 
he found that survival expectations of "never," "former," and "current light" 
smokers were quite close to actuarial predictions.94 In contrast, among 
"current heavy smokers"-those who smoked twenty-five cigarettes (that is, 
1 .25 packs) or more per day-expectations of reaching the age of seventy-five 
were approximately twice as high as actuarial predictions.95 Specifically, 
heavy-smoking men predicted a 50. 1 % chance of reaching seventy-five, despite 
actuarial chances of just 26.3%, while heavy-smoking women predicted a 
60. l % chance of surviving to seventy-five, despite actuarial chances of only 
30.8%.96 Contrary to Viscusi's suggestion, Schoenbaum's evidence 
demonstrates that heavy smokers underestimate, without discounting entirely, 
the risks to themselves.97 Moreover, Schoenbaum notes, younger smokers 
may be even more optimistic. Schoenbaum's sample was aged fifty and over, 
an age group in which most smokers have been smoking for more 
than 3 decades and have presumably begun suffering adverse health 
effects of smoking . . . .  That respondents in this sample apparently 
underestimated their risk of premature mortality, possibly to a large 
extent, suggests that typical new smokers may be making even less 
well informed decisions.98 
Schoenbaum's study, therefore, raises significant doubts about Viscusi's 
data and the conclusions that he draws from it. In upcoming sections, we 
elaborate on Schoenbaum's findings by providing further evidence that all 
smokers (and, perhaps, especially younger smokers) are ill-informed. 
2. The Problems of Impeifect Brand-Specific Information 
Even if consumers did know the generic health risks associated with 
smoking, they would need considerably more information in order to ensure 
that market outcomes would yield optimal deterrence. In particular, they would 
also need to know the risks of individual brands and types of cigarettes. In the 
absence of this information, the market for cigarettes would fail in a number 
of ways. First, smokers would assume that all cigarettes are equally risky, 
which would remove any incentive that manufacturers otherwise had to make 
their particular brands less dangerous.99 Investments in safety could not be 
94. See id. at 757 tbl.2. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. at 758. Also in contrast to Viscusi"s findings, Schoenbaum found that "no smoking group 
appeared to overestimate the likely mortality effect of smoking." Id. 
98. Id. 
99. This may help explain the failure of the Premier cigarette. See infra Subsection 11.B.4.e.i. 
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recovered on the market because. by hypothesis. consumers would not 
appreciate them. Manufacturers, in fact, would have an incentive to cut their 
safety investments because, by doing so. they could lower their costs of 
production without lowering consumers' willingness to pay for their product. 
An "unraveling" of cigarette safety might then occur. as each manufacturer 
chose to make the smallest possible safety investment. '00 
In addition to this lowering of manufacturer care levels, the inability of 
consumers to identify the risks of specific cigarette brands would also have 
deleterious activity level effects. That is, even if product safety unraveling did 
not occur, consumers would nevertheless underestimate the risks of some 
relatively risky brands of cigarettes and overestimate the risks of relatively safe 
brands. As a consequence, they would consume too many or too few 
cigarettes. 101 
Viscusi emphasizes that low-tar cigarettes are safer than standard 
cigarettes 102 and indicates that consumers correctly perceive them as 
such. 103 It is not clear, however, that so-called "light" cigarettes arc any safer 
than their "regular" counterparts. I0-1 Indeed. the mistake that Viscusi and 
1 00. For more thorough accounts of thi> unra, ehng problem and of how enlerpme hab1ht) would 
eliminate it, see Croley & Hanson. E111erprise Lwbi/m., supra note 40. al 776-78. 791 -92. and Hanwn & 
Logue, The First-Porty Insurance Exremo/11y. supra note 40. al 1 77-79. I S  I .  The unraveling phenomenon 
is well-recognized in the products liab1hty literature. s,.,., ,. g .  I AMERICA" L.\W h�-r . E.'IF.RPRISE 
REsPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 227 ( 1 991  ): Howard A Laun. Problt'm·Soh 1111: 8t'htn wr 11nd 
Theories of Tort Uabiliry, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677, 695 ( 1 985). Ste,en Sha,ell. Srn.-1 L111b1/IT\ VasuJ 
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. I ( 1 980): see also Duncan Kenned). Drsmb11111 t' 11111/ Pt11t'n111/uru· .\10111·t'1 
in Contract and Torr loH; with Speciai Reference ro Co111p11/son frm1s and Unt'qtwf 811ry:11111111g Po .. a. 
4 1  MD. L. REV. 563 ( 1 982) (noting that con>umcr.. tend to "gcnerJlc fan1a...1c. of .afct) ." w h1d1 lca1h lo 
the systematic underpricing of goods). The >emmal amclc dc>enbmg the unrJ\ ehng phenomenon " George 
A. Akerlof, The Marker for "Lemo11s": Q110/m· U11ar1t11111\ mu/ rhr M11rl.t'1 Mnl11111u111. 84 QJ Eco' 48!1 
( 1 970). As we indicate below. however. the phenomenon ha> often been O\ erlookcd m d1.cu-.>1on> of how 
best to regulate the market for cigarette>. See. r.g .. 111/ra Sub>ecuon IV C 2 (dc>enb111g the unraveling 
problem created by ex ante exc1>e taxe>); mfra note 602 (dc>enbmg how cla...> acuon >Ull> may create the 
same problem); infra text accompanying note 64 1  (c:.plaimng how the propo>Cd >Cttlcmcm ought lead to 
unraveling). 
I 0 I .  For a discussion of a closely related ac11v11y le' cl mcffic1cn9 and of ho\\ an enlcrpn>C hab1lll) 
regime would eliminate it. see Hanson & Logue. The F1n1·P11rl\ ltis11rt111a £11t'n111lm. mpra note 40, at 
1 77-79, 1 8 1 ;  and Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Lwb1lm . s11pro note 40, at 778. 79 1 ·92 
1 02. See. e.g., \V. Kip Viscusi. Cigareue Tiuo/1<111 011J lht' Socrol Co11Jt't/llt'11ct'J of Smokmi.:. 111 To\\ 
POLICY AND lllE EcONOMY 5 1 ,  69 (Jame> M. Poncrba ed . 1 995) 
1 03. See, e.g., V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 37-4 1 (dc•cnbmg the heahh-rcl:uc:d comparall\C ad,crtmng 
that has been fairly common in the cigarcne mdu>tr)'. c'JX'Clally \\ llh re>pcct to tar lc\chl. V1>eu>1. rnpm 
note 1 02, at 67 ("Individuals who exprc•> concern• about the health con>Cqucnce> of 'mokmg arc much 
more likely to smoke low-tar cigarcnes . . .  " ). 
I 04. See Mirjana V. Djordjevic cl al.. Self-R1•g11/111um of Smokmg /111r11s1t\ Smolt' Yir/J1 of lht' Lo" · 
Nicotine. Low- 'Tar ' Cigare/les, 1 6  CARCINOGENESIS :!0 1 5. 20 1 8· I 9 ( 1 993). Lynn T KoLlow >kl cl al . 
Blocking Cigarelle Filter Ve111s ll'ilh Ups More Thon Do11bles C11rbo11 Mo11ottdt' /111t1!t' from U/1r11 ·Lo" 
Tar Cigarelles, 4 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCllOPllARMACOl.OGY -104. 406-07 ( 1996). Lynn T 
Kozlowski et al., Smokers Are Unoll'are of the Ftfrer \'.-111s No11· cm Most CtgoTt'llt'J Rt'rnlts of 11 N111w1111/ 
Survey, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 265, 267-68 ( 1 996); Richard Sahu>. M11las To Rt'l<"tzf CtgtzTt'llt' Add1111·e1 
Massachusells Order ls First i11 the Norum, BOSTON Gl.0111:. Aug 20. 1 997. at B I  (paraphr.1.>mg Grego!) 
Connolly, head of the Ma...sachuselb Tobacco Control Program of the >late Department of Pubhc Health. 
in stating that "most cigarene' advcnised a> being VCI)' lo\\ m mcoune actuall) deh\er about "-' much of 
the substance as a regular cigarette bccau,e they arc >mokcd more 1nten>el) ··1 
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many smokers appear to be making is evidence of our basic point: Smokers 
(and, at least to date, administrative regulators and scholars) cannot recognize 
the riskiness of individual brands of cigarettes. 105 Moreover, the mistake is 
a consequence of a third problem of imperfect brand-specific information: The 
incentive of manufacturers is not to make their cigarettes safer-as Viscusi has 
claimed and as it would be were consumers truly well-informed-but to make 
their cigarettes seem safer. 106 To the extent that manufacturers have 
succeeded in creating such an impression, it seems likely that many smokers 
have been lulled into underestimating the risks to themselves of smoking and, 
thus, into smoking too much. 107 
3.  The Problem of lmpeifect Relative-Risk Information 
Even if smokers overestimate the absolute risks to themselves of smoking 
their particular brand of cigarettes, it does not follow that they will be well­
informed. To know whether consumers are making truly well-informed 
decisions, it is necessary to know their assessments of the relative risks of 
smoking. 108 If, in fact, consumers tend to overestimate some or all of the 
1 05. The Surgeon General's 1 989 progress report summarizes an "Adult Use of Tobacco Survey," 
conducted in 1 986. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, s11pra note 3, at 1 8 1 ,  247. According to 
that survey, 50% of then-current smokers believed that "[a]ll cigarettes are probably about equally 
hazardous," and 45% believed that "[s]ome kinds of cigarettes are probably more hazardous to health than 
others." Id. at 1 8 1  tbl.3. There were four subcategories of responses among those in the latter category. Of 
all smokers, 21 % believed that their brand was "less hazardous than others," and 13% believed that their 
brand was "about the same" as other brands. Only 8% believed that their brand was "more hazardous than 
others." The remaining 2% did not know. Even that small percentage of smokers (29%) who believed that 
their cigarettes were more or less dangerous than other cigarettes may well have been wrong. See infra note 
I 06 and accompanying text. Viscusi does briefly acknowledge this evidence and its potential significance. 
See V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 49-50. 
I 06. This was a distinction that the industry apparently understood and may have exploited with 
respect to tar and nicotine levels. Recently released documents regarding a conference of tobacco company 
scientists in 1 968 demonstrates that several of the scientists at the conference emphasized the di5tinction 
between a "(h]ealth image" or "health reassurance cigarette," such as "a low tar-low nicotine cigarette 
which the public accepts as a healthier cigarette," and a "[h]ealth-oriented" cigarette, which is intended to 
be truly safer. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 1 29 ( 1 996) (emphasis omitted). 
A very similar story can be told with respect to the introduction and eventual dominance of lilter­
tipped cigarettes in the 1 950s. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging Market for long-Term Nicotine 
Maintenance, 278 JAMA 1 087, 1 088 ( 1 997) (explaining that filters were introduced primarily as a "public 
relations gambit" in reaction to newly emerging evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer and 
that their introduction reversed what had been a decline in per capita cigarette consumption). Cigarette 
manufacturers continue to market seemingly safer cigarettes that, in fact, may not be safer. The most recent 
example is the current campaign for Winston cigarettes, which are controversially being marketed as free 
of additives. See Rajiv M. Rao, All Nat11ral Killers: RJR's Co111roversial Additive-Free Cigarelles, 
FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1 997. at 40; cf infra notes 2 1 0-2 1 8  and accompanying text (raising doubts about the 
health benefits of RJR's "cleaner" cigarette, the Premier). 
1 07. This source of optimism would enhance the third-party effect described above. See s11prc1 
Subsection II.B. I .  
I 08. Indeed, for the reasons that we provide i n  this subsection, so long as consumers properly assess 
relative risks, consumers may act as if well-informed even when they grossly underestimate the absolute 
risk levels. Put differently, consumer estimates of absolute risk levels may be irrelevant to the policy 
analysis. 
1998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 1 9 1  
other risks to which they are exposed, they may well behave as if they 
underestimate the risks of smoking. That is, insofar as individuals perceive 
nonsmoking activities as substantial threats to their health or life, they will 
give less significance, other things being equal, to the risks of smoking.109 
The problem of imperfect relative-risk information is particularly important 
where smokers significantly overestimate the risks of not smoking relative to 
the risks of smoking. For example, smokers commonly claim that smoking 
helps them to keep weight off or reduces their stress levels . ' 1 0  If those 
smokers believe the risks of obesity or stress are greater than or comparable 
to the risks of smoking, then those smokers' decisions are dangerously 
misinformed. 
As it turns out, there is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that 
smokers misestimate the relative risks of cigarettes. In 1 989, the Surgeon 
General summarized numerous studies indicating as much. ' 1 1  Between 1 970 
and 1978, for example, Roper conducted five surveys in which it asked 
respondents whether they agreed that certain risks .. make a great deal of 
difference in longevity." 1 1 2  In each one of those surveys, roughly 30'7c more 
of the respondents answered "yes" when the risk was .. a lot of tension and 
stress" than answered "yes" when the risk was ··smokes a pack of cigarettes 
a day."1 1 3  In 1983, Louis Harris & Associates conducted a national telephone 
survey of 1 254 randomly selected adults . 1 1 �  Respondents were asked: . .  In 
helping people in general to live a Jong and healthy life, how would you rate 
the importance of' each of twenty-four health and safety factors on a scale of 
one to ten? 1 1 5  The low end of the scale represented the response, "of low 
importance," and the high end represented "of utmost importance.'' 1 16 The 
study yielded several interesting results. For instance, the lowest mean health 
ranking for all the safety factors among respondents was 6.42 (for "drinking 
no alcohol"), well above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that virtually all 
health factors were viewed as substantial, including "[g]etting 7-8 hours [of] 
sleep" (8.04) and "[e]ating breakfast daily" (7.6 1 ). 1 11 More important, the 
perceived mean health ranking of .. [n]ot smoking" (8.32) indicated that 
consumers had imperfect relative-risk information. Of the twenty-four health 
factors, "not smoking" had the tenth highest ranking, placing it somewhere 
I 09. See infra notes 249-250 and accompanying 1c:x1. 
1 1 0. See, e.g . •  Scharf. supra no1e 48, al 64 1 (noting thal 1hc: tobacco andu•tl)' ha, cap11ahLcd on ,uch 
factors and that one manufac1urer encouraged •mokmg a,, a "c:1ght·lo" me1hod " uh the ,Jogan ··Rc:-.ich for 
a Lucky instead of a Sweet'"); McCullough. supra note 5. al T:!. I (noting 1hat •ome people 'mol..c to rchc'c 
stress). 
1 1 1 .  See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpm nolc 3. al :!07. J :! 
1 1 2. Id. at 207; see also id. at 208 tbl . 1 6  (•ummanLmg lhc Roper 'un c) ' I  
1 1 3. Id. a t  208 tbl . 1 6  (emphasis added). 
1 14. See id. at 207: see also 1d. al 209 fig. I .  2 1 0  fig :! bUllllllJrlllng the Ham' 'unc� I 
1 1 5. Id. at 209 fig. I .  
1 1 6. Id. 
1 1 7. Id. 
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near the middle, immediately above "[h]aving friends, relatives, neighbors" 
(8. 1 8) and below "[n]ever driving after drinking" (9.25), "[k]eeping air quality 
acceptable" (9. 1 1 ), "[k]eeping water quality acceptable" (8.95), "[h]aving 
smoke detectors in home" (8.89), "[k]eeping close to recommended weight" 
(8.54), "[h]aving blood pressure reading annually" (8.5 1 ), "[t]aking steps to 
control stress" (8.36), "[g]etting enough vitamins, minerals" (8.37), and 
"[ e ]xercising regularly" (8.32) . 1 1 8  
Those studies, and many others since, 1 19 indicate that consumers' 
relative-risk information is quite imperfect.120 The most recent relevant study 
that we came across was completed in 1 993 by the American Cancer 
Society. 12 1  That study found that "[a]lthough Americans are generally aware 
of the personal health risks associated with tobacco use, the public seriously 
underestimates the magnitude of the impact cigarette smoking has on the health 
of the country as a whole" as compared to other health risks. 122 When asked 
what they consider to be the country's most serious health risk, for example, 
36% of respondents mentioned the AIDS virus, whereas only 9% answered 
smoking. 123 When asked to select from a list of various health risks the 
single risk that they believe is responsible for the greatest number of deaths, 
28% of respondents identified car accidents, 1 6% named illicit drugs, 12% 
named AIDS, another 1 2% answered alcohol abuse, and 7% said murders. 124 
Only 2 1  % identified cigarettes as the number one killer. 125 Cigarettes, 
however, kill significantly more than all the other causes of death put 
together. 126 
When consumers make poor relative risk estimates, even accurate 
cigarette-specific risk estimates may not prevent them from smoking too much. 
Thus, studies that examine only cigarette risk estimates may substantially 
overstate the rationality of smokers' decisions. Unless smokers understand that 
gaining, say, ten pounds from quitting smoking is healthier than continuing to 
smoke, they will not make appropriate risk calculations. 
I I 8. Id. (emphasis added). As part of the project, Louis Harris & Associates also sampled 103 health 
experts and asked them to rank the same 24 health factors with respect to the "overall health of the general 
population." Id. at 207, 2 1 0  fig.2. Unsurprisingly, they ranked "(n]ot smoking" as by far the most important 
factor (with a mean ranking of 9.78). See id. at 2 1 0  fig.2. 
I 19.  The Surgeon General's report, for example, summarizes five more recent studies, all of which 
confirm the conclusions of the Roper and Louis Harris & Associates studies. See id. at 207- 12. 
I 20. Unsurprisingly, there is also evidence that the problem is particularly acute among smokers, 
which may help explain why they are smokers. See id. at 207, 2 1  I tbl . 1 7. 
1 2 1 .  See Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Highlights from an American Cancer Society Survey of U.S. Voter 
Attitudes Toward Cigarette Smoking (Sept. 9, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yelle law 
Journal). 
1 22. /d. at 2 1 .  
1 23. See id. 
1 24. See id. 
1 25. See id. 
I 26. See id. at 2 1 -23; see also supra notes 1 -4 and accompanying text. 
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4. The Potential Significance of Addicrion and Orher Relared Sources of 
Imperfect Informarion 
In addition to the third-person effect, the absence of brand-specific 
information, and the presence of imperfect relative-risk information. cigarettes ' 
addictiveness has major implications for consumer awareness and 
deterrability. 127 Before examining these implications, it is worth highlighting 
the increasingly abundant evidence that cigarettes are addictive, evidence that 
has accumulated despite industry claims to the contrary. At the end of 1 994, 
for example, the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention reported the results of a survey conducted on a sample 
of some 20,000 adults.128 The survey found that, of the American adults who 
currently smoke, 70% "said they would like to quit completely," and 34% try 
to quit in any given year. 129 Of the 34% who try to quit in any given year, 
the study revealed, only 8% are successful . 1 30 Similar statistics were reported 
in 1993 following the Massachusetts Tobacco Survey. which found that 88% 
of current Massachusetts smokers were at least thinking about quilling. and 
75% had attempted to quit at some time in their lives. 1 3 1  The Massachusetts 
survey also found that 43% of smokers had "quit" for at least one day in the 
past year only to resume smoking subsequently, while 2.8<7£- of smokers claimed 
(optimistically, in l ight of the survey's findings) that they were planning to quit 
smoking within thirty days. 1 32 
That evidence-and a great deal more evidence like itm-poscs a sticky 
challenge for economists, who for the most part have failed to provide a 
plausible account of the apparent conflict between smokers' revealed 
1 27. Addiction can be understood � a 1ype of mfonna11on deficn bc:cau..: II le.uh •mok.er. 10 
underestimate the hanns of the marginal cigarenc. 
1 28. See Spencer Rich, Smdy Says Adulr S111ol.u1g Dropp<'d /CJ 25"< 111 1993. R .. u11rd1c-r o .. sa1b.-, 
Resulrs as Encouraging, WASH. POST, Dec. 23. 1 994. at A6 
1 29. Id. 
1 30. See 8% of Smokers \Vho Try To Quir Succud. Sun<'\ S111·s. LA. Tl\ll:S. Dec 23. 11)<).1. at A4 
1 3 1 .  See LOIS BIENER ET AL., 1993 MASSACl!l'SE'JTS TOBACCO SL'R\'EY 6 ( 1 99-1  l 
1 32. See LOIS BIENER ET AL.. 1 993 MASSACHL'SE'JTS TOBACCO Sl'RVE) APl'E.'DI\ TAB� 10 !bl A3· 
A ( 1 994). 
1 33. See, e.g .• AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass·N. DIAGNOSTIC A"D STATISTICAL MA"l AL Of· )',(E,-.TAL 
DISORDERS 1 8 1 -82 (3d ed. rev. 1 987) (descnbing "mcolme dependence" and the facl 1ha1 "(p )eople \\ llh 
this disorder are often distressed because of their mab1l11y to 'lOP mcoune u"'"): Cig11rr11.- S11wk1111: Amoni: 
Adu/rs-United Srates, 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALm' WKLY REP 925 ( 1 993> (IC\ lewing r�uh, ot 
the "National Health Interview Survey,'' which md1ca1ed 1ha1 roughly 70,._ of 'mol..er. wanl lo qu11 'mol..ing 
completely and roughly 34% anempt 10 qun each yearl 
Viscusi finds remarkable some rela1cd survey evidence. s .... VISCl SI, mpnz nole 49. at 90 < "One 
would have expected almost all individuab who curremly purcha..: a product 10 be en1hu>1a..11c about II 
What we find instead is that there are a large number of negau,·e menuon' of c1gan:uo from 111<: •mokmg 
population."); id. at 88 ("What is most stunning " 1he over\\ helmmgly ather.c ..:n11111cn1 again.I the 
product, even among current product users . . . .  The d1wr.11y of Ihe adver.c reacuon' 10 c1garc110 " qu11c 
striking and is possibly unequaled by any 01her widely u.cd con,umer product ") 1'e,enhcle". Vi.cu" 
gives this type of evidence shon �hrift when he argue' tha1 1he con,umpuon of c1gare11� " ba..1call) 
indistinguishable from the consumption of ordmaf)' con,umer producl>. s .... 111/nz not� 233-237 and 
accompanying text. 
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preferences and their stated preferences. 134 The possible explanations for this 
conflict, it turns out, undermine the conclusion that consumers overestimate the 
risks of smoking. To the contrary, those explanations suggest that consumers 
underestimate those risks considerably. We explore several of those 
explanations in the subsections that follow. But first we respond to the claim 
made by tobacco industry officials that cigarettes are not actually 
addictive. 135 
a. The Industry's Claims 
Most cigarette manufacturers have consistently challenged the proposition 
that cigarettes are addictive. 136 For instance, in response to a question about 
the addictiveness of cigarettes, William Campbell, CEO of Philip Morris, 
answered that "Smoking is not intoxicating. No one gets drunk from 
cigarettes."137 The problem with that response is that there is no reason that 
a substance's ability to addict users should necessarily be linked to the 
substance's ability to intoxicate users. As Dr. Jack Henningfield, a scientist at 
the Addiction Research Center, observes, the full spectrum of characteristics 
of nicotine that relate to addiction put it "right in the top tier with cocaine, 
heroin and alcohol." 138 Cigarette manufacturers also defend their position 
with the following interesting statistic: Approximately 50% of smokers manage 
to quit. 1 39 This figure derives from evidence that there are about as many 
living ex-smokers as current smokers. Even discounting the inherent inflation 
1 34. There is disagreement regarding whether to measure people's preferences according only to whal 
they do or according also to what they say they want to do. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 13- 14  (4th ed. 1 992) (explaining that evidence of "willingness to pay can be determined 
with great confidence only by actually observing a voluntary transaction"), with ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS 200-03 ( 1 993) (criticizing the assumptions underlying the use of 
cost-benefit analysis for policymaking and arguing that what matters normatively are people's "attitudes," 
not their "revealed" preferences), Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & Puo. 
AFF. 54, 59 ( 1 988) ("[R)evealed preference theory can make claims only about what people choose, not 
about how they view their choices."), and Amartya Sen, Behavio11r and the Concept of Preference, 40 
ECONOMICA 24 1 ,  258 ( 1 973) (arguing that "there remains a fundamental question of the relation between 
preference and behavior"). The fact that smokers trying to quit have spent a lot of money on only 
somewhat effective smoking cessation programs and products, see infra notes J 60, 375, and accompanying 
text, indicates that even if one looks solely at revealed preferences, smokers' conduct is not easily 
reconciled with the rational actor model. 
1 35. In Subsection 11.B.4.e.ii infra, we respond to specific claims made by Viscusi that cigarettes arc 
no more addictive than other products or activities. 
1 36. See infra note 1 6 1 .  
1 37. Frontline: The Nicotine War (WGBH radio broadcast. Jan. 3 ,  1 995) (transcript o n  file with the 
Yale law Jo11rnal). 
1 38. Id.; see also U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TllE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL at 
iv-v ( 1 988) (reporting that "the processes that determine tobacco addiction arc similar to those that 
determine addiction to other drugs" such as cocaine and heroin). 
1 39. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 
87 1 & n. 1 14 ( 1 992); cf Epstein, s11pra note 22 (suggesting that "claims of addiction failed [in tobacco 
lawsuits] because too many smokers had already quit"). 
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caused by the greater mortality of smokers compared to ex-smokers. the 50% 
figure remains impressive. 140 But it also appears inconsistent with the 
emerging body of evidence indicating that only a small percentage of people 
who attempt to quit succeed. 1 4 1  
Actually, however, the two bodies of evidence are not necessarily 
inconsistent. The industry 's 50% figure is cumulative, presenting the number 
of smokers who manage to quit, before dying, over all of their years of 
smoking, and often after many unsuccessful attempts. That is, if 34% of 
current smokers attempt to quit each year, but only 8% of those attempts arc 
successful, 142 then about 2. 7% of smokers will quit each year. leading to a 
cumulative 50% quitting rate over about twenty-five years. 1 4 3  In twenty-five 
years, that is, fifty of 100 smokers will have quit smoking, but those 100 
smokers will have made a total of 575 attempts to quit- 1 1 .5 failed attempts 
for each success. This average figure, of course, represents a more complicated 
reality: A few smokers are able to quit successfully the first time they try. 
others require several attempts, and the majority are unable to quit even though 
they try time after time. Properly understood as cumulative, then, the industry's 
50% figure may dramatize the difficulty. not the ease, of quitting smoking. '.w 
1 40. The evidence may be mbleading inasmuch as people who smol..e cigarette' -cem Jes> hi.el) 10 
call themselves "smokers" in survey settings (or othen, 1>e) than people " ho stop ,11101..ing arc 10 �-all 
themselves "ex-smokers." See Edwin T. Fujii, The Demarrdfor Ctgal'l.'ll<'s · Funlia Empinrnl Eudma mrd 
Its Implications for Public Policy, 1 2  APPLIED Ecos. 479. 480 ( 1 980) ("The understatement of the e\lcnl 
of cigarette smoking in surveys is exactly what we mrght expect. Long expenence " uh >UTYe) e' 1dence 
suggests that respondents tend to provide inten·ie\\ers wrth a fo, orable picture of them-che> and hence. 
in this case, to understate their extent of cigarette smoking."); Kenneth E. Warner. Pombl<' /rrcl'l.'aso rn 
the Underreponing of Cigarette Consumption, 73 J. A�I. STAT. ASS''\ 3 1 4. 3 1 ·H 5 1 1 978) buggesung that 
evidence of underreporting of cigarette consumptron might be explained by the incrca.>ing soc1.il 
undesirability of smoking). 
1 4 1 .  See Tara Parker-Pope, Facts Abo111 tire Global Tobacco B11s111t'ss. WA.LL ST J .  June 23. 1997. 
at B I ;  supra notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying text. 
1 42. See supra text accompanying notes 1 29- 1 30. 
143. We arrived at this estimate by raising .973 (because 97.3"< of >mol..ers remain each ) earl 10 the 
25th power (based on the number of years)-a cakulauon 1ha1 ) reld> .SQ.I Thi> rough calculauon pro' 11!c, 
some explanation for how the 50% cumulative quitting figure and the 8"< hkehhooJ of quuung succc" 
are consistent. This calculation assumes that the same percentage of >mol..ers tncs 10 quit each ) car. C\ en 
though some have already succeeded and thu> have left the pool \rcqurnng that. each ) car . •  u lea>! an 
additional 1 .9% of smokers attempt 10 quit, having never med before ). It al>o a.>sumc' no d1rfcrcncc m 
mortality rates between smokers and former smokers. Morco' er. 25 ) cars may understate the number of 
years that some smokers smoke before succes>fully quuung. Su mate> of attempts and >UCCC>� at qu111rng 
are from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention >ludy SC'<' S'.'< of Smo!a1 11'/ro Tn fo {!1111 
Succeed, Sun•ey Says, supra note 1 30. 
144. Their public denials notwith>tanding. manufacturers >eem 10 understand th" perfect!) \\ell The 
consensus view of the industry's own re>earcher> appears 10 be that mcounc I> adJrcm c Sa K �lrchacl 
Cummings et al., \Vhat Scientists Funded b\· the Tobacco /11d11stn Bdr<'•·<' Abo11t th<' lla:ard1 o/ Cu;arelle 
Smoking, 8 1  AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 894. 894-96 ( 1 99 1  ). Indeed. the recent relca.>c of documenl> frum Bro\\ n 
& Williamson and other cigarette manufacturers >trongl) >uggc>I> that manufacturers hJ\ c long �no" n or 
the addictive propertie> of nicotine. See Phrhp J. Hrh>. Tobacc a Compmn llCu S1/e11T 011 l/tl:ard> . S Y  
TIMES, May 7 ,  1 994, al A I ;  see also Sheryl Stolberg. Defecton Hdpmg To Crack \foll .-\rmmd Tob,1< w 
Firms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3. 1 996. at Al (dr>CU»tng the affida\ Us of fonncr Phrhp �lorn> cmplo)cc' lo the 
FDA. which state that company execuuve, rntcrfcrcd \\ 1th rc-carch on cigarettes" hc:ihh ham" Jnd hed 10 
Congress about addiction). The Brown & Wrllram>on document> are >Uf\ C)ed c\11au>U\ cl) rn -c\ eral 
articles in the July 1 9. 1 995. issue of the Joumal of the Ama1w11 Mecl1wl .-\ 1wna1w11. "'" �7-1 JA�IA 2 l 'J 
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The question to which we now turn is the economists' response to the 
issue of nicotine addiction. Economists have not offered a convincing 
explanation of the disparity between smokers' revealed preferences (the fact 
that they smoke) and their stated preferences (that they want to quit). 145 In 
the next three subsections, we explore several explanations for this conflict, 
explanations suggesting that consumers underestimate rather than overestimate 
the risks of smoking. Then, in Subsection II.B.4.e, we respond specifically to 
evidence offered by Viscusi that cigarettes are not in fact addictive. 
b. Identifying the Relevant Margin: The Problem of Path 
Dependence 
Typically, economists describe consumption choices of rational actors as 
taking place on an incremental or marginal basis. 146 The question facing the 
consumer is typically said to be of the following sort: Should she purchase one 
(more) widget? If the answer is yes, that does not imply that the consumer 
should continue to purchase widgets on a regular basis in perpetuity. Indeed, 
it does not even imply that the consumer should purchase a second widget. 
Owing to, among other things, budget constraints and the law of diminishing 
marginal returns, the decision whether to purchase each new widget requires 
its own independent analysis. 
In contrast, Viscusi seems to imagine that consumers conduct a different 
sort of marginal calculus. He suggests that consumers compare all of the 
benefits that they will receive from the "marginal" decision to become a 
"smoker" with "the incremental lifetime death risk from lung cancer to a 
smoker."147 The question of how consumers frame the smoking decision is 
( 1 995), and are also available on the World Wide Web, see Tobacco Control Archives: Brown cmc/ 
Williamson Collection (visited Nov. J 3, 1 997) <http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/index.html>. Then-FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler testified to Congress that Brown & Williamson had spent several years 
growing a genetically altered variety of tobacco that contains very high doses of nicotine nnd had used 
ammonia as a cigarette additive to increase the amount of nicotine delivered to smokers. According to 
Kessler, this new information Jays to rest "any notion that there is no manipulation and control of nicotine 
undertaken in the tobacco industry." Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Chief Denies Nicotine Scheme i11 
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1 994, at A l .  Commissioner Kessler also pointed to numerous patents 
illustrating that the industry has been working to sustain addictive nicotine levels in tobacco products. These 
include patents to increase nicotine content by adding nicotine to the tobacco rod, filters, and wrappers; 
patents on the extraction of nicotine from tobacco; and patents to develop new chemical variants of 
nicotine. See Compa11ies' Alleged Nicotine Manipulation Is Issue for FDA, Kessler Tells House Pe111el, 
Products Liability Daily (BNA), Apr. 8, 1 994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, PLO File (discussing 
patents that illustrate the industry's intent to increase the nicotine content of cigarettes); see also Kelder 
& Daynard, supra note 3, at 77 ("[The] evidence [from the FDA, whistleblowers, and internal tobacco 
company documents] . . .  indicates that the tobacco industry manipulates nicotine levels in their products 
with the intent of addicting or maintaining the addiction of consumers."). 
1 45. See supra notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying text. 
1 46. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-26 ( 1 988); RICHARD G. 
LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 1 3 1 -37 (6th ed. 1 98 1 ); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 0. 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 447-48 ( 1 3th ed. 1989). 
1 47. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 34 (emphasis added). Perhaps Viscusi frames the consumer decision 
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critical. As Viscusi briefly acknowledges. perceptions of per cigareuc risks 
may d iffer from perceptions of long-term smoking risks. He writes: 
Lifetime risks are substantial, but the risks from a pack of cigarettes 
or a single cigarette are relatively small. producing a tendency to 
overestimate the risk level. An open issue that will affect the direction 
bias for smoking behavior is the extent to which individuals arc 
thinking of the lifetime risk or the individual cigarette risk when 
making smoking decisions. 148 
Thus, Viscusi apparently justifies framing the consumer decision in the unusual 
way that he does by claiming that if. indeed, consumers do make their 
decisions to smoke on a per cigarette basis, then, for that very reason. 
consumers likely overestimate the risks. We disagree. 
Even assuming Viscusi is correct that consumers would overestimate 
smaller risks, the actual risk of one cigarette or one pack is probably 
infinitesimal.149 Even a consumer who egregiously overestimates this risk is 
likely to find it insignificant. In the cigarette-at-a-time decision model, the 
health risk from the marginal cigarette is not Viscusi's 439c perceived risk of 
lung cancer from being a smoker; it is more likely to be that figure divided by 
the number of cigarettes smoked over a "smoker's" lifetime, something on the 
order of .0001 % or .0002%. 1 50 Even if the smoker were to overestimate this 
risk by a factor of two, five, or ten, it would appear trivial. Contrary to 
Viscusi's suggestion, however, there is conflicting evidence and theory on 
whether people exaggerate such small risks. Some scholars argue that. below 
a certain threshold, consumers discount risks altogether. treating them as if 
they were zero.15 1  Other scholars argue that. because of certain biases and 
in the unusual way that he does because the >urvey upon which he rcho " ""  11..:lf unphcnl) .:onductcd 
from the standpoint of a one-shot, long-term dec1>1on model of "nol.mg Sur.C) rc>pondcnl• \\ ere ..,l,.cd 
about the health risks to a '"smoker.'" To most respondent>. tlm hi.cl) connoted long·lenn Jnd frequent 
consumers of cigarelles. See infra notes 789-791 and accompanying tc\l 
1 48. V1scus1, supra note 49. at 25. 
149. As far as we know. no one has a11emptcd 10 mea>urc the ml. po..:d b) •mol.111g one c1garellc 
1 50. This figure is derived by dividing the 43'k h fet11ne percel\ ed ml. by one :?O-c1garclle pacl. per 
day for 60 years (.0001 %) and 30 year> (.00024). It :l!>>Ume>. of cour,..;. that the >mol.er percel\e• the total 
lung cancer risk as a strictly linear function of the amount >mokcd. >O that the marginal ml from e.ich 
cigarelle is invariant. That assumption. though que>llonablc. 1> common (and often unphcitJ m the lncrnturc 
See W. Kip Viscusi, Seco11dha11d Smoke: F<Icll <Ind Fm11t1sl'. 18 RcGl LATIO' 42. 43 1 1 995 1 tc\p!Jtning 
that government agencie> such "" the EPA and OSHA ha\e focu.cd ··on hne.u do.c-rc,pon..: 
relationships"). The assumption i> implicit m the recent effort> to e>lllnate the per pacl. co.h Jnd benefit, 
of cigare11es. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL .. supra note 49. at 82-85. V1.cu>1. SU/lr<I note 1 02. at 67-9-1 
1 5 1 .  See. e.g., HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL. DISASTER ''Sl RA 'CE PROTECTIO' Pl Bl.IC"" Poun 
LESSONS 248-49 ( 1 978) (indicating that indiv1duab often underc>llmate lo\\ ·probab1ht) mk>. •Uch '" tho..: 
presented by earthquakes and floods, and often do not \\OIT)' about ml> that arc bclo\\ a certain thrc.hold). 
Howard Kunreuther. The Economics of Prorec11011 Agwnsr Lo11 Prulx1btlm El't:ms. 111 DEC""ISIO' !\IAKl'G 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY 1 95. 209 (Gerardo R. Ung>on & Daniel N Braun>tern cJ, . 1 9821 tnoung 
that consumers may actually ignore low-probabrhty event> and thetr con,i;:quence> unul the) percel\ e that 
the probability of such an event's occumng ha. men abo\ e a thrc>hold )e\elJ. </ Frnnci. W )l"\\ rn. Sr<Il.-d 
Expectations as Fu11crio11s of Probab1/iry and Des1rab1/I/\ of Omwmes. 2 1  J PER.so,ALm 329. 3 33 t 1 953 I 
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heuristics, 152 consumers are likely to underestimate risks associated with 
products with which they previously had uneventful experiences; thus, 
consumers may not associate the overall harms of "smoking" with the 
individual harmless cigarette. 153 
The question of how a smoker frames his or her smoking decision is, at 
bottom, a question of how well consumers are informed. Market outcomes will 
not be efficient, of course, if consumers underestimate a product's risks. But 
even if consumers accurately estimate, or overestimate, those risks when 
framed as a durable decision, the market will still lead to an inefficient 
outcome if consumers rarely or only partially apply those estimates to their 
own consumption choices. The frame, we submit, will turn in part on a 
consumer's perceptions of cigarettes' addictiveness. A rational actor who 
believes that cigarettes are addictive-such that any smoking today will very 
likely be replicated, if not amplified in the future-will frame the decision as 
Viscusi does.154 In contrast, a rational actor who believes cigarettes to be 
nonaddictive will likely frame the decision as a comparison between the 
marginal benefit of one cigarette (or pack of cigarettes) and its marginal cost. 
(providing evidence that people are more likely to state higher expectalions of drawing a "favorable" 
outcome and significantly underestimate expectations of drawing a "negative" outcome when asked to give 
probability ratings in a card-drawing psychology study). 
I 52. For a compendious and influential collection of essays describing the various biases und 
heuristics, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman ct al. eds., 
1 982). 
1 53. Howard Latin, for instance, argues that, because of the "representativeness heuristic," "[w)hcn 
consumers use particular products without injury, the 'input' in their assessment of product safety-these 
safe experiences-will lead to an expected 'outcome' of continued safety." Howard A. Latin, "Good" 
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 4 1  UCLA L. REV. 1 193, 1 230, 1 232 ( 1 994). As a 
result of such biases, according to Latin, "people often ignore low-probability risks." lei. at 1 245. From a 
cognitive capacity perspective, ignoring small risks makes sense. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, 
Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, AM. ECON. REV., May 1 978, at 64, 67 ("Unless we 
ignored many low-probability threats, we would become so burdened that any sort of productive life would 
become impossible."); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 146, at 4 1 6  (describing how the "availability 
heuristic" may have a similar effect). 
Viscusi briefly acknowledges the evidence suggesting that individuals will sometimes underestimate 
low-probability events such as earthquakes. See VISCUSI, s11pra note 49, at 25. He downplays the 
significance of the evidence, however, by describing the underestimated events as "hidden" and pointing 
to other studies in which respondents overestimated these risks once the risks were called to their attention. 
See id. Therefore, Viscusi concludes, "[t]o the extent that cigarettes are among the most-discussed risks in 
our society, one would expect there to be an overestimation of these hazards." lcl. We huve doubts about 
Viscusi's attempted reconciliation of the studies. II is not clear that the risks of earthquakes are any more 
"hidden" than are the risks of individual cigarettes. Moreover, evidence that survey respondents 
overestimate risks that are made salient to them by survey takers simply highlights a weukne�� in the 
survey data on which Viscusi relies. The fact that consumers ignore the same small risks when making 
consumption choices that they overestimate when responding to survey questions should make one 
suspicious of survey results of the sort on which Viscusi relies. Cf. Latin, s11pra, at 1 246 ("One explanation 
for the disparity between experimental evidence that low-probability risks arc overweighted and 
observations Ihat people often ignore these risks is that experimental methodology forces high salience for 
the risks under study while 'real life' experiences seldom make low-probability risks available."). 
I 54. Note that by assuming the frame that he does, Viscusi is implicitly assuming that cigarettes arc 
addictive, an assumption that he rejects elsewhere in his analysis. See infra Subsection 11.B.4.e. 
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The latter is true because the decision to purchase a pack of cigarettes by 
a person who believes cigarettes are nonaddictive does not implicate the 
long-term calculations that might go with a decision to become a long-term 
smoker. If the tobacco consumption decision is made strictly one cigarette at 
a time, only the marginal risks and benefits of that cigarette are relevant. The 
marginal benefit of the next cigarette is likely substantial. The enjoyment of 
the next cigarette is not much, if at all, diminished by the number that one has 
consumed in the past or expects to consume in the future. It may not be too 
much to say that. when a cigarette is consumed, the marginal benefit of that 
cigarette equals the total benefit, at that moment, of being a smoker. • �� The 
marginal cost of the next cigarette, on the other hand, is tiny. It is quite 
artificial and most likely not reflective of medical reality to compute the 
marginal risk for a single cigarette or pack, given that the harmful 
consequences of smoking seem to be caused by regular smoking over a period 
of years, not by any single cigarette. 1 56 Consumers may therefore. correctly. 
view a single cigarette or pack of cigarettes as posing virtually no health risk. 
A smoker could smoke one cigarette at a time over the course of a lifetime 
without ever making a conscious decision to encounter a health risk perceived 
as significant. 157 
Consumers may be capable of producing lifetime mortality rate estimates 
when someone surveys them, but our argument is that the conditions of their 
everyday lives-in particular, the incremental , recurring nature of decision 
points-will not produce such estimates. At the margin, the benefit of the next 
1 55. Cf OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTt RE OF DORIA!'> GRA) 87 (l\lodem Libr.tr) 193 1 J  ! 1 891 J l ""r\ 
cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It I> eAqu1>1te. and II lc:a\O one un"1t 1,fied ··1 
1 56. See, e.g., 0FACE Ol\ SMOKING Al\D HEALTII. U.S. DEP0T OF HEALTII & Hl \IA' SERV � . T11i, 
HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATIO!'>: A REPORT OF TIIE Sl RGEO!'> GE.,ERAL 92 ( 1 990 )  ldl'ICU�'rng 
the hanns of regular smoking and the benefits of qmtung at any po111t rn hfcl. RG Roger.. & E Powell· 
Griner, Life Expec1a11cies of Cigare11e Smokers and Nm1s11wAas 111 th<" l'mt<"d S1t1t<">. 32 Soc Sn !'.IED 
1 1 5 1 ,  1 1 54 ( 1 99 1 )  (same). 
1 57.  Professors Rabin and Sugannan make a related point 
Unlike the sky-diver. skier, or even the alcoholic. the typu:al >mol..er ha> no fc:cdbacl.. 
mechanism in the course of her daily routmc to tngger a •eri.e of unmment Jeopardy to ph) '1<:al 
condition. Indeed, given the long-tcnn nature of the hann from >11101..mg. and the potential for 
avoiding serious physical consequence. by qu1tt111g ··,oon."" tobacco u..: take> on an e>pcc1all) 
sinister character: cumulative phy>rcal dcb1lna11on goc> largely unnoticed. and. \\hene\er 
extrinsic risk infonnauon i> a>>rmr latcd. a rauonalc 1>  at hand for d1"1Coun11ng one"> 
concern-the risk can be addre>sed at a later pomt 111 lime 
Rabin & Sugannan, supra note 28. at 1 1 - 1 2. 
Unfonunately, one of the federally mandated cigarette \\ammg>-"'Qumrng Smol..mg Sow Greatly 
Reduces Serious Risk> to Your Health,"" 15 U.S.C § 1 333(a) ( 1 994)-may exacerbate the effect> of the� 
phenomena. Viewed from the perspective of Vi>cu>r'> 1deahzcd >mol..er. \\ ho 1> mal..mg a dcc1>1on \\ hether 
or not to continue smoking cigarette> for 1he 111defin11e future. the " ammg .ounds hl..e an mducement to 
quit. The smoker can eliminate many of the ill-health cffccl> of pre' 1ou> >mol..mg >1mpl) by qunung 
Viewed from the perspective of the one-c1garette-at-a-t1me >mol..er. ho\\ e\ er. the \\ammg .ound> more hke 
an i nducement to smoke another. The me»age >CCm> to be lhat 1f 1he ne�t cigarette I>  1he lout crgarene. 
then there i; vinually no health-related rea>on not to ha\ e II. Not onl) '"" one cigarette po>e onl) de 
minimis potential health ri;ks. but by not havmg another cigarette .1f1er thal one. e\ en th.it much mk. \\ I l l  
be substantially reduced. if  not eliminated. 
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cigarette may easily outweigh the harm, resulting in a consumption decision 
that might be irrational from the perspective of the one-shot de�ision that 
Viscusi posits. Any new smoker, therefore, who assumes that smoking is 
nonaddictive (or who, more likely, underestimates its addictiveness) may well 
make an inefficient choice to smoke.158 For such smokers, the costs of 
deciding to smoke will likely be underestimated given the unanticipated costs 
of quitting. 159 Since addiction seriously raises such costs, a person might 
decide to forego the health benefits of quitting in order to avoid the costs of 
quitting (even if the person would never have smoked the first cigarette if he 
or she had understood the addictiveness of smoking). 160 In sum, because of 
the potentially substantial unanticipated costs of quitting (created by the 
addictiveness of cigarettes), individuals may well choose to endure costs (of 
continued smoking or of quitting) that greatly exceed any benefits that they 
might have anticipated when initially deciding to smoke.161 The initial choice 
1 58. Arguably, consumers who accurately estimate (or overestimate) the addictiveness of cigarettes 
could make an "efficient" choice when they decide to begin smoking. That also assumes, of course, that 
those consumers do not underestimate health risks and that there are no other information problems, 
including those described in this Article. If consumers, fully informed of cigarettes' health risks and 
addictiveness, decide to start smoking, presumably they have done so because the benefits of doing so 
outweigh the costs. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 18 ,  1 19-20. 
It is not clear to us, however, how consumers could, ex ante, accurately estimate the strength of their 
addiction to smoking. And even if consumers are fully informed of the strength of cigarettes' addictiveness, 
if manufacturers could have made nonaddictive or less addictive cigarettes but chose not to, then the 
choices made by some consumers to smoke may well be inefficient. Under a rational choice model, 
consumers must be presumed to take whatever costs are associated with becoming addicted to cigarettes 
into account when they commence smoking. If they assumed that addiction was an inevitable property of 
cigarettes, however, consumers volunteered to become addicted only because they wrongly assumed that 
smoking entailed becoming addicted. If they were aware that the pleasures of smoking were nvailable 
without addiction, it is doubtful that they would have chosen to smoke addictive cigarettes. Therefore, it 
is not clear that consumers' decisions should be treated as informed, even if consumers accurately estimate 
the addictiveness of the cigarettes they were smoking. 
1 59. Viscusi briefly acknowledges this potential source of inefficiency. See id. at 1 1 9-20. 
1 60. To be sure, there may be times when continuing to smoke becomes so costly that a person will 
quit, but that does not imply that the person will not have to endure the substantial costs of quitting. 
The unanticipated costs of quitting may help explain the survey evidence that most smokers regret 
having started smoking but cannot manage to quit, see supra notes 128- 1 33 and accompanying text, and 
why smokers spend $41 7.7 million annually in the United States on products to help them quit, see Parkcr­
Pope, supra note 1 4 1 .  
1 6 1 .  This model o f  the choice t o  smoke can b e  understood a s  a form o f  "path dependence." Path 
dependence occurs when actors continue to use an inefficient path long after the circumstances warranting 
its use have disappeared. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolmion in Law and Economics, 1 09 HARV. L. 
REV. 64 1 ,  643-44 ( 1 996); cf HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 25-27 ( 1 996) (describing 
the problem of "lock in"). The path dependency model of cigarette consumption may be well 
understood-and perhaps exploited-by the cigarette industry. In a 1 973 memorandum, Claude E. Teague, 
Jr., the assistant director of research and development for R.J. Reynolds, noted the need to get young 
smokers past the initial discomfort of smoking so that they would become habituated: 
For the pre-smoker and "learner" the physical effects of smoking arc largely unknown, 
unneeded, or actually quite unpleasant or awkward. The expected or derived psychological 
effects are largely responsible for influencing the pre-smoker to try smoking, and . . .  [to) keep 
the "learner" going, despite the physical unpleasantness and awkwardness of the period. 
In contrast, once the "learning" period is over, the physical effects become of overriding 
importance and desirability to the confirmed smoker . . . .  
RJR Confidential Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands ofCigarel/esfor 
the Youth Market (visited Dec. 9, 1 997) <http://www.gate.net/-jcannon/documentsf730202rl.txt> [hereinafter 
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to smoke, therefore, may often be inefficient when consumers underestimate 
the addictiveness of smoking.16� 
On the important question of whether consumers know about cigarettes' 
addictiveness, consider survey evidence from the Monitoring the Future 
Project, 163 regarding the extent to which young smokers see their decision 
to smoke as a l ifelong decision. In that study, high school seniors were 
RJR Memorandum]. 
In light of this path dependency model of add1c1ion. consumer informauon Je,·eb in n:cent yean lose 
some of their significance. Whatever consumers knew about >mol.ing in 1 985. " hen the >tudy on which 
Viscusi primarily relies was conducted. may provide hnle in>1ght into the dec1>1on> of many indl\ 1duals 
to start smoking sometime in the past and to keep smoking today After all. man) of the smokers sune)ed 
likely began smoking well before that date. at a lime when the average con>umer might " ell ha' e perceived 
a significantly lower risk of smoking. Cf Rabin & Sugamian. supra note 2S. at -I (d1>el&Sing the steady 
increase in public perceptions of the danger of smoking). V1>cu>1 points out that then: ha. long been a fairly 
widespread perception that smoking po>es health mk>. Su VtSCL'SI, supra note -19, at -18-53 As he 
concedes, however, the opinion poll qucsuons on which he b;i,,es has empmcal concl11>mn "cannot n:soh·e 
the issue of whether the absolute level of nsk perccptmns 1> sufficient." Id. at -18. 
In addition, courts as late as the 1 960s found manufactun:r> not hablc: bccaU>C plrunt1ffs could not 
prove cigarettes caused their health problems. See, e.g . . Lamgue ,. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co . 3 1 7  F 2d 
1 9  (5th Cir. 1 963) (holding for manufactun:rs pamally on causauon ground>). The first maior studies 
indicating the potentially harmful effects of smoking did not appear unul the 1 960s. Sa supra notes 59-60 
and accompanying text. Information about addiction has been e\en mon: n:cent, much of 11 coming to hght 
in the last several years (after Viscusi's book was published). Sa supm notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, any information that has been made available to the pubhc has arguabl) been contradicted 
through the marketing and public relations efforts of c1gan:ne manufactun:rs, su supra note 12.  not to 
mention in the congressional testimony of their CEOs. see Ahx Ill. Freedman, Tit<' Deposma11. Ctgarme 
Defector Says CEO Lied to Co11gress Abow View of N1co1111e. WALL Sr. J .. Jan. 26. 1 9%. al A l .  John 
Schwartz, Tobacco Finn Chief Denies FDA Charges: House Subcommwu Told Ctg1mmes \Vae Nei,·a 
Spiked, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at A I .  
1 62. Viscusi would likely respond to all of th1> by arguing that the 1-.ue of addacuon 1 >  irrelevant tb 
we detail below, Viscusi argues that cigarettes an: not in fact any more ··add1cll\ e" than most other 
consumer products. See infra Subsection 11.8.4.e. That conclu>1on. ho\\ ever. 1s incon>1>tent " uh a growing 
body of medical research indicating that cigarette >moking 1> quue add1ct1ve Sa supra notes 1 38. l -14 
Even putting that evidence to one side, Viscusi has a problem inasmuch as he himself 1mphc1tly �umcs 
that cigarettes are addictive in some meaningful sense when he treats the marginal dec1S1on as the 
"incremental lifetime death risk" of smoking. VISCUS!, supra note -19. at 3-1; St.'<' t1lso supm notes l -19- 1 5-1 
and accompanying text (describing how Viscusi's model of con>umer dec1S1onmaking differs from the 
standard economic model). 
Furthermore, the possibility that consumers may mn· in their csumates of the add1c11veno.s of 
smoking might explain one of Viscusi's mon: stnking finding>. According to V1>eu>1. smokers and 
nonsmokers have roughly similar estimates of the nskincss of smoking. Su Vtsct SI, supm note -19. at 1 10; 
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67. Viscusi conclude> that the dec1>1on whether to smoke, therefore. turns 
significantly on consumers' varied preferences for risk. Su VtSCL'SI. supra note -19, at 1 1  O. Viscus1. s11pr11 
note 1 02, at 67. The difference in consumption pattern>. however. could as east!)' be explained by \ anauons 
in estimates of addictiveness: Consumers who believe that c1gan:nes an: n:lat1vely nonadd1c11' e an: more 
likely to begin smoking, other things being equal. 
1 63.  The project is being conducted by the l n>lltute for Social Re>earch at the Um,er..uy of M1ch1gan 
The study results referred to in the text are unpublished. but an: summanzcd in U S DEP'T OF HEALTII & 
HUMAN SERVS., PREVE.,'TING TOBACCO USE AMOl"G YOt.,1'G PEOPLE A REPoRT OF TIIE Sl RGEO" 
GENERAL 84-87 ( 1 994) (hereinafter PREVENTING TOBACCO USE] The only potent1all)' n:le\'ant suney 
evidence that Viscusi discusses comes from a 1 97-1 study that n:ported that approximately 75% of children 
between the ages of 7 and 1 4  agreed with the statement that "(1]1 1> \'ery hard to stop smol.ing " VtsctSI, 
supra note 49, at 1 2 1  tbl.6-1 (citing F.W. Schneider & L.A. Vanma.tng. Adolescem Prradolesalll 
Differences in Beliefs a11d A11i1udes Abo111 Ctgarel/e S111ok111g, 87 J PsYCllOL 7 1  ( 1 97-l)J Of course. that 
figure implies that 25% of those children did not agree that II 1> hard to >top smolang. >1gmficantly more 
than the current national teenage smoking rate of 16%. See Andrea Adelson, Is Ambcx/\ Gm111g rhi: 
Picture? Despire Ads, Teen-Age Smoking Is Unabwed, N.Y. TIMES. July 17 .  1 997, at D I  
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surveyed each year for one decade-from 1 976 to 1 986-and then again five 
years later after graduating. In the first stage of the survey, seniors were asked 
"Do you think you will be smoking cigarettes in five years from now?"164 
At the second stage of the survey, respondents were again asked about their 
current smoking status. Of those respondents who smoked at least one pack per 
day as high school seniors, 32% of them predicted at the first stage that they 
would "probably" or "definitely" stop smoking within five years. 165 At the 
second stage of the survey, however, only 13% of those graduates had quit, 
while nearly 70% continued to smoke more than one pack per day.166 Of 
those high school seniors who smoked about one half pack per day, 42% 
predicted that they would probably or definitely quit within five years; only 
1 9% actually did. 167 Moreover, nearly half of those seniors had increased 
their habit to more than one pack per day five years out. 168 Finally, of the 
seniors who smoked only one to five cigarettes per day, 6 1  % believed that 
they would probably or definitely quit within five years. 169 As it turned out, 
only 30% managed to quit, while nearly half at least doubled their smoking 
rates. 170 
As the Surgeon General's Report summarized: "When earlier smoking 
behavior is controlled, seniors' expectations to smoke had very limited power 
to predict subsequent smoking behavior." 17 1  "[T]he expectation to abstain 
from smoking in the future seemed overwhelmed by the strong forces that tend 
to maintain or advance smoking behavior once it is established."172 This 
evidence suggests that Viscusi's view that beginning smokers base their 
decision on their perceptions of the "incremental lifetime risks" of smoking is 
fundamentally flawed. Of all the respondents who smoked as seniors, only 
around 8% believed that they would "definitely" be smoking five years 
later, 173 and thus only that many might have considered the risks of smoking 
even for five years. 
1 64. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 1 63, at 84. 
1 65. Id. at 84 tbl . 1 9. 
1 66. See id. at 85 tbl.20. 
1 67. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9, 85 tbl.20. 
1 68. See id. at 85 tbl.20. 
1 69. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9. 
1 70. See id. at 85 tbl.20. 
1 7 1 .  /d. at 84. 
1 72. Id. at 87. 
1 73. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9; cf 1Y Spots Hit Smoking with Graphic Visuals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 
1 997, at A22 ("When I speak to smokers, almost all of them say they will quit within two years . . . .  
When I ask if  they expect to quit within the next two weeks, the answer is invariably no." (quoting Howard 
K. Koh, Massachusetts Public Health Commissioner)). 
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The Problem of Myopia 
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Even if Viscusi were correct that smoking is viewed by smokers as a long­
term decision (in other words, that consumers do somehow understand the 
extent of cigarettes' addictiveness even before they are addicted), there are 
additional attributes of the cigarette consumption context that may lead 
consumers to underestimate smoking's risks. Again, the challenge is to explain 
how a person's revealed preferences (e.g., smoking a cigare!lc) can conflict so 
dramatically with that person's stated preferences (e.g., "I want to quit 
smoking"). Economists have offered several plausible explanations for the 
seemingly contradictory behavior, all of which relate to the context or structure 
of the smoking decision. In the next two subsections. we discuss two such 
explanations. 174 
REWARD 
EFFECTIVENESS 
FIGURE 1 
B 
TIME 
The most common explanation relies on the fact that the health effects of 
smoking are temporally distant from the pleasures of smoking individual 
cigarettes. The intertemporal choice l iterature suggests that the discount rate 
1 74. In addition to the features of cigarette• dc•cnbcd in the next '" o •ub..:cuon' thal n11gh1 con1nbu1c 
to their addictiveness. there is a growing body of C\'1dcnce ind1ca1ing thal c1garc11e, are add11:l1\e bccall-'C 
of their physiological and pharmacolog1cal effccl•. The Surgeon General tir..1 add�!>Cd lhe 1,suc of 
addiction in 1 988, drawing the following lhrec conclu.,on• ·· 1 Cigarette. and other fonn' of lobacco arc 
addicting. 2. Nicotine b the drug in tobacco thal cau-.:• add1cuon 3 The pham1acolog1c and bcha' 1oral 
processes that detennine tobacco addiction are •nmlar lo lho•c !hat detenmnc add1ct1on lo drugs 'uch a. 
heroin and cocaine." U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKl1'G & HEALTH. s11pm nolc 1 38. al 9 In 196-1. lhc Surgeon 
General had stated that ''[t]he tobacco habit 'hould be char.1c1en1cd a. an habnuat1on ralhcr 1han an 
addiction."' 1 964 SURGE01' GENERAL'S REPORT. Sltflr<l note 60 . .it :w 
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that some consumers use to measure the long-term health effects of smoking 
(or the costs of quitting) is greater than the discount rate used to measure the 
short-term benefits of satisfying a craving to smoke. 175 George Ainslie, a 
psychologist, illustrates the point graphically, as depicted in Figure 1 .  176 
Suppose that the individual is choosing between two rewards: a smaller, 
earlier reward S, which occurs at t1, and a bigger, later reward B, which occurs 
at t2• More concretely, imagine that S is the satisfaction that a consumer would 
receive if she were to smoke a pack of cigarettes today and that B is the 
incremental increase in long-term health that the smoker would enjoy if she did 
not smoke that pack. The lines depict the present utility of the rewards that the 
consumer enjoys over time. As George Loewenstein and Richard Thaler 
explain: 
If the individual discounts the future at a constant rate, that is, if 
discounting is constant for different time delays, then the curves will 
never cross. However, if discounting decreases as a function of time 
delay, as the empirical research suggests, then the curves may cross, 
leading to a reversal of preference. When both rewards are sufficiently 
distant, the individual prefers B, but as S becomes more proximate, its 
relative value increases until at t*, S abruptly comes to dominate B in 
terms of present utility. The significance of the crossing curves is that 
behavior will not generally be consistent over time.177 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that this sort of dynamic 
inconsistency is common. 178 Loewenstein and Thaler, for example, highlight 
the following anecdote: In West Virginia, the passage of a law mandating that 
students under the age of eighteen who drop out of school lose their driving 
permits led, in only one year, to a reduction in the dropout rate of one­
third. 179 It seems unlikely that the expected costs of losing drivers' permits 
for a few years could tip so many potential dropouts' rational human capital 
investment decisions toward completing high school. Instead, the results 
suggest "extremely myopic preferences."180 Similarly, many more people 
J 75. Note that this phenomenon, if true, violates the predictions of economic theory. See George 
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Interremporal Choice, J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 1 989, at 1 8 1 ,  
1 83. Nevertheless, there i s  considerable evidence that the phenomenon i s  real. See id. 
1 76. See George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse 
Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 471 fig. I ( 1 975). The diagram provided is a slightly modified version 
of the Ainslie original. 
1 77. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75, at 1 85. 
1 78. See Ainslie, supra note 1 76. 
1 79. See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75, at 1 82. 
J 80. Id. Commentators often suggest-as do the examples offered by Loewenstein and Th11lcr-th111 
this tendency for myopic behavior is especially acute during adolescence. In that light, it bears noting that 
"[e]ighty-two percent of adults who ever smoked had their first cigarette before the age of I 8, and more 
than half of them had already become regular smokers by that age." Regulations Restricting the Sulc and 
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 
44,396, 44,398 ( 1 996) (citing PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 163, al 65). 
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avoid sun exposure to prevent large pores and blackheads in the short term 
than will  act to minimize the long-term, much more signi ficant risk of skin 
cancer. 1 8 1  Because of this sort of intertemporal myopia, even smokers who 
fully anticipate the addictiveness and health effects of smoking may be making 
irrational decisions. 182 
d. Disaggregated Benefits and Pooled Costs: 
The Problem of Multiple Selves 
Some scholars prefer an alternative to the discount rate explanation for the 
confl ict between what smokers say and what they do. 183 For example. 
Thomas Schell ing, one of the first economists to focus on the issue. 
demonstrates that "[p]eople behave sometimes as if they had two selves, one 
who wants clean lungs and long l ife and another who adores tobacco."1s.i To 
understand smoking behavior, Schelling argues, it is useful to view individuals 
as comprising at least two selves who "are in continual contest for 
control." 1 85 With respect to most consumption choices, there is a "dynamic 
programming self'-a sort of referee-that manages continually changing 
wants and desires, harmonizing them over time in an evenhanded manner. l ll6  
But with respect to some consumption choices, that referee does not exist. 
Instead, there is a series of impermanent selves. Each has its own needs and 
desires, and some have preferences about what should be done when other 
selves are i n  command. Thus, the nicotine addict wants to smoke when he is 
i n  charge, but another self is concerned about health and wants not to smoke 
even when the addict is in command. 187 
In the wake of Schell ing's path-breaking work.188 numerous scholars 
have offered similar multiple selves models. 189 It is critical to recognize that 
1 8  I .  See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75, at I 82. 
1 82. Viscusi describes an extreme ver..ion of myop1a---0ne in which '"[t]he >moker >amply ignores the 
risk component since these risks are remote." V 1scus1. supra note .i9. at 2 1  According to Im ' er>1on. 
'"[o]nly the immediate gratification provided by c1garc:1te> dme> con>umer behavior " (J. Conlral')· to 
Viscusi's suggestion, however, the fact that consumer.. ma) apply a larger discount rate to more: remote 
risks does no! imply that consumers ignore those mks or 1hat only the 11nmed1ate grat1ficat1on of smoking 
matters to consumers. See infra notes 25 1 -256 and accompanying text (arguing that V1i.c�1 has provided 
an extreme, straw man version of '"addiction"). 
1 83. One perceived problem with the discount rate explanauon 1> that tt 11nphes that people have an 
astronomically (and, perhaps. implausibly) high d1scoun1 rate in >Ome c1rcum>tanco. e\en \\hen the future:. 
t,. is only a few hours away. See THOMAS c. SCUELLl�G. CHOICE A '\D COSSEQUo-'Cc 62-63 ( 1 98.i) 
1 84. Id. at 58. 
1 85. Id. 
1 86. Id. at 86. 
1 87. See id. at 86-87. Schelling as unwilling 10 comm11 regarding the extent to which has muluple 
selves model is merely metaphorical. See id. at 96. 
1 88. See also T.C. Schelling, Egonomics. or the An of Self-Marwgeme111, AM Eco' Rlo>' • May 1 978, 
at 290; Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Co111111a11d 111 Practice. 111 Polin. t111d m t1 T/1et1n of R<11wm1/ Clw1cr, 
AM. EcON. REV., May 1 984, at I .  
1 89. See. e.g., ]ON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND TIIE SIRf..'\S 1 03- 1 1 (rev ed. 1 98.i), George Aanshe. Bewnd 
Microeconomics, Conflict Among Interests 111 t1 Mu/11ple Self t1s ti Derem1111t111t of \'<zlue. 111 TllE Mt.:LTIPLE 
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these models do not assume that consumers are ignorant of the fact that 
cigarettes are risky or that consumers completely ignore their risk perceptions 
in making consumption choices. Indeed, the models acknowledge that smokers 
are reflective creatures who do, at least partially, take into consideration the 
long-term risks and benefits of smoking. Moreover, they acknowledge that 
other variables, including price, can affect consumption decisions in predictable 
ways. A major advantage of multiple selves models, however, is that they help 
to make sense of common behavior that, at least on its face, does not comport 
with the basic rational actor model. As Schelling puts it: 
Many of the skills and maxims and stratagems for coping with one's 
own behavior become less mystifying and more familiar if we can 
recognize them as the same principles and stratagems that apply to 
managing someone else-someone in a close relation, with a 
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child, 
teacher and pupil, missionary and convert, master and apprentice, or 
guide and follower. 190 
Individuals "struggle for self-command" through the application of tactics that 
are essentially variations on the Homeric episode in which Odysseus ordered 
that his hands be tied to the ship's mast so that he could not be seduced by the 
song of the Sirens. 191 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such tactics are routinely employed by 
smokers. Some smokers, for example, limit themselves to smoking only 
cigarettes that are given to them; they have a "rule" against buying cigarettes, 
a practice that many admit is not easily sustained. Similarly, closet smokers 
conceal their habits from some or all of their friends and loved ones, a strategy 
that can reduce the number of cigarettes smoked but can also have the 
unintended effect of reducing the smoker's social encounters. Other tactics 
include enlisting the aid of a trusted friend to allocate cigarettes in limited 
quantities or smoking only in a limited number of predefined circumstances. 
Thomas Schelling, for instance, reports his own rule of smoking only after an 
"evening meal," a strategy that ultimately failed. 192 Many heavier smokers 
also apparently attempt to "tie their hands." As Loewenstein and Thaler have 
SELF 1 33 (Jon Elster ed., 1 986); Jon Elster, Weakness of Will and the Free·Rider Problem, I ECON. & 
PHIL. 231 ( 1 985); Ian Steedman & Ulrich Krause, Goethe's Faust, Arrows Possibility Theorem and the 
Individual Decision-Taker, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 1 97; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive 
Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 ( 1 980); Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M. 
Shefrin, An Economic Theory ofSe/f-Co111rol, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 ( 1 9 8 1 ); Gordon C. Winston, Addiction 
and Backsliding: A Theory of Compulsive Consumption, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 295 ( 1 980). 
I 90. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 63. 
I 9 1 . Id. at 76-82 (describing ways in which individuals manage or discipline their many selves). 
1 92. See id. at 77. 
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observed, many "smokers buy cigareues by the pack (rather than by the carton 
which is cheaper)." 193 
For many, these sorts of efforts to smoke in moderation fail .  driving 
smokers to attempt quitting entirely. As Schelling explains, "Just as it may be 
easier to ban nuclear weapons from the baulefield in roro than through 
carefully graduated specifications on their use, zero is a more enforceable limit 
on cigarettes . . .  than some flexible quantitative ration."1� Efforts to quit, 
too, are often fashioned in a self-binding way such that the common self can 
justify singling out the current self to bear the initial burden of the decision to 
quit. Resolutions to quit smoking are an example. The common self does not 
fully control the current self's decision to smoke, but it can raise the costs to 
a future self by publicly resolving to stop smoking on a date certain sometime 
in the future, invoking shame as an aid to sel f-govemment. 19s Another 
feature common to many smokers' attempts to quit is that they occur at special 
moments, such as on smokers' birthdays or on New Year's Day!96 The 
multiple selves model may also explain some of the logic behind the annual 
"Great American Smokeout," in which smokers are urged to stop smoking 
even for just the day. 197 
With those tactics in mind, it seems plausible that the desire to quit 
smoking (or not to start smoking) might itself raise consumers ' estimates of 
the risks of smoking. Survey data showing that respondents overestimate the 
risks of smoking, therefore, might reflect merely a desire on the part of many 
consumers to trick themselves into overestimating those risks. The problem 
with any instrumental attempt to inflate the underlying risks in that way is that 
the current self is not easily fooled. The person whose watch is set ahead of 
the true time, for instance, will often adjust for that fact. As Schelling puts the 
point, "There is one family of tactics common in interpersonal relations that 
1 93. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75. al 1 86. 
1 94. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83. at 77. 
1 95.  See id. at 76. 
1 96. See id. The American Cancer Society (ACS ) la>l )'Car >pon>on:d a '" eep>l.il.e> for >moler. \\ ho 
purchased Nicorette Gum or Nicoderm patch�. The tear-off >helf tl) er read m large and bold pnnl '"For 
Mother's & Father's Day, Commit to Qmt1" AMERICA' CA�C'ER SOCltTY CO\l\llT To Ql IT '  
(advertisement, on file  with the Yale law Jounw/). 
1 97. The ACS has been sponsoring the Great Amencan Smol.eout. on the third 111ur'>il.i) of .,-.,ch 
November, since 1 977. As part of their "Commit lo Qun plan." the ACS encourage> >moker> lo d100>e 
a date for quitting and lo mark that date on their calendar Amencan Cancer Soc1el). Grw1 A111eriw11 
Smokeo111, Commi1 To Quit (visited Dec. 9. 1 997) <lmp://www.cancer.org!ga>plcomracl html> S1mil.irl). 
the ACS encourages smokers seeking lo quit lo put their tnlenuon "m wnung-and >ign 11'' and m.ike> 
available a "Contract to Quit." Id. In their "Quit Smol.mg Tip>." the ACS e\platn> th.it ''(c lold turkey 1' 
the most successful" method of quitting and then advt>e> quilter> to "(t)hro" a\\a) all c1gan:tt� and 
matches" and "[h]ide lighters and ashtrays." Amencan Cancer Society. Q111r S11wJ.111g n,,, ( \ l>llcd Dec 9. 
1 997) <http://www.cancer.org!tobacco/tr8.html>. The ACS then encourage> tho>e \\ ho prder .i more 
gradual approach to make it harder for themselve> to >mol.e c1gareth:>-for 1mtance. b) bu) mg one p.ick 
at a time and by wrapping up that pack and puumg ela>uc band> around n Sec- ''' Another up for the 
smoker is to "[s]moke with your left hand if you usuall) >mol,.e " nh )'OUr nght"-.i near!) lateral an.ilogue 
of tying one's hands to the mast. Id. 
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is peculiarly unavailable, or nearly so, in dealing with oneself. That is 
deceit."198 Even so, we think it common that individuals attempt to deceive 
themselves, even if they are only partially successful. 
For a variety of reasons, these strategies for binding the current self are 
likely to be especially ineffective in the cigarette context. 199 Cigarettes are 
widely available and relatively inexpensive. Moreover, a smoker can often 
conceal the fact that he or she has smoked cigarettes. Therefore, the multiple 
selves model of smoking behavior leads to a prediction that is extremely 
difficult to square with the basic rational actor model. Specifically, some 
smokers favor policies that help smokers precommit to quit or curtail smoking. 
Indeed, as Schelling observes, "[i]f there were some way that cigarettes could 
be reliably put beyond reach, and people could vote on whether they would 
like that done, my guess is that a majority of smokers would elect to deny 
themselves the possibility of lighting another cigarette."200 In contrast, if 
smokers were rational actors of the sort imagined by most economists, they 
would be squarely against policies that made smoking more difficult. 
As far as we know, there has not been an extensive empirical test of 
Schelling's prediction. That 70% of smokers say they want to quit and many 
try to quit but fail,201 however, should give pause to those who assume that 
smokers are making decisions based on a single, stable set of preferences. The 
multiple selves conception of consumers may also help explain a result that 
Viscusi finds remarkable: Even smokers in the surveys he reports had 
predominantly negative things to say about smoking and very few positive 
things to say.202 The artificiality of the survey context, where the respondent 
is not making an immediate consumption decision but is invited to consider his 
or her habit abstractly and in the long term, generates an emphasis on the 
negative side of the equation. It may be that in the real world (e.g., at the 
convenience store counter), exactly the opposite side of the equation is 
implicated. 203 
1 98. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 78. 
1 99. Cf id. at 69-73 (describing various relevant product dimensions that may affect how difficult 
self-command is likely to be). 
200. Id. at 74; see also id. at 78 ("Doctors report that when patients are flatly told that their condition 
makes it imperative they cease smoking at once, the patients quit not only more reliably than when they 
are left any choice, but far more comfortably. Continual indecision . . .  aggravates both the discomfort und 
the temptation . . . .  "). 
201 .  See Parker-Pope, supra note 1 4 1 .  
202. See V1scus1, supra note 49, a t  88-95; supra note 1 33. 
203. On the day that the tobacco settlement was announced, some newspapers included among the 
stories on the settlement a public reaction section. The samplings of public opinion were by no means 
scientific; nor were they intended as a test of the multiple selves model. Still, the responses of smokers to 
the news seem to suggest that, indeed, some smokers would support a settlement that made quitting easier. 
In the Boston Globe, for example, three of the six interviewees were regular smokers, and only they seemed 
clearly to favor the settlement. They did so, it appears, because they believed the settlement might help 
them quit. See "How Do You Feel About the Settlement with the Tobacco Industry?", BOSTON GLOBE, June 
2 1 .  1 997, at A I O; see also Lynda Richardson, The Smokers: Reacting with Skepticism bm Also with Some 
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, June 2 1 ,  1 997, at 8. 
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In sum, the multiple selves model is important in two ways to 
understanding the results of Viscusi's survey evidence. First, it makes Jess 
relevant the underlying estimate of smoking's costs (because the current self 
does not take into account the full costs to future selves), and second, it helps 
to explain why respondents might artificially inflate those estimates. 
e. The Economists ' Response 
The issues discussed in  this section might be characterized as .. addiction" 
problems inasmuch as they create a conflict between what a consumer wants 
to do and what the consumer actually does. Once one takes seriously the 
evidence that c igarette smoking is addictive, the claim that a smoker's decision 
to keep smoking is efficient is less easily maintained. In this subsection, we 
discuss specific evidence put forward by Professor Viscusi in support of his 
claim that cigarettes are not addictive in any meaningful sense. In our view, 
the evidence he presents is either unconvincing or, in some instances, actually 
supports our contention that cigarettes are addictive. 2<>l 
1. The Premier Experiment 
Viscusi draws his first evidence from the market for cigarette substitutes, 
which he sees as inconsistent with the predictions made by the sorts of models 
of c igarette addiction discussed above. Responding to Schelling in  
particular,205 he points out that such substitutes have been offered but have 
failed, suggesting that consumption choices are not driven by any sort of 
addiction: 
[I]t appears that most consumers enjoy smoking as a consumption 
decision. In 1988 R.J. Reynolds introduced the Premier cigarette . . .  
204. Of course, if cigarettes are not addicuve. then the fact that mo't cum:nt •mol..ers began smoking 
as minors loses some of its significance. Viscus1 dedicate> a chapter to rcv1e\loing 'ur.ey rc.ull'I and arguing 
that the smoking decisions of teenagers arc just as .. sen.ible"' as tho!><! of adults. Sa VISC1.'SI. 111pra note 
49, at 10- 1 1 ,  1 1 9-37. 
The observations that we make above and below regarding Vi,..;u,1\ e\'tdence. arguments . •  md policy 
conclusions regarding the smoking deci•ion of adult' apply equally to hi. e\'tdence. nrgumenl'I. and policy 
conclusions regarding that of children. We would add abo that the evidence with regard to children» 
assessment of risk seems especially inappo,ite. Vi-cu.i at one point ackno" ledges the J>O>'>tbthty that the 
young smoker may not "fully recognize how ht• or her future ,elf will \ alue health as comp•m:d \lo 1th 
smoking," though he concludes that young people mal..e ml..-!>Cn.ill\'e •mokmg deci.1ons Id at 1 19 
205. See \V. Kip Viscusi, Strategic and Etlucal /ss11t's 111 1/zt' \'ulita11011 of Ll/.-. 111 STRATI:GY A'D 
CHOICE 359, 372 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1 993). Schelling coniecturcs that .rnol..ers \\Ould be willing 
to pay a great deal, on the order of SI 00 billion. for .. a reliable way to qun c1garctte>-10 qun e\ en "'anung 
them-without torment or suspense or loss of pnvacy or any rc,1nc11on' on mob1lit) or any ph) sical side 
effects." SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 74. The path dependence model 1111plie' the "1Ille pn:d1cuon If an 
inexpensive way to leave the current path were d1sco\'ercd. dcc1.ionmal.ers \loOUld be much more likely to 
take the new path. Cf Parker-Pole, supra note 1 4 1  (de-cnbmg cum:nt expendnurc' on 'mokmg cessation 
aids). 
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[which was] [e]xternally indistinguishable from a traditional 
cigarette . . . . Smokers of the Premier could enjoy the physical 
movements of holding a cigarette and the oral gratification achieved 
through cigarette smoking as well as the nicotine that smokers 
presumably desire. . . . Perhaps the only attribute on which the 
Premier fell short was its taste. The result was a marketing disaster, 
and the new product was withdrawn from the market. 
The Premier provided an almost perfectly controlled 
experiment. . . . Surely if  cigarette purchases were driven by 
"addiction" alone, this product would have dominated the market. It 
seems clear that some fundamental taste on the part of consumers for 
the smoking experience is at play.206 
At first blush, the evidence from the "perfectly controlled experiment" 
seems compelling. The failure of the Premier seems to prove that the taste of 
cigarettes, and not addiction, is the primary reason for smoking. Under closer 
scrutiny, however, the experiment appears less than perfect. Even assuming 
that the Premier experiment unfolded exactly as Viscusi describes, it would 
prove little with respect to the addiction models we discussed above. Those 
models, recall, depend not so much on nicotine-based addiction, but on, among 
other things, the fact that the good taste is delivered with each cigarette while 
the ill-health effects are incurred much later-or, if the smoker quits in time, 
possibly never.207 To treat the Premier as a test of, for example, Schelling's 
model is to misunderstand that model.208 If the Premier tasted bad, then it 
would not be a viable cigarette "substitute" within Schelling's conception. If 
each puff is unpleasant, none of a person's "selves" would have any interest. 
The Premier experiment nevertheless may indicate that consumers do not 
smoke solely because of chemical addiction.209 In numerous ways, however, 
the experiment was far from "perfectly controlled"; it was badly flawed. First, 
it is questionable whether the Premier's purported health advances were 
206. Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added). 
207. See supra notes 1 55-157 and accompanying text. The path dependence model does depend in part 
on nicotine-based addiction. Specifically, because consumers underestimate the costs of quitting (that b, 
the addictiveness of nicotine) when initiating their smoking habits, their choice to begin or continue 
smoking may not be a welfare-enhancing choice. 
208. In a 1 993 article, Viscusi described the Premier experiment to help sort out questions Schelling 
raised about smoking behavior. Viscusi's framing of questions, however, suggests that he mistakenly take� 
Schelling as explaining smoking as the consequence of chemical addiction to nicotine: "Is the authentic self 
the smoker or the person who claims to want to be a nonsmoker? What does it mean when individuals 
express a desire to quit smoking? Are they physically dependem 011 nicotine, or is it the act of smoking 
that they cannot quit?"' Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added). Limiting himself to those 
dichotomous alternatives, Viscusi ultimately concludes that, for reasons we examine and criticize in this 
subsection, "there is at least some evidence that cigareue smoking is an action of one's authentic self." It/. 
at 373-74. 
209. This assumes, contrary to our arguments above, that smokers are in fact well informed of the 
health risks that they face and would have been willing to trade seemingly trivial taste concerns to reduce 
health risks while still getting their nicotine fixes. 
1998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 2 1 1  
substantial210 or whether the new cigarettes were percei1·ed by consumers as 
substantially safer.2 1 1  In addition. a host of nonhealth differences between the 
2 10. As compared 10 traditional cigarenes. the Premier contamc:d fe"er of " hat RJR .:ailed 
"controversial compounds" like tar. John Helyar. RJR Pla11s Ta Markt't SmoAdt'n Ct>:<lf<'ll<' '" 
Breakthrough with Hefty Price Tag. WALL ST. J .  Aug. 30. 1 988. al 25 [heremafler Hcl) ar. RJR Plt11u )  
It was 1 0  produce no ash, less s1des1ream >mokc. and l e "  mcoune than 97"< o f  the brand, o n  the 111.irlet 
See id. The number of chemical compound> w� not chmma!ed. but reduced b) 82"< to %"< .:ompan:d lo 
low-tar cigarenes. See John Helyar, Scie1111s1s G11·e the SmokdeSJ Ctgcueue Goud Rn l<"h ' 111 Prr/<1< <" to 
RJR Repon, WALL ST. J., Sep!. 8. 1 988, a! 36. More spec1ticall). RJR" 7-M-page ..:1enu11.: .:ompend1um 
stated !hat there were 6.0 mg of tar per c1garcuc compared 10 S 2 lo 1 2  0 mg for leading Jo\\ -1.ir hr.ind.. 
See Finn Introduces the 'Clean ' Cigarel/e. ST PETERSlll RG Tl\IE.S. Sepl 26. 1 988, al 03 A• .i 
consequence of these sorts of changes, lhe Premier '' � e�pecled lo be Jc,, oifen>I\ e lo non•moler.. su 
Betsy Morris & Alix M. Freedman, 'Smokeless · Ctgarelle ls faputed To Pou 81g .\forJ.e11111: Clra//em:e. 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1 8, 1 988, at 39; Betsy Mom> & Peter Waldman. Tire De111lr of Pri:1111a. W .\LI. ST J . 
Mar. 1 0, 1 989, at B l ;  Peter Waldman & Betsy Mom>. RJR .\'alusco AbcmJ01u ·smoJ.den '  C11:<1rrll<", 
WALL ST. J., Mar. I ,  1 989, at B I ,  to ease "the social pre»ure and gu1h man) •moler. •uffer." �lorm & 
Freedman, supra, and to appeal particularly lo \\Omen. see Mom> & Waldman. rnpra 
The continued presence of nicotine sugge>l> thal the Prenuer w� not >Ub>lanuall) .afcr Ahhough 
tar is believed to elevate the risk of cancer m >mokcr>. mcoune 1> be he' c:d lo create lugher ml ol heart 
disease and is suspected to play a role in the mel�lal1c >pread of cancer Su l lo\\ard Wohn,l}. 
Pseudo-Cigare11es Still Han' Toxms. CHI. St1-.-T1\IES. Sept 20. 1987. at 1-1  Further. reduced mcoune 
levels, researchers suggested. would not nece»anly reduce the Je,el of mcolme-b.bed ml. � .:omp.m::d to 
conventional cigarenes. In RJR's studies, test rat> exposed 10 >mol.e from the Prenuer \\ere reported lo 
have twice the level of nicotine in their blood a> lest rat> expo>ed lO regular c1garem:• Su F1m1 ltrtrodun-1 
the 'Clean ' Cigarelle, supra. Moreover. RJR» claim that ll reduced the mcoune )e\ cl m Prc1111er belo\\ 
that of 97% of the brands on the market casts doubt on the •lalu• oi the Prenuer a.> .in .idequate 
"substimte." See Helyar. RJR Plans. supra. 
2 1 1 .  RJR did not promote the Premier a> a "heahh1cr" c1gareue becau..: oi the uncertamt) rei,:;irdrng 
its health effects and because such adverti>ement> nught h.t\ e unphculy md1c1ed other !ob.i.:co product. 
and invited FDA regulation. See Don Colburn. 'Cleaner. · Bur ls Ir S<tfer ' R J Re1 1w/Js Tout> " .v .. ,, 
High-Tech Cigarelle-Very Carefully. \VASIL POST. Sep! 6, 1 988. at Z6 ln•!ead. RJR •ugge•led onl) that 
!he Premier was "cleaner," hoping that the con>umcr \\ Ould read bet\\een the lmC> See Fm11 /111rod11t<"> 
the 'Clean ' Cigarette, supra note 2 1 0. Heahh claim> made b) RJR \\ ould al•o ha\e done hnle to 
distinguish !he Premier from conventional c1gare1te>. gl\ en thal c1gare1te manufacturer. had long demed 
that conventional cigarenes have any significant 111-heal!h con>c:quence> S.:-e supra nole 26. cf mprct nole' 
99- 1 0 1  and accompanying text (arguing that 1f con>umer> do nol ha\C br.ind .. pc:.:1lic mfom1.iuon . 
manufacmrers will have reduced incenuves 10 marlel relatl\cl) >afe c1gare1te•I 
In addition, regulators, heahh groups. and comumcr group> did nol treat Prenuer .:igarenc. '" n,1.Jc" 
Potential FDA regulation of the Premier � a drug. see FDA \\\mis R J R.-vwld> Tlrcll SmoJ.t'/.- , ,  
Cigarelles Could Be Classified a Dnig. 0RA1'GE Cot �TY REG <Cal l .  Sep! 3. 19SS. a l  A8 . .ind 1 1 >  ongoing 
review until the Premier was withdrawn from the marl.et rn Februaf) 1989 could h;I\ e hrnden:d the ne" 
cigarene's acceptance by cus!Omers. The ho>ule re>pon>e of heahh group• and anti.mol.ing 1;:rouP' .imilarl) 
doused the chances that consumer> m1gh1 con'1der 11 •afcr Sa F1m1 l11tn><l11ro tire C/<"<111 Cu:m.-tk. 
supra note 2 1 0. These groups joined the Surgeon Gener.ti 111 labehng the Prenuer .i "drug-deh, er) ') 'lem" 
and in raising a range of cri11ci>m>. Ne"' ·c1gcrre11<" Recr/11 e1 Om�. Kool' Cle1111u. L A  Tl\ll-'>. 0.:1 2 1 .  
1 988, at 2 ;  see also Smokeless Cigarcue Amro1111ccme111 Ref1<1rtedh Ser for .\fmtc/d\ . AP. Sep! I 3. 1 987.  
al'ailable in 1 987 WL 3 1 7-1997 ("\Ve don't kno\\ what ebe 1> going 10 be g1,en oil Once ) OU put pl.t•llo 
in there you have to be concerned about the compound, m the pl�llc• .. 1quo1111g a re>e.in:h ..:1enu,1 .it the 
Georgia Ins1im1e of Technology)); Scon Ticer & Rcg111ald Rhem Jr .  171.:- 8cm1111g Qu<">lw11 "' RJR ,V,,,. 
What?, Bus. WK., Sept. 28, 1 987. a! 28 ("( 1 ]1'> mcrel) a ne\\ fanglcd drug-deh\ Cf) •) 'tem ror mcoune " 1 .  
Michael Waldholz & John Helyar. FDA Feels Ht•tll 011 SmoJ.den C1g<1rt'll<". \\' .\ LI.  Sl J . Oc t  2 1 .  1988. 
a! BI (reporting that the Premier 1s  >een a> e�1ly adaptable for the u..: of cra.:l coc.1111e1 
Regardless ofit> veracity. the Premier\ bad pre» hi.cl) 1111iuencc:d con•ume"' ,ubJCCll\e perceplrun, 
of ri;k, which are what count in con>umer dec1>1on> Cf V1sn SI. SUf1rct note -19. al 5 tC \pl.i111111g tl1'1l "the 
effect of these risk percepuons on their dec1>1on> . 1> lhe mam maner of 1111ere,1" • .  Jom ller..:h & W 
Kip Viscusi, Cigarelle Smokmg. Seatbelt Use. crnd D1ft'a.-m e> 111 \foge-RuJ. fre1ifr·Of/> .  25 J Ill \I Rt� 
202, 226 ( 1 990) (explaining that "mdl\'Jduab' >UbJ�-Cl1vc percepuon' of the mk111c:" ol 1hc:1r )Ob " the 
relevant factor governing individual dec1>10n> regard mg polcnual l) haLardou, JOb," 1 In .i d.iun th.it .ippe.ir' 
10 be in tension with hi> sugge>llon thal Prenuer prO\ 1ded J "perfccl l) control led e\pcrt111e111," V1..:u>1 
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Premier and traditional cigarettes undermines the view that the experimental 
c igarettes were a viable substitute. The Premier's taste was not merely a 
"drawback," as Viscusi would have it, but a fundamental flaw. According to 
test marketers, the Premier "smell[ed] like burning garbage,"212 and "taste[d] 
like shit."213 Furthermore, contrary to Viscusi's reckoning, the Premier did 
not retain the "look and feel" of conventional cigarettes. "Smoking is a 
complex psychological, emotional and mechanical process, 'a total 
activity' . . . .  'Smokers like taking out the cigarette, tapping it, playing with 
it, blowing smoke.'"214 With the Premier, there was no ash and therefore no 
flicking.215 For many smokers, '" [t]he smoke itself is part of the 
satisfaction,"' and many were not eager to become mere "puffers."216 More 
generally, smokers found the Premier cigarettes to be difficult and unpleasant 
to consume.2 17  Finally, beyond these issues of "look and feel," Premier 
suggests that the government's regulatory interference with the marketing of Premier cigarenes was largely, 
if not entirely, to blame for the failure of that and other potentially safer cigarene substitutes. See VtSCUSI, 
supra note 49, at 147-48 (concluding that "government policies now in place actively discourage safety 
innovations in cigarenes."). 
2 1 2. Melissa Turner, The 'Cleaner' Cigarelle Will Make Its Premiere, ATLANTA ].-CONST., Aug. 3 1 ,  
1 988, a t  C I .  
2 1 3. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 
1 12 ( 1 990); see also Bradley Johnson, Cigarelle May Fuel Heated Debate, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. 
(N.C.), Sept. 5, 1 988, at CS (reporting that the Premier tasted like "singed hair"); Douglas C. McGill, 
Consumers Give 'Smokeless' Cigarette Unfavorable Reviews, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 19, 1 988, al 
A4 ("It tastes like burning plastic."); John Riley, Smoker Carries a Torch; Aficionado Reflects on 'Weird, ' 
New Smokeless Cigarelles, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 7, 1 988, al 2 (stating that Premier cigarettes were at 
first fine, but then "harsh in the mouth and sickening in the nose" and "gave me headaches."); Smokeless 
Cigareue Gets Varied Marks in Informal Taste Test, AP, Sept. 4, 1988, available in 1988 WL 3808039 
(stating that the Premier smelled "like a tennis shoe burning"). RJR was not entirely surprised by the 
reviews. Indeed, its own ambition was apparently not to attract currently satisfied smokers to switch to 
Premier cigarettes. According to an RJR executive responsible for the Premier's initial development, the 
firm "hoped [the cigarene] would keep smokers from quilling and draw ex-smokers back to Reynolds." 
BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra, at 74. That RJR did not target Premier for consumption by currently 
satisfied smokers may further impeach the claim that it was a "substitute" for other cigareltes. 
2 1 4. Morris & Freedman, supra note 2 1 0  (quoting Leo Shapiro, a Chicago-based marketing 
consultant). 
2 1 5. See Johnson, supra note 2 1 3. 
2 16. Smokeless Cigarelle Announcement Reportedly Set for Monday, supra note 2 1 1 (quoting Dave 
Brenton, head of the Smoker's Rights Alliance). 
2 1 7. A host of practical complications made the Premier potentially unappealing. To begin with, 
Premier did not mix well with matches or even cheap lighters, which only exacerbated the cigarene's bad 
taste and smell. See BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 2 1 3, at 1 12. RJR's own CEO at the time, Ross 
Johnson, was quoted as saying that when lit with a match, the Premier smelled "like a fart." Id. Even with 
a quality l ighter, Premier cigarettes took longer than normal to light, and an inadequate lighting caused the 
smoker to experience what became known as the "hernia effect," the need to overexert on the inhale 
because the cigarette was not lit properly. See Morris & Waldman, supra note 2 1 0. To overcome those 
problems, RJR provided consumers with four pages of directions on how to smoke the Premier. Each 
cigarette was good for around I 0 to 1 2  solid drags before the heat source ran out, but who was counting? 
Disposal of spent cigarettes also proved a problem, which RJR endeavored to solve by including with each 
pack a plastic case to carry unpleasant cigarene carcasses, but that solution, according to one investigator, 
had a negative psychological effect because it reminded the smoker of a junkie's discarded hypodermic 
needles. See Riley, supra note 2 1 3. 
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cigarettes were priced 15% to 20% higher than conventional cigarettes-··at a 
time when discount brands [were] taking off."2 1 8  
In light of this history, i t  seems doubtful that the .. marketing disaster" 
provides any evidence that cigarettes are not addictive. If anything, the Premier 
experiment and other efforts to provide a viable cigarette substitute provide 
some evidence of the addictiveness of nicotine. In each of these cases. the 
manufacturer has chosen to leave nicotine in its product, despite an abil ity to 
remove the substance and despite knowledge of the hazards it poses.21� 
11 .  Evidence of Rational Decisionmaking 
Viscusi offers a second type of argument to suggest that ··smoking 
behavior follows patterns similar to that of other types of consumption 
goods,"220 or, in other words, that cigarettes are not addictive. For instance. 
Viscusi emphasizes that the elasticity of consumer demand with respect to both 
cigarette price and consumer income is "not entirely dissimilar" to those of 
other products.221 Specifically, Viscusi summarizes forty-one studies that 
were "able to generate estimates that indicated a negative elasticity of demand 
2 1 8. Ticer & Rhein, supra note 2 1 1 .  It is wonh noting finally that, although comumcl'> h.ul plcnt) ol 
good reasons not to switch 10 Premier c1garc11e,, II wa' ultnnatcly RJR'' dcc"ion to pull the product from 
the market after only a very brief tnal. A number of internal corporJtc 1�u� ma) help to e�plJin the 
"marketing disaster," including uncenainty. d"agrccmcnt � to RJR'' true mou'e' and the Premier·, 
chances of success. concerns over the rcadine" of the product for market. and corporate mJncU\enng 
relating to the leveraged buyout of RJR. See Bt'RROl'GI! & HEl.YAR. suprn note 2 1 3. at 1 1 1 - 1 2. 1 1 9-22. 
Bradley Johnson, Up in Smoke, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC' (:"< C ), Mar 1 3. 1989. JI 8. �lorn' & 
Waldman, supra note 2 1 0. 
2 1 9. A sworn statement given to the FDA in March of 1 996 b) Dr Ian L°) dc"· a fonncr .i.-'>OC1Jte 
scientist for Philip Morris, is enlightening on th" point· 
Tobacco companies like Phihp Morri' learned a Jong tune ago that 11 " "' hJrd to get people 
to stay with a good tasting product if the nicotine lc:vcl wa' too low It " fairl) \Jfc to -ay that 
while taste is a very imponant component of a 'mol.cr\ cxpcncncc (""-at"la.:11011·· 1 \\tth a 
cigarene, that good taste alone does not ,u,tain a marl.ct Pl11hp Mom' clcarl) undcr,too<l 1111, 
relationship between nicotine level and product acceptab1hty (c.g . that the) could dc,clop a 
market for a medium to high nicotine product that had marginal t�te. but that the) \\ ould lta' e 
trouble sustaining the sales of a good-t�ung product that w� too Jo" in mcotincl 
Declaration of Ian L Uydess. Ph.D. to the Food and Dmg Ad1111111s1rnt1em. 1 1  2 Toba.:co Pro<l, Lmg Rep 
(TPLR) 8. 1 ,  8.6 ( 1 996); see also lmemal Memos Sholl' RJ Remolcls TolH1cco Comp<m\ for;:eted U11dam:e 
Smokers and Viewed Nicotine as a Dmg. 10.6 Tobacco Prod' Ltt1g Rep I 1 57. I 1 57 f 1 995! (hcreuwller 
lmemal Memos] (''"Happily for the tobacco indu,try. mcounc " both habttuaung and umquc 1n tt' 'anct) 
of physiological actions."' (quoting an internal RJR memo)) Smoke� choo.c brand' according to their 
"individual nicotine dosage requirement' and 'econdanly by a vanety of other con\ldcrJllon,. i ndudmg 
flavor." Internal Memos, supra. at 1 . 1 57; see also suprn note 144 (de><:nbing " hat the tobacco indu>tf) 
has known about the addictiveness of c1garc11e, and ho" the indu•tf) may ha' c mampulatc<l that 
addictiveness). In shon, the fact that ta,te may play a role m people·, choice' among c1gan:11e bramh doc' 
not--even the industry seem' to rccognize-md1catc that c1garc11c' arc not addict I\ e Th" wn of e\ IJcn.:c 
led FDA regulators to suspect that nicotine had been mampulatc<l for 11, addict I\ c effect, prompting the 
FDA to enter the "tobacco wars." See HILTS. suprn note 1 2. at 1 02- 1 2  
220. Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 66. 
22 I .  VISCUS!, supra note 49, at I 0 I :  see also Vi'CU\I. su11rn note I 02. al 52. 66 bub>tttullng the 
phrase "�imilar to"). 
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for cigarettes" ranging from -0.4 to - 1 .4.222 The latter extreme was an 
estimate of the price elasticity for teenagers, "who appear to be most sensitive 
to the price."223 Viscusi finds "striking[]" that all the studies would provide 
evidence that "as the price of cigarettes declines, consumers increase their 
demand for the product" and that "price increases for cigarettes will reduce 
consumer demand."224 He concludes that such evidence "implies that 
smoking decisions satisfy a basic but fairly undemanding test of 
rationality."225 
Viscusi also makes a closely related observation that "the character of 
individual risk perceptions" also affects a consumer's smoking propensity.226 
"Higher assessed smoking risk probabilities decrease the probability that an 
individual will smoke."227 For instance, "smokers assess the lung cancer risk 
as being .37, which is .06 lower than the societal perception of .43."228 This 
finding is "also consistent with rational decision making."229 This is true 
because rational actors would treat perceived increases in risk as tantamount 
to price increases.230 
Still more evidence of rational decisionmaking can be found in smokers' 
selection of cigarettes. Although a majority of all smokers in the survey 
expressed concern about the health risks of smoking, a disproportionate 
percentage of those who expressed such concern smoke putatively healthier 
"low-tar" cigarettes.231 Thus, risk perceptions seem to have a predictable 
effect on decisionmaking among smokers, just as they do between smokers and 
nonsmokers. 232 
According to Viscusi, "The character of the tradeoffs that smokers make 
in other contexts," such as in the workplace, is "consistent with risk-taking 
decisions in the smoking domain."233 Nonsmokers require more 
compensation to bear job-related risks of serious injury.234 This is probably 
222. V1scus1. supra note 49, at 1 06-07. 
223. Id. at 1 06. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. He also points out that the evidence "highlights the potential role of taxes as a policy 
instrument for influencing cigarette smoking behavior." Id. 
226. Id. at 1 1 0; see also Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67. 
227. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67; see also V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0. 
228. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 10. 
229. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67. 
230. It is noteworthy that Viscusi's own findings suggest that risk perceptions arc not especially 
influential in  a person's decision to smoke. See, e.g., V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0 (explaining thut 
differences in risk assessments should help explain consumption choices and then conceding that difference� 
in smoker and nonsmoker risk perceptions were "not stark"); id. at 1 14 (describing the "disparity in the 
perceptions of smokers and nonsmokers" as "minor"). 
23 1 .  See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67. 
232. But cf. supra notes 1 04-105 and accompanying text (describing how "light" cigarettes may be 
deceptively dangerous). 
233. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66. 
234. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 10- 1 1 5, 143; Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-67: Viscusi, supra 
note 205, at 373. 
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the most important evidence, in his view, because it indicates "that smokers 
differ systematically from non-smokers in terms of their valuation of the health 
effects of smoking."235 
Based on this evidence that the decision to smoke is responsive to price 
and risk perceptions and that smokers appear more willing to take risks than 
nonsmokers, Viscusi suggests that the purchase of cigarettes is 
i ndistinguishable from the purchase of .. automobiles . . . or books.''2� Put 
differently, "there is at least some evidence that cigarette smoking is an action 
of one's authentic self."237 This evidence. however, is perfectly consistent 
with the addictive models that we described above.23K The general message 
of those models is that some consumers who now smoke might not if the risks 
and benefits were presented to them simultaneously in an aggregated fashion 
at the moment of decision. Indeed, those models would predict that price 
i ncreases and risk perceptions would influence aggregate smoking patterns. 
To be clear, it may be helpful to describe in slightly more detail Thomas 
Schell ing's multiple selves model, which Yiscusi's arguments seem specifically 
intended to refute.239 In Schelling's view, self-management is equivalent to 
the management of someone else-"someone in a close relation, with a 
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child."240 
Sticking with Schelling's parent-and-child analogy. one would predict that. 
other things being equal, the greater the perceived price or risk facing a child's 
decision, the more control a parent would seek to exert. Moreover, a great deal 
of Schell ing's discussion of how individuals manage the contest for 
self-control, as well as how the Jaw might assist them, involves altering the 
"prices" and the perceived risks associated with smoking.2� 1 Indeed, that 
effect is what leads some consumers 10 cry 10 crick chemselves into 
overestimating the risks of their choice-noc unlike che common and more 
observable habit of setting one's watch a few minuces fasc.242 The same poinc 
235. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at  1 1 2. 
236. Id. at 1 09. 
237. Viscusi, supra note 205. at 373- 74. Vi,cu,1 concede' 1ha1 man) 'mol.c:n 'ur"c:) cd c\prc:� a 
desire to quit, but states that .. the full implicauon' of the 'ur.cy rc:'pon�' lire: not clear .. Id at 37-l 
238. See supra Subsections 11.B.4.b-d. 
239. See supra note 205 and accompanying tcx1 
240. SCHELLING, supra nole l 83. al 63. 
24 1 .  Thus, Schelling is unsurprised by 1hc fac1 1ha1 n hcn 1hc Surgeon General nc:nl publu; \\llh 
findings about 1he risks of cigareues, smoking decreased. 5,.,. 1d. at 82 
242. See id. at 78-80. One might explain Vi'cu>t \ finding> in JU'! lhc>c lc:nm llia1 I>. con>umc:n ma) 
attempt to trick themselves into believing that cigareuc' arc cx1rc:mcfy dangcrou> as a mean> of mamlmnmg 
some self-control. If that were true. then Vi�u,i\ cv1dcnce could be undcn.tood as the: >)'mptom. no1 1hc: 
absence, of a problem. 
Schelling does, from lime to 11me. empha!>1ze 1ha1 h" conccp11on of the: md1\ 1dual 1> d1ffcrc:n1 from 
the rational ac1or conception. He wri le>. for m'tancc. thal "'lhc ordinary human being t> wmcumc' nol 
a single rational individual . . .  [bu1] more lil.c a 'mall collcclf \ 1 1) ·· Id al 93 Con�uc:nll) . ··mdn1dual> 
may nol make decisions in accordance w11h the po,1ula1c> of r.11 1onal11y " /ti. A pc:non ·, choice:> may foil 
to "display the qualities 1ypically imputed 10 rauonal dcc1Mon. ltkc: lr.Jn>lll\ lly. 1rrdc,ancc: of "1rrc:fc:,an1' 
alternatives, and short-run stability over ume ... Id. at 94. But. again. Schc:lhng doc:> not mean IO >Ugg�I 
tha1 price or ri>k perceptions will not influence con>umcr.· conduct tn prc:d1c1ablc: \\3)> Tho-.: \ anablc> 
1 2 1 6  The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 163 
can be made with respect to George Ainslie's time-discounting model.243 
That model also predicts that price increases and perceived risk increases 
would lead to decreases in consumption levels. To be sure, the more immediate 
the increase, the more dramatic will be the response, but at the margin, average 
consumption levels will always be inversely related to price and risk 
perceptions: When consumers face a higher price or perceive an increase in the 
risks of cigarettes, they will, other things being equal, smoke less (or switch 
to a brand that they perceive to be less risky). 
Viscusi's evidence is also consistent with the path dependence model of 
addiction. In terms of the decision to smoke, the point of the metaphor was not 
that smokers would fail to alter their smoking behavior in the face of new 
costs. Instead, it was that some smokers would continue to smoke only because 
earlier decisions raised the costs of quitting. In the aggregate, however, if price 
or perceived risk levels of smoking were to increase, the model would predict 
that more smokers would quit. 
In addition to the evidence that smokers respond to price variations in 
cigarettes, Viscusi presents findings that smokers are, other things being equal, 
less likely to wear seat belts and more willing to accept job risks than 
nonsmokers.244 These findings, he suggests, support the conclusion that 
smokers are less risk averse than nonsmokers, a conclusion that is consistent 
with the rational smoker model. These findings, however, are also consistent 
with the addiction models that we have considered. The possibility of varying 
tastes across consumers is not unique to Viscusi's rational actor model. Tastes 
could just as easily vary across consumers under our addiction models, with 
similar effect. Consumers who are especially sensitive or insensitive to risk in 
one context will likely be the same in other contexts.245 For example, 
returning to Schelling's parent-child metaphor, if the parent self is especially 
will influence which of the multiple selves wins the contest. The self who wants to stop smoking gains 
some advantage in the contest for control, other things being equal, when cigarette prices increase. The type 
of "irrational" behavior that Schelling has in mind is that of the individual who in one moment is cursing 
and forswearing cigarettes as he crumbles a pack in his hand and, in the next moment, is lighting the bent 
and busted remains of one of those cigarettes. See id. 
243. See Ainslie, s11pra note 1 76, at 47 1 ,  492-93. Schelling also describes the person whose multiple 
selves differ along "the dimension of time preference-of the discount rate to compare present with future, 
near future with far future, imminent with remote, or permanent with transient. The idea is that the person 
who . . .  lights that cigarette . . .  is merely discounting the future with a high interest rate." SCllELLINO, 
s11pra note 1 83,  at 62. 
244. See Vtscus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 13-14. 
245. It may be worth emphasizing i n  this regard that social scientists have long recognized thut 
personal or behavioral characteristics likely play a significant role in the smoking habits of individuals. The 
Surgeon General's 1 989 report summarized that evidence as follows: "Studies have linked initiation of 
smoking with rule breaking in school, general delinquency, age at first intercourse, inadequate contraceptive 
use, low levels of child compliance within the family, low levels of responsibility, nonconvcntionulity, 
impulsivity, rebelliousness, and previous use of alcohol and other substances." SURGEON GENERAL'S 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 336 (citations omitted). Such correlations are analogous lo those 
observed "with other drug addictions," id., and as such do not imply that cigarettes are not addictive. 
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lax in  controlling the child self with respect to one type of risk, then it seems 
l ikely that the parent self would be lax with regard to all types of risk. 
There may be another problem with Viscusi's evidence-a problem of 
interpretation. In his view, the evidence "is consistent with differences in 
individual tastes driving choices in a rational economic manner. "246 In an 
earlier article (with Joni Hersch), however, Viscusi seems to identify two other 
viable explanations for the evidence, neither of which suggests that smokers 
smoke simply because they value their lives less than nonsmokers, as measured 
by job-risk premiums. One "hypothesis that generates similar patterns of 
influences is that cigarette smoking and seatbelt use serve[] as proxies for the 
production of safety."247 Alternatively, Hersch and Viscusi concede, the 
evidence is consistent with systematic differences across individuals in 
estimations of the magnitude of the health loss: "If individuals underestimate 
the severity of all adverse health risks from jobs, cigarettes. or automobiles, 
they will be more l ikely to engage in all of these forms of risky behavior.''248 
Though Viscusi once recognized these other potential explanations for his 
evidence, he does not, so far as we can determine, consider them in his work 
on smoking policy. 
Moreover, there is another viable interpretation of the evidence that 
Viscusi seems nowhere to consider. Contrary to Viscusi 's implicit assumption, 
for instance, tastes may not be completely exogenous-that is, fixed and 
uninfluenced by consumer's smoking decisions and other risky decisions. 
Instead, a consumer's decision to encounter one risk may well influence the 
consumer's willingness to encounter another. Accepting for the sake of 
argument that smokers believe they face a substantial risk of illness, disability, 
or premature death from smoking, it seems plausible that smokers will have 
less distaste for other types of health risks than will nonsmokers. The greater 
the chance that a person will grow ill or die prematurely from one type of risk, 
the less willing that person should be to invest in avoiding illness or death 
246. VJSCUSI, supra note 49, at 1 1 3. 
247. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2 1 1 ,  at 225; see also 1d. at 205 (explaining the intuition behind the 
hypothesis). A similar panial explanation that Hersch and ViM:u>1 do not con>1der " that smol..crs may be: 
less productive or more costly (or perceived as less producll \ e  or more costly) on the JOb, oth<:r things 
being equal, than nonsmokers. For instance, smokers probably take more break> than do their nonsmolang 
counterparts, for obvious reasons. For summanes of a number of studies that have purponed to find that 
smokers are less productive or more costly to employ. sec: David B Ezra. ··G,.r Off Your Burrs·· Th .. 
Employer's Righr To Regulate Employee Smoking. 60 l°Er-N. L. REV. 905. 9 1 0- 1 6  ( 1 993). and Jimmy Goh. 
"Smokers Need Not Apply ": Challe11gi11g Employmem D1scnmmarw11 Agauut Smokt'rs Unda th<' 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 8 1 7. 823 ( 1 99 1 ). Su also mfra note 278 (dc:scnbing 
the potential savings in health insurance costs to employers who institute smol-ing bans in the "' orkplaceJ. 
Some scholars, however, have challenged the evidence that smokers are le>> producU\e than nonsmokers. 
See, e.g., Alfred Vogel, Are Smokers Really Less Productm� Than Nonsmokas'. LEGts. POL'Y. Summer 
1 985, at 6. 
248. Hersch & Viscusi. supra note 2 1 1 .  at 205. The evidence u incon>1stent. ho" ever. with the 
hypothesis that "health-related activities capture difference> in nsk p<'rr:t'ptw1u." Id. (emphasis added) 
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from another type of risk, other things being equal.249 To the extent that 
consumers' risky decisions affect their other risky decisions as we have 
described, it no longer follows that "it is largely . . .  differences in taste that 
drive the differences in smoking decisions."250 
In sum, it seems that none of the evidence Viscusi highlights rules out the 
possibility that consumers are addicted to cigarettes, at least as we have 
defined "addiction." Perhaps the only model of addiction that Viscusi's 
evidence contradicts is the model that assumes that "addicted" smokers are 
simply incapable of not smoking at some fixed rate, no matter the price and 
no matter the risk. Indeed, it appears that Viscusi has that model in mind. For 
example, in a very recent article, he explains that he is responding to those 
"observers [who] have hypothesized that even if people understand the risk of 
smoking, they may . . .  be addicted to smoking and unable to alter their 
behavior."251 His definition of the stylized smoker model-which he 
describes as the "main characterization of smokers underlying the smoking 
debate"-also seems to include that extreme notion of addiction.252 We are 
doubtful that such an extreme position is as common as he suggests.253 
Similarly, we have nowhere encountered a claim that smokers, in the 
aggregate, will not lower their smoking rates in response to price increases and 
we do not believe that anyone holds such a view.254 
249. The basic intuition underlying our point here has an analogue in the cynical bumper sticker that 
reads, "Eat Well, Exercise, and Get Hit by a Truck," and is related to the argument above regarding 
imperfect relative-risk information. See supra Subsection Il.B.3. 
250. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 14. Finally, we are suspicious about the study results in light of the 
absolute wage-compensation amounts that Hersch and Viscusi found. It seems to us implausible that a 
sample of blue collar employees of three manufacturing firms (a wholesale warehouse, a laundry, and a 
gardening firm), would implicitly value an injury that caused a worker to miss one workday at 
$83,2 1 7  .39-even if the worker is a nonsmoker and a non-seatbelt-user. The point is even more clear when 
one takes into account that the "compensating differentials may be biased downward" by at least 
$ 1 2,608.70. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2 1 1 ,  at 221 .  Again, it seems odd that workers would demand 
what is likely to be well over one year's salary as implicit compensation for the risk of an injury leading 
to the loss of one day of work. These results suggest that something is wrong with the methodology of the 
study or with the rationality of the subjects studied. Hersch and Viscusi do not, as far as we can tell, 
address this issue. 
25 1 .  Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66 (emphasis added); see also VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 5, 1 8, I O I .  
252. V1scus1, supra note 49, a t  5; see also id. at 1 8  (stating that "if they are cognizant o f  the hazards, 
they ignore these risks in making their decisions"); id. at 2 1  ("Only the immediate gratification provided 
by cigarettes drives consumer behavior."). 
253. Indeed, Schelling, the only scholar whom Viscusi mentions by name. devotes considerable 
attention to understanding the mechanisms that individuals commonly employ to help with the battle of 
self-control. Implicit in Schelling's discussion is the notion that different consumers will have different 
amounts of self-control. See T.C. Schelling, Self-Command: A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIME 1 67 
(George Loewenstein & Jon Eisler eds., 1 992) (noting that people vary in their ability to stop using cocaine 
or cigarettes, to get out of bed at a chosen time. and to do many other things that they know they should 
do). 
254. After cursorily surveying 4 1  studies of price elasticity, Viscusi concludes that "most of the 
demand elasticities are clustered in the range from [-0.4 to - I .OJ," implying that a 1 0% increase in price 
would reduce consumption by 4% to 10%. Vtscusr, supra note 49, at 1 05. His argument seems to be that 
if cigarettes were truly addictive then price increases would have little or no effect on overall con�umption 
rates. 
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We have a variety of re,ponse,. First. It 1' not clear that an) plausible model of add1c11on could lead 
to the conclusion that addicted consumers \\ I l l  be \\holly pnce 1n�n'111 ' e  A- Gar) Bccl..cr dcmon,trated 
in a cla5sic anicle, "[N]egatively inclined marl..et demand cune' re'uh not so much from rational beha\lor 
per se as from a general principle which includes a " 1de clas' of 1rrat1onal beha\ 1or as " el l  � Gary S 
Becker, Irrational Beha1·ior and Eco11on11c Tlzeon. 70 J POL Eco". 1 .  4 ( 1 962 ) It 1' thus unclear " h) 
Viscus1 stresses that the "most striking[]" insight from h1' 'un e) of 'tud1e' ma) be that all the studies 
indicate downward-sloping demand or why he a"en' that '"(t]he pnce re'pon,1, enes' of c1gan:t1c demand 
implies that smoking decisions satisfy a b;1'ic but fairly undemanding test of rauonaht) " V1sn SI. rnpm 
note 49, at 1 06. 
Still, Vi'cusi'' bigger point may be s1mpl) that addicuon unphes that demand cune' \\ ould be 
extraordinarily steep. See id. at 1 0 1 .  The claim that cigarette> are add1ct1\e ,  ho\\e\ er, doc, not ncce,.anly 
lead to such a prediction. Instead it may sugge>t onl) that demand for c1garet1e' \\ i l l  be le" pnce d.i.st1c 
among current smokers than it would be were cigarette' stnpped of their add1cll\ e features le g . nicotine l 
But even if Viscusi were correct, we bel ieve the evidence 1' quite con>1stent \\ uh V1,,.;u,1·, notion of 
··addiction." 
To see why. it is necessary inmally to point out that. as far as \\ e can tell. V1,,.;u,1 mappropnatcl) 
truncates the lower end of the price-elasticity estunate' that he 'un e)'' From \\hat "e can o1™:ne, It 1s 
more accurate to state that the estimates cluster between a r.mge of -0 2 and - 1  0 Su td at 1 02-05 tbl 5-6 
(summarizing the studies). Indeed. 11  appears to u' that rough!) one-third of the ,1ud1cs that V1,,.;u,1 
summarizes include estimates of less than -0.4. See td 
Another problem with Viscus1 's interpretauon 1s that u seem' to assume that all 'mol..er. arc c:quall) 
addicted to cigarettes. Elasticity studies. however. typ1cjl ly measure a\ erage n:spon�' to pncc changes 
It may well be that for a sizable percentage of 'mol..ers. pncc: pla) '  little role in the dc:c1,1om of "' hc:thcr 
and how much to smoke. If enough smol..ers are highly pncc: �n>lll\e, ho\\ e\ c:r, their pnce reacuons "' I l l  
dilute some of the price insens1t1vity o f  other smokers. when the quanut) reaction' to pncc incrca� arc: 
averaged. In other words, averaging may understate the s1gmlicant problem that man) people ha\ c 111  
quitting. To get some sense of the vanance of pncc clast1c1111:s. It nnght be 1l lun11na11ng to d1\ 1dc: the 
market into different groups. Long-tenn smokers, one 1111gh1 predict, are hl..cl) to be more addicted and thus 
to evince much less responsiveness to price than the average: '11101..c:r and, c:spcc1all). the: ,hon-tc:nn smoker 
Evidence that young people have the most elastic demand scems to confim1 th1' claun Su. <" i: .  td al 1 04  
tbl.5-6 (summarizing a n  elasticity study o f  children age' 1 2  t o  1 7  that c'umatcd a pncc dastlcll)' o f  - 1  4 ,  
which made chi ldren b y  fa r  the most price-sensl!J\ e group i n a l l  of the studies suncycdJ 
I t  is imponant to note as well that change' in sales wil l  reflect �'·eral vanablcs, includi ng how man) 
nonsmokers do not begin smoking becau'e of pncc mcn:ase' 111c dec1>1on not lo become a smol..cr 1s. 
obviously, unaffected by the addictive quality of cigarette,, becau� tho� who an: not ) ct 'mol..cr. cannot 
be addicted. Consequently, the price elasticme' that V1.cus1 'umman1.e' may 0\ e�tatc the c:� of quitting 
(or understate the addictiveness of smol..ing). given that they al'o reflcc1 the dcc1,ion' of nommokc� lo 
remain nonsmokers. 
In light of these critic1,ms. it b 1llummat1ng to loo!.. clo'cl) at the real-\\orld '1gmlicancc oi \'1,,.;u,1·, 
elasticity figures. What are the 1mplica11on� of h1' finding' on. sa) . a t) p1cal long-tem1 "nol..cr " ho •mol..e­
two packs (40 cigarettes) per day'> Suppo'e that the pncc mcrea'e' b) S0.20 per pacl.. trcprcscntmg a 1 0"< 
increase over the current pack pnce of appro�1matcl) $2 OOl Our "noker. \\ho "nol..c' 730 pacb tor 
1 4.600 cigarettes) per year. would have to shell out an add1t1onal $ 1 46 00 per ) ear lo rnam1am •-Urrcnl 
levels of consumption. According to the elast1c1ty studies that Vi.,.;u,1 'un cys. ho\\ c\cr . .:on,umpuon le'cl' 
will, on average, likely be reduced by between 2'!< and 1 0'<- Suppose that our 'mokc:r \\ I l l  re'pond lo the 
price i ncrease as an average smoker would. Under the lo" 2"< c'umate, the pnce mcrca!>C " 111 lead to " 
decrease of fewer than 15 packs per year to a total of 7 1 5  pacb t" l11ch 1' equ1, alcnt to 1 4,300 .:1garcttcs 
per year or 39. 1 7  cigarettes per day-a decline of le" than one cigarette per da) I Under lhc: 1 W cstunate, 
the total number of cigarettes consumed per year \\ I l l  drop to 657 pacb ( 1 3 . 1 40 mdl\ 1dual cigarettes or 
36 cigarenes per day). Either way there 1s plenty of smol..ing. 
Still more can be said about pnce effecb on 'mokmg habits A"umc that onl) half of the o' crall 
reduction in consumption will be on the pan of those 'mol..crs " ho continue to 'mol..c And •upposc: that 
the other half of the total reduction will be made up of tho'e smol..e� " ho quu and thO!>C nommolcr. " ho 
choose not to stan. Assume, finally. that quuu ng and not ,1amng occur in rough!) equ .. l mca.urc. so thal 
each is responsible for about one quaner of the overall cla,t1cll) re'pon!>C Under tho!><: a.'umpuom. the 
lower and upper benchmarks would be clo,er: 111e ela,t1C1t) \\ould be bct\\cen -0 1 5  ;ind -0 75.  " h1ch 
would imply an expected reduction from 40 cigarette' to bet"cen 39 4 and 37 c1gan:t1c' per da) �lorc:o,c:r. 
those who did not quit would decrease their 'mol..ing le\ds b)· '1gmlicantl) le-' tl1Jn thilt in hght of the 
fact that one quaner of the total effect 1s. by a.sumpt1on. the con,equc:nce of 'mokcr' " ho quu '11101..mg 
altogether. 
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Given that Viscusi's evidence refutes, at most, the straw man model that 
assumes all consumers completely ignore risk and price information, it is not 
clear why Viscusi believes his evidence regarding the aggregate effect of 
information has any relevance to the underlying question. Viscusi himself 
stresses that "[e]ven addictive drugs, such as heroin, exhibit price 
responsiveness so that the existence of some price elasticity does not rule out 
all addictive properties."255 Ultimately, therefore, the evidence that Viscusi 
offers to demonstrate that the decision to smoke is like the decision to 
purchase other consumer goods fails to demonstrate why that decision is not 
equally analogous to the decision to inject heroin. The evidence does not help 
answer the question that motivated it.256 
This discussion should help to put Viscusi 's elasticity figures into perspective. The price sensitivity 
of smokers, particularly long-term smokers, is likely more consistent with even Viscusi's extreme uddiction 
model than Viscusi gives it credit for being. In any event, other economists who huve looked at such 
evidence have indicated that, contrary to Viscusi 's conclusion, demand for cigarettes is unusually inelastic 
and entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are addictive. For example, although Manning 
et al. concede that "[e]stimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes vary enormously from study 
to study," MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 170, they also indicate that cigarettes are especially price 
inelastic when they explain that "cigarette taxes cause relatively less distortion and tax evasion behavior 
than other taxes," id. at 24. Moreover, they make the following observation with respect to income 
elasticities: "Apparently the demand for cigarettes is income inelastic, with the estimates ranging from a 
low of -0.002 to a high of 0.93. This suggests that cigarettes may in fact be considered a necessity (at least 
among smokers}, probably because of the addictive nature of smoking." Id. at I 7 I .  Another group of 
economists recently summarized the price-elasticity evidence as follows: "Cigarettes are widely regarded 
as having a relatively low elasticity of demand, with a consensus estimate in the vicinity of -0.4 in many 
of the major industrialised nations." Warner et al., supra note 28, at 38 1 ;  see also Craig Howell el al., 
Pricing Practices for Tobacco Products, 1980-94, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. I 994, at 3, I O  (noting the 
"generally low responsiveness of consumer demand for cigarettes to price changes, al least in the short 
run"); Jeffrey E. Harris, What Can the Cigarette Industry Afford? Stmclllring a Long-Term Scttlemelll 
(visited July 28, I 997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/afford.html> ("Economists generally regard the 
demand for cigarettes as not very sensitive to price."). It is fair to say that although other economists 
recognize that there is a range of estimates, they also view the evidence as indicating that demand for 
cigarettes is relatively price inelastic and as entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are 
addictive. 
255. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at I O I .  
256. Cf Croley & Hanson, A Defense o f  Pain-and-Suffering Damages. supra note 4 0  (making a 
similar critique). 
A third and final way in which Viscusi attempts to demonstrate that cigarettes arc no different from 
"almost all economic commodities" is by pointing to the numerous ways in which the term "addiction" hns 
been overused: 
In recent years the addiction label has been liberally applied to a variety of behavioral 
phenomena. Most residents of Los Angeles claim to want to move out of the city but do not. 
Similarly, millions of workers profess a desire to leave their jobs, but they do not quit. Self-help 
psychology paperbacks provide guidance for overcoming addictive relationships. 
Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372; see also V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 20. Here again, Viscusi's argument 
begs the question. If the addiction label has been liberally applied, that docs not tell us whether cigarettes 
are addictive. Does the fact that some Los Angeles residents said they wanted to move out of Los Angeles, 
but did not, imply that heroin is not addictive? 
We suspect, moreover, that the disparity between what unhappy Los Angeles residents say and what 
they do may be quite analogous to the problem that we believe some smokers face. Within the last decade 
Los Angeles has been plagued by crime, racial strife, natural disasters, and controversial jury verdicts. The 
Los Angeles economy, among other things, has suffered tremendously as a consequence. See Natulie 
Kostelni, Phoenix Area Led Nation in New Jobs; Los Angeles Posted the Biggest Decline, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 22, I 996, at A2. The fact that some current residents do not move out of Los Angeles docs not mean 
that if they were currently living elsewhere they would return to Los Angeles Similarly, you will not hear 
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111. Summary 
A number of efficiency-minded scholars appear to have concluded that 
Viscusi's evidence significantly undermines the case for consumer-protection 
laws with respect to smoking.257 While we applaud Viscusi 's efforts to shed 
empirical light on this important question. his evidence does not have the 
policy implications that he endorses. In the following section. we explain how 
an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, such as enterprise liability. would 
respond to all of the information-based market failures discussed in this part. 
including those related to addiction. 
C. The Jnfonnational Effect of Ex Posr lncemive-Based Regularion Revisired 
Having described in detail the variety of information-related reasons that 
consumers may be undeterrable, it may be helpful to revisit the question of 
how ex post incentive-based regulation would respond. :?5K If cigarenc 
manufacturers were liable for all the harms caused by cigarenes. whether 
through tort law or another compensation system, they would have to raise 
their prices to offset those liability costs. And through product prices 
consumers would internalize the costs of smoking. Manufacturer liability 
of nonresidents of Los Angeles staling 1ha1 they do no! want lo hve in Lo> Angele:; and then moving there. 
Residents are "stuck." For instance, many homeowners will lose cons1der.1ble money 1f 1hcy sell al currcnl 
market prices. In other words, some residents of Los Angeles may nol move away-and wme smokers may 
not quit-simply because exit costs arc unexpectedly high. Under !hose e1rcums1ances. II 1s nol clear 1ha1 
the "revealed choice" is efficient. See supra Subsecuon 11.BA.b. Wha1ever label 1s u� 10 dcscnbe such 
a state of affairs, it seems inappropriate 10 be sanguine or d1>m1sm·e aboul 11. Elsewhere Viscus1 poinl5 oul 
that "[t]he fact that reversing . . .  decisions is cosily docs nol imply 1ha1 lhe choices arc incorrccl. lmtcad, 
we must be cognizant of the potential losses from m1>1al.es when dec1>1ons arc hard 10 aher •· Visci:s1. 
supra note 49, at 1 1 . Perhaps so, but Viscusi ignores 1ha1 many people m1gh1 nol a:>sume 1ha1 the dec1S1on 
is hard to alter. And absent that assumplion, consumers have no need 10 lake inlo account the polenual 
losses. 
Finally, we agree with Viscusi's suggeslion 1ha1 lr.insacuon co>ls m1glu prevent people from doing 
what they purport to wan! 10 do. See Viscus1, supra nole 205. al 372.73 The lr.imacuon cos! label, 
however, which has been liberally applied 10 a vancty of efficiency 1mped11nents in recenl years, " no more 
precise or illuminating than the addiction label that Viscus1 cn11c1zc>. In any even!, a:>surmng 1ha1 V1scus1 
does not mean "addictive" as we have used the term (including path dependence). !hen 11 1s e'.\lrcmcly hard 
to understand what transaction costs could possibly be incurred by q111111ng smoking. Ahhough II 1s easy 
to imagine the sizeable transaction costs associated with moving or even wuh ending a rcla11onsh1p, "'e arc 
unable to conjure up similar costs that might resuh from the decision 10 stop smolang. If  anything. we 
would predict a significant reduction in transacuon costs. as 1ha1 ienmnology has been conventionally 
employed. Given that Viscusi must be referring 10 the wuhdrawal effecl> of smoking c�uon. ''add1cuon" 
and not "transaction cost" more accurately descnbes the underlying problem. 
257. See, e.g., Taxin. supra note 49. al 230-42. 260-63; Jacob Sullum. Up 111 Smok.-, 25 REAsos 66 
( 1 993) (reviewing VISCUS!, supra note 49) (''Viscus1 demolishes !hi> view of smokers [as mcoune slaves), 
which has long been a basic tenet of U.S. heahh policy."); sa also V1sn1s1. supra noie 49. al book Jackel 
(statement of Michael Grossman) ("Viscus1's resuhs-that on average. persons o\·ercsumale the nsk of 
contracting lung cancer from cigarette smoking and. that an incrca5e in the perccpuon of 1h1s nsk lo"'ers 
the probability of smoking for adults and teenagers-have profound 1mphca11on� for pubhc policy wuh 
regard to this behavior."). 
258. For a fuller treatment of the general argument. sec Crolc) & Han>on, fj11.-,.,1ru.- Lwbilm. mpra 
note 40, at 770-79. 786-92; and Hanson & Logue. Producls L1ab1l11y in Contexl. mprn nole -10, al 23-33 
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would, in other words, help to educate consumers concerning the full costs of 
each and every cigarette. This is not to say that manufacturer liability would 
educate consumers about cigarettes on a cognitive level. The point is, rather, 
that consumers would, in reacting to changing product prices, respond as if 
they were adding the health costs of smoking to what had been the nominal 
costs of smoking. They would do so precisely because under enterprise liability 
the nominal costs of cigarettes would reflect those health costs. Consumers 
need never do any calculations.259 Furthermore, to the extent that different 
manufacturers' products pose greater or lesser health risks (through variation 
of tar and nicotine levels, the presence, size, and type of filters, and so on), 
consumers educated by the price mechanism would, all else being equal, 
consume fewer relatively dangerous cigarettes and more relatively safe 
cigarettes. 260 
By incorporating the total costs, including the expected ill-health costs, of 
each cigarette into the price of each cigarette,261 the addictive qualities of 
cigarettes may also be overcome. The sources of addiction, it may be recalled, 
are all related to the ways in which the consumer encounters the costs and 
benefits of smoking. Presumably, if the costs and benefits were presented 
simultaneously, these problems would not arise. Manufacturer liability for the 
costs of cigarettes has the effect of presenting individual smokers with the 
costs and benefits of smoking at roughly the same moment, the point of 
purchase. The path dependence model of addiction would therefore pose less 
of a problem: The consumer's initial path would need less reorienting because 
she would take future costs into account. More concretely, higher prices would 
be more likely to discourage nonsmokers from starting than they would be to 
encourage current smokers to quit.262 Similarly, the problem of the temporal 
259. This means of "infonning" consumers through price is one that economists accept. See, e.g., 
Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 56; Warner et al., s11pra note 28, at 381 -82: cf V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 06 
("[H]igher taxes will [by increasing prices] reduce the demand for cigarettes in much the same way as 
would higher risk perceptions."). 
260. We return to this point below. See infra Subsection V.B. I .  
26 1 .  We are assuming here that the cost function o f  cigarettes i s  l inear. This assumption, though 
questionable, is common. See s11pra note 1 50. 
262. See s11pra note 1 60 and accompanying text; see also Warner ct al., s11pra note 28, at 385 
("Taxation has been shown to be an effective deterrent to smoking, however, with the preponderance of 
evidence suggesting that this is especially true among children, and even many smoking adults support tax 
increases with the expectation that they will discourage children from initiating nicotine addictions." 
(footnote omitted)); Philip J. Cook, Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and C11l111re, 262 SCIENCE 1750, 1750 
( 1 993) (book review) ("[T]here is definitive evidence . . .  that raising the . . .  [price] on cigarettes 
discourages youths from developing a smoking habit and causes some adult smokers to desist."). 
Some might want to reject any liability proposal that is justified in part on the grounds that consumers 
do not act in a way that is consistent with the rational actor model, for fear that doing so will crcalc a 
slippery slope toward a world of paternalistic laws. We are not similarly concerned, for a variety of reasons. 
First, we are not certain that such a slope is undesirable, at least on efficiency grounds. See Hanson & 
Logue, The First-Party lns11rance Externality, s11pra note 40, passim; see also Croley & Hanson, Enterprise 
Liability, s11pra note 40, passim (making the case for mandatory absolute manufacturer liability for all 
products). Second, even if  we were certain, relying on multiple selves analysis in this context to justify 
liability does not imply that liability would be juMified on that basis for all products. Scholars have offered 
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separation of costs and benefits would be mitigated. Consumers would confront 
costs and benefits simultaneously, at the point of purchase. Finally, multiple 
selves would also present less of a problem. The costs that would otherwise 
be borne by a smoker's future selves would, under enterprise liability, be borne 
by the present self in the form of an increased price. In sum. ex post incentive­
based regulation would address many, if not all. of the sources of consumer 
misinformation. 
Ill. THE SECOND SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY: 
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
In Part II, our argument for implementing some form of ex post incentive­
based regulation in the cigarette market was based on informational 
i mperfections. More precisely, we relied on the claim that consumers. when 
deciding whether to purchase and smoke the next pack of cigarettes. either 
underestimate the long-term risks of smoking or do not fully take those risks 
into account. That fact, we said, was a primary source of "consumer 
undeterrability." In this part, we introduce a second source of consumer 
undeterrabi lity: the fact that many of the harms caused by cigarettes are not 
in ternalized by smokers themselves but are instead externalized to third 
parties.263 We describe the sources of those negative externalities in the 
cigarette market, focusing on "insurance externalities" in Section Ill.A and 
"noninsurance externalities" in Section lll.B. In Section III .C. we mount a 
response to the argument made by some economists that, given the external 
social "benefits" of smoking from pension and other savings that occur when 
smokers die relatively young, and assuming that many of the costs to smokers' 
fami lies are already fully internalized by smokers, there is a net positive 
some guidelines for recognizing when the multiple •Che• problem will  be mo't •1gmhcant 5u e � .  
SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 70 (noung the n<-cd for "a ') •temauc " a) of Jnal) 1mg the hJbll or 
weakness along relevant dimensions: the vulnerJb1l1t1c• of 11, \'ICtnn. the environment m " h1ch 11 occur•. 
and the information, communication. and mstituuonal commitment> that can be brought to bear" 1 �lo-.1 of 
those scholars view cigarenes as a parad1gmauc example of a product for \\Inch lhe mult1plc \Che• 
problem plays a role. Schelling, for instance. frcquenily choo•e• c1garc!le •mo1.mg 10 mal.e h1• more 
general points. See, e.g., id. at 58; see also mfra note 784 (de.cnbmg other •1gmlieant d1.11nc11on• bel\\ccn 
cigareues and other consumer products). llurd. n 1• not clear 1ha1 manufacturer hab1hl) can. under any 
circumstances, be characterized as especially patcrnah•llC. After all. hab1ht} doc• nol purpon to be. nor 
does it necessarily have the effect of, a prol11bit1on L1ab1hl) .impl) en•Ure• 1ha1 lhe Clhl• borne in the 
future are internalized in the present. Con•umers are •till free to ma1.e lhe choice thJt 1he) \\anl 10 ma1.e 
given those costs and benefits. For an argument that only an e� po•t mcenll\ e·� regulJ!Or) regnne \\ 111 
ensure that consumers and manufacturers tal..c personal rc•pon•1b1lny for their acuom . .cc 111/rn le�l 
accompanying notes 775-778. Finally. there 1• abo the quc,uon of \\h1ch 1• the au1hen11c \CU-the one \\ho 
wants to smoke or the one who doe• not. For an argument 1ha1 1he authenuc \Cll 1• lhe IJ!ter . .cc 
SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 67-68. 
263. An externality occurs when ""the acuv11y of one person affe<:l[•) lhe \\ clfarc of J1101hcr 111 J \\ilY 
that is not outside the market." HARVEY S. ROSE!'. Pl BLIC' Fl'A'CE 53 t::!d cd 1%81  Thu•. ii negal1\e 
externality occurs when the activny of one cnmy 1mpo•C• a co•l on anoiher 111 a " a) 1ha1 I• nol fully 
reflected i n  market prices, and a po•itive extcrnaluy occurs \\hen the e\lernal effe<:l 1• ii benelil 1hJ1 I• not 
reflected in prices. 
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externality associated with smoking (and, therefore, that smoking should not 
be regulated). Using those economists' data (but changing some key 
assumptions), we show in Subsections III.C.2.a and III.C.2.b, respectively, that 
the negative externalities are greater than these economists have estimated and 
that the positive externalities have been overstated. We conclude that a smoker 
externalizes approximately $7.00 of costs per pack on average.264 In Section 
III.D, we explain how an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime could 
internalize those costs, thereby leading to more efficient care levels (safer 
cigarettes) and activity levels (less smoking).265 
A. Insurance Externalities 
The presence of first-party insurance266 can cause many of the costs of 
smoking to be externalized by smokers to nonsmokers or by heavy smokers 
to light smokers, if the insurers fail  to make premium or coverage adjustments 
based on the insureds' smoking choices. Any of the costs caused by cigarettes 
for which first-party insurance coverage exists can be externalized in this way. 
Those costs include increased health care expenses because of smoking-related 
illnesses, lost income (either lost income to the smoker due to smoking-related 
absence from work or lost to the smoker's dependents due to the smoker's 
illness or premature death), and property damage due to smoking-related fires. 
To understand in general terms how the insurance extemality works, start 
by imagining a world of perfect first-party health, life, disability, and property 
insurance, a world in which insurers could not only distinguish costlessly 
between smokers and nonsmokers but could also make fine-grained distinctions 
at all levels-for example, between light smokers and heavy smokers, and 
between smokers of Camel filterless and smokers of Carlton Ultralights. In 
264. Furthennore, we argue that in any event the so-called savings from smokers' premuture 
deaths-whatever their amount-should be ignored. See infra Subsection 111.C.2.b.iv. 
265. Others have made the argument that market externalities warrant regulation of tobacco. See, e.g., 
Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 48, at 945-48; Gamer, supra note 48, at 272-73; Yandull. 
supra note 48, at 4 1 7- 1 8. 
We should note that much of our analysis in this part depends in important ways on the imperfect 
infonnation arguments from supra Part II. For example, Subsection 111.C.2.a.iii draws heavily on those 
arguments. Indeed, there is a sense in which the imperfect infonnation arguments can be readily trnnslutcd 
into an extemality argument-an "intrapersonal extemality" from the smoker to her future selves. Cf 
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 53 (explaining that smokers might "ignore the externnlity to their future 
selves"); id. at 66 ("[T]here is a time lag before the adverse effects of smoking will become apparent . . . .  
[O]ne's future self may make different decisions than one would make if fully apprised of the long term 
consequences of smoking."). But cf id. at 66-72 (ultimately rejecting on empirical grounds the notion thut 
cigarette-related risks are externalized to smokers' future selves). 
266. The phrase "first-party insurance" is often used to refer to insurance arrangements that cover 
insureds against some loss to the insured other than legal liability. Although most first-party insurance· is 
sold to individuals-e.g., health, life, auto-collision, or homeowners' insurance-it can also be �old to 
businesses-e.g., fire insurance or business interruption insurance. First-party insurance can be provided 
privately through individual insurance policies or group policies, or it can be provided publicly through 
government insurance programs. The phrase "third-party insurance" is often used to refer to covernge for 
the risk of some type of legal liability. 
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such a world, insurers would, in an effort to attract customers. charge different 
premiums to different insureds based on the insureds' levels of smoking and 
on the types of cigarettes smoked. Those premium differentials would perfectly 
reflect the d ifferences in expected costs posed by each insured, based on his 
or her smoking habit. Consumers would thereby be induced through insurance 
premiums to make efficient smoking decisions (whether to smoke at all, how 
much to smoke, what brand to smoke), as they would bear the full costs of 
their consumption choices with respect to cigarettes. Consequently, care levels 
and activity levels would be optimized.167 
But that is not our world. In reality, insurers make virtually no distinctions 
in premiums (or, in the case of publicly provided first-party insurance. taxes) 
or benefits between smokers and nonsmokers, or among different classes of 
smokers. This means that most of the insured costs of smoking are 
externalized; that is, the costs of smoking are not taken into account by 
smokers. As a result, as compared with the world of perfect insurance (or as 
compared with a world with no insurance but with perfect information). 
tobacco companies are not induced to invest optimally in reducing the risks 
posed by cigarettes, smokers are not induced to take all cost-justified steps to 
smoke cigarettes carefully, and there are too many cigarettes produced and 
consumed. 268 
Those inefficiencies can occur in connection with any cigarette-relatc:d risk 
that is covered by first-party insurance. As it turns out, many cigarc:tte-relatc:d 
risks are in fact insured through first-party arrangements. Most of the increase 
in health care costs caused by cigarette smoking is funded through some: form 
of first-party health insurance arrangement. Such arrangements include, for 
example, fee-for-service policies, managed care contracts, or 
government-provided plans such as Medicare or Medicaid.1"" Likewise, a 
267. Cf Hanson & Logue, The Firsr-Parf\· /11s11ra11ce £11enwlm. mprn nole -10. al 1 63·6-I (e\plammg 
how perfect first-party insurance can produce opllmal dc1cm:ncc e'en m a  "' orld \\ llhoul !Ort law) 
268. Cf id. at 1 64-68 (explaining care level and acll\'ll)' lc"cl mcffic1enc1C\ rc>ulung from !he prC\Cnce 
of imperfect first-party insurance). There 1s abo a 'L-cond 'ourcc of acll\'ll)' le' cl 1nefficu:nc) . but 1h1' one 
is in the market for insurance r.uher than in the marl..cl for c1garclle> TI11> me11ic1enc) folio" ' lrom the 
first-party insurance extemality becau'e >Orne non>mol..cr.. who \\ould be m>urcd 111 a \\orld of pc:rfecl 
insurance may, given the insurance ex1emali1y. decide nol 10 purcha>c ut>urancc or decide 10 pun:ha,,c le"' 
insurance than otherwise; and 'ome 'moker.. who "'ould nol ha' c  purcha.>cd m>uram:e lor a> much 
insurance) in a perfect-insurance world can be induced to bU)' lll>Ur.mce (or more m>ur.ince than 01hen• 1..cJ 
Those changes in the allocation of insurance cover.ige can produce a \\clforc lib> Se.- �hchacl Ro1h...ch1ld 
& Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Comperirii'e /11s11ra11ce Markers An Essa\· 011 rlze Eco1101111< J of lmp.-rfnr 
Informarion, 90 Q.J. EcON. 629, 629 ( 1 976). There " abo a po1cn11al d"inbuuonal 1"ue. "" "' callh I> 
transferred from nonsmokers 10 smoker... Thi> occur.. bccau.c >Orne >mol..er> can conunuc 10 >mole tor 
smoke at a higher level) and simply pocket the >:l\'lllg' m lll>Ur.ince prcnuurm. " here"" .ome non>mol..c" 
remain insured but at a higher premium The.c effect>. m combmauon. produce a pure 1ran>fer from 
nonsmokers to smokers and from light smoker.. 10 he;I\ ) >mol..er.. 
269. The vast majority of individuab in 1he United Stale> are co, ercd for a large fra.:uon of 1he1r 
overall medical expenses either through employer-pro\'1ded hcallh tn>Urance. md1\ ldual heJhh tn>urance 
policies, or some form of government heallh m>urance progr.un See L' S Dl:P'T OF CO\l\ll:RCE. 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STAlCS- 1 996. at 1 20 ( 1 9%) (herctnafler STATISTI('.\L 
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STAlCS) (reporttng that approAnnalel) 85'<- of Amencan' h;l\e >Orne form ol 
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large fraction of the risk of lost income due to smoking-caused deaths and 
illnesses is covered through life insurance or disability insurance policies or 
through employer-funded sick leave.270 And the risks of property damage 
arising out of cigarette-related accidental fires are largely insured through 
homeowners insurance or other types of property or fire insurance policies.27 1 
Although some insurers attempt to charge higher premiums to smokers than 
to nonsmokers, for the most part first-party insurers do strikingly little 
classification of smoking risks.272 
Of all the types of first-party insurance, life insurance and disability 
insurance do the best job of classifying smoking risks.273 For example, some 
life insurance applications ask whether an applicant has smoked in the 
preceding twelve months or, more generally, whether the applicant is a 
"smoker."274 If applicants answer positively to either question, they must pay 
a somewhat higher premium for a given level of coverage than nonsmokers do. 
A similar story can be told about individual disability insurance policies and 
their applications.275 H!!alth insurers, on the other hand, have lagged far 
behind life insurers in offering premium discounts to nonsmokers (or in 
reducing benefits to smokers). According to a 1 987 survey, only 14% of 
commercial health insurers and only 1 6% of Blu� Cross/Blue Shield plans in 
health insurance). Those insurance arrangements contain no exclusions for smoking-caused harm. See 
TOLLISON & w AGNER, sapra note 49, at 77-78. 
270. A large number of individuals in the United States have some level of life insurance or disability 
insurance. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1 996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 6 ( 1 996) (reporting 
that 67% of adult Americans in 1 995 owned life insurance). Those insurance arrangements either contain 
no exclusions for smoking-caused harm or do a poor job of drawing such distinctions. See infra notes 276-
278 and accompanying text. 
271 .  Many buildings in this country have some level of fire or property insurance (as is required by 
virtually all mortgage lenders). See Guy Halverson, Insurance Described as a Financial Necessity. 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8, 1995, at 9 (reporting that 95% of homeowners in the United Stales have 
homeowners' insurance, according to the Insurance Information Institute). We arc aware of no instances 
in which fire or property insurers have refused to pay a damage claim because the fire damages were 
smoking-related. 
272. It is, of course, next to impossible to "prove" such a negative. Nevertheless, bused on our 
assessment of insurance policies and based on our conversations with people in the insurance industry. ii 
is safe to say that the vast majority of private insurance companies do very little (and most do absolutely 
nothing) in the way of risk classification on the basis of smoking status. Furthermore, virtually all the 
economists writing on this topic seem to accept that there is an insurance externality of the sort that we 
have described. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., sapra note 49, at 27-28, 36, 62; Viscusi, sapra note 1 02, at 
75; Warner et al., supra note 28, at 3 8 1 .  
273. See Smoker Rates Same as  Rest, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 7 ,  1 993, at S A  (reporting tlmt 
the only types of individual insurance that provide nonsmoker discounts are life and dbability covcmge). 
274. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 294 ( 1 995) (reprinting a �landard 
l ife insurance application form that asks, "Have you smoked one or more cigareltcs within the last 12 
months?"); Gary Schuman, Misrepresentation of Smoking History in Life lnsarance Applications, 30 TORT 
& INS. L.J. 1 03, 1 08 ( 1994) ("The key question typically asks whether the proposed insured hus smoked 
cigarettes in the last twelve or twenty-four months."). 
275. For life insurance and disability insurance sold to nonsmokers, the premium discounts lend to run 
between 1 0% and 25%. See Jane Bennelt Clark, Getting What Yoa Need in Disllbility /nsurcmce, 
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. I ,  1993, at 98, 1 02. With respect to life insumnce policic� in particulur. 
it has been reported that nonsmoker discounts can go as high as 45%. See Erin M. Piorek, Neither Wind. 
nor Rain, nor Laws Stop Smokers, PROVIDENCE Bus. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1 997, at 22. 
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the United States anempt to adjust for the increased risks associaced wich 
smoking.276 Although there is some evidence that these percemages may 
have increased recently,�77 most health insurers still do noc make adJuscments 
for smoking in individual health policies. Whal is more. alchough ic is 
extremely difficult to come by evidence on chis question. it is our impression 
that, in the case of group health, l ife. and disabilicy insurance. insurers are even 
less l ikely to differentiate between smokers and nonsmokers in setting 
premiums.278 The difficulty of verifying answers to questions regarding 
smoking status is even greater in these settings. where the whole poinc is 10 
avoid much of the cost of individual underwricing by offering coverage 10 
entire groups based on where they are employed or some other association. As 
far as we know as well ,  there are no employers who have sick-leave plans chat 
draw distinctions between smokers and nonsmokers. and chere are no 
homeowners' policies that offer discouncs 10 nonsmokers. 
Thus, relatively little risk classification based on smoking scatus is done 
by private first-party insurers; and, with respect 10 some types of insurance, 
virtually no such risk classification is even attempted. Moreover, even when 
276. See Health Promotion and Chemical Abuse 181 TasJ. Forr.-. (:!] 1 987 PRoc !' \T"L .·h�·, I'� 
COMM' RS 648, 687-97; see also Chns Leo Pasho>. The Role: of Health ln>Urer> 111 Promo110g SrnoJ..mg 
Cessation 53 ( 1 989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissenat1on. HJnJrd l'ni, c:r>ll) 1 Ion rile: " nh 1hc: HJnJrd 
University Library). Of the heahh insurer> that offered d"coum>. 1hc: amoum of lhc d1..:ounl• rJngc:J from 
I 0% to 27.8%. See Pashos. supra. at 52: see also TOLL!50' & \\' .\G,ER. s11pm nole -19. al S I  1 ··Health 
insurance companies typically do not offer d1>c0Unt> 10 non>mol..er> onl) about 15 percent of health 
insurers offer nonsmoker discounts. and wnh tho>e d1>eoun1> running around I 0 10 1 5  pcri:enl .. 1 
277. See Helen Halpin Schaufner. Healrh /11s11ra11ce Polin anti rlze Po/1110 aJ Tob"' '""· 111 S\101>..l'G 
POLICY, supra note 6, at 1 8-1, 1 9 1  (finding that of the 5-l°c of Companie> re>pondmg lo a 1 993 >Uf\ e) . 35"< 
of the health insurance companies indicated thal the) ha\'e >old 111d1' 1Jual heahh puh..:1e• 1h,11 cmplo) cuhcr 
smoker surcharges or nonsmoker discount>). 8111 cf S1cphen D Sugannan . D1Jp11rnr.- /nmrnrr-111 0/ S11w4rn 
in Emp/oymem and /11s11ra11ce, in SMOK!r>G POLICY, Jt1pra nolc 6. al 1 6 1 .  1 6 1  l .. h '' 1101 ) Cl dear \\hcthc:r 
disparate treatment of smokers in 1he>e way> repn:>enl> an 1111punan1 trend or merel) J mode'!. Jlld p.:rhJP' 
only temporary. devia1ion from <r.idnional pr.icuce ") 
278. See Smoker Rares Same as Resr. Sllflr<I nolc 27 J 1no11ng lhJI group hcJhh Hhun:r' Jo ' 1rtualh 
no risk classifying according to ind1 v1dual >lllokmg ,1a1u> l Appro\1111a1d) 85'"f ol 1ho..c " uh pm Jlc hcJhh 
insurance coverage in the United Stale> are CO\cred under e111plo) er-pro, 1dcd group poh..:1c> Su J>.i,ho' 
supra note 276, at 60. II >hould be no1cd 1ha1 >Ollle group hcJllh, d1-.ib1hl).  Jnd 1 1 !.: m•ur.m.:c h 
experience-rated on a group basis. As a re>uh. group> " nh fc\\ er >mol..cr> \\ 111 . other llunp bc111g <:<jUJl , 
sometimes be able to pay lower premium> as a gnmp See. r � . Schaufnc:r. mprn no1c 277. JI 1 <J 1  1 nollng 
that most Americans get their health in>ur.incc through cmplo) Cr> or olhcr IJrgc group,. \\h1ch hJ\C 1101 
traditionally classified risks on an mdindual ba>J>. bu1 1hat .. pm ale hcahh ""ur.incc ..:ompa111c' h.;•c Jbo 
begun to experiment with nommoker di.counts for gnmp pohc1e>· 1 For e\amplc. II ha• been rcponcJ lhJI 
health insurance premium> for busine»e> 1ha1 ban >11101..mg in 1he \\orl..placc .:an be 25'• 10 35'< lo\\cr 
than the rates charged to bu>me»e> 1ha1 do not ln>lllulc a ban Sa P1orel.. rnpr11 noic 275 "010..c prcnuum 
discounts may give employers an inccnlJ\C to d1>cour.ige 'moJ..111g Jrnong 1hc:1r cmplo)CC'· to ban •mol.111g 
in the workplace, or to avoid huing >moker> in the tir>t place Although lho•c •on> ol cmplo) er rc'I"'""'' 
have more of an internalizmg effect than nothmg al all. 1he) do nol pro' 1de 1hc ..amc Jcicrrcn.:c bcncrn, 
as would individually diffcrcntia1ed m>ur.incc prem1u111> 1ha1 Jre ba>cd on e.ich " orl.cr·' "nol.1ng 
decisions-the number of cigarette> >mol.cd. whal brand. and 1he hJ..c h I> al>0 " onh no1mg lhJI ' er) le" 
employers who use self-funded health m>ur.incc plan> attemp1 10 reyu1re d1flenni: k,c:J, ol cmplo)cc 
contributions on !he ba.i> of >mokmg >talU>. S<'e Helen Halpin Sc·h.1Uffler. /111ri;rt11111i; !l11ioJ.111� Co111ml 
Policies imo Employee Benejirs: A Sun·e.\ of larg<' Ca/1fomw Corpcmmom. 83 A \I J Pl II HI \UH 1 226. 
1 227 ( 1 993) (finding 1hat only around 2"l- of 1he companie> re>ponJmg lo a >Unc) mJ11:JtcJ ollenng 
nonsmoker discount> to employee panic1pants m employcr-pro\ Jdctl health plan•• 
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insurers do inquire about an applicant's smoking status in the insurance 
application (to enable them to charge higher premiums to the smokers), the 
questions they ask do not necessarily result in better risk classification. For one 
thing, applicants may simply lie about their smoking status or smoking history. 
Insurers who ask smoking-related questions will have considerable difficulty 
monitoring the truthfulness of the applicants' responses.279 Furthermore, if 
an insurer discovers that an applicant has falsely represented her smoking 
status, it is unclear how useful that information will prove to the insurer. If the 
discovery is made during the underwriting process, the insurer can decline to 
issue the policy. After the policy has been issued, however, to deny coverage 
to the insured on the grounds of falsely answering the smoking questions, the 
insurer will have to navigate the murky legal doctrines of misrepresentation. 
To be sure, courts that have addressed the issue have held that 
misrepresentation of smoking status on a life insurance application can provide 
grounds for an insurer to rescind the policy.280 Unless the insured dies within 
two years of the date of issuance of the policy (which is typically when the 
incontestability clause found in all life insurance policies kicks in), however, 
the insurer will not even be able to raise the misrepresentation defense.281 
Therefore, although life insurance companies may attempt to charge higher 
premiums to smokers, the success of their efforts turns largely on the honesty 
of the applicants.282 
Even if efforts at classification were completely successful at what they 
sought to accomplish, the resulting level of risk classification and thus cost 
279. See Schuman, s11pra note 274, at I 09. Perhaps the best way for insurers to test the truthfulness 
of applicants' answers during the underwriting process is to conduct a thorough medical evaluation of cuch 
applicant. We are told by life insurance agents that there are blood and urine tests that can reliably reveal 
whether someone has used any tobacco product within the preceding seven days. Thus, the result of such 
tests could be used to determine not only the likely smoking status of the applicant, but also, ufler 
cross-referencing against the applicant's answers to questions about that issue, the applicant's propensity 
to lie or exaggerate her health status on an insurance application. If the applicant is able to go without 
smoking (or using any other nicotine product) for more than seven days, however, those tests will reveal 
nothing about prior smoking status. 
280. See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. JMR Elec. Corp., 848 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1 988); see er/so 
Schuman, s11pra note 274, at 1 1 1  n.63 (citing several cases holding that misrepresentation of smoking status 
by smokers justifies voiding a l ife insurance policy); Taxin, s11pra note 49, at 237 n. I 04 (same). It is worth 
noting, however, that there is a dearth of case law on the treatment of misrepresentation of smoking status 
in the health insurance context. In fact, we have searched in vain for a single decision holding that 
misrepresentation in that context permits an insurer to rescind coverage. The principal reason for the 
absence of such cases may be that health insurers rarely ask their insureds or insurance applicants whether 
they smoke. 
28 1 .  See Schuman, s11pra note 274, at 1 30-3 1 .  All life insurance policies issued in the United Stutes 
contain incontestability clauses. See ABRAHAM, s11pra note 274, at 330. The following is an incontestability 
clause from a typical life insurance policy: "'We cannot contest your policy after it has been in force during 
the Insured's lifetime for two years from its Date of Issue, except for nonpayment of premiums."' lei. 111 
284 (quoting a sample term life insurance policy). 
282. Of course, most insureds are likely unaware of that rule and, hence, the fear of recision may, in 
conjunction with the insureds' scruples, encourage honest responses. By the same token, however, less 
scrupulous insureds may also be unaware of the potential consequences of material misrepresentation on 
an insurance application in the first place and therefore may have a greater incentive to answer falsely. 
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internalization to smokers would be very crude. For example, insurers never 
make fine distinctions among smokers. distinctions that could affect 
substantially the level of smoking risk that an insured poses.2s3 In addition, 
ex-smokers, who may pose disproportionately high risks to the insurance 
pool,284 are not segregated in any way, assuming they quit at least one or 
two years before completing their policy applications such that they can answer 
"no" to any smoking questions.285 Finally, even when some insurers do 
attempt to segregate, a smoker is often able to find an alternative insurer that 
does not. In that way smokers may be able to avoid at least some of the 
additional premium that they would otherwise face.2si. 
In sum, there are large negative insurance externalities associated with 
smoking. Because private, first-party insurance policies distinguish only 
crudely, if at all, between smokers and nonsmokers in their premiums and 
benefits, nonsmokers bear a disproportionate share of the health care costs 
associated with smoking. Moreover, as severe as this insurance externality 
appears to be in the context of private insurance arrangements, it is likely to 
be even more severe in the context of public or social insurance programs, on 
which many smokers rely for health care and in which no effort whatever is 
made to classify smokers into separate risk pools.2s7 
B. Noninsurance Externalities 
In addition to insurance externalities, there is an assortment of other cost� 
associated with smoking that are externalized onto nonsmokers. First, consider 
the harm caused by "environmental tobacco smoke" (ETS), sometime� referred 
to as "passive" or "secondhand" smoke. ETS is the name given to cigarette 
smoke that is inhaled by people other than the smokers themselves. There is 
a growing body of evidence indicating that ETS produces substantial cost� to 
society.288 Those exposed to ETS include not only the family members and 
283. See Hanson & Logue. The First-Parry Insuranc e £t1erna/t1\. s11f1m nolc 40 . •  u 14 7 
284. See MANNING ET AL.. supra nolc 49. al 66-75 
285. See supra note 274 and accompanying 1cx1 
286. Insurers who do not adjusl premium' to refkc1 .inokmg ,1a1u, hkd) co,cr a d1,propon1onJIC 
share of smokers, which in tum may cau•c their premium' 10 n.c: A"urmng 1hat .umc nommokcr- rcm;un 
in the pool, however, their premiums will be lower lhan lho>c charged 10 >mokcr.. by m'urcr.. 1tw1 do 
segregate. For some indication of 1he ,aving• enjoyed by •mokcr.. \\ho choo.e non.egrcgaung m•urcr.. . .cc 
Pashos, supra note 276, at 54 1bl.3. 
287. See, e.g., Schauffler, supra nolc 277, at 1 93 ("Al prc•cnl, none of 1hc kdcrall) ltn.inced he-Jhh 
i nsurance programs (Medicaid or Medicare) mk-r.ite beneficial')· con1nbu11on• ba...:d on •mol..mg •lalu' ·· , 
Although we have found no data on 1his que•llon. we would cxpccl 10 find 1ha1 •mokcr.. compo...: .i 
disproponionately large percentage of tho•e who depend on pubhc tn>Ur.incc 10 co,·cr 1hc1r hcahh .:Jrc 
expenses, given that typically the level of one·, •mokmg hab11 " JO\cr..cly rcla1cd 10 one" •oc1occonon11c 
status. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. SllJ'rll note 3. al 272-74, V1..:u>1, lllJ'm nolc 1 02. at 
58-60. 
288. See. e.g., OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR, l'. S E" TI. PROTI:c-tlO' AGl.'n . Tiii:. C�I'> 
AND BENEATS OF SMOKING RESTRlc-tlONS: Al\ ASSESS\tE'I OF nu: S\101\E·FREE E" IRO"ll''' An 01· 
1 993 (H.R. 3434) ( 1 994): U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTI! & Ht"\(," St:.R\ s . Tl!E HEAL.TI! Co,Sl:.Ql i:'("l:.<; u� 
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coworkers of smokers, but also subway riders, restaurant goers, and pool hall 
frequenters who happen to occupy a space next to a smoker.289 Second, there 
is the external pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm to the family and friends of 
smokers resulting from the smokers' premature death and from the smokers' 
years of ill health. For example, family members of a smoker may suffer 
significant financial hardship as a result of the smoker's uninsured medical 
expenses or as a result of the uninsured loss of the smoker's income on which 
the family had been depending. Or the smoker's family and friends may 
experience severe emotional costs (which they would ex ante have been willing 
to pay a large price to avoid) as a result of watching their loved ones or 
friends suffer the negative effects of smoking.290 Third, even the harm to the 
smoker herself-that portion of the harm not compensated by first-party 
insurance-can be viewed as a form of externalization. Costs are, on this view, 
externalized by the smoker's current self to her future selves.291 
At this point, we should elaborate on how these noninsurance externalities 
actually remain externalities and therefore a legitimate cause for government 
intervention. In other words, we need to explain why the market itself does not 
respond to internalize those external costs.292 For example, take the external 
costs associated with ETS exposure. Why would nonsmokers and smokers not 
arrive at some Coasean bargain regarding the efficient level of ETS exposure? 
The standard transaction cost response, at least with respect to public ETS 
exposure, comes immediately to mind. Except through the political process, it 
is difficult to imagine such a deal taking place. 
But for some types of public ETS exposure, that response is too simple. 
Consider, for example, ETS exposure in the workplace. There, a Coasean 
bargain between all nonsmokers and smokers would not be necessary. So long • 
as nonsmokers were informed of the risks posed by workplace ETS exposure, 
and the labor market were otherwise efficient, those risks would be 
internalized. Workers would demand either a higher wage to compensate them 
for bearing the risk of workplace ETS exposure or a safer workplace. In turn, 
employers (again assuming a perfect labor market) would respond either by 
paying higher wages to employees exposed to ETS or by taking steps to reduce 
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL ( 1 986) [hereinaflcr 1 986 SURGEON 
GENERAL'S REPORT); EPA, PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 4. For a discussion of these costs, �cc infra 
Subsection IIl.C.2.a.i. 
289. Most of the empirical evidence to date regarding the hannful effects of ETS ha� concentrated on 
exposure within the home and the workplace. 
290. Note that some of the hanns just mentioned may be compensated through the smoker\ lire 
insurance policy. If that is the case, those costs would be externalized to the extent they arc covered 
through imperfectly classified first-party insurance arrangements. In contrast to the previous scclion of the 
Article, however, we mean to emphasize in this section the hanns not covered by the smoker's in�uruncc. 
29 1 .  See supra note 265; cf Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-72 (discussing, but ultimately rejecting, 
the notion of cigarette risks' being externalized to smokers' future selves). 
292. For a discussion of why the market does not respond to correct insurance externalities, sec 
Hanson & Logue, The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 148-50, 1 64-68. 
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workplace ETS exposure, whichever approach was cheaper. Such steps might 
include banning smoking in the workplace or limiting workplace smoking to 
certain areas in the building where special ventilation systems have been 
installed to whisk the smoke away from nonsmoker coworkers. Thus, a perfect 
labor market would cause workplace ETS risks to be internalized, and. as a 
result, the costs of workplace ETS exposure (including the costs of avoiding 
that exposure) would be minimized. 
The problem, of course, is that labor markets are not perfectly efficient in 
this way. In particular, workers almost certainly do not take into account. at 
least not fully, the costs associated with workplace ETS exposure. This is true 
not only for the reasons that smokers fail 10 iake inlo account !he risks 10 
themselves of smoking,293 bu! also because !he risks associated wilh ETS 
exposure are much less well publicized 1han arc the risks 10 smokers 
themselves and because the studies documenling ETS risks coniinuc 10 be 
d isputed.294 In any even!, ii seems 10 be generally agreed, even among 
economists, that insofar as ETS does pose subs1an1ial risks, !hose risks are not 
internalized through the labor market 29� 
A similar story can be told about why !he cosls borne by the families and 
friends of smokers will not be internalized 10 smokers. about. !hat is, why 
family members and friends do no! enter into Coasean bargains wi1h smokers 
to achieve the optimal level of smoking. We lake 1his issue up again in the 
next section,296 but for now we say only 1his: Bolh because of imperfect 
information on the part of smokers and nonsmokers aboul the risks of ETS 
293. See supra Pan II (di,cu,,ing anfom1a11on problcrm ), rnprn Scc11on Ill  A 1d1>eU•\lng rn•ur.tncc 
ex1ernali1ies). 
294. See. e.g., Viscu,1. supra no1e 1 02. al 78 (quc,1ronrng 1hc rclrabrlrl) of EPA ,1udrc• •ho\\ lng ml. 
of ETS exposure). Of cour..e, rf Vi,cu" " ngh1 about 1hc rclrabr lrl) of 1hc ETS co,1 C>Umah:•. and lho>e 
costs iurn ou1 10 be small or nonexisiem. 1hcn 1hc need for a regulator) rc'pon.c 10 ETS-rdaicd mh goc, 
away. For 1he purpose of responding 10 1he clann 1ha1 'mok111g po'c' no ncl ncgall\C C\lcmalr1). "C •rmpl) 
adopl !he ETS es11ma1e given by Manning el al . allhough \\C bclrc\c 1hc aclual number 1lrkc 1hc number 
ul1ima1ely used by Viscu" for ETS ri'h) would lrkcly be much higher s .... 111/m Sub...:clron Ill C 2 .1 1 
Later in 1he Anicle, where we de,cnbe po»1blc polrc) rc'pon,e> 10 lhe ncgall\ c c\lcrnalr11c• rrc>emcd b) 
cigarene>, we suggest 1ha1 1he be>I way 10 deal " uh ETS-rcla1cd co,b. \\hale\ er 1ho.c co.I> an: ulumalcl) 
de1ennined 10 be, may be ,ome fonn of c\ anlc rcgula11on--<:1lhcr co111111and-and·comrol. pcrfonnancc­
based, or incemive-based. See 111fra Sub,ec11on VCJ 
295. As far as we have been able 10 de1em11nc. none of 1he ccono111"1> \\ n11ng on ihc •UbJccl or ETS 
risks has argued 1ha1, 10 the exiem 1ho'e ml-> arc real. 1hc) " oulJ be 1 111cmalrlcd through 1hc labor marlc1 
This omission >eems e'pecially 1 1nponam Ill Vi,cu"" ca><: gl\ en 1ha1 he ha. Jc, oicd a fair amoum of h" 
scholarly anenlion over !he year> 10 inve>ugalrng 1hc cxicm 10 " Juch labor marlcl• rc•ponJ 10 \\ orlplacc 
risks in jus1 1his way. See W. KIP VtSCL'Sl. E�tPLOYME'ff HAi'.AROS A' 1'\l:STIGATIO' OF �IARKlff 
PERFORMANCE ( 1 979); W. Krp Vi.cu" & Charle' O'Connor. ll11::i1rd \\dmmgs for \\'orkf'l<K� Ruh 
Effects 011 Risk Percepttons. \foge Rares. and Tunwn:r. 111 LEAR'l'G ABOl T RISK CO,Sl \IER ·"0 
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFOR\tATlO'\ 98 (W. Krp V1"u" & \\blc) A �lagal cd' . 1 9871 8'1.'>Cd 
on 1his earlier work, one would expect 1ha1 V1>eu"·' tir..1 polrC) rc>poni.c 10 the pubhc ETS ml. \\OUIJ be 
10 call for 1he disseminauon of add111onal mfonnauon about 1ho>c mb 111 order 10 iac1hlJlc 1hc m.1rlc1 
response. Instead. however, V"cu>i seem> 10 >uggc>I 1ha1 1hc Jppropna1c regu lator) rc•pon.c 10 pubhc ETS 
exposure is �ome fonn of direct regulauon. Sa. ,. g .  V1-.·u" . mpr<1 no1c J O:!. al 10::! wppan:mly fa, onng 
direct regulation of ETS O\'Cr 1axa11on ). 
296. See infra Sub,eciron 1 1 1 .C.2.a.1 
1 232 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07:  1 1 63 
exposure, and because of insurance externalities, even the costs of in-home 
ETS exposure are unlikely to be fully internalized to smokers. 
To summarize, there are large external costs associated with cigarette 
smoking, costs that will not be taken into account by the relevant 
decisionmakers, unless there is some form of government intervention. In the 
following section, we analyze, among other things, why economists writing in 
this area have not called for such intervention. 
C. A Review of, and Critical Response to, the Economists' Rebuttal 
Notwithstanding the arguments made in Sections Il.A-B, few if any 
economists have called for any sort of regulatory response to the negative 
externalities associated with cigarettes. To state the point briefly, the 
economists who have attempted to quantify the social costs and benefits of 
cigarettes have concluded that, overall, the total social benefits of smoking 
equal or even exceed the costs. In fact, some economists have even suggested 
that cigarette consumption should be subsidized.297 In this section, we contest 
the economists' cost-benefit analyses, which wrongly exclude some important 
costs (for example, those inflicted on smokers' families and friends) and 
underestimate others. We arrive at an alternative figure of nearly $7 .00 in costs 
per pack. Our analysis in this part is also guided by a conviction that the 
economists' calculations ignore important moral elements of the issue. 
1 .  Summary of the Economists ' Cigarette Studies 
There is now a vast economic literature attempting to quantify the costs 
and benefits of smoking.298 The most significant recent contributions to that 
literature can be found in a 1 99 1  book by Willard Manning, Emmett Keeler, 
Joseph Newhouse, Elizabeth Sloss, and Jeffrey Wasserman299 and a 1 995 
297. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75. 
298. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE TAXES To FUND HEALTll 
CARE REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3-17 (Congressional Research Service No. 94-2 14 E, Mar. 8, 
1 994); MANNING ET AL., s11pra note 49; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 
SMOKING-RELATED DEAT,HS AND FINANCIAL COSTS, OTA STAFF MEMORANDUM ( 1 985); GERRY OSTER 
ET AL., THE EcONOMIC COSTS OF SMOKING AND BENEFITS OF QUITTING ( 1984); TOLLISON & WAGNER, 
supra note 49; V1scus1, supra note 49; W.F. Forbes & M.E. Thompson, Estimating the Health Care Costs 
of Smokers, 74 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 1 83 ( 1 983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub, Does Smoking 
Increase Medical Care Expe11di111re?, 1 7  Soc. SCI. & MED. 1 907 ( 1983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub, 
More 011 the Impact of Smoking 011 Medical Care Expendiwres, 2 1  Soc. SCI. & MED. 825 ( 1 985); Bryan 
R. Luce & Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Smoking and Alcohol Ab11se: A Comparison of Their Economic 
Conseq11e11ces, 1 98 NEW ENG. J. MED. 569 ( 1 978); Dorothy P. Rice ct al .. The Economic Costs of the 
Health Effects of Smoking, 1984, 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL Q. 489 ( 1 986); John B. Shovcn et al., The Social 
Security Cost of Smoking, i11 THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 231 (David A. Wisc ed., 1 989); Virginia Baxter 
Wright, Will Quitting Smoking Help Medicare Solve Its Fi11a11cial Problems?, 23 INQUIRY 76 ( 1 986). 
299. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. To a significant degree, the book reproduces a Rund study 
conducted by the authors in 1989. See Willard G. Manning et al., The Tcues of Sill: Do Smokers cmcl 
Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1 604 ( 1 989). 
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article by W. Kip Viscusi.300 For simplicity, we refer to those two studies in  
the following discussion as the "economists' cigarette studies," and we refer 
to any arguments associated with chose two studies as the "economises ' 
arguments. "301 
Although the Viscusi study and the Manning et al. study differ in the 
details, their policy conclusions are the same: Smokers should not be forced 
to internalize any more costs than they already do.30? Indeed, if any 
government intervention is required, their logic implies, it should rake the form 
of a subsidy to smokers.303 How do the economisrs reach a conclusion thar 
is so divergent from ours? They claim that a complete cost-benefit analysis 
should take into account not only the external costs posed by cigarettes but 
also the external benefits of smoking, such as the social "savings" derived 
from the pension, social security, and nursing home enti1Jemen1s thar smokers 
leave unconsumed because of their premarure dearhs. JI}.! Once one rakes inro 
account those external benefits and the current level of federal and state taxes 
imposed on tobacco products, the economists argue, smokers already more rhan 
fully internalize any external costs they may be imposing on the res! of 
society. 305 
Manning et al. estimate the per pack external costs and benefits of 
cigarette smoking under three alternative discount rates: O'lc, 5 o/c .  and 1 0%.  306 
300. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02. 
301 .  It is our understanding that the main prem"c' under!� mg the Vil>CUSt and rhc �lannmg ct al 
studies, premises that we will criticize in >ome detail tn the next >Ub>eeuon. are generally comtstent \\ tth 
the standard assumptions of the discipline of economics To annburc tho� pn:mt�> 10 ··cconomt>ts" qua 
economists, as we do, therefore seems reasonable. We should note. howe,·er. 1ha1 wme economist� who 
acknowledge these premises as being pan of the dt>ctphnc of economic• aho bdtc:\c: land stare: 
emphatically) that in the debate over cigarettes noneconomic concern> an: a. 1mponan1 a. econonuc one:. 
For example, the Office on Smoking and Heahh of the Center> for Dt�a.c: Control and Prc:H:nuon 
convened a meeting of top economist> in 1 995 .. [1]0 evaluale 1hc cnrena for defining an op11mal c1garc:11e 
lax, from the perspecth•e of the disciplme of eco1101111cs ... Warner ct al.. supra note 28. al 380 (empha.ts 
added). Although the group adopted some of the same pn:mt•e> as Vil>CU>t and lllanmng c:r al . u concluded 
that its final positions regarding whar 10 do about c1garenc. would depend largely on .. con>tdc:ra11ons other 
than those that derive from our professional expeni>e as cconom1>i.." Id. ar 386. Willard G �lanmng and 
Joseph P. Newhouse, two of the authors of the Manning er al. >tudy. ncn: among rhe economt>l\ who 
participated in that 1 995 conference and who >tgned the >latement JU>I quoted. Jeffrey Hams. a phy>1c1an 
and economist, is a self-described .. wann" econom1s1. for he refu,o 10 con>1dcr some benefits of smoking 
and includes some costs that are very difficult to measure. Su Tes1111w111· of Jef/tY\' £. Harns MD PhD 
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Rep1Yse11ta111· .. s (v,.ued July 25. 1 997J 
<http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harri!Jte>timony.hrml>. 
302. See MANNING ET AL, supra note 49. al 1 9; Vi>CU>t, supra note 1 02. at 75 
303. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75. 
304. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. al 7: Vt>cus1. supra note 1 02. al 53, su also Warner er al . 
supra note 28, at 382 (making the same observation). 
305. See MANNING ET AL., supra nore 49, at 19:  Vil>CU>J, supra note I 02. al 5-1. 75. ue a/10 Tot.USO' 
& WAGNER, supra note 49. at 92 ("Rather than the common allegat ton 1ha1 >mol.er.. arc: 'O\erU>tng' 
publicly provided health-care program>. a more careful accounting of >moken' role m pubhc tran,fer 
programs would clearly show that, 1f anything. >mo�er> >hould be candidate> for a tax refund ·· < footnorc: 
omitted)). 
306. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. al 7-8 (del>Cnbmg the n:a>on for dtl>Counungl 
1234 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07 :  1 1 63 
Because Manning et al. believe that 5% is the most accurate discount rate,307 
their "best" estimates are as follows: total medical costs, $0.26; sick leave, 
$0.01 ;  group l ife insurance, $0.05; nursing home care, -$0.03; retirement 
pension, -$0.24; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings, $0.09.308 The authors 
summarize the data as follows: 
Our best estimate is that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is 15 
cents. Smoking leads to higher medical costs (principally hospital 
costs), more covered work-loss days, less years of work and life, and 
more disability retirements than not smoking. The external financial 
impact of smoking is greatly reduced, however, by the effects of early 
death. Because smokers die younger on average, they receive less in 
pensions, Medicare benefits, and other long-term care. Thus, smokers 
subsidize nonsmokers' Medicare and retirement benefits, while 
nonsmokers subsidize smokers' medical care, disability, and sick leave 
early in life.309 
To this figure of $0. 15  per pack, Manning et al. add the costs of 
noninsurance externalities, which they estimate to range between $0. 16  and 
$0.39.310 They thus conclude that the total external cost per pack of 
cigarettes is somewhere between $0.3 1 and $0.52.31 1 As Manning et al. 
emphasize, this estimate of the external costs of smoking is around or below 
the average combined state and federal excise and sales taxes on cigarettes, 
307. Manning et al. say little about their choice of discount rates other than to observe that "[t]he 
'correct' discount rate is always a matter of controversy. The costs estimates in this part of the book reflect 
a 5 percent (real) discount rate." Id. at 8. Based on the structure of their analysis it appears that they chose 
5% because it falls midway between 0% and 1 0%. How they chose those benchmarks is not clear, however, 
except inasmuch as they are focal points within a range of reasonable discount rates. 
308. See id. at 79 tbl.4- 1 6; see also infra Table I .  
309. MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 127 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Under a 0% 
discount rate, total net costs are -S0.9 1 ;  under a 10% discount rate, total net costs arc S0.24. See icl. ut 79 
tbl.4- 1 6. 
To determine the costs that are fairly attributable to cigarettes, Manning ct al. do not compare smokers 
to nonsmokers; instead, they compare smokers to "nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 8. They "controlled for uge, 
sex, race, education, drinking habits, exercise habits, family size, income, self-assessed measures of 
physical, mental. and general health, and seat-belt use. Thus [they could] calculate the external co5ts of 
smokers if they had never smoked but had retained all their other characteristics"-that is, as if they were 
"nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 29-30. Manning ct al. express some concern that their $0. 1 5  per puck 
estimate may overstate the external costs of smoking inasmuch as they did not control for "bad dictury 
habits or an affinity for high-risk activities." Id. at 30. Arguably, however, the SO. I S  figure understates the 
external costs they were attempting to mea�ure inasmuch a� the deci�ion to smoke cigarettes may be 
causally linked to smokers' other rbky lifestyle choices. The more accurate comparison may be between 
smokers and nonsmokers. That comparison, according to Manning et al., yields an estimate of $0.28 per 
pack. See id. at 14. Nevertheless, we will, for the sake of argument, accept Manning ct al.'s npproach to 
this issue. 
3 1 0. See id. at 83-85, 1 33-34. 
3 1 1 .  See id. at 85. Note that Manning et al. omit from this total any cost� attributable to ETS exposure. 
See infra note 360 and accompanying text. Also, there is a small dhcrepancy in the Manning ct ul. 
numbers. Whereas in one place they state that the total external cost of cigarettes ranges from $0.3 1 to 
S0.52 per pack, see MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 85, in another place, where they report 
noninsurance and insurance externalities separately, the top number i n  the range would sum to $0.54 per 
pack, see id. at 1 33. 
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which they report as $0.37 per pack.3 1 2  They therefore conclude that 
"[s]mokers are already paying their way, if we judge solely on the grounds of 
economic efficiency."31 3  
Viscusi's analysis has the same structure as that of  Manning et al. Indeed, 
Viscusi uses the Manning et al. study as a baseline and simply updates that 
study in a number of ways.314 Using a 3% discount rate.m Yiscusi 
calculates that smokers on net externalize $0.32 of benefits with each pack of 
cigarettes they consume. The breakdown is as follows: total medical costs, 
$0.50; sick leave, $0.0 1 ;  group life insurance, $0. 13 ; nursing home care, 
-$0.22; retirement pension, -$ 1 .  l 0; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings. 
$0.35.316 Viscusi therefore concludes: "In effect, smokers are already paying 
their own way in the sense that there is a net externality cost savings to society 
from their smoking because of the cost savings arising from their premature 
deaths."317  When Viscusi considers the external costs of secondhand smoke, 
he concludes that the total external costs associated with each pack of 
cigarettes range between -$0. 1 8  per pack (i.e., that smoking on balance saves 
society resources) and $0.41 per pack.3 18 In any event, he argues, smokers 
more than pay their own way at current levels of taxation. which he estimates 
at $0.53 per pack.319 
As in the Manning et al. study, all of the external savings in the Yiscusi 
study come in the form of reduced amounts collected by smokers from private 
pensions and social security and from reduced nursing home expenses. Given 
this net external benefit of smoking, Viscusi (like Manning et al.) concludes 
that current levels of federal and state taxation on tobacco are excessive.320 
In fact, under this analysis, any tax on tobacco would be excessive. In 
Viscusi's words: "Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that, if one 
3 1 2. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 1 8. 
3 1 3. Id. at 1 9; see id. at 24 ("Taxes on cigarette. are at a le,el >Uch that smolers pay approximately 
the costs they impose on others."). For their discussion of pas"ve >mokmg co>ts. sec rd. at 83. 
3 1 4. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 72. Viscu" dcnves hi> table by t�mg Table 4 - 1 6  from �tanning 
et al., see MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4 - 16. and updaung 11 for mllat1on, real cost mcn:a.cs. 
and other trends. Viscusi's cost estimate> are based on data a\ ailable as of 1993. V1.cus1" table also 
includes columns showing how the various costs of >mokmg change 1f one attempt> to talc into account 
the fact that, over time, the tar content of cigarettes has been reduced. Becau>e \\C behcvc that the tar 
content of individual cigarettes is a poor predictor of the health hanm of smolmg. sa supra notc:s IQ.I- I 05 
and accompanying text, we omit the tar-level-adju>ted numbers from our tabulations that follow 
3 15. Without commenting on Manning et al.'> choice of discount rate.. Vi.cus1 as>eru that "the mo't 
reasonable [discount] rate corresponding to the long-run real rate of return an the U.S. economy 1s around 
3 percent." Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 73. If Viscusi had used the same di.count rate as Manning ct al 
used (5%), Viscusi's results would have been strikingly similar to theirs. 
3 1 6. See id. at 74 tbl.4; see also infra Table I .  At a 0% discount rate. the net cost per pack 1s - S I  57; 
at 5%, it  is S0.27. See Viscusi, supra note 102. at 74 tbl.4. 
3 1 7. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75. 
3 1 8. See id. at 77 tbl.4. 
3 1 9. See id. at 57: see also 1d. at 93 ("[C]1garette taxe> already exceed the lc'cl of the csumatcd 
externalities."). 
320. See id. at 92-93. 
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were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount results, 
cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed."321 
Whether or not one takes Viscusi's suggestion at face value, the general 
message of his and Manning et al.'s studies is clear: Any proposal for 
internalizing the external costs of smoking through some form of regulation 
should be rejected (or at least reevaluated) in light of the external benefits of 
smoking.322 
2. Critique of the Economists' Cigarette Studies 
For a variety of reasons, we disagree with the economists' conclusions. 
Broadly speaking, the economists' studies significantly understate the external 
costs of smoking, greatly overstate (if not mischaracterize) the external benefits 
of smoking, and rnischaracterize the effect of current excise taxes. The 
principal areas of disagreement come down to which costs and which benefits 
of smoking should be considered external to the smoker, and which should be 
considered internal. As will become clear, our conclusions with respect to 
those issues derive largely, though not entirely, from the imperfect information 
arguments that we detailed in Part II. Based largely on those disagreements 
with Viscusi and Manning et al., we ultimately conclude that the economic 
case for some type of government intervention in the cigarette market is 
reasonably strong. 
a. A Closer Look at Negative Externalities: Incorporating the 
Imperfect Information Argument 
One of the main reasons that the economists reject the goal of requiring 
manufacturers to internalize more than they now do is that they grossly 
underestimate the negative externalities created by smoking. As a starting 
point, it bears noting that Manning et al. intend to generate a conservative 
estimate of external costs.323 As we argue, however, a better estimate would 
include many costs that the study's authors sometimes recognize as potential 
costs, but choose to exclude from their "best" estimate. In the next two 
sections, we focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the Manning et al. 
321 .  Id. at 75 (emphasis added). 
322. According to many commentators, the future of tobacco regulation will certainly be informed by, 
and could well tum on, the evidence regarding social costs provided by these economists. See, e.g., Fromu 
Harrop, Smoking Is Becoming a Social Taboo, DENVER POST, June I I , 1996, at 87; Laura Mnnsncrus, 
Tobacco on Trial, Making a Case for Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, § 4, at I ; Matthew Miller, Clecm 
Lungs at a Price: Do Smoking-Related Deaths Save the Nation Money?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 
7, 1 997, at 52; Robert J. Samuelson, Who Elected the Lawyers?, WASH. POST, July 2, 1997, at A23. 
323. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 4 n . 1 95 (stating that their goal is "to provide 
conservative estimates of the external costs"); id. at 1 3  ("We believe [our estimates] arc reasonable, even 
conservative."). 
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estimates and methodologies. Because the Viscusi study relies on the Manning 
et al. study's findings as a baseline, most of the criticisms that we make of the 
Manning et al. study apply in roughly equal measure to the Viscusi study. 
1. Costs to the Smoker 's  Family and Orlzer Third Parries 
Manning et al. 's "best estimate" assumes that smokers internalize all of the 
costs that their smoking imposes on members of their families.324 In the 
authors' words, such costs are "internal because the family constitutes an 
economic unit (it pools income)."325 Strikingly, neither Manning et al. nor 
Viscusi carefully explores how plausible the assumption is.m' Indeed, they 
seem to rely on the fact that the assumption is conventional among economists. 
Examined on its own terms, however, the assumption that smokers internalize 
the costs of smoking imposed on their families seems implausible. 
The prevailing model of the family as a single preference function with an 
altruistic head of household allocating resources was developed by economist 
Gary Becker.327 Neoclassical and feminist economists alike, however, have 
levied a variety of criticisms against that model.328 These scholars note, for 
example, that because Becker fails to look within the black box of intra­
household bargaining, he does not explain intra-household allocation of 
consumption choices.329 
324. See id. at 4 n.5 ('"(W]e are considering the family as a "ngle dec1S1on-malang unit and treating 
costs imposed on other family members as internal.'"). 
325. Id. at 28-29. 
326. Viscusi offers a somewhat more developed JUst1fica11on for the assumption He wntes 
Theories of the household typically assume that the household hc:41lh make decmons on behalf 
not only of themselves but also on behalf of other family members. Thus. the husband or wife 
would take into account his or her own welfare when making the smoking dec1S1on as well as 
the implications that the smoking behavior would ha\"e for the well-being of other family 
members. If individuals do in fact internalize these intrafamily ex1ernaht1cs. then they will be 
already reflected in the individual deci,ions. Rational individual decisions consequently will 
imply that household externalit1es are internalized as well and need nol be considered. 
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 7 1 -72 (citing GARY S. BECKER. A TREATISE OS TIIE fA\llLY (en larged ed. 
1 99 1 ), and MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, for the same assumption). 
327. See BECKER, supra note 326. 
328. A number of feminist scholars have cn11c1zcd Beeler\ model. Sa. e g .• Barbara R. Bergmann, 
Becker's Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusums, I FEMlSIST Ecos. 141  ( 1 995) (arguing !hat 
Becker ignores intra-familial dynamics and power dbpanucs): Frances Wooley. Getting the Beller of 
Becker, 2 FEMINIST EcON. 1 1 3  ( 1 996) (describing a vanely of allernat1vcs 10 Becker's model of the family): 
id. at 1 16 (noting that '"(t]he common thread 1ha1 linls these models 1s a recogmuon that fanuhcs cannot 
be treated as if they were a single individual: there are complex interactions bet\\ccn the behavior of 
different family members, and family hfc doe' not benefit all family members equally"") Within the 
neoclassical camp, see, for example, Pierre-Andre Chiappon. Collectm.• Labor Suppl\ and \Ve/fare, 100 
1. POL EcON. 437 ( 1 992), which develops a collective model o f  household labor supply and resource 
allocation. 
329. See. e.g., Martin Browning el al., Income and Outcomes: A Stnic/llral Model of /nrruho1uchold 
A/location, 1 02 J. POL ECON. 1 067, 1 069-70 ( 1 994) ('"What recent empmcal analym points toward 1s that 
multiperson households cannot be treated as 'ingle dec"1on makers and that household allocallons should 
probably rather be considered as the outcome of >Orne mteracuon between household members with 
different preferences."); Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Bunon. Slwn11g \\7tlun Fanuhe1 · lmplu:atwns for 
the Measurement of Po1·erry Among lndii-iduals 111 Canada. 28 CA� J Ecos 1 77 ( 1 995) (demonstrating 
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Even if the assumption that family costs are fully internal to individual 
decisionmakers were plausible with respect to other types of costs, it is 
implausible with respect to the costs of smoking. If the costs and benefits of 
smoking were truly internalized across members of a family, one would expect 
nonsmoking members of a family to be more encouraging of those family 
members who smoke. Yet one does not hear statements of the following sort 
from family members of smokers: "It's fine that my spouse (or child or parent) 
smokes. In light of the fact that she has taken into account the costs to herself, 
to me, and to other family members, it must be that she is benefiting greatly 
from the cigarettes. I would not want to deprive her of that tremendous 
pleasure. Indeed, given the net benefits, I am glad that she smokes." Similarly, 
it would be astonishing to hear a smoker say: "It's worth it to me to smoke 
even when I consider the costs to my loved ones of my dying earlier than I 
otherwise would and of their dying earlier than they otherwise would." It is 
likely that neither nonsmokers nor smokers frame the matter in those terms 
because smokers do not, in fact, fully internalize the costs that they impose on 
others.330 
There is another way to put the point that smokers do not fully internalize 
the costs their smoking imposes on their family and friends. Even if it is 
assumed that smokers to some extent behave altruistically with respect to their 
loved ones-that is, they derive utility from bestowing benefits on loved ones 
and they experience disutility when they impose costs on loved ones-smokers 
do not take into account the fact that those costs experienced by their loved 
ones should, in and of themselves, count in the social welfare calculation. 
Thus, even if smokers in some sense "feel the pain" they are causing others, 
that is not enough from the perspective of overall social welfare. There is still 
a need for incentive-based regulation. One could argue, therefore, that it is 
through simulation how intra-household distribution can drastically affect the incidence of poverty 
experienced by different family members, especially children); Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton, 
Social/Institutional Variables and Behavior Within Households: An Empirical Test Using the Luxembourg 
Income Study, I FEMINIST ECON. 1 5 1  ( 1 995) (analyzing social and institutional factors that inHucncc 
bargaining power within a marriage); Duncan Thomas, Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential 
Approach, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 635 ( 1 990) (noting that intra-household consumption decisions, 
particularly those regarding the well-being of children, will vary depending on whether the mother or father 
has control of resources); Frances R. Woolley & Judith Marshall, Measuring Inequality Within tire 
Household, 40 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 4 15, 425-28 ( 1 994) (describing a study of household members' 
inequality in control over expenditure and consumption decisions). 
330. Cf. Financing Provisions of the Administrations Health Security Act and Other Health Reform 
Proposals, Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 1 03d Cong. 3 1 7  ( 1 994) (statement of 
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) [hereinafter Health Care Reform 
Hearings] ('"Cold' economists [those who ignore all difficult-to-quantify costs] assume that smokers and 
their families privately, rationally, and voluntarily bear the costs from smoking-related disease and death. 
This is a fiction that ignores the dual reality of teenage initiation into cigarettes and adult addiction to 
cigarettes."); Linda B. Ford, M.D .. President-Elect, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at News Conference 
on Potential Tobacco Settlement, Wash., D.C. (June 1 7, 1 997) (transcript on file with the Yale Law Journal) 
("I've seen the fear in the eyes of a child who suffers an asthma attack triggered by environmental tobacco 
smoke. Since it is the child's parent who smokes, I know I will sec this child again and again because of 
a parent's addiction to tobacco."). 
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appropriate for the societal cost-benefit calculus regarding smoking to take into 
account both the cost to the smoker of her feeling that she has imposed a cost 
on a loved one and, separately, the actual cost imposed on the loved one by 
the smoker.331 
We should also note that the economists' assumption that family costs are 
fully internalized by smokers is subject 10 the same types of critiques that we 
made in  Part II. For many of the reasons that we argued there that smokers 
tend to externalize costs to their future selves,332 they would also likely 
externalize costs to their families. For instance, if smokers behave 
optimistically with respect to the risks of smoking, then they would be just as 
likely to behave optimistically with respect to the risks 10 their families.333 
Similarly, if smokers externalize some of the costs of firsthand smoke 10 their 
insurers, then smokers' family members undoubtedly externalize some of the 
costs of secondhand smoke to their insurers.3:;.a 
Finally, there are many more persons harmed by smoking than just the 
smokers themselves and their immediate families. Among others, friends, 
coworkers, and extended family members (those who do not share in the 
household income pool) all bear some of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs 
of smoking. For the most part, those third parties and the external costs they 
bear are ignored in the economists' studies. 
To their credit, Manning et al. seem to recognize that family costs might 
properly be characterized as external.335 Consequently, they make an effort 
to quantify how their estimates would change if some of those costs were 
treated as external.336 At the same time, they briefly consider some of the 
external costs to "those outside the smoker's family.'"37 Using as a value of 
life $ 1 .66 million and treating all deaths as external, they estimate a per pack 
33 1 .  This argument is a version of an obscrva11on made: rc:cc:ntl) by Lollis Kaplow m lhe contc:\I of 
altruistic gift giving. See Louis Kaplow, A Nole 011 Subs1d1:111g G1f1s. 58 J PL B. EcON 469 ( 1995 J What 
is interesting for current purposes is lhal Kaplow·, point applu:• nol only lo the: bestowal of gifts but al'° 
to the avoidance of costs. As Kaplow points oul. 11 ma)' be con1rovc:r.ial lo count as a social cosl-�aratc: 
from the cost to the loved one imposed by the smokc:r°• prc:malurc: death-the pam fc:h by the smoker 
purely from knowing that she is imposing 1his CO•l on olhc:r.. See 1d. ul 475 & n . 1 2. Such costs. howc:, c:r. 
arc nol significanlly different from the types of psychic cost. lhal gc:t included. uncontro, c:r.1ally. m lhe 
social welfare function. 
332. See supra Subsection 11.B.4.d. 
333. Note that Viscusi and Manning et al. do nol c:vc:n claun lo prondc: C:' 1dc:ncc: th.11 •mol..eo and 
those around them are well-informed of lhe ml.. of pa.•1 \ c:  .mokc: or lire: or olhc:r "'�" facing the fanuly 
members of a smoker. 
334. We know of no life, heallh, or d1•ab1hl) pohcy lhal adJU•l> prc:m1ums to tal..c: into .,.;count lhe 
fact that one or more of an in,urance applicanl'• family member. •mokc:• h 1• •lnkmg lhal the: c:.:onom1sts' 
studies seemed to mi•s lh1s fairly obv1ou' potnl. Con.1dc:r, for 1n•lancc:. lhc: 1c:n•1on m lhe folio" mg I\\ o 
statements, which are in close proximily lo each olhc:r m Manning c:l al " bool.. ( I  l ··11Jo the c:\tc:nl thal 
passive smoking generale• health care and olher collc:cll\ c:I)· linancc:d co•l•. a pomon of tho..: c0>!> 1• alw 
paid by nonsmokers"; and (2) "[w]e do nol con,1dcr . . .  the: CO•l• of pa.-1\ c  •mot-mg \\ llhtn fo1111hcs 
as external." MANNING ET AL.. supra nOle 49. al 4. 
335. See id. at 4, 32, 1 95 n.5. 
336. See id. at 1 8. 
337. Id. at 83. 
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cost of $0.09 for lost lives in fires and another $0. 1 4  for fetal deaths caused 
by smoking.338 In addition, they estimate $0.02 per pack for smoking-caused 
neonatal intensive care costs.339 Finally, Manning et al. estimate the external 
costs of ETS to be $.014 per pack.340 
In sum, the economists exclude from their calculations substantial costs 
imposed by smokers on those around them, even though there are good reasons 
to count those costs as noninsurance externalities. Including those costs affects 
the cost-benefit calculation significantly. 
ii. Insurance Externalities 
For the sum of the insurance externalities, we accept the numbers given 
by Viscusi, with a few notable exceptions. Again, those numbers are based on 
the Manning et al. study but were updated by Viscusi in various ways. Thus, 
we accept per pack figures of $0.50 in medical costs, $0.01  in sick-leave costs, 
$0. 1 3  in group-life insurance costs, and $0.02 in fire-related property costs. We 
deal with the positive externalities in Subsection III.C.2.b below.341 
iii. Costs to the Smoker 
For all the reasons set forth in Part II, another cost that should be taken 
into account in an incentive-based system is the costs to the smokers 
themselves of their smoking habit. Although Manning et al. emphasize that 
"[t]he biggest component of total costs is the cost to the smoker of premature 
death and disability," they exclude that cost from consideration "[b]ecause this 
338. See id. at 83-84. 
339. See id. at 83-84; id. at 1 33 (summarizing their calculations of these costs); see also id. at 14 ("If 
we were to expand our external cost definition to include the costs of passive smoking. neonatal 
complications caused by mothers' smoking, and other costs to individuals other than the smoker, the 
external costs would range up to 52 cents per pack."). 
340. See id. at 83. In arriving at S0. 1 4  per pack, Manning et al. assume that all ETS·cuuscd dculhs 
are "external" and that the value of each life, on a willingness-to-pay measure, is $ 1 .66 million. See id. 
Viscusi provides a more thorough analysis of ETS costs than Manning et al. do, and Viscusi takes into 
account government studies of ETS costs that were issued after the Munning et al. book was published. See 
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 78-92. For two general reasons, however, we use the Manning ct al. estimate 
of $0. 1 4  per pack for ETS costs. First, we cannot determine what number Viscusi uses for overall ETS 
costs in  his final analysis of total external smoking costs. Viscusi states that the total passive smoking costs 
that are included in his final calculations "are assessed as the low, median, and high numbers from Tables 
6, 7 (lung cancer), and 9 (heart disease)." Id. at 93 n . 1 9. Those tables have so many different numbers and 
capture so many alternative assumptions, however, that we are unclear which numbers he means. We 
suspect that the final numbers exceed the S0. 1 4  estimated by Manning et al., but we cannot be sure. Cf. 
infra note 361 (discussing Viscusi's later estimate). Second, Viscusi omits all costs attributable to in-home 
exposure to ETS. See Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 93 & n. 1 9  (describing his table summarizing the externnl 
costs of smoking as being derived from an earlier table that included only outside-the-home ETS cost). We 
regard that omission as a serious mistake, for the reasons discussed in the text. 
341 .  As we explain infra Subsection III.C.2.b, we regard those positive externalities as having zero 
internalized value to the smoker. Note also that we omit the external costs attributable to lost tux revenues 
because the assumption underlying the estimate of those lost tuxes was that the entire amount would be 
returned to the smoker in the form of government benefits. 
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cost i s  borne by the smoker."342 Implicit i n  the logic that those costs are 
already internalized by smokers because they bear them is an assumption that 
smokers are well-informed of the health risks and addictiveness of smoking 
and that their smoking decisions take all of that information into account. 
Unlike Viscusi, Manning et al. do not attempt to justify that assumption.J.13 
Indeed, they acknowledge that, if the assumption were false, then the negative 
externalities (including the intrapersonal externalities to future selves) would 
greatly exceed their estimates of $0. 1 5  per pack. :144 Specifically, the negative 
externality from death and disability "would be on the order of SS per 
pack."345 In addition, "[s]mokers also pay 7 cents per pack more on 
out-of-pocket medical costs, and lose 86 cents in wages in salaries."J.16 
In Part II, we argued that smokers do not internalize those costs (even if 
their future selves must bear them) because of numerous consumer-information 
problems. Therefore, we conclude that those costs-for regulatory purposes 
and from the perspective of economics-should be viewed as external to the 
smokers. According to Manning et al. 's calculations, which we accept for 
present purposes, those costs total $5.93 per pack.J.17 
342. MANNING CT AL., supra note 49. at 82. 
343. In his anicle measuring externalities. Vi.cu" prov1dei. a thumbnail version of the arguments thal 
we summarized and criticized supra Pan II regarchng the nature and extent of consumer mformauon. Su 
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-72. 
344. See MANNING CT AL., supra note 49, at 2 1 .  
345. Id. The basis and precise meaning of thi. estimate " not clear to us. As far as " e  can tell. the 
$5.00 figure is meant to represent only the externality to each >moker"s future >ehcs and thU5 would need 
to be added to any other net negative externalities associated wnh >mokmg El>ewhcre Manning cl al. 
emphasize the imprecision of that number and suggei.t that the real number las 1f there were such a thing) 
may be lower: 
What is the cost to a person and his or her family of lo.mg 28 di.counted nunute• for c;u:h 
pack of cigarettes smoked? In monetary term>. thi. " 93 cents of wage. But >Urvcys ha' c 
shown that most people are willing to pay many umes their expected increase m earnmp for 
additional safety. Thus, this component of costs may be as much as S5.00 a pack 
Id. at 82 (citations omitted). Manning ct al. appear to have di.counted 1 37 mmuto of lost hfe expectancy 
per pack of cigarettes smoked to 28 minutes. See id. at 79 tbl.4 - 1 6. In another place. Manning et al. appear 
to offer a different calculation. See id. at 1 34 ("For cigarettes the di.counted cost 1s 0 4 hour per pack for 
the smoker . . . .  At $5 per hour, these costs amount to S I  to S2 per pack . . . .  "). Mann mg et al. do not 
make clear where they got these numbers or how they fit wnh the S5.00 per pack number u><:d earlier. 
346. Id. at 8. Understanding the meaning and proper interpretation of Manning cl al 's figure" 1s not 
easy. Indeed, they at times give different numbers for tho><: that we have noted m the text Su. e.g . td. 
at 1 4- 1 5  ("If we were to add the internal costs of disab1hty and premature death to our c.umatc. the costs 
could range from 78 cents to $5 per pack, depending on how we valued the lost year. of hfc. ") In add1t1on. 
we are not clear on whether the costs of pain and suffenng borne by the smoker are included m thc::>e 
numbers. Cf id. at 28 (suggesting that pain-and-suffenng costs are excluded) 
347. That estimate includes costs to the smoker of premature death and d1sab1ht)· (S5 00). out-of­
pocket medical expenses (S0.07), and lost wages ($0.86). Su 1d. al 8, 21 Ag;un. some might object that. 
insofar as smokers are mindful of those costs, counung them as costs m an mccnu,·c-ba>Cd system of 
regulation would produce overdeterrence-i.c., too httle smoking. Below. we explain how some mcenuve­
based systems ameliorate the overdeterrence problem. whereas others do not. Sa 111/ru Sub>Ccuon IV.D.3. 
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TABLE 1 .  ESTIMATED EXTERNAL COSTS PER PACK OF CIGARETIES 
HANSON & 
COSTS MANNING VIscusI349 LOGUE'S 
ET AL.348 ALTERNATIVE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Medical Care $0.26 $0.50 $0.50 
Sick Leave 0.0 1  0.01 0.0 1  
Group Life 0.05 0. 1 3  0. 1 3  
Insurance 
Nursing -0.03 -0.22 -
Home Care 
Retirement -0.24 - 1 . 1 0  -
Pension 
Fire Insurance 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Taxes on 0.09 0.35 -
Earnings 
I Total : Insurance I 0. 1 5  I -0.32 I 0.66 I 
Costs to - - 5.93 
Smoker 
ETS - - 0. 14 
Other - - 0.25350 
Total 0. 1 6  to 0.37 0. 14 to 0.73 6.32 
Noninsurance 
� 0.3 1 to 0.5235 1 -0. 1 8  to 0.4 1352 6.98 
We also accept (without endorsing) Viscusi's estimates for the negative 
insurance externalities associated with medical care, sick leave, fire insurance, 
348. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4- 16  (utilizing a discount rate of 5%). 
349. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 74 lbl.4 (utilizing a discount rate of 3%). 
350. This estimate, based on Manning et al., includes lives lost in tires ($0.09), fetal deaths ($0. 14), 
and neonatal intensive care ($0.02). See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 83-84. 
35 1 .  See id. at 85. The "Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting "Totul Insurance 
Costs" from 'Total Costs." 
352. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 93. The 'Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting 
'Total Insurance Costs" from 'Total Costs." 
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and life insurance.353 When it comes to the negative costs (or ··positive 
externalities") that Viscusi and Manning et al. attribute to nursing home 
savings and pension savings, however, we part company with the economists. 
As we discuss in detail in Subsection III.C.2.b. iv, we take the position that the 
"savings" to society resulting from the fact that smokers tend to die at a 
younger age than nonsmokers should not be included in the calculation of the 
size of the net externality produced by cigarettes. For essentially the same 
reasons, and in the interest of consistency, we also treat the external costs of 
lost "taxes on earnings" because of smokers' premature deaths as being 
zero354 whereas Manning et al. and Viscusi assign a positive number to those 
costs, as is consistent with their view of the positive externalities associated 
with smoking.355 This leaves us with a total negative insurance extemality 
of $0.66 per pack. To that, we add the costs to the smokers themselves 
($5.93), the total ETS costs ($0. 14), and other assorted costs attributable to 
c igarettes ($0.25). As Table 1 shows, we arrive at a total cost of almost $7.00 
per pack, which greatly exceeds the estimates of both Viscusi and Manning et 
al.356 
iv. Additional Concerns 
At this point, let us emphasize that our decision to take at face value the 
economists' estimates of external smoking costs (with the exceptions already 
noted of family costs and costs to the smokers themselves) should not be 
understood as an endorsement of those numbers or of the methodology used 
in arriving at them. To the contrary, there are reasons to believe that those 
numbers substantially understate the external costs of smoking. For example, 
when Manning et al. calculate the total life insurance externality associated 
with cigarette smoking, they limit their analysis to group life insurance. 357 
They justify this l imited focus on group insurance by assuming that individual 
l ife insurance policies adequately classify risks according to smoking status, 
thus creating no insurance extemality.358 We strongly disagree with that 
assumption. For many people, individual rather than group policies are their 
353. For a discussion of our reservations about Vi�u.i·, and Manning cl al \ cakulauons . .cc m/rt1 
Subsection III.C.2.a.iv. 
354. Our rationale b that, if the pen,ion and nur.mg home .a\ mg' due 10 the earl) deal� of 'mokcr. 
are to be excluded, it make' 'en'e 10 exclude from 1hc analy.i' a. \\ Cl l  1hc i;nc> 1ha1 \\ould ha\e been 
collccled had smokers lived a s1a1i,1ically nom1al nommol.cr hfc,pan 
355. Manning et al. and Vi,cus1 include only the 10,1 tal(C' that \\OulJ have been u.cd lo fund the 
costs accounted for in their numbers. such a. medical care and pen.ion,. 
356. Our total cos! number. ignore exi,ting foderal and '!ale cxc1>c lal(C:> on c1garellc:>. though V1"1Cu>1 
and Manning et al. analyze these costs. See supra note' 3 1 2. 3 1 9. and accompanying lc:"l For ihe reason> 
why we believe those taxes should be ignored. see 111/ra Sub>cclion 111.C.2 b 111 
357. See MANNING ET AL., supra nolc 49. al 37-38. \'i>cu,1 adopl' lhc .ame approach. although he 
updates the figures. See Viscusi. supra note I 02. al 96. 
358. See MANNING ET AL .. supra nole 49. al 37-38. 
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major form of life insurance coverage, and, as we observed above in Section 
III.A, those policies, even when they attempt to classify smoking risks, do a 
poor job of it. 
Another reason that we are inclined to doubt the reliability of Manning et 
al.'s and Viscusi's numbers is their treatment of ETS costs. For instance, 
Manning et al. estimate the total cost of ETS to be $0. 14 per pack,359 but 
they omit that number from their final calculations for reasons that are 
unclear.360 Viscusi, on the other hand, includes a figure for ETS costs that 
is based on more recent evidence, although we were not able to determine 
from his tables precisely what the final number is or how exactly it was 
calculated.361 More troubling with respect to Viscusi's ETS calculations are 
the questionable assumptions upon which the calculations are based. For 
example, Viscusi assumes that the morbidity costs associated with ETS are 
zero.362 This seems especially odd, given that the studies upon which he 
principally relies for his mortality-cost estimates also include substantial 
morbidity-cost estimates.363 In addition, consistent with his treatment of 
family members of smokers elsewhere, Viscusi omits all ETS-caused mortality 
costs attributable to in-home exposure to ETS.364 When we attempt to 
calculate the total ETS costs, using the EPA's estimates of total ETS-induced 
mortality and morbidity costs and applying a plausible willingness-to-pay 
measure of the value of a lost life, we arrive at a number in the neighborhood 
of $ 1 .00 per pack.365 Nevertheless, we have chosen simply to accept in this 
359. See id. at 83. 
360. See id. at 79 tbl.4- 1 6  (omitting the ETS cost estimate from final totals). Viscusi claims that 
Manning et al. omit the $0. 14 because they concluded that "the evidence at the time of their study was too 
fragmentary to make a reliable judgment." Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 78. But Viscusi cites no specific 
language in the Manning et al. studies to support that interpretation. 
361 .  In a more recent summary of his earlier work, Viscusi writes: "Using the uppcr·bound EPA 
estimates of the ETS body counts in conjunction with a figure of $5 million per life lost, I have estimated 
that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is as high as 41 ¢ per pack." Viscusi, s11pra note 150, at 46. 
362. We take that to be Viscusi's assumption because his study does not mention ETS morbidity costs 
and because the tables summarizing his calculations do not contain any morbidity cost estimates. For the 
same reasons, we conclude that Manning et al. make the same assumption. 
363. For example, the EPA study on which Viscusi bases some of his calculations estimates the total 
annual morbidity costs of ETS to be between $2.7 billion and $6.5 billion. See OFFICE OF RADIATION & 
INDOOR AIR, s11pra note 288, at 1 3. Those costs include the medical expenses associated with an assortment 
of ailments, particularly asthma. 
364. He omits inside-the-home heart disease mortality costs because they "may well be internalized 
by the smoker" and because "the underlying scientific basis for these estimates is extremely fragile and 
highly speculative." Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 87. He omits inside-the-home lung cancer deaths from his 
analysis for similar reasons. See id. at 85. 
365. For the purpose of making this calculation, we used as a starting point the estimated mortality 
and morbidity losses shown in OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR, s11pra note 288, exhs.2·6, 2-7. To 
arrive at an annual dollar cost for mortality losses (discounted to present value to account for the fuel that 
tobacco-smoke exposure shortens one's life at the end, which will typically be years in the future), we used 
a valuation of $924,000 per life lost due to ETS. Applying this approach, we found that the total annual 
cost of in-home ETS exposure falls somewhere between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion. 
We should also note that Viscusi, in his calculation of total insurance externalities, includes u range 
of estimated "ETS insurance externalities." Viscusi, s11pra note 102, at 9 1  tbl. 1 1 .  Again, we arc not entirely 
sure how he arrived at these numbers; the only discussion of his methodology that we can find is one 
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part the Manning et al. number of $0. 14 per pack for the external ETS-related 
costs of cigarettes. 366 
There are other examples of questionable calculations in both the Manning 
et al. and Viscusi studies. From the positive externality side, when Manning 
et al. (and thus Viscusi) attempt to compute the total external benefit 
associated with pension savings attributable to smokers' dying young. they 
assume unrealistically that all pension plans are defined benefit plans that 
terminate when the smoker dies.367 A majority of people in this country who 
have pension plans, however, have some form of defined contribution 
plan.368 In contrast to defined benefit plans. the benefits of defined 
sentence that reads: .. The insurance externalill<!l> from ETS are the lir..t csumale> of lh1' I-ind and n:llect 
the analog of the insurance externalities from smoker.. them,elvc' " Id at 87. Ba.cd on that sentence. and 
because the ETS insurance externality numbers in Vi.cu"'' table end up being po"ll'c  c�tcrnah11c,, we 
assume that those numbers are the excess of the pem1on and nur..ing home ··saving>" �mtcd \\ llh the 
premature death of those exposed to ETS over the medical. "ck lea\c, hfc insurance, and lirc·rclated 
external costs of that exposure. Therefore. if we were to apply to the ETS i nsurance c�tcmahty the 
approach developed in this Article--that 1s, eliminating the pen,1on and nursing home clement from the 
fonnula--the ETS insurance externalitie' would clearly be net co'!' rJthcr than net benefit, to wc1cl) We 
do not, however, attempt to quantify those additional external co'i. 
366. The most recent reports suggest that then: 1s growing C\ 1dcncc of hc:lft J1sea.c ml �1a1ed 
with ETS exposure. See, e.g., Denise Grady. S1ttd\ F111ds Seco11dlu111d Smoke Doubl.-1 Ruk of lleun 
Disease, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1 997, at A l  (reporting on the finding> of a recent ,1ud) b) !lan ard 
researchers suggesting that there may be 50,000 ETS-cau,L-d heart J1sea.c death. per ) car in the L:mtcd 
States). It is the connection between ETS exposure and heart disease that V1.cu'1 'uggot' 1• most 
questionable. See Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 85. 
367. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 29 By a defined benefit plan. �tanning ct al mean .i 
private pension plan that, upon the worker·, retirement, pay' her 'omc annual amount that 1• a funcuon 
of her salary at retirement. What is key for our purpo":' 1' that Manning ct al �umc that. 1f the woricr 
dies prematurely (whether due to smoking or 'omc other cau•c). the pen,1011 re•oureo that would ha'c 
gone to the worker are instead returned to the other par11c1pani. in the pen,1on plan, cuhcr in the fom1 of 
smaller required contributions or larger pensions. Thur effect " the •Upposcd pen.ion sanng> to wc1c1y of 
cigarette smoking. Viscusi does not menuon speci fically what Im "''umpuon• are regarding dclincd 
contribution and defined benefit plans, but he seem• to ha\C adopted the Manning ct al approach 
368. See U.S. DEP.T OF LABOR. PENSION AND HEALTII BE.'\El'ITS OF AMERICA' WORKtRS :-It'\ 
FINDINGS FROM THE APRIL 1 993 CURRENT POPL1LATION StRVE\ al B - 1 9  ( 1 99-1) According to that •tudy. 
of those workers in the United States covered by only one or the other type of pen"on plan. alma.I 1w1cc 
as many report being under a defined contribuuon plan a. report being under a Jctincd bench! plan Sa 
id. Additionally, when those wage and salary worker.. who reported par11c1pa11ng in bolh defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans were asked to identify which type of plan wa. ··ma.I unportam:· 60% .aid 
defined contribution and only 40% said defined benefit. See 1d at B·20 Finally. 75% of "' orkcr. 
participating in private pension plans report being ve,tL-d: only 1 5"<- report being UO\ c•ted <The rest 
reported not knowing the answer 10 the question.) Sa 1d. at B-2 1 .  
A defined contribution plan, in contrast to a defined benefit plan. 1 '  more of an ··employer-enhanced 
private savings plan." MANNING ET AL, supra note 49, at 29. After 'ome penod of lime, 1f the worker >ta}' 
on the job long enough, the contributions to a defined contnbuuon plan and the accumula1ed earning• on 
those contributions begin to vest to the worker. That mean• that those :is.ct" c.scnually become 1hc 
property of the worker: She can take those benefit, wuh her 1f 'he change> JOb>. and her otalc " ould 
receive the benefits if she were to die prematurely. With defined contnbuuon plan>. therefore, the \\Orkcr'• 
benefits, to the extent they have vested. do 1101 go back into the pen"on pool. Set:" Tlie B11s1n of Pt'llsw11 
Plans (visited Nov. 7, 1 997) <http://www.pen"onapprJ1.cr...com/penba.1c' html> Consequently. to the 
extent private pension plans take the form of defined con1nbu11on plan" there " no po•lll'c c\lcrnaht) 
even under Manning et al. 's own analy'i'. 
Manning et al. base their decbion 10 ignore defined contnbuuon plans on I\\ o rauonalo "( 1 1  
[D)efined contribution plans are a minority of pnvatc pen"on plan>. Jnd !2l C\ en in defined contnbu11on 
plans, the amount of the annuity is usually not a funcuon of habit •tatu' " �IA.,.Nl.,.G ti AL, rnpru note 
49, at 29. The first rationale appears to be a product of the author..' n:hance on no" -dated stat1>11cs. A!> 
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contribution plans do not terminate at death and, according to the Manning et 
al. analysis, would not be considered a positive externality associated with 
smokers' dying young. We will address the concept of positive externalities 
from premature death below.369 Here we only mean to suggest why our 
confidence in the economists' numbers, which we are taking as given for the 
purposes of argument, may be unfounded. 
In addition, although we follow Manning et al.'s and Viscusi's lead in 
omitting a number of important categories of smoking costs, ideally those costs 
should be included in the analysis. For example, wholly separate from ETS 
costs, we would expect there to be large pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs 
experienced by smokers' families and friends as a consequence of smokers' 
protracted smoking-related illnesses and their smoking-caused premature 
deaths.370 Neither Manning et al. nor Viscusi attempts to measure these costs 
(which could, in theory, be quantified by using some combination of estimated 
out-of-pocket costs together with a willingness-to-pay measure for the 
nonpecuniary element). If those costs were taken into account, it is likely that 
the external costs of smoking would be much higher than is reflected in the 
third column of Table 1 .  Less significant than those suffering costs, but 
perhaps more familiar, are the annoyance costs faced by nonsmokers. As at 
least one commentator has correctly noted, many nonsmokers would be willing 
to pay something for smoke-free and smoke-residue-free environments: "If 
nonsmokers were willing to pay $50 a year for this privilege, it would add up 
to $ 10 billion. That in turn could justify a 42-cent-per-pack tax, forcing 
smokers to pay for their annoying habit."371 
Finally, there are also a number of non-health-related costs to the smokers 
themselves that Manning et al. and Viscusi overlook. For instance, smokers 
likely pay, on average, higher home cleaning costs, higher dry cleaning bills, 
and higher amounts for teeth cleaning products and services.372 Many of 
them are also likely to spend more on breath mints and sprays and on repairing 
or replacing scorched clothing or furniture.373 Because of lingering smoke 
to the second rationale, we agree wilh the premise, but not with the conclusion. It is true that defined 
contribution pension plans and the annuities lhat are issued in connection with those plans do not typically 
distinguish among beneficiaries on the basis of their smoking status. That fact, however. has no implications 
for the question at hand. The point is that the "benefits"' of early death are not enjoyed by other pension 
plan participants; they remain with the decedent's estate. They are not, in other words, e:cterna/izecl. Those 
pension payouts should therefore be excluded from any calculation of the positive externalities of smoking. 
Manning et al. may have wrongly decided to treat pension payouts of this sort as an externality simply 
because of their more general definition of externalities. See, e.g., icl. at 45 ("(T]hc concept of externality 
is usually clear: a portion of the costs is generally external if costs are financed by a large pool of insured 
individuals, and premiums (or taxes) do not depend on smoking status."). 
369. See infra Subsection III.C.2.b. 
370. See supra Section IIl.B. 
37 1 .  Miller, supra note 322, at 53; cf. infra text accompanying note 404 (describing possible psychic 
costs of "sin"). 
372. See Vivian Marino, Smokers Cough Up Big Bucks To Feed Habit, AP, July 8, 1997. cm1ilt1ble 
in 1 997 WL 4874041 .  
373. See id. 
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odors, smokers may also face additional costs in terms of reduced resale 
market value of their homes and cars.374 Finally, a large number of smokers 
have paid billions for various sorts of smoking-cessation aids.m I! seems 
doubtful that most smokers take those added costs into account when deciding 
whether to smoke.376 Indeed, the fact that economists such as Manning et al . 
do not even consider those costs provides some evidence that they are not 
widely recognized as costs.377 
For all of those reasons (especially the apparent omission of in-home ETS 
mortality costs and all ETS morbidity costs and, perhaps most significant, the 
omission of any pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers' 
family and friends), it is likely that our final estimate of the total external costs 
of smoking shown in Table I-roughly $7.00 per pack-may understate by a 
large amount the magnitude of the problem.378 In sum, even our conservative 
estimate of $7.00 per pack of external costs dwarfs the numbers derived by the 
economists. As we have stated, the main reason for the difference is our 
decision to include the costs of smoking to smokers themselves, which we do 
for the information-based reasons discussed in Part II. In the following section, 
we explain the other principal difference between our final estimate and that 
of the economists, namely, our decision not to include the social benefits of 
smoking. 
b .  A Closer Look ar the Positive Exrernaliries 
As we noted at the outset of this section, economists argue that the 
external costs of smoking are offset (or more than offset) by the social 
"benefits" of smoking. In the previous subsection, however. we explained that 
the external costs of smoking have been drastically understated. In this 
subsection, we explain that the external benefits of smoking have been at least 
as drastically overstated. We argue further that the so-called social savings 
374. See id. 
375. See Health Care Reform Hearmgs. supra note 330. at 3 1 6  (>tatement of Jeffrey Ham>). Eben 
Shapiro, After Nicotine Parches: Sprays, Ptlls. Inhalers '. WALL ST. J.. Nov 8. 1 993. at B I ,  '"'" also 
Parker-Pope, supra note 1 4 1  (reporting annual cxpendnure> on >mol.ing-ce>>allon de,1ces and programs 
at $41 7.7 million). 
376. See Health Care Reform Hearmgs, supra note 330. at 3 1 6  (>tatement of Jeffrey Ham>) 
377. Jeffrey Harris has cnticized the sort of >tudtc> conducted by Manning et al and Vi'ICw.t for 
focusing "only on the easy-to-measure costs." Id. at 3 1 6. Tut> "cold approach," according to Hams. 
assumes "that all unquantifiable costs somehow cancel each other out." Id. Ham> adopt> instead the '°" arm 
approach," which resists the temptation to "di.mi» injury and >Uffenng mere!)· becau>e: n cannot be: simply 
calibrated." Id. 
378. We omit some costs that other economt>l> include. For in>tance. Jeff re) Ham> calculate> a Joss 
in personal income taxes of $ 1 4  billion per year due to premature death> from smoking Sa 1d. at 3 1 7  
Similarly, Manning et al. calculate a per pack cost of S0.09 for lo>t income taxes. ue �IA'l.'1.1'1.G cl AL. 
supra note 49, at 75, while Viscu>i e>timatcs such lo» at SO 35. su V1scu>1. mpra note I 02. at 74 rbl .-1 
We exclude those costs. for reasons di>CUS>Cd supra note 35-l 
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resulting from cigarette-caused deaths should, for economic and noneconomic 
reasons, be excluded from the policymaker's calculus. 
All of the alleged external benefits of smoking derive from the fact that 
smokers, as compared to nonsmokers, tend to die near the end of their most 
productive years and at the beginning of the years in which they will draw 
down the various accounts they have accumulated over a lifetime of productive 
work. As a consequence, the argument goes, when smokers die, large amounts 
of resources (especially public and private pension entitlements as well as 
nursing home entitlements) are, on average, left to be consumed by the rest of 
society. This translates into lower pension and nursing home premiums for 
nonsmokers during their lifetimes.379 
Based on that rationale, and according to Manning et al.'s calculations, 
smoking saves society $0.24 per pack in smokers' unclaimed pension 
entitlements and $0.03 per pack in smokers' unclaimed nursing home 
entitlements.380 After making a number of updating adjustments, Viscusi 
reports those per pack benefits at $ 1 . 1 0  for pension savings and $0.22 for 
nursing home savings.381 Ultimately, the conclusion of the positive 
externality story is that, instead of trying to deter cigarette consumption, we 
should be subsidizing it.382 
When we first encountered this positive externality argument, it struck us 
as bizarre and counterintuitive. Because we are responding primarily to 
economic arguments, we emphasize here the economic flaws in the positive 
externality story. This focus on economics and efficiency, however, should not 
be interpreted to mean that we think the strongest responses against the 
positive externality argument are economic ones. To the contrary, as we 
suggest briefly below,383 we suspect that the moral objections to this story 
are at least as strong as the economic objections.384 
379. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 28; Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75. 
380. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4- 1 6; see also supra Table I .  Herc, ns elsewhere 
in this Article, we use Manning et al.'s "best estimates"-i.e., the figures arrived at using n 5% discount 
rate-in discussing their calculations. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. We use Viscusi's 3% 
discounted figures in discussing his calculations. See supra note 3 1 5  and accompanying text. 
3 8 1 .  See Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 74 tbl.4; see also supra Table I ;  cf. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 
95-97 (discussing his updating adjustments to Manning ct al.'s numbers). 
382. See, e.g .• Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75 (''Taken at face value, these estimates indicntc thnt, if 
one were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount rate results, cignrettc smoking 
should be subsidized rather than taxed."). 
383. See infra Subsection III.C.2.b.iv. 
384. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that there is a positive extemality associated with the 
lethal effects of smoking and that it has been properly measured (both of which clnims we contest in the 
following subsections), the positive extemality identified by the economists' studies is still swamped by 
the nearly $7.00 of negative externalities that we have identified, see s11pra Table I ,  using basicnlly the 
economists' own numbers. From an economic perspective, this fact calls for more intemaliwtion of costs, 
not less. 
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Even if we were willing to consider the savings from premature deaths in 
our social cost-benefit calculation, the only possible positive extemality 
associated with the premature deaths of smokers would be the assets that the 
smokers themselves would have consumed had they not smoked and, as a 
result, had l ived longer. Any assets that would have been consumed by anyone 
other than the smokers had they not smoked cannot be considered part of the 
extemality. When the smokers die early there may be a trnnsfer of those assets, 
but this transfer should not go into the efficiency analysis. For example, assets 
that would have been consumed by the family of the smokers (or by charities 
to which the smokers would have made contributions, etc.) but that instead get 
consumed by the smokers ' fellow pension plan participants do not count as a 
positive externality. (Our conclusion here assumes that everyone other than the 
smokers, including the smokers ' family members, is external co the 
smokers.)385 Therefore, the economists' estimates of pension savings should, 
at the very least, be reduced to take into account the extent co which those 
so-called savings represent such transfers. 
Similarly, the positive extemality story seems to assume that smokers die 
leaving no liabilities. That is, the economists make no anemp! co offset the 
pension and social security savings associated with smokers' premature death 
by whatever l iabilities go unpaid when smokers die. It may be the case that 
smokers, on average, have fewer liabilities when they die than nonsmokers do. 
But no evidence to that effect is offered. In any event, some adjustment should 
have been made to account for whatever liabil ities smokers do tend to leave 
when they die. 
i i .  Do Smokers Really Extemali':.e Forgone "Benefits " ?  
The positive externality argument also seems wrong based on the fact that 
information problems (such as the ones we discussed in Part II) prevent 
smokers from experiencing the loss of future pension benefits as a current cost 
in their decisions regarding whether to smoke the next pack. If the forgone 
pension benefits of smokers are indeed to be understood as a positive 
externality, then their loss must affect the incentives of the smokers. 1116 To 
385. See supra Subsection 1 11.C.2.a.i. If we were 10 accept the ;i,.,umpuon made by Manning cl al and 
Viscusi that costs borne or benefits enjoyed by a 'mokcr\ hou•ehold member arc 1memal 10 1he •moker. 
their mistaken assumption 1ha1 all pen,ion plan' are defined bcnefi1 plan• would pronde another b;i,." 10 
criticize their estimate of positive extemalitie,. See supra nole> 367-368 and accompan) mg le\t 
386. There is linle doubt that Manning el al. arc makmg a po"11ve cx1cmahl)' argument s ..... <" 11 • 
MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, al 28 ("[S]mokmg lead> 10 a •haft m future claim> or bcnefiu from 
smokers 10 nonsmokers, thereby yielding a po,111vc cx1cmah1y to non•moker.. 00) 01her langtrage m their 
book also indicates Iha! they have !hi' son of mccn11ve-affcc11ng cxtcmaluy m mmd 1mtcad of a transfer-
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see why this is so, take a standard example of a positive externality: paying to 
have one's lawn beautifully landscaped. If we assux:ne the cost of landscaping 
to be $400, but the benefit to the homeowner herself to be only, say, $ 1 00, 
then the homeowner will not make the investment. That would be inefficient, 
however, if the landscaping would produce anything greater than $300 worth 
of benefits to the homeowner's neighbors. The reason, in the absence of 
government intervention, that the landscaping would not get done, despite the 
overall social benefit of its getting done, is that the homeowner would 
experience the full $400 cost of landscaping investment but would not 
experience enough of the social benefits to justify the cost. Hence, it might be 
appropriate for the neighbors (or the government on behalf of the neighbors) 
to pay the homeowner a subsidy in an amount that is just enough to outweigh 
the costs to the homeowner but not so much as to exceed the external benefit 
to the neighbors. In such a situation, the positive externality would be fully 
internalized to the landowner. 
Now turn to the cigarette example and the potential external benefit to 
nonsmokers of smokers' dying prematurely and leaving unconsumed pension, 
social security, and nursing home entitlements. Recall our earlier example of 
the consumer who values a pack of cigarettes at $3.00 and who must decide 
whether to purchase the next pack of cigarettes faced with a nominal purchase 
price of $2.00, which represents only the production and distribution costs of 
the product.387 Assume also that there are no health costs, or other external 
costs, to nonsmokers associated with smoking, but there are $2.00 of pension 
"savings" to nonsmokers associated with each pack. From society's 
perspective, therefore, the $2.00 is an extra benefit (just as the additional $300 
of value to the homeowner's neighbors in the landscaping example was a 
benefit). The problem, according to the positive externality story, is that the 
consumer experiences the $2.00 transfer to nonsmokers as a personal cost to 
herself with no offsetting benefit (just as the homeowner experiences the extra 
$300 of the landscaping cost as a cost with no offsetting personal benefit). 
Thus the consumer in the smoking example would inefficiently choose not to 
consume the pack of cigarettes. Why is that outcome inefficient? For the same 
reason it was inefficient for the homeowner not to make the landscaping 
investment: There are social gains that could be made. The suggested solution 
The customary arguments for ignoring transfer payments in assessing economic efficiency do 
not apply here . . . .  In the usual case, transfer payments do not depend on the behavior of the 
consumer. Thus, they do not alter behavior unless the payment is large enough so that income 
effects are considerable. In the case of smoking, however, receiving the transfer depends on 
choices made by the consumer . . . .  Suppose the government were to promise that everyone 
who reached age 70 would receive a million-dollar payment (transfer). It seems likely that many 
people would stop smoking (or never start) and engage in other less risky activities so that they 
might receive the "transfer." The ability to change one's activities to get the million-dollar 
bonus implies that it is not a pure transfer. 
Id. at 27. 
387. See s11pra text accompanying note 44. 
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of the economists to this problem is to subsidize the consumer (by paying her 
up to $ 1  per pack) to induce her to purchase and consume the pack of 
cigarettes. 
The problem with this argument is that the potential positive extemality 
associated with smoking is importantly different from other positive extemality 
situations, including the landscaping scenario. The difference is that. for all the 
reasons explained in Part II, smokers do not experience (or take into account) 
the lost pension, social security, and nursing home benefits as a $2.00 per pack 
cost today.388 Either because they are optimistic with respect to those costs, 
because they apply an inappropriately high discount rate, or because they 
simply regard those costs as being zero (for example, expecting that they will 
be able to quit smoking and reverse the effects of their habit), it seems 
extremely unlikely that a consumer would take those costs into account when 
making the pack-by-pack decision regarding whether to smoke.3S9 If such 
costs are not taken into account, there is no positive extemality.390 
If consumers did take into account the forgone pension benefits associated 
with smoking, and if transaction costs were low, the market might produce a 
Coasean bargain that would achieve the efficient result. One mechanism 
388. If this particular efficiency argument were our only respon..: to the pos1t1ve exlemahty story. we 
might be running some risk of double-counting the external co'ts of cigarettes. m the following sense We 
argued supra Section 11.C that the costs to the smokers them.elves of dying prematurely. measured in terms 
of willingness to pay, should be internalized to cigarette compamc.-. and. through the pnce mechanism. to 
smokers because smokers do not otherwise fully take tho..: cost' into account. owing 10 imperfect 
information. That number, taken from the Manning et al. 'tudy. came to as much as S5.00 per p;u:lc Su 
supra note 345 and accompanying text. It may be the ca..:. however. that the S5.00 figure includes the cost 
to smokers of forgone pension, social secunty, and nursing home enutlemenb. That 1> 10 say. that S5.00 
figure may represent, in per pack terms, what a consumer would be w1Jhng to pay 10 avoid losing the 
relevant number of years at the end of her life. assummg slit' 11'111 TYan·e all of ha penswn and other 
enriclemenls during chose years. If that was what those con,umers were thinl.ing when they made the 
choices that served as the basis for the $5.00 figure. then an efficiency argument for offscmng wnh permon 
savings might be plausible. We do not know, however. what exactly that S5.00 figure includes; we would 
not be surprised if the consumers whose behavior W3' the foundauon for that number " ere not thinking 
about forgone pensions at the time. In any event, our other arguments in 1h1> ..ecuon-espcc1ally those infra 
Subsection 111.C.2.b.iv-are more than enough on their own to JU,ufy 1gnonng the pension saving.s. 
389. The difference with the landscaping example. of course. 1> that the costs to the homeowner of 
getting the landscaping done are experienced fully by the homeowner al the same ume as the benefit would 
be bestowed upon the neighbors. That is, in the landscaping example. there 1s no temporal scparauon of 
costs and benefits as there is in the cigarette setting. If there 1> any temporal separauon. II would be in the 
opposite direction-the cost to the homeowner would be felt bt'foTY rather than after the benefi!S were 
bestowed on the neighbors. 
390. Although we have done only a casual in\'e,ugauon of the matter. no smoker to whom we ha\·e 
talked has given any indication of consciously perceiving that h1> or her pen>1on and nursing home 
arrangements have influenced his or her smoking calculauon. Moreover. in newspaper amclo that we have 
seen purporting to measure the costs of 'moking to smokers. the forgone pension and nursmg home benefits 
are never included. See, e.g., Marino. supra note 372 (poinung out many of the obvious and not-so-obvious 
costs to smokers, but excluding entirely any mention of forgone benefit, resulting from early death). lbc 
fact that the point we are here making has never before been made. together wnh the fact that V1KUS1 and 
Manning et al. focus mostly (though usually implicitly) on cro"·'ub>1d1zauon 1,,,.ues. S.-<' MA,Sl'G ET AL, 
supra note 49, at 127; Viscusi, supra note I 02. at 5 1 .  may be indirect evidence that people do not 1yp1cally 
consider forgone pension and nursing home benefit, 3' co't' 10 be con>1den:d " hen deciding " hether 10 
take a risk. 
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through which such a Coasean bargain could in theory be achieved would be 
the labor market-specifically, the market for salary/pension packages. In 
theory, workers who plan to be long-term smokers could negotiate with their 
employers to receive more of their compensation in the form of up-front cash 
and less in the form of pension benefits. Hence smokers and nonsmokers 
would have different salary/pension packages. Interestingly, however, we do 
not see such distinctions in actual salary/pension packages. One reason that 
smokers do not attempt to negotiate such deals with their employers may be 
that they do not think about the effects of their smoking habit on their ability 
to claim pension entitlements.391 
Even if we were to assume for the moment that consumers do take into 
account the general mortality risk of each cigarette they smoke, we doubt that 
they take into account the accompanying forgone pension benefits. There is a 
fair amount of evidence suggesting that, broadly speaking, individuals tend to 
ignore or give less weight to costs that take the form of forgone benefits, even 
when those same individuals would take into account costs of equal present 
value that take the form of actual payouts.392 This phenomenon is sometimes 
391 .  We do not wish to overstate our reliance on this sort of rough-and-ready empirical observation. 
There are obvious reasons, besides lack of consumer demand, for the absence of discrimination between 
smokers and nonsmokers in employment packages. For example, there might be severe moral hazurd and 
adverse selection problems that prevent employers from making such distinctions. See Hanson & Logue, 
The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 148-5 1 .  There may be some reason to believe that 
the sort of market failures that prevent first-party insurers from reliably identifying smokers for tho purpose 
of charging them higher insurance premi11ms will not pose as significant a problem to employers who seek 
to identify smokers for the purpose of "charging" them lower pension contrib11tions. For instance, given 
that, for pension contribution purposes, smokers would stand to benefit from being identified as smokers, 
they would obviously have an incentive to divulge rather than to hide their status as smokers. The supply­
side problem in this context, therefore, would be nonsmokers seeking, for pension purposes, to make 
themselves look like smokers. But smokers might be able to signal their status more reliably than 
nonsmokers. For example, given the addictive nature of cigarettes, if a smoker can demonstrate she is 
currently a smoker, she has provided a credible signal that she will continue to be a smoker; in the case 
of a nonsmoker, demonstrating that she is a nonsmoker at the time of her application for insurance suggests 
less about her likelihood in the future of remaining in that status. Also, if a person could show that she had 
a health condition that strongly correlates with smoking (such as emphysema or lung cancer), that showing 
would constitute good evidence of smoking status. Moreover, if supply-side rather than demand-side 
difficulties were responsible for the absence of smoking-based distinctions in compensation packages, it 
is a little curious that we have not heard stories of workers at least attempting to negotiate such packages 
with their employers. In the first-party insurance context, there is at least some attempt (albeit largely 
ineffective) to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, which suggests a demand on the part of nonsmokers 
for such a distinction. In sum, there is very little market evidence to suggest that smokers, under the current 
regime, give much thought to the possibility of negotiating more favorable pension arrangements with their 
employers. 
If we shift to an enterprise liability regime, however, then once the full costs of cigarettes (including 
the costs to the smokers of their foreshortened lives) are impounded into the sale price of cigarettes, 
smokers may then be induced to give greater consideration to the possibility of negotiating more favorable 
pension arrangements with their employers. This might happen both because the rise in cigarette prices 
would make the issue more salient to smokers and because, for those who opt to continue smoking, the 
price increase might necessitate "borrowing" against future pension claims in order to help fund the higher 
cost of smoking. 
392. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Stcttlls Quo Bicts, 
5 J. EcON. PERSP. 1 93 ( 1 99 1 )  [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Stcttlls Q110 Bicts]; Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Experimentctl Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coctse Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1 325 ( 1 990); Jack 
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called the "status quo bias."393 In light of this bias, i t  seems implausible that 
smokers would say to themselves: "I need to cut back on my smoking, lest I 
give up too much of the pension and nursing home benefits that I will enjoy 
if I don ' t  smoke." 
But perhaps the positive externality story is not an externality or efficiency 
argument at all. One could reasonably interpret both Viscusi and Manning et 
al. to be taking the following position: Regardless of whether the social 
benefits of smoking are externalized by smokers (that is, regardless of whether 
smokers' incentives are affected by the potential social savings attributable to 
their smoking habit), so long as cigarette smoking in the aggregate produces 
social benefits that exceed the social costs, there is no need for government 
intervention.394 Such an argument is not an efficiency argument, since it does 
not require cost internalization of any kind. Instead, it is a distributional 
argument. Smokers as a group enjoy the benefits of smoking. the argument 
goes, so they (as a group) should bear the costs of smoking as well. Therefore, 
so long as smokers transfer sufficient funds to nonsmokers (via unclaimed 
pension entitlements, for example) to offset whatever transfers go in the 
opposite direction (via insurance externalities and passive smoke). there is no 
distributional need for a regulation. That may be so. 
The best justification for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes, however, 
is not the need for redistribution, but the need for improved efficiency through 
increased cost-internalization. Another way to put our response to the 
distributional argument is this: As with other normative economic analyses of 
accident law, we take as one uncontroversial objective of tort law, and of 
safety regulation generally, the minimization of the costs of accidents.m As 
we explained in Section LB, if there are market failures that give rise to care 
level and activity level inefficiencies, achieving the goal of minimizing 
accidents requires a regulatory response of some sort. Merely to determine that 
the aggregate costs of an activity are borne ultimately by the parties 
participating in the activity is, therefore, nor a cost-minimizing response to the 
problem. So, for example, if we determined that all of the harms caused by 
automobiles were borne ultimately by the people who benefit from the 
existence of the automobile, such a finding would not be an efficiency 
L. Knetsch, 17ze Endowment Effecr and El'ldence of Ncm�1·ers1ble /lld1fle�nce Cun·es. 79 AM ECO'< REv 
1 277 ( 1 989). See generally David Cohen & Jack L. Kneli.ch. J11d1cwl CJ101ce and D1spanr1es Berwun 
Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J . 737 ( 1 992) (>ummanzmg expcnmental evidence 
indicating !hat people evaluate aclual payouls and forgone gain> differently and arguing !ha! !he la"' should 
and does take that difference into account). 
393. E.g., Kahneman el al., Sraws Quo Bias. supra nolc 392 
394. See, e.g., Viscusi. supra nole I02. al 92 ("A comprehcn>1,·c a.scssmcnt of these costs suggests 
that on balance, smokers do no! cos! sociely re>ource> bccausc of lhetr >mo!..mg ac11vu1e:s. bu! ralhcr save 
society money."). We should nole. however. !ha! !he cconom1,l> sccm confl™:d aboul whether !hey are 
making a distribulional argument or an efficiency argumcnl See. e.g . . MANNl"<G 1:1 AL. supra nolc 49. at 
1 9  ("Smokers are already paying !heir way. if we JUdgc >Olcly on !he ground> of economic efficiency.") 
395. See GUIDO CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF AC'CIDE.'\'TS 26 ( 1 970). 
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justification for abolishing tort law in this area or for eliminating auto safety 
standards more generally. Such a response, rather than reducing the costs of 
auto accidents, would likely increase those costs. 
iii. What About the Current Level of Excise Taxes? 
The economists, given their calculations of the external costs and benefits 
of smoking, conclude that current levels of federal and state excise taxes on 
cigarettes more than fully internalize any remaining external costs imposed by 
cigarettes.396 Indeed, they go so far as to imply that current levels of 
cigarette taxation are excessive, because cigarettes are socially beneficial on 
net.397 Therefore, they argue, imposing any additional incentive-based 
regulation would only worsen the overdeterrence problem. 
We have several responses to that line of argument. The first and most 
obvious response is that, based on our recalculation of costs and benefits,398 
current excise taxes appear to be drastically inadequate. According to Viscusi, 
the combined state and federal taxes on cigarettes total, on average, 
approximately $0.53 per pack. 399 And, as we indicated in Table 1 ,  the 
external costs of cigarette smoking come in around $7.00 per pack-roughly 
thirteen times the average combined federal and state tax rate. 
It might be argued that because the excise tax does internalize some of the 
costs, any proposal to add further incentive-based regulation should take the 
existing level of deterrence into account. The argument initially seems 
appealing.400 Upon closer examination, however, the argument that future 
incentive-based regulation should be adjusted to take the current excise taxes 
into account seems flawed, for two general reasons. The first, which we will 
discuss more fully in Section IV.C, is that excise taxes are a less efficient form 
of incentive-based regulation than some other forms, such as enterprise 
liability. There is a strong argument that the more efficient approach should be 
adopted, and any overdeterrence that results from the presence of the 
inefficient excise tax is best remedied by removal of the redundant excise 
taxes.401 The second reason that we are hesitant to adjust any new incentive­
based regulation to account for current excise taxes is that those taxes may 
396. See, e.g., MANNING ITT AL., s11pra note 49, at 24 ("Taxes on cigarettes are at a level such that 
smokers pay approximately the costs they impose on others.''); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 93 ("(C]igaretlc 
taxes already exceed the level of the estimated externalities."). 
397. Cf. Viscusi, s11pra note I 02, at 75 (arguing that, even without taxes. smokers more than pay their 
way). 
398. See supra Table I .  
399. See Viscusi, s11pra note 102, at 57. 
400. The deterrence objective of tort law would favor making adjustments to the level of tort damages 
in order not to overdeter. See Hanson & Logue, Tort Law in Context, supra note 40, at 8. There muy be 
nondeterrence reasons such as insurance, however, not to adjust damages downward. 
401 .  This argument seems especially strong in the current climate, when Congress is considering 
adopting a comprehensive regulatory strategy. 
1998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 255 
serve the purpose of internalizing a different set of costs than the ones we have 
been discussing in this part. Indeed, there is agreement even among economists 
that the current system of cigarette taxes was almost certainly not designed and 
calibrated to internalize the costs at issue here.402 
So what is the function of cigarette taxes? One might contend that 
cigarette taxes are merely another source of government revenue, and a 
relatively efficient (that is, nondistortionary) revenue source at that given that 
consumer demand for cigarettes is relatively price inelastic compared to many 
other products.403 But demand inelasticity cannot fully explain why we have 
such a high level of excise taxes on cigarettes as compared to the taxes 
imposed on most other consumer products. There are many other products with 
low demand elasticity that we do not tax at nearly the level we tax cigarettes 
(for example, staple foods). In our view, one plausible explanation for the 
current level of excise taxes on cigarettes is suggested by the name commonly 
given to this type of excise tax: "sin tax." To put this idea in tenns of cost 
internalization, sin taxes serve to internalize the psychic cost that nonsmokers 
(and perhaps some smokers) incur merely by living in a society where 
cigarettes-a nasty, unhealthy, strongly addictive, ultimately debilitating, and 
eventually l ife-shortening product-are marketed for profit and widely 
consumed not only by adults, but also by children.� In any event, if the 
current sin taxes are meant to impose those costs on smokers and tobacco 
companies, then all of the external costs calculated above remain to be 
internalized. 
Even under this theory, of course. part of the reason for society's 
disapproval of cigarettes may be the fact that smoking produces costs that 
smokers externalize to their future selves as well as to nonsmokers. Thus. 
current excise taxes on cigarettes probably do some of both things (some 
internalization of the external costs discussed in Section III.B and some 
internalization of the psychic or expressive harm just mentioned). but only in 
a very rough way. In any event, for reasons that we discuss in Section IV.C. 
there are efficiency reasons to use some other type of incentive-based 
regulation to internalize the external costs of smoking. 
iv. Morality and Social Norms 
We have focused on the economic responses to the positive externality 
402. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 1 8-22; Vi>eu.i. mprn note I 02. al 54. 72 
403. See supra note 254; see also. e.g., MANNING ET AL . supra note 49. al 24 ("(C]lgarene laxo 
cause relatively less distonion and tax evasion behavior than other taxo."J. 
404. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER TilE RIGHTS REVOLIJTION 44 ( 1 990) (explaining that legal rub 
can enhance social welfare by altering preference. in a way that ""decrca>(e,) ham1ful behavior [,uch as 
smoking). remov[es] the secondary effect' of tho>.: harm>. and produc(o) more healthful and >ausrymg 
lives"); Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28. at 1 2- 1 3  (noung that many 'ocial nonn> condemn >molang) 
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argument because this Article is, after all, an attempt to make the economic 
case for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes. Because of the nature of the 
positive extemality story, however, it is appropriate at least to suggest the 
possibility of equally powerful, and perhaps considerably more powerful, moral 
objections. To adopt the positive extemality argument, on this view, would 
constitute a costly breach of social norms. Perhaps the most straightforward 
and compelling support for that claim is that the positive extemality argument 
simply is not used (or at least is not taken seriously) in any other policy 
context. For example, in debates over the appropriate response to 
environmental hazards, we do not hear polluters urging policymakers to take 
into account the many pension-saving deaths that would result if Congress 
would only leave polluters unregulated. Likewise, opponents of gun control are 
not heard to tout the enormous financial windfall to society from all the 
premature deaths caused by handguns. And in no context other than smoking 
that we can identify do we hear calls for affirmative subsidies to promote the 
positive externality of premature death.405 
Perhaps the most revealing societal rejection of the positive extemality 
story can be found in tort law-specifically, in the calculation of damages in 
wrongful death cases. If the positive externality argument were fully 
implemented in such cases, one would expect to see tort damages being 
reduced by life insurance proceeds as well as by that portion of decedents' 
pension benefits that go to compensate plaintiffs' losses. That, however, is not 
the law. The collateral source rule has long forbidden courts from reducing tort 
damage awards by the amount of any payments that have already gone to 
compensate the plaintiffs' losses.406 What is perhaps more interesting, of the 
ten states that have recently altered the collateral source rule legislatively, all 
but one have drawn a distinction between health and disability insurance (with 
respect to which the collateral source rule has been repealed) and life insurance 
405. The economists' response to these observations might be that the activities mentioned would lend 
to end lives before individuals have reached an age at which they begin lo consume more of society's 
resources than they produce. If, however, the only reason such proposals are not seriously considered is 
this "target-age problem," we would expect to see some empirical analyses by policymakers and scholars 
to determine what the optimal target age actually is. In addition, if retirement age did turn out to be the 
target age, we would expect to hear some discussion of subsidizing activities (or not penalizing activities) 
that tend to kill people in their post-retirement years. As far as we can tell, no such empirical investigations 
are done, and no such proposals are seriously made. 
Another objection to the handgun example might be that it lacks the element of voluntary assumption 
of risk that exists in the cigarette context. We have two responses. First, we do not regard the cigarette 
context as one that involves a clear case of voluntary assumption of risk, for ull the reasons discussed supra 
Part II. Second, even if voluntariness is present, we doubt that the positive externality argument would be 
acceptable. See infra text following note 4 1 4  (discussing an extreme example of "voluntary" mass suicide 
that seems patently objectionable). 
Jeffrey Harris has made an argument very much like the one we make in this section. He compares 
the economists' arguments to opposing breast cancer research. See Health Cure Reform Heari11gs, supm 
note 330, at 3 1 7  (statement of Jeffrey Harris). In his view, the positive externality argument is simply "not 
the kind of calculation that a civilized society engages in." Id. We agree. 
406. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b ( 1 965). 
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(with respect to which the collateral source rule has generally been 
maintained).407 Moreover, the American Law Institute in a recent report 
advocated the repeal of the collateral source rule in every context except life 
insurance.408 Likewise, a recent bill backed by the Clinton Administration 
proposed eliminating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases as 
the rule applies to disability insurance and health insurance. but not as it 
applies to life insurance.409 
The extent to which tort law has rejected the assumptions underlying the 
positive extemality argument can also be seen in wrongful death cases 
involving children.410 If the logic of the positive extemality story were 
applied strictly in such cases, the damage awards would typically be very 
small, or even negative, because the pecuniary costs to parents of raising 
children typically outweigh the pecuniary benefits. Indeed, in the late 
407. The ten states are Arizona, Ronda. Indiana, M1ch1gan. Minnesota. New Jersey. New York. Nonh 
Dakota. Ohio, and Oregon. Arizona is the one stale that did not draw a d1suncuon between health and 
disability i nsurance, on the one hand, and life in,urance. on the other. Su ARIZ. REV. STAT A:-.N § 1 2-565 
(West Supp. 1 996) (allowing evidence of paymenb from any collateral source, mcludmg hfe insurance. m 
medical malpractice actions). As for the other slates. some statutes also repeal the collateral source rule as 
it applies to pension benefits or social security paymenb. Su FLA. STAT ANN. ch. 768.76 ( Hamson 1994) 
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other than hfc insurance benefiuJ; I'D CODE 
§ 34-4-36-2 ( 1 996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral •ource other than hfc insurance. 
social security, and workers' compensation); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6303 ( 1996) (,.;ime as FlondaJ. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 1 988) (allowing evidence of paymenb from any collateral source other 
than life insurance, pensions, and social secunty); N J .  STAT ANN. § 2A 1 5-97 ( \Vest Supp 1 997) 
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral •Ource other than hfe insurance and "'orkers' 
compensation); N. Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 1 992) (allowing evidence of pa) ments from any collateral 
source other than life insurance, some social sccunty. workers' compcnsa11on. or employee benefit 
programs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 ( 1 996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral 
source other than life insurance, other death or rcuremcnt benefits, or any m•urance or benefit purchased 
by the recovering pany); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317 45 (Anderson Supp. 1996) (,.;ime as Ronda); OR 
REv. STAT. § 1 8.580 ( 1 995) (same as Minnesota); su also Gary T. Schwanz. A N1ma11ul flt-11l1h Cure 
Program: What Its Effect Would Be 011 Amer1cu11 Tort Lu"' and Malpractice Law, 79 CORSELL L. REv. 
1 339, 1 345 ( 1 994) ('Though many stales in recent years have abrogated the collateral source rule. the:sc 
abrogations have typically excluded life insurance."). 
408. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 100, al 1 6 1 .  165 Indeed. then: .ccms 10 be almo.-st no 
support for repealing the collateral source rule as 11 apphe• 10 hfe m•urancc proceeds Su. <' g • Jerry J 
Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reflections on Chw:gmg Our Tort S\Stmr. 46 Mo. L. REV 55. 58 I 1 986) 
("Curiously, no one suggests that the collateral source rule •hould be ehmrnated wuh rcfcn:nce to lrre 
insurance proceeds, although clearly such proceeds arc a collateral •ource m a  wrongful Jeath ca>e -, E'en 
the most extreme opponents of the collateral source rule make an exceptron for hfe m•uram:e proceeds Sa. 
e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00. at 1 82 ('"We recommend vinually complete rc\er,.;il or the 
collateral source rule wherever such an approach i> feasible A plarntrff'• ton rccO\ ef) ,hould be reduced 
by the amount of present and estimated future payments from all •ources of collateral benefit, <' •<"<'pt lr/t' 
insurance." (emphasis added)). 
409. See S. 1 757, 103d Cong. § 5305 ( 1 993), cued 111 Schwanz. supra note -107, at 1 345. Ut' also 
Schwartz, supra note 407, al 1 345-46 (suggesting that one explanatron for marntammg the collateral source 
rule for life insurance is that "life insurance continue> to be acquired m accordance wuh nmeteenlh<entury 
norms," by which he means that life insurance. rn contrast wuh health rn•urance. " far from uni versal and 
varies significantly from policy 10 policy). 
4 1 0. Cf VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 138-68 ( 1 985) (dcscnbmg ho"' the 
evolution of damage calculations in child wrongful death cases demon•lralcs the law's eventual rcJectron 
of the devaluation of children's lives): Croley & Han•on. supra note 22. at 1 9()6.-08 l usrng Zchzcr's 
discussion of child wrongful death damages 10 illu•lrale •OC1ely°• acceptance of the 1deoi that, m certarn 
circumstances, quantifying pain-and-suffering damages " acceptable). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the damage awards in such cases were 
calculated in just such a manner-by netting the pecuniary costs and benefits 
of raising children.41 1  Over time, however, as that traditional formula began 
to produce lower and lower awards, and as child labor laws increasingly 
removed children from the workplace, the law moved in the opposite direction, 
taking into account the nonpecuniary value of the lives of children. Indeed, tort 
awards for the wrongful death of children increased significantly after 1 920, 
notwithstanding the declining pecuniary value of children during the same 
period.412 The relatively large damage awards in child wrongful death 
cases-large relative to the damages that would be awarded under the 
nineteenth-century formula-appear not to have abated (and perhaps have 
continued to increase),413 a fact that strongly suggests society's rejection of 
the positive externality argument in the tort context. 
The positive externality theorists might offer the following response: 
Subsidizing premature death to save on pension payments is not significantly 
different from what our society does in other contexts. For example, the market 
often pays premiums to compensate individuals for accepting unusually high 
levels of mortality risk. Furthermore, the government in some circumstances 
directly subsidizes the payment of such risk premiums. For example, some 
portion of the salaries paid to firefighters probably constitutes a premium for 
accepting the substantial risk of injury or death associated with performing 
their jobs. Similarly, soldiers who are exposed to combat conditions typically 
receive additional money in partial compensation for the special risks they bear 
for defending their country. So, the argument might go, if we can pay people 
in those contexts to take risks that, statistically speaking, shorten their lives, 
why is it unacceptable to pay people (through subsidized cigarette prices) to 
do the same thing by smoking? 
The decision to smoke and the decision to accept a mortality-risk premium 
for undertaking a dangerous job, however, are different in important ways. For 
one thing, because of the information problems discussed in Part II, the 
payment of a smoking subsidy looks less like a well-informed, voluntary 
transaction than does the payment of a mortality-risk premium in connection 
4 1 1 .  See ZELIZER, supra note 410, at 142. 
4 1 2. See id. at 1 53 ("By 1 930, it was estimated that a typical family with an income of approximately 
$2,500 per year would spend an average of $7,425 to raise a child to age eighteen . . . .  [T]he deceased 
child was a financial liability . . . .  Yet, all evidence points to an increase in awards for children after the 
1 920s."). According to Zelizer, this trend reHected the increasing noneconomic or "sentimental'" value of 
children. See id. at 1 53-54, 1 64-65. 
4 1 3. We have uncovered no recent systematic studies on the size of wrongful death awards in cases 
involving deceased children. There are, however, numerous news accounts of extremely large jury awards 
in child wrongful death cases. See, e.g., Michael Bradford, Largest Awards of 1995, Bus. INS., Jan. 22, 
1 996, at 3 (reporting a $500 million verdict in a wrongful death case in Tampa, Florida, involving the death 
of a nine-year-old boy); Maggie Mulvihill, Couple Awarded $23 Million for Baby's Wrongful Death, 
BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 25. 1 995. at 25 (reporting a $23 million verdict in a wrongful dealh case in 
Connecticut involving the death of a couple's infant daughter). 
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with hazardous jobs. If, however, it could be demonstrated that individuals 
who enter into transactions involving "hazard pay" do not understand or fully 
take into account the mortality risks they assume by doing so. there would be 
an argument for regulating those transactions in some way-either through tort 
law, contract law, or direct regulation. 
Even if we ignore the information problems and addiction problems 
associated w ith c igarettes, there still seems to be an important intuitive 
distinction in context between the typical employment transaction that involves 
a mortality-risk premium and a smoking subsidy.414 Specifically. the decision 
to accept a mortality risk is part of a larger decision to accept a job, an 
independently productive endeavor. The decision to smoke. on the other hand. 
is pure consumption. In order to induce soldiers to accomplish a socially 
valuable task, we compensate them with combat pay for assuming a risk of 
death. With a smoking subsidy, by contrast, we would simply be paying people 
to die early. The latter seems objectionable in a way that the former does not. 
Before we leave the positive externality argument behind. let us consider 
one final economic response to it. To the truly hard-core economist who 
remains unpersuaded by the arguments in the preceding section. we offer the 
following observation: As a mauer of pure cost-benefit analysis. the 
economists seem to have overstated the size of the positive externality 
associated with smoking because they have ignored far less costly means of 
achieving their desired goal. The goal, starkly described, is to create the 
incentives nece!>sary to induce a large group of people approaching retirement 
age to commit suicide so as to maximize the pension windfall to everyone else. 
Basic principles of cost-benefit analysis. then, require the adoption of the 
lowest cost means of achieving that goal. Even if  we were to assume for the 
moment that the smoking decision is made "knowingly and voluntarily,'' there 
must be cheaper ways of inducing people to kill themselves than through the 
use of cigarettes. 
One cheaper and more straightforward approach might be to off er a deal 
to all American citizens on their sixtieth birthday: If they will agree to commit 
suicide on their sixty-fifth birthday, their government will pay them an annual 
financial supplement to make the last five years of their l ives especially 
pleasant and enjoyable. The only substantial costs would be the costs of 
4 1 4. Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has wnnen at length about the nnponancc of >OCial context JO 
determining the appropriateness of including monahty mk JO  •ocial co>l-bcnefil analy">C> 
Because people's anitudes toward mk vary w11h the •OC1al context. co•t-bcnclit analy•l> an: nor 
entitled to assume that the ri>klmoney tr.idcofh people make al work or m olhcr rnaric1 chou.:"" 
express how people think the>e tradeoff> •hould be made " hen !hey an: JO\ olumanly subJc<:lcd 
to risks by the state or third panic>. or when !hey arc •UbJcclcd 10 mh for lhe .al..c of 
achieving purpo.es they do not value. 
ANDERSON, supra note 1 34, at 200. Likewi>e. JU>l bccau>c \\e as a >OCJety ma) allo\\ (or even cncour.igc) 
the use of monality-risk premium> in >Ome contcxl> doc' nol imply 1ha1 \\C >hould •Ub.id1u: c1garcnc 
smoking. 
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whatever means were chosen to accomplish the task and the payments 
necessary to induce some people to accept the deal. As long as those costs 
remained less than the pension, social security, and nursing home savings 
associated with killing people at age sixty-five, we would save money vis-a-vis 
the cigarette alternative, which poses enormous additional medical costs. 
Obviously we are not recommending government-subsidized mass suicide 
as a way of economizing on resources. To the contrary, we believe that the 
so-called external benefits of premature death-for moral as well as economic 
reasons-should be excluded from the social cost-benefit calculus altogether. 
(Or at least we are unpersuaded by the economists' arguments that these 
benefits should be taken into account.) Our only point here is that, if such 
considerations are to be given weight (as the economists clearly believe), it is 
important that we do the cost-benefit analysis properly. Thus, even if the 
benefits of causing early death exceeded the external costs of cigarettes, 
choosing cigarettes as the means to achieve that goal would be economically 
unjustifiable. 4 15  
D. The Potential Internalizing Effects of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation 
How would an idealized ex post incentive-based system of regulation, such 
as enterprise liability, respond to the problems of negative externalities? For 
purposes of this analysis, we continue to assume away any difficulty in 
determining the causal connections between specific harms experienced by 
smokers and by third parties and the specific brands of cigarettes that cause 
those harms.416 Given that assumption, an idealized incentive-based system 
could produce optimal deterrence-both in terms of manufacturer care levels 
and activity levels. For example, under enterprise liability, tobacco companies 
would be held liable ex post, either by a court or by a regulator, for all the 
harms caused by cigarettes. In addition, each manufacturer's ex post liability 
would reflect the harms caused by that manufacturer's brand. Ex post liability 
coupled with competitive market forces would give manufacturers incentives 
ex ante to make all optimal investments in reducing the risks posed by their 
4 1 5. We can illustrate this last point with a more traditional example of a positive externality: If we 
wanted to create the external benefit of safe shipping in an especially treacherous harbor, we would choose 
the least costly means of achieving that goal. Thus, we ccnainly would not spend $400 on a computer 
navigation system that produced $500 in safe-shipping benefits if we could generate the same benefits by 
spending only $200 on a lighthouse. What is more, if we were for some reason to adopt the more expensive 
alternative-the computer navigation system-we could not say that we were saving society $ 1 00 (the 
difference between $500 and $400). Instead, we would be costing society $200 (the difference between 
$400 and $200). 
4 1 6. We explore the implications of relaxing those assumptions infra Section V.A and compare how 
alternative forms of incentive-based regulation might deal with problems of causation. In addition, infra 
Section V.C we examine circumstances in which either ex ante incentive-based, performance-based, or 
command-and-control regulation would be necessary or at least useful as a supplement to ex post incentivc­
based regulation. 
1 998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 2 6 1  
brands o f  cigarettes. And because cigarette prices would reflect not only their 
production costs but also their expected accident costs, something approaching 
the optimal quantity of cigarettes would be produced and consumed.�17 
Moreover, because enterprise liability would place che full coses of 
smoking a particular pack of cigarettes upon the manufacturer of that brand 
and, in turn, upon the smokers of that brand, it would go a long way toward 
eliminating inefficient cross-subsidies within pri vale and public first-party 
health, life, disability, and property insurance markets. Manufacturers would 
become quasi-insurers; in that capacity, they would charge more tailored 
premiums to cover the risks associated with cheir produces. Under such a 
regime, nonsmokers would no longer subsidize the activities of cigarette 
manufacturers and smokers: Whereas there would be a subscamial increase in 
cigarette prices (with all the beneficial deterrence effeccs just described).� 18 
there would also be a nearly commensurace reduction in premiums paid 10 
public and private first-party health, life, disability, and property insurers.�19 
To the extent such an idealized system of encerprise liability were able 10 
take into account expected-cost differences across brands of cigarettes, there 
would be efficiency-enhancing segregation even within the population of 
smokers. Manufacturers whose cigarettes were relatively risky would charge 
higher "premiums" in the price of their brands 10 cover the greater liability 
costs, while manufacturers of relatively low-risk cigareues would charge 
relatively lower premiums. Thus, whereas some private first-party insurers try 
in whatever rough way they can to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, an 
idealized system of enterprise liability would segregate and inform smokers 
further according to the type of cigarettes they smoke. Indeed, perfect 
enterprise liability would segregate smokers according to more than just the 
4 1 7. For a fuller treatment of chis general argument. sec Han>0n & Logue. Tli� F1nt·P11rt1 /11.rnr11nce 
Extemaliry, supra note 40, at 1 87-88. Note also that once the mcffic1enc1c> m the cigan:ne market \\en: 
corrected by enterprise Jiabilicy, the relaced mefficicnc1e> in the marke1 for m>urance. 1a 111prct nolc 268. 
would likewise be corrected. That is true because >mokmg mh would. m �sence, be tramfcm:d out of 
the first-party insurance sysccm and into the con-law-qua-msurJnce sy>lem. m which rherc " ould be belier 
segregation of smoking risks 1han currently ex1s1s. 
4 1 8. We assume rhac the excise tax and the expected CO>l> of ton hab1h1y \\Ould be rcficctcd fully m 
consumer prices. This is a standard assumpcion in the li 1era1un: on the mc1dence of exct>e iaxe> s� ... � g .  
MANNING rr AL, supra note 49, at 1 70 ("Empirical C\'tdencc suggesu that cxc1>e ta.\ mcn:a>e> arc m foci 
passed on 10 smokers."); James M. Potcrba, Lifetime /11c1Jena mid rlt.- Du1rtb111w1111/ 811rd.-n vf £1cue 
Taxes, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 325, 327 ( 1 989). 
4 1 9. With this particular syslem of incentive-based regulation. we imagine that at Je;u1 .ome of th<»<: 
who suffer smoking-caused harms would continue 10 >eek n:1mbur..emenc 1m11ally from 1he1r lir>r-pany 
health, life, disability, and property insurers. In 1ho>e case.. either !he mJured party or rhe msun:r. who m 
mos! instances would be at lease partially subrogaced 10 the claims of the m>un:d, \\Ould bnng the ton sun 
against the relevant cigarette manufacturer. To 1he extent there i> >Ubrogauon 10 the finl·pany m>urer. 1he 
consumers' first-party premium would no longer need 10 reflect the mb of >mokmg. Fir..1-�ny m>urancc 
premiums, however, would probably include a surcharge co cover the m>un:n' lmg:lllon e\penses and 
perhaps to cover the risk of judgment-proof defendant>. In add111on. under certain crn:um>tance>. \\e would 
expect 1ha1 !he insurer and insured. for decerrence and m>urance =on>. m1gh1 agn:e 1101 10 gn·c full 
subrogation righcs co the insurer. In chat ca.e. firs1-pany premiums would n.e 10 reficct 1h1s n:..1dU<1I 
retention of smoking risks by the insurer. 
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type of cigarettes they smoke. It would also, for example, cause heavy smokers 
to pay higher premiums than casual smokers.420 And because the 
consumption of cigarettes is a "pay as you go" activity, high-risk consumers 
(in terms of activity levels) would contribute more to the tort-provided 
insurance pools than would low-risk smokers, even within a given brand of 
cigarette. 
E. Summary 
The large negative externalities produced by cigarettes, together with the 
consumer-information problems discussed in Part II (which can also be 
understood as a species of intrapersonal externality), create a prima facie case 
for adopting some type of regulation of cigarettes. What is the magnitude of 
these externality and information problems? In this part, we adopt the numbers 
derived from the economists themselves (albeit with some important changes 
in assumptions about whether some costs should be considered external or 
internal to the smoker's decision to buy the next pack of cigarettes) to arrive 
at a total external cost per pack of cigarettes of approximately $7 .00. Because 
we made no effort to arrive at our own calculation of the total costs and 
benefits of cigarette smoking, and because there were numerous external costs 
that were not included in this number (such as the large nonpecuniary costs to 
families and friends of smokers resulting from the smokers' years of suffering 
and their premature deaths), this $7.00 figure must be kept in perspective. It 
is not even a rough estimate of the total external costs of smoking, much less 
a precise measure. Instead, it is meant only to indicate that, contrary to some 
economists' reports, there is a large and pressing need for regulation in the 
cigarette market. 
Notwithstanding that the $7 .00 per pack figure may well understate the full 
external cost of a pack of cigarettes, we expect that the vast majority of our 
readers will find the $7 .00 per pack figure to be surprisingly high. That 
reaction serves, however, to confirm the principal claim made in this part and 
Part II-that consumers do not fully take into account the total costs posed by 
cigarettes. In the next part, we off er a theoretical framework for comparing, 
contrasting, and evaluating alternative regulatory responses to this failure in the 
cigarette market. We discuss the serious informational disadvantages of 
command-and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based 
regulation; and we describe the advantages of an ex post incentive-based 
regime. In addition, we provide a brief outline of a particular ex post incentive-
420. This is true given the nature of cigarettes-nondurable products that must be purchased in grcntcr 
quantities the more they are used. 
1998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 263 
based approach, which we call smokers' compensation and which is modeled 
loosely on the workers' compensation model.421 
IV. CHOOSING AMONG REGULATORY APPROACHES 
In Parts II and III, we concluded that the cigarette market is characterized 
by significant market failures and is therefore very much in need of regulation. 
Along the way, we showed how one form of regulation-an idealized regime 
of enterprise liability-could counteract such market failures. Of course, in 
order to make a strong case for any particular regulatory approach, we must 
answer two further questions. First, are there other regulatory regimes that 
could serve to correct the market failures just as wel l  as, or better than, 
enterprise liability? Second, might any real world factors cause our idealized 
enterprise liability regime to perform less well (especially as compared to 
alternative regulatory regimes)? This part provides a theoretical framework for 
answering the first question; in Part V. we take up the second. 
As noted in Section l.B, some scholars divide regulatory approaches into 
three types: command-and-colllrol regulation, petforma11ce-based regulation, 
and incentive-based regulation.422 In this part, we further divide incentive­
based regulation into two general types (ex ante and ex post), and we then 
divide ex post incentive-based regulation into two general types (victim­
initiated and state-initiated).423 We argue that when it comes to certain 
product-market failures (especially those in the cigarette market), one type of 
42 I. One of the benefits of the ex po>I approach. as we >ho\\ m 1he nexl part. t> 1ha1 making an ex 
ante calculation of the external costs of c1garenes-\\ hcihcr 11 be: S7 00 per pad or S3 00 or S I 0.00-1s 
unnecessary. All of the costs of smol..ing are imposed on c1garene manufacturers ex p<»l. and the mar!r.el 
generates the right ex ante price increa>e or 1mphc11 lax. llm>. our >mol..ers" compen>al1on propos<il Joo 
not require the use of this figure. 
422. Our description of the different type> of regulauon draw> hcavil)· from the " nimgs of Sw;an 
Rose-Ackerman. See. e.g . •  SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMA�. Rl:"Tlll�Kl�G TIIE PROGRESSIY!o AGE.,OA TUE 
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 19.  1 55-56 ( 1 992) (d1>eu»mg mcenll\ e-bascd regimes 
vis-a-vis command-and-control and performance-based fonm of regulauon) The dt>lmcuons we draw 
among the three types of regula1ion are no1 perf�-cl and m >ome m>1anccs blur Thu>. some examples of 
command-and-control regulation begin 10 shade 11110 perfonnance-b:t.>Cd regulauon. \\ lule some e'l.ample" 
of performance-based regulation begin 10 look lil..c incenuve-b�d regulauon Sa Cropper & Oa1es. 111pru 
note 38, at 699 ("[T]he dividing line between so-called (command-and-con1rol] and mccnll\ e·bascd pohc1cs 
is not always clear."). It is probably more correct 10 understand the three categoncs of rcgulauon as 
demarcating three points along a continuum. wuh command-and-control regulauon al one end. mccnuve· 
based regulation at the other end, and perfonnance-b:t.>Cd regulauon >omewhere m bcl\\ccn Neverthdcss. 
it is useful to maintain the conceptual dis1inc11on> among the three type> of regulation m order 10 1den11fy 
more distinctly the costs and benefit> of moving in one dm:cuon or the 01her along 1he conunuum. 
423. As far as we can tell. Donald Winman wa> the firsl 10 dra\\ exphculy 1he d1>11nc11on bcl"ccn 
ex ante and ex post regulation. See Donald Winman. Prior Reg11ltlt1011 \'.-rs11s Post Lwb1/m· TI1e Cl101a 
Betwee11 lllpur tllld Outplll Mo111tnri11g. 6 J. LEGAL Sn·o 1 93. 1 93-95 ( 1977) (cumg Gary S Becker. Crime 
""d Punishmelll: An Economic Approach. 76 J. POL. Eco?-.. 169 ( 1 968)) Ste,·en Shavell also draw'< the 
distinction between ex ante and ex post rcgula110n. Sa STioVE .. -.: Sl!AYELL Eco�O\llC A'ALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW 277-82 ( 1 987). In addition. Shavell draw> a dt>ltncllon between s1a1e-1m11a1ed anJ pnva1ely 
initiated regulation. See id. at 278. 283-84: Steven Shavell, Lwbt/11\ for Hann Versus Reg111"1w11 af S<t[elY. 
1 3  J. LEGAL STUD. 357 ( 1 984). 
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incentive-based regulation-victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulation 
(of which enterprise liability is one type)-has substantial efficiency 
advantages over its alternatives. 
A. The Disadvantages of Command-and-Control Regulation 
Under command-and-control regulation, the regulator imposes specific 
requirements on the regulated firm. In the pollution context, for example, the 
command-and-control regulator might prescribe specific technologies that must 
be used by manufacturers to reduce the level of pollution emitted into the 
environment by their production processes.424 In the product safety context, 
the command-and-control regulator might require manufacturers to implement 
particular safety-related designs in the manufacture and distribution of their 
products.425 
The command-and-control regulator must tell the manufacturer precisely 
what care level investments to make. Selecting the optimal level of care for a 
given product, however, would be a virtually impossible task for a regulator. 
This is because the question of what care level investments to make with 
respect to a given product is just one of a series of complex and interdependent 
questions of product design, manufacture, distribution, and marketing. To 
know, for example, how "safe" to make a product-that is, how much money 
to invest in making the product safer and how to spend that money-the 
regulator must know not only what safety improvements could be made to the 
existing product design, but also what design changes could be made to 
improve safety and how much safety would be enhanced by those changes. In 
addition, the regulator must know what those safety improvements or design 
changes would do to the demand for the product. She must know how much 
consumers would be willing to pay for the safety improvements and whether 
the additional consumer demand would exceed the costs of those 
improvements. That analysis would be especially difficult with respect to 
products that present long latency periods between initial exposure and the 
final manifestation of harm. 
Essentially, then, to determine the optimal manufacturer care level for a 
given product, the regulator must construct supply and demand schedules for 
the product in question-indeed, for all the different designs of the product in 
question, including substitute products.426 Such an analysis would require 
424. See Hahn, supra note 38, at 95. 
425. Command-and-control regulation is sometimes referred to as "input regulation." Other non­
cigarette examples of this type of regulation include requirements that manufacturers install scrubbers nnd 
other pollution abatement devices or that smokestacks be constructed to a given specification. See JOSEPH 
E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 226 (2d ed. 1988). 
426. It turns out that choosing the proper care level requires all the same information as choosing the 
proper activity level. In a previous anicle, we made a similar observation in connection with the question 
whether a coun in a products liability case can achieve optimal deterrence through an ex post negligence 
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regulators to have an enormous amount of information that they typically do 
not have at their disposal.427 With cigarettes, a command-and-control 
regulator would need to determine the exact safety-enhancing technologies 
(e.g., a reduced-carcinogen cigarette recipe) that the industry could use in 
making cigarettes as safe, and cost-justifiable. as possible. Such an analysis. 
however, would require the regulator to conduct complete marginal-cost-benefit 
analyses of every potential smoking technology at every level of cigarette 
production, taking into account, among other things. the overall effect of each 
technology on not only accident costs, including the costs of accident 
prevention, but also cigarette demand. Thus, command-and-control regulation, 
done properly, would require the regulator to evaluate both safety elements and 
aesthetic elements of cigarettes, such as taste.428 
What complicates the analysis further is that, to construct a demand 
schedule for cigarettes, given the consumer information problems described in 
Part II, the regulator would not be able to use the same sort of information that 
might be used for other products. Smokers· revealed preferences through 
purchasing decisions, for example, may not be especially helpful to the 
regulator, given that smokers' consumption decisions are one of the sources of 
market failure in the first place. Moreover, even if the regulator were able to 
construct supply and demand schedules for cigarettes once, the regulator may 
be slow in updating its calculations from year to year. If so, once a given set 
of regulations were put into place and once manufacturers had responded to 
those regulations in their production decisions, there would be a strong 
disincentive for manufacturers to improve upon current technologies, at least 
until the regulators got around to updating their regulations. 
analysis that anempts to detennine what precautionary measuro a manufactun:r would ha'c taken See 
Hanson & Logue, The First-Party lns11rance E.rtema/1ry. s11pra note 40, at 1 69-70 Such dctcmunanoM 
are arguably even more difficult when done ex ante rather than ex po't. The frame" orlr. of the curn:nl 
Article makes clear that the ex post cost-benefit analys1' perfonned by a coun m a ton ,uu ts a type of ex 
post command-and-control regulation. 
427. Funhennore, it is a type of analysts that we nonnal ly do not than!- n:gulators an: competent to 
undertake. After all, our decision to adopt a market economy rather than a planned economy rcpn:senl!> a 
recognition that, in selecting what producb and scrv1co to make. ho" to make them, and what to charge 
for them, the market rather than the government ., the pn:fcrn:d means of generaung and !>Orting through 
all the relevant information regarding costs and benefit,. Of course. 11 ., marl.et fa1Jun:' that have made 
us look to a regulator in the first place. As we argue 111/ra Secllon JV D. howe\'er, for tho..: who behe\c 
generally in the market's superior ability to generate and :1.!>Wntlate Va.!>! quanuucs of mformat1on regarding 
product and service supply and demand, the bot mean' of corn:ctmg market failure> ., 10 find government 
responses that are tailored to the market failure m que,t1on and that, 10 the extent feasible, n:Jy on the 
market rather than the regulator. 
428. It is important to empha.!>izc that the mformallonal di.advantage of regulators would not be 
limited to manufacturer care levels. Given that the opllmal acll\'lt)' level will depend on the can: Jc, cl 
chosen, if  regulators cannot choose the most efficient technology. then they cannot detennme the efficient 
activity level. (Other things being equal, the •afer a manufacturer·, technology ts. the gn:ater the 
manufacturer's efficient level of activity.) The mformauon problem ..:ems relevant 10 v1nually all aspects 
of cigarette regulation, as past failed efforts to regulate the industry demonstrate. Sa s11prt1 note 9 
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Scholars and policymakers tend to prefer performance-based regulation to 
command-and-control regulation.429 The potential advantage of performance­
based regulation is that it can create incentives for manufacturers to choose the 
best current technology at the time the regulation is implemented and to 
develop better technologies over time. For instance, a performance-based rule 
might, without specifying a particular technology to be used, prohibit cigarette 
manufacturers from making cigarettes that expose smokers to more than a 
given amount of nicotine or a given amount of carcinogens.430 Or a 
performance-based rule might require either that the number of underage 
smokers be reduced by a given percentage431 or that the number of cigarette­
caused deaths be brought down from 420,000 per year to, say, 50,000 per year. 
As a means of enforcement, the regulator would then declare that failure 
to meet those performance requirements would result in drastic consequences 
for the manufacturers-for example, being shut down completely. The 
consequence of an ideal performance-based regime would be that 
manufacturers would, seeking to minimize their own costs, select the cheapest 
technological option for complying with the relevant performance goal. That 
many economists prefer performance-based regulations to command-and­
control regulations is a consequence of those scholars' assumptions that 
manufacturers are better informed of their options and the costs and benefits 
of those options than regulators are.432 
429. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAliDIRTY AIR 1 2 1 -28 ( 198 1 )  
(arguing for greater reliance o n  "ends·oriented" environmental regulation and less o n  "means-oriented" 
regulation); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSJ"EMS: ACCOMPANYING REPORT 
OF Tl!E NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 24 ( 1 993) ("Performance standards are generally preferable to 
prescriptive or design standards because they give the regulated industry the Hexibility to determine the best 
technology to meet established standards."); ROSE· ACKERMAN, s11pra note 422, at 1 9  (expressing preference 
for performance-based regulations if financial incentives to manufacturers cannot be implemented); 
STIGLITZ, s11pra note 425, at 226 ("What society is concerned with is the level of pollution, not how the 
pollution is produced. The firm is likely to know better than the government the best ways of reducing the 
level of pollution (how to reduce the level of pollution at least cost)."). Much of what goes by the name 
of incentive-based regulation would actually fall under our definition of performance-based regulation. For 
example, one commonly cited example of incentive-based regulation is marketable permits for pollution. 
In our framework, pollution permits would constitute a performance-based approach, given that such u 
system requires an initial determination of a maximum quantity of permissible pollution. 
430. Cf infra Subsection VI.D.2 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement 
that call for FDA-imposed nicotine target levels). 
43 1 .  Cf infra Subsection Vl.B.3 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement 
that call for certain percentage reductions in the level of underage smoking by given target dates). 
432. The following quotation from a popular textbook in public economics, written by one of the 
nation's most prominent economists, captures this conventional economic wisdom: 
It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the government has a fair estimate of the marginal social 
costs associated with pollution. But it is likely that the government is not well informed about 
the technology of pollution abatement and control, at least not as well informed as are private 
firms. This is particularly true in those cases where the pollution control devices have not yet 
been developed. Neither side has very good information: both arc simply making guesses, but 
since producers know more about the technology of their industries than does the government, 
their guesses are likely to be more accurate. 
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We agree with those assumptions of economists. It is not obvious. 
however, that performance-based regulation would avoid any of the problems 
of command-and-control regulation. For a regulator to set performance-based 
regulations that fully correct market failures, the regulator would need all the 
same information that is necessary to write fully efficient command-and-control 
regulations. 
Imagine that a regulator, rather than telling cigarette manufacturers how 
to make their cigarettes (which would be a command-and-control approach). 
told them that they must reduce the level of nicotine and that they could do so 
in whatever manner they saw fit. Failure to achieve the goal, however, would 
result in a very serious penalty, such as the banning of cigarettes altogether. 
Such an approach would seem to have many of the benefits of a market­
oriented or incentive-based approach. (Indeed, one might include performance­
based regulation as a subset of market-oriented regulation. )  But that 
appearance, at least from an economic perspective, is an illusion. The choice 
of the permissible level of nicotine itself-if done to achieve efficiency-has 
built into it the same elaborate cost-benefit calculation that is required in 
command-and-control regulation. How should the regulator choose the 
permissible level of nicotine (or of carcinogens or of smoking-caused deaths 
per year)? To reach an efficient number on any of those questions, and to 
reach the prior decision to choose those measures of performance instead of 
others, the regulator would have to include in her massive cost-benefit 
calculation not only all the costs (including expected health costs) associated 
with the different levels of nicotine. but also the costs of alternative designs 
that might have been plausible substitutes to nicotine-reduction as ways of 
reducing cigarette harms. In addition. the regulator would have to determine 
the aggregate value to consumers of smoking cigarettes with different levels 
of nicotine, taking into account all the other plausible cigarette-design 
alternatives. 
In sum, under fully efficient performance-based regulation-as under 
command-and-control regulation-it would be necessary for the regulator to 
be able to construct demand-and-supply schedules for every conceivable 
alternative design of cigarettes. And to determine the answer to that question 
would require all the same information that a fully efficient command-and­
control regime would require.4'3 
This is not to say that there are no advantages of performance-based 
regulation over command-and-control regulation. If, for example. society 
STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 230; see also Cropper & Oate,. mpra note 38. at 699· 700 (e�plammg the cost 
savings possible with incentive-based policy in environmental regulauon); Hahn. :wpm note 38. at 96-97 
(discussing theoretical efficiency gains from the u.e of marketable pcnmt' for pollution) 
433. Cf Cropper & Oates, supra note 38. at 682 (noung that. "m a world of perfect 1.nowlc:<lgc," 
marketable emission permns. a form of performance-b3'Cl.I regulauon m our taxonomy. can replicate the 
efficiency benefits of a Pigouvian tax). 
1 268 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63 
decided, for reasons not considered in the efficiency model being deployed 
here, that it wanted to reduce the number of children who are smoking to some 
de minirnis amount,434 it might be useful to have a performance-based rule 
that imposed huge fines (or, better yet, banned all sales to adults as well) if the 
target level of underage smoking was not achieved. The additional layer of 
performance-based regulation on top of ex ante policing would have the 
following benefit: Given the political decision to eliminate underage smoking, 
the approach would allow manufacturers, rather than the regulator, to 
determine the most cost-effective way of achieving that goal.435 
C. The Disadvantages of Ex Ante Incentive-Based Regulation 
1 .  The Informational Demands of an Ideal Pigouvian Tax 
Economists often contend that ex ante incentive-based regulation is 
superior to command-and-control regulation (and perhaps even superior to 
performance-based regulation) because, under such an incentive-based 
approach, the regulator needs less information to counteract the relevant market 
failures.436 Under this view, a regulator applying an incentive-based approach 
need not know the marginal costs to manufacturers of taking additional 
precautions. Instead, by forcing the manufacturers to take into account the full 
marginal social costs of not taking precautions (that is, the amount of the 
external cost), the manufacturer-who, by hypothesis, is better informed on 
this question-would decide whether the benefits of prevention exceeded the 
costs.437 In contrast to that conventional economic wisdom, however, we 
argue that, as between the idealized versions of incentive-based regulation (ex 
ante versus ex post), it is usually only the ex post version that has the oft­
mentioned informational advantages over command-and-control and 
performance-based regimes. Given these informational advantages, ex post 
incentive-based regulation has both care level and activity level benefits over 
its ex ante counterpart. 
What we call an ex ante incentive-based system, an economist would call 
a Pigouvian tax.438 Under a Pigouvian tax, the manufacturer is required to 
pay, on each unit of production, an amount just equal to the marginal external 
434. Cf. supra note 204 (indicating that the case for parentalistic Jaws may be especially strong where 
consumers are children and the product is addictive). 
435. For a discussion of how the performance-based provisions in the tobacco settlement agreement 
having to do with reducing underage smoking fall short of this ideal, see infra Subsection VI.B.3.b. 
436. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 230. 
437. This seems to be the conventional wisdom among economists. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, makes 
the point in connection with pollution regulation, comparing fines (an incentive-based system) to command­
and-control or performance-based regulation: 'The government need ascertain only the marginal social costs 
of pollution. Then the firms decide whether the costs of the pollution control devices exceed the benefits 
of the pollution control as measured by the penalties imposed for failing to control pollution." Id. at 230. 
438. See, e.g., Cropper & Oates, supra note 38. at 680 (defining a Pigouvian tax). 
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cost that the unit causes at the efficiem level of output and ar rlze efficienr level 
of manufacturer care.439 The difficulty that the Pigouvian tax presents to the 
regulator lies hidden in the choice of the optimal tax rate. For the regulator to 
arrive at the efficient tax rate, she must first determine what the efficient 
activity levels and care levels are. 
Imagine how the regulator would determine what the optimal Pigouvian 
tax rate would be for cigarettes for a given year. It would almost certainly not 
be exactly $7.00 per pack. At best, the $7.00 per pack figure represents a very 
rough approximation of the average annual external cost of a pack of cigarettes 
at roughly the current level of production and assuming essemially the current 
design of cigarettes. For the Pigouvian regulator, however. that is the wrong 
number, even in theory.440 
First, if the Pigouvian rate were chosen without taking into account the 
efficiently safe design, manufacturers would have no additional incentive to 
make safer cigarettes beyond that which exists in the absence of regulation. 
For example, if all manufacturers were charged the same per pack tax, there 
would be no incentive for manufacturers to improve safety. After all, smokers 
would have to pay the same tax regardless. By comparison, one could imagine 
a theoretical ex ante tax regime under which manufacturers would be charged 
not some fiat, industry-wide tax but instead some amount commensurate with 
the level of safety of each manufacturer's individual cigarette design. So, for 
example, the manufacturer would have the burden of proving to the regulator 
each year how safe its cigarettes were. Such a finely tuned Pigouvian tax, if 
possible, could have a substantial corrective effect on manufacturer care levels. 
For such a regime to work, however, the regulator would need a great deal of 
information about the differing external costs associated with alternative safety 
designs.441 Thus, to have such beneficial effects on manufacturer care levels, 
the regulator using tl1e Pigouvian tax must have all the information necessary 
to determine what the efficient manufacturer care level is. That inquiry requires 
the Pigouvian regulator to have all the same information required by the 
command-and-control regulator.442 
439. See ROSEN, supra note 263, at 1 3 1 -33. Roo.cn·, detimuon of a P1gouv1an ta\ foe= on the case 
of environmental pollution, and it focuses only on polluter acuvny levcb. assuming away. for >1mphcny, 
the possibility of changing polluter care levels. Su td. at 1 28 n.7 ("(T)h1s model iu.sumcs the only way 10 
reduce pollution is to reduce output. If antipollution technology 1s available. II may be possible 10 mamtain 
output and still reduce pollution. However, the analy"s " bai.1cally the same, ""cc the adoption of Jhe 
technology requires the use of resource•."). BccauM: we arc mtcrcstcd m both acuvny levels and 
manufacturer care levels, however, we take both into account m our detim11on of a P1gouv1an !ax. 
440. As we argue infra note 579. even under our propoo.cd ex post mccnti,·e-bascd regime. for reasons 
of political and administrative feasibility, the implicit tax would likely be much lower than S7.00 per pack. 
44 1 .  Such a system would also create incentive. for manufacturcn. 10 dcccl\ e  the regulator regarding 
the safety effects of their individual product design•. 
442. In the next subsection, we discuss additional detem:nce problem• that ;ire caused by a P1gouv1an 
tax that does not differentiate among individual br.md•. 
The activity level point is more subtle. To make the argument clear. assume away manufacturer care 
level issues for the moment; assume as well that cigarette deMgn• arc already as safe as they can possibly 
1 270 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07:  1 1 63 
In sum, with respect to the information that she needs to do her job, the 
ideal Pigouvian regulator is in essentially the same position as the ideal 
command-and-control regulator.443 Both need to know enough to do precisely 
that which we normally expect product markets to do for us-to produce the 
optimal product design at the welfare-maximizing price and quantity. All of 
this is not to say, however, that economists and others are wrong to prefer 
Pigouvian taxes and performance-based regulation to command-and-control 
regulation, or to prefer Pigouvian taxes over performance standards.444 If, for 
example, it were the case that monitoring tax compliance by manufacturers 
were easier than monitoring output compliance or care level compliance, then 
the Pigouvian approach might be the best alternative of the three. Alternatively, 
if we had some noneconomic reason for choosing a particular performance 
goal, then the choice of a performance standard could be defended on 
economic grounds.445 Finally, there may be occasions when neither the 
Pigouvian tax nor the performance standard is as useful as a command-and­
control approach.446 Regardless, we argue in Section IV.D that in most 
be and that the external cost of a pack of cigarettes still turns out to be on average $7.00 at the existing 
level of production, which is roughly 24 billion packs per year. Cf. Tobacco Selllement Review: Hearings 
on the Tobacco Settlement and the F11111re of the Tobacco Industry, 1 05th Cong. 5 ( 1 997) (statement of 
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) (stating that the current level of annual 
cigarette production is 24 billion packs), available in 1997 WL 1 4 150659 [hereinafter Tobacco Selllemell/ 
Hearings]. In addition, assume (as most economists typically do when discussing analogous negative 
externalities, such as pollution) that the marginal social cost of cigarettes increases with output. Cf. ROSEN, 
supra note 263, at 1 27 (noting that he drew the marginal external cost curve in his supply-demand diagram 
sloping upward to reflect the assumption that as people arc subjected to additional pollution they are 
harmed at an increasing rate). This assumption-that the tenth unit causes more harm than the first unit of 
production-may be as plausible with respect to cigarettes as it  is with respect to pollution, though we have 
no independent confirmation of this. Under these assumptions, if a tax were imposed, some of the cost of 
the tax would be passed through to consumers. This would, assuming less than perfectly price-inelastic 
demand for cigarettes, result in a reduction in the quantity of cigarettes demanded and produced. 11mt 
reduction in quantity, under current assumptions, would cause the e'{ternal costs of cigarettes to full. Thus, 
given that the tax would remain at $7.00, there would actually be too little smoking. 
The intuition behind this point is simple enough. If cigarettes become relatively less harmful when 
the quantity declines, then as production shrinks in response to the initial Pigouvian tux, there should be 
an adjustment to the tax. Failure to anticipate that reaction in advance and to adjust the tux rate downward 
accordingly would produce too much deterrence in terms of activity levels and too little smoking. If a 
Pigouvian regulator wanted to anticipate all of these market reactions and choose a theoretically ideal tux 
rate up front, she would need all the information that was required by the idealized command-and-control 
regulator. 
443. Economists seem to recognize the practical difficulty in choosing the optimal Pigouviun tux, but 
they also seem to believe that the necessary concessions to practicality are less with such u tux than with 
other forms of regulation. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 263, at 1 00 ('There are practical problems in 
implementing a Pigouvian tax scheme. In light of the . . .  difficulties in estimating the marginal damage 
function, it is bound to be hard to find the correct tax rate. Still, sensible compromises can be made."). 
444. A number of noneconomists have called for increased use of incentive-based regulation. See, e.g., 
CHARLES SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 57 ( 1 977) (arguing for greater use of 
"injury-rate taxes" and other "incentive-oriented" approaches, in place of existing "specific regulations"); 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 404, at I 09 (calling for "market-oriented" and "incentive-based" approaches to 
environmental and workplace safety regulation, including the possibility of a "tax" on employers for 
workplace risks). 
445. See supra notes 434-435 and accompanying text. 
446. It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is superior to performance-bused 
regulation where inputs are more easily monitored than outputs. See, e.g., STIGLliZ, supra note 425, at 226 
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situations-and especially in the cigarette context-an ex post incentive-based 
approach is preferable to any of the other three regulatory altematives.�7 The 
main reason is that ex post regulation requires less information on the part of 
the regulator, because it relies instead on manufacturers and the product market 
to make decisions about costs and benefits. 
2. Additional Deterrence Problems with Current Eccise Taxes: 
The Unraveling Effect and Errors of Omission and Commission 
In the preceding subsections, we noted that an ideal Pigouvian regulator 
would impose an ex ante tax on each cigarette manufacturer equal to the 
expected external cost of that manufacturer's brand of cigarettes. As cigarette 
taxes are currently designed, however, all manufacturers are taxed the same 
amount per pack regardless of the specific risks posed by their particular 
brands.448 Even if we were to assume that current cigarette taxes reflect the 
average external costs of smoking (which they almost certainly do not), and 
even if we were to assume that future cigarette taxes would be changed to 
reflect changes in the average external cost per pack of cigarettes (which is 
also unlikely to happen), an excise tax presents significant deterrence problems, 
both in manufacturer care levels and activity levels.�9 
The manufacturer care level problem would result from the fact that 
manufacturers would have less than optimal incentives to make investments in 
cigarette safety: They would reap little of the competitive benefit of making 
such investments because they would continue to pay the same excise tax as 
their competitors.450 Thus there would be an "unraveling" effect of sorts with 
(suggesting that in some cases rnoniionng rnanufac1urer.. · inpul•. such a> their u� of i.crubbc:� m 
smokestacks, may be easier than monitoring the level of polluuon ern111ed by each rnanufactureo. Wmman. 
supra note 423, at 1 96-97. The argument has 'orne plau"b1h1y. For example. 1f lhe regulaior J..new thal 
adding at least one scrubber to a srnoke,tack generJlly " as a co,1-cffecuve mean• of reducing polluuon. 
but the regulator for some reason could not easily rnonnor the le\cl of polluuon being ermned by any 
particular manufacturer, the optimal response might be to require all manufacturer.. 10 '"'tall at lc:a..1 one 
scrubber. Even in the situation just described, however, the command-and-control regulator would ha\e to 
know a great deal about the overall external co'!' cau'cd by the manufac1urer's product when consumed 
(or, in the case of pollution. in the manufacturer\ production proces•) to be: able to make a '°und 
judgment. 
447. We also observe, however, that one or more of 1ho� approache" rmght be a u�rul 'upplement 
to the ex post incentive-based regulation of crgareuc,. 
448. The same can be said of propo•ab in recent year.. to mcrea.e the federal e":'"' ta\es on 
cigarettes. See Gary S. Becker & Michael Gro"man. The Senate s Heu/th Curr Fo/11.-s A11J C1�"'""" 
Revenues up in Smoke. WALL ST. J., Aug. 9. 1 994. al A 1 2  (d1i.cu"ing propo� mere= m crgan:ne la\� 
to help fund health care reform). 
449. As we noled above, see supru note 402 and accompanying texi. crgarene la\� are in fact "'' 
without any regard to the expected external co'b of c1gare11e •moJ..mg ln•lead. they are the r�uh pnmanly 
of revenue-raising objectives. See supru text accompanying nole 403 To the ex1en1 1ha1 lhen: " ' anat1on 
in tax rates, it is across 'tales, not brand,. See MA�Nl�G ET Al. . supm nole 49. at 1 70 
450. There would be some competitive benefit from maJ..rng >afety in•e•tmenl•. '"'°far a> .:on,umel"> 
are uninsured and accurately perceive and procc" the difference> among crgarene brand, rn 1em1' of �fety 
characteristics. In our view. however, becau'e of the con,umer 111fonna11on problem> d1.cu'>..:d mpm Part 
II, this effect would be small. 
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respect to manufacturer care levels.451 Competitive forces-that is, smokers' 
demand for, all else being equal, the cheapest available cigarettes-would 
induce manufacturers to lower the overall price of their cigarettes by cutting 
back on investments in safety, cutbacks that (we are assuming) consumers 
would not perceive.452 Thus cigarette manufacturer care levels would be 
suboptimal. 453 
The activity level inefficiency is a bit more subtle. Assume for the moment 
that manufacturer care levels are not an issue so that we can focus on the 
activity level effects of the excise tax. In a world with an excise tax on 
cigarettes that is computed on the basis of their average risk, activity levels 
(the number of cigarettes produced and consumed) may be, on average, 
roughly optimal. Nevertheless, there would be welfare losses because some 
individual consumers, compared with their perfectly informed selves, would 
be smoking too much and some too little. These are the same kinds of welfare 
losses that would occur in the absence of such an excise tax, if it were true 
that consumers (on average, but not individually) accurately perceived the risks 
of cigarettes. 454 
The problem with the excise tax solution is that consumers facing a higher 
price would adjust their consumption decisions to reflect their own estimates 
of risk given that they would not expect to be compensated by the 
manufacturer for any harms that materialized. Their individualized risk 
assessments would lead them to continue making errors of commission and 
omission. 
Nonetheless, even the imperfect excise tax takes us closer to efficiency 
than no excise tax at all (assuming, of course, that some superior ex post 
incentive-based system is not an available policy option). If manufacturer care 
45 1 .  For discussion of how ex post incentive-based regulation responds to the unraveling problem, see 
infra Subsection IV.D.3. 
452. The discussion supra Part II regarding consumer information problems provides support for our 
assumption that these cutbacks would not be perceived by consumers. Cf. Hanson & Logue, The First·Party 
Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 1 76-77 (describing unraveling of manufacturer care levels under 
circumstances of imperfect consumer information and imperfect insurance in the absence of excise taxes). 
453. This is the same species of problem that we discussed supra Subsection 11 .B.2 regarding the 
problems of imperfect brand-specific information. Any time the incentive structure is not tailored to specific 
manufacturers and specific brands, the incentive structure will be Hawed in this way. Even economists and 
policymakers who have recognized this unraveling problem with respect to markets and consumer 
information have failed to recognize the numerous alternative ways in which other market and regulatory 
mechanisms can lead to the same unraveling effect. As we describe below, see infra text accompanying 
notes 64 1 ,  709-7 1 3, there are a number of ways in which the proposed national settlement reflects this 
failure. 
Interestingly, even the economists who support using excise taxes on cigarettes (at least as a 
"component of a package of policy measures directed at discouraging smoking by children," Warner ct al., 
supra note 28, at 385) acknowledge that "[t]axation is a rather blunt instrument" and that higher cigarette 
taxes might "encourage smokers to switch from higher priced branded cigarettes to lower priced (and often 
higher tar and nicotine) generic and discounted brands, thereby possibly increasing smokers' exposure to 
the toxic substances in cigarette smoke," id. at 385-86 (citation omitted). 
454. Those welfare losses are sometimes referred to as errors of omission and commission. See Hanson 
& Logue, The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 1 77-79. 
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levels unravel, the amount of the tax would rise; thus, the nominal price of 
cigarettes would rise, which would cause a reduction in the aggregate amount 
of smoking. Although in this scenario there would still be welfare losses from 
errors of omission and commission, the aggregate activity levels may be closer 
to the optimal levels than if no tax were imposed. 
D. The Advantages of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation 
1 .  The Reduction of Information Problems 
In contrast to any of the previously discussed forms of regulation, under 
an idealized ex post incentive-based system (such as an idealized enterprise 
liability regime), the regulator would not need to know anything, ex ante, 
about the product's supply and demand curves. Instead, the regulator would 
simply commit to charging the manufacturer, ex post, for any costs that the 
product winds up causing. It would therefore be the manufactllrer that would 
make the ex ante expected cost calculation, and it would be the manufacturer 
(and the product market) that would determine, ex ante, optimal product design 
(including safety considerations) and optimal quantity. Thus, under an ex post 
incentive-based system of cigarette regulation, the cigarette manufacturers 
would, ex ante, take into account the fact that, ex post, they would be held 
liable for any costs caused by their products.455 They would build those 
assumed costs into their design, production, and pricing decisions. Once an 
equilibrium was reached in the market, the optimal quantity of cigarettes would 
be sold at the optimal level of safety.456 
455. It should be clear that an ex po•t inccnuve-b� regime docs not entail any Jctcm11nat1on as to 
the reasonableness of manufacturers' conduct. It ••. in other worih. a no-fault system. By contrast. a ton 
regime that relied on fault-based principles of ··=onablcne""" and the hke would. under our taxonomy. 
be considered an ex post command-and-control regime. 
456. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 423, at 52-54 (arguing that. under cen:un assumpllon>. 'Incl habthty 
with a defense of contributory negligence could lead to optunal ac11v11y levels and care Je,·eh in the product 
market). In addition, because the price of cigarenes would reficct their full costs and because consumers 
would anticipate being compensated ex post for cigarene-cau.cd hamt>. there would be no "clfare lo= 
associated with errors of omission and commis•ion. 
Some readers might be tempted to argue that an ex po't sy•tcm of regulauon would be more 
expensive than an ex ante system because the ex po•t regulator would have to tdcnufy and mea.un: th<: 
harms that the product actually caused. That argument. however. •• a red hcmng. Any form of regulauon 
that seeks to internalize costs must mea.ure actual damages. To argue 01hcrw1..: •• to misunderstand the 
idea of internalizing costs. The real difference, as •lated in the text. " tht•: Under ex ante regulauon 
(whether it be command-and-control, performance-based, or mccn11ve-�). th<: regulator would have to 
estimate the furure costs and benefit. of the product, tn all of 11> vanous altcmauvc dotgns Thll!I, in 
addition to examining the costs as they occur today in making that c•Umauon. the regulator would have 
to examine how those costs were likely to change in the future. The regulator, therefore. would aucmpt to 
measure the influence of a variety of mutable factor..  including the product dotgn. the consumer mu:, the 
medical system's ability to reduce or eliminate the threat of harm. the industry"> ab1hty to offer a "'fc and 
viable cigarette substitute, and so on. Over a latency penod of 25 to 60 years. •Uch ot1ma1tons would be 
extremely speculative. Under an ex post approach. by contr.ist. the regulator would not need to make such 
an estimate. Instead, the manufaccurer would make che csumace. The regulacor would have 10 �ruun only 
the harm caused by the product after it had occurred. 
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Not only would ex post incentive-based regulation use the manufacturer's 
grasp of existing information to guide production decisions, it would also 
encourage the production of more information. Some commentators argue that 
under command-and-control regulation (and perhaps under performance-based 
regulation), manufacturers have an incentive to conceal information about the 
harmfulness of their products or about potential technologies for improving 
their products' safety.457 Ex post incentive-based systems respond to those 
types of problems. Under an ex post incentive-based regime, manufacturers 
would use all the information they have. Moreover, because manufacturers 
would have to pay for cigarette-caused harms once they occur, manufacturers 
would learn something about the probability and magnitude of those harms as 
a result of the process of regulation itself. 
There is yet another information problem that ex post incentive-based 
regulation reduces: Under an ex ante system of regulation, manufacturers 
would have an incentive to convince regulators and consumers that the risks 
of their products were lower than they truly were. By doing so, they could 
lower the perceived costs of their products and benefit from a lower Pigouvian 
tax rate.458 Under an ex post regime, in contrast, the manufacturer would not 
escape paying those costs, no matter what regulators and consumers were led 
to believe ex ante. Thus, manufacturers would have no reason to convince 
regulators or consumers to be optimistic under an ex post regime. Cigarette 
manufacturers under an ex post incentive-based scheme would, in essence, be 
bonded.459 
2. The Reduction of Overdeterrence Problems When Information Varies 
Across Consumers 
Another significant advantage that idealized ex post incentive-based 
regulation has over idealized ex ante incentive-based regulation stems from the 
possibility that some consumers may be better informed than others. 
Economists typically assume that consumers are homogenous with respect to 
information levels. So, for example, Viscusi premises his policy 
457. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 230 (arguing that under direct regulation, private producers 
"have every reason to try to persuade the government that the technology for pollution abatement will be 
extremely hard to develop, so that it will be impossible to satisfy stringent regulations"). 
458. It might be argued that regulators could simply ignore the information provided by munufucturers 
regarding product risks under an ex ante regime. Such a policy would come at a cost, however, because 
manufacturers, as we have repeatedly argued, are typically better informed about their own products thun 
regulators are. 
459. Cf. Croley & Hanson, Ellferprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92 (explaining the informntionul 
benefits of bonding in the products liability context). Of course, an ex post approach may not eliminate the 
information problem with respect to questions of causation or damages. Manufacturers would be able to 
lower their costs if they could persuade regulators that their products caused fewer harms than they actually 
did. That problem. however, would exist for any type of regulation that seeks to correct the market. But 
see infra Subsection V.A.2.a (describing how an ex post incentive-based system could be employed to 
overcome the causation problem). 
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recommendations largely on consumers' ai•erage estimates of risk.�60 even 
though his own evidence shows that some people underestimate nsks.�1 
Viscusi would have to concede that his policy recommendations would be 
inefficient with respect to such optimistic consumers. If one takes seriously the 
possibility that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to information levels, 
therefore, the question of which specific type of incentive-based regulation is 
adopted becomes very important. 
If the quality of information varies across consumers, any ex ante form of 
incentive-based regulation, such as a Pigouvian tax, would create a problem of 
either overdeterrence or underdeterrence. To understand this point, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two categories of ex ante incentive-based 
regulation, based on who receives the proceeds of the tax (or charge or fine) 
that is collected ex ante. In one category, the potential victims would receive 
the proceeds, based on the ex ante risks they face. We call this category 
"victim-initiated ex ante incentive-based regulation.'..:6� One can imagine a 
regime in  which consumers, after buying their cigarenes, submit to the 
regulator all receipts (or empty packs) for cigarenes purchased; and then, 
before any injury occurs, they receive a rebate equal to their per pack share of 
the tax collected.463 Although such a regime would raise the nominal retail 
price of cigarettes, it would fail to have any effect on consumers' consumption 
choices. The rebate would lower the price that consumers would have to pay 
for cigarettes; the consumers, in making their decisions, would be responsive 
only to the price net of the rebate. Optimistic consumers would continue to 
behave optimistically, leading to an underdeterrence problem. while those 
consumers who accurately measure or overestimate the risks of cigarenes 
would continue to do so. As to those laner consumers, there would be no 
deterrence benefits from this ex ante incentive-based system. 
Now consider the effects of a different ex ante incentive-based system, one 
in which the proceeds from the tax are paid to someone other than the 
potential victims-most likely the state. Under such a state-initiated regime. 
consumers who correctly estimate or overestimate the risks of cigareltes would 
be overdeterred-or doubly deterred-from smoking. Not only would those 
consumers pay the additional price to cover the ex ante tax charged to 
manufacturers, but they would also continue to take into account their own risk 
estimates of smoking because they would still fu lly bear those costs ex post. 
460. See, e.g., Vbcusi. supra note 1 02. at 70 (;i,,'c'"ng ho\\ \\ Cll con,umcr.. arc 111fom1cd on a' cragc >. 
id. at 92-93 (concluding that higher cigarette taxc' would be mappropnalc. m pan bccau>e mo,1 '111okcr.. 
overestimate the risks of smoking). 
46 1 .  See VISCUS!, supra note 49. at 124 & tbl.6-3 
462. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 283-84 (d"cu,_.ng the 1r.1dcofh bct\\ ccn ··pm .11cly mma1cd"" 
versus "state initiated" approache' to regulation). 
463. Such a system might operate very much hkc a bottle dcpo,11 ,y,1cm 
1 276 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 163 
Thus only consumers who were purely optim1st1c (and thus who assume 
cigarettes are riskless) would be optimally deterred from smoking.464 
This type of overdeterrence problem, coupled with an overly narrow focus 
on ex ante incentive-based regulation, appears to be one of the main reasons 
that economists who have studied cigarettes have not called for increased 
efforts to internalize costs.465 Those economists start with the assumption that 
a large fraction of consumers are, even in the absence of any regulatory 
intervention, already deterred or overdeterred regarding smoking risks (at least 
with respect to those risks that are not externalized to third parties), because 
those consumers are well-informed of or actually overestimate those risks.466 
Then the economists focus their analysis on only a single regulatory policy 
tool, the excise tax,467 which is a very crude form of ex ante incentive-based 
regulation. That approach creates the potential for overdeterrence, a possibility 
that apparently motivates Viscusi and others to oppose the idea of internalizing 
the negative externalities of smoking through higher excise taxes.468 
What those scholars seem to have overlooked, however, is that some forms 
of ex post incentive-based regulation (namely, victim-initiated regimes) are less 
464. The effect would not quite be that of double taxation, however, because the amount of the 
implicit tax, averaged across all smokers, would be somewhat less than the explicit tax imposed by the 
regulator. This is because the tax imposed by the regulator would include negative external costs not borne 
by smokers (for example, ETS costs) as well as the costs they do bear, and the implicit tax fell by the 
smoker would not (unless we were to assume, wildly unrealistically, that consumers for some reason fully 
internalize all costs they impose on others). 
465. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 19 (concluding that the current level of cigarette 
taxes is adequate or even excessive); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 92 (same). The other main reason, 
discussed earlier in the Article, is that economists working in this area have concluded that cigarettes, on 
net, do not create negative externalities. See supra Subsection III.C. I .  
466. See supra Section II.A (discussing Viscusi's argument that consumers are well-informed o f  the 
risks of smoking). 
467. In the recent studies by economists of cigarette-caused negative externalities, the only policy 
option that has seriously been considered is an excise tax. See MANNING ET AL., supm note 49, al app. F; 
see also GRAVELLE & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 298, passim; VISCUS!, supru note 49, al 1 06-09; Viscusi, 
supra note I 02, passim; Warner et al., supra note 28, passim. For a discussion of the historical development 
of cigarette taxes, and a description of the changing magnitude of those taxes over time, see MANNINO llT 
AL., supra note 49, at app. F. One can imagine a number of other plausible policy options, such as ( I )  a 
complete ban on cigarette production and consumption; (2) a ban on cigarette smoking in public places: 
(3) increased use of warnings and negative advertising; or (4) direct regulation by the FDA. Except in 
connection with ETS (where limited smoking bans have been tried), the excise tax on cigarettes is the only 
policy option that has been used or studied to any significant degree. 
468. For example, when Viscusi addresses the topic of cigarette taxes, he describes such taxes us 
substitutes for, or alternatives to, increasing consumers' perceptions of the risks of smoking. See W. Kip 
Viscusi, Promoting Smokers' Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 554 ( 1 994); see 
also Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 54-57. Even those economists who have called for some increase in 
tobacco taxes have done so only in situations where overdeterrence problems are not likely to be present 
(such as with smoking among children), seemingly giving no consideration to the possibility of using other 
incentive-based systems besides excise taxes as a means of internalizing the external costs of smoking. See, 
e.g., Warner et al., supra note 28, at 385-86 (arguing that increased excise tax on cigarettes may be 
appropriate as means of discouraging children from starting to smoke, but not mentioning the possibility 
of using tort liability to the same effect). 
If we allow for the possibility of imperfect information, the problem of overdeterrence under a tux 
regime diminishes: If consumers do not perceive the risks of smoking, they will not add their implicit 
premium to the price of cigarettes. 
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susceptible to the problem of overdeterrence. Under an ideal ex post incentive­
based regime, for example, smokers would internalize the costs of cigarettes 
once when they purchased the cigarettes, as the nominal price of the cigarettes 
would rise to reflect their full expected costs. Smokers would not, however, 
count those costs fully a second time by adding to the nominal price of 
cigarettes their own estimate of the expected monetary harm to themselves of 
smoking, because they could expect to be compensated for that harm ex post 
via tort damages.469 
Even under such a regime, there could be some overdeterrence, depending 
upon what damages are included in the ex post awards, but less overdeterrence 
than with an excise tax. Overdeterrence under enterprise liability would occur 
to the extent smokers themselves anticipate dying before having a chance to 
collect their ex post awards. One cost of cigarette smoking that would, ideally, 
be internalized to manufacturers and thereby into the price of cigarettes is 
some willingness-to-pay measure of the value of the lost years of the smoker's 
life. To the extent smokers fully appreciate the risks of smoking (including the 
risk of a shortened life) and fully take those risks into account in deciding 
whether and how much to smoke, however, adding a tort premium for the risk 
of a shortened life could produce overdeterrence, since the smokers themselves 
will not be around to enjoy that portion of the award. 
There are a number of reasons, however, that this type of overdeterrence 
would be relatively small compared to the overdeterrence associated with an 
excise tax. The overdeterrence that stems from smokers' dying before receiving 
their award would exist with the excise tax as well.�70 With respect to the 
rest of the harms of smoking, however, enterprise liability would produce 
significantly Jess overdeterrence. Smokers could expect to receive 
reimbursement for at least some of those costs ex post in the form of a tort 
judgment during their lifetimes. Such costs include the smoking-related 
medical costs borne by smokers, all of the lost income to smokers due to 
smoking-caused disability, and all of the pain and suffering experienced by 
smokers during their lifetimes as a result of cigarette smoking. In contrast, 
with an excise tax, no ex post reimbursement for those costs can be expected, 
and thus all of those costs would contribute to overdeterrence.�71 
469. We are assuming that consumers are aware of the .incl hab1h1y rule 
470. Even overdeterrence stemmmg from the co•! to 1he Mnol.er of dymg early would be mlllgated 
to some extent. Recall that we are currently a.•ummg pcrfoctly mfonncd •mol.ers Under an enterpme 
liability regime, those kinds of •mokers could take •lep' to reduce the amount of O\ erdelerrcnce For 
example, since they can expect to live •honer live•. the)' rmght decide to reduce !heir Je,cJ of .annp. 
which would provide them with more money during their •rnol.mg hfeurn� to help off-.:1 the mc�d 
price of cigarettes. Or they might be able to reduce their hfe 111.urJnce coverage >111<.:e 1he >hortfall would 
be covered by the ton awards. Or perhap' long-term •mol.ers who could demon•lrate 1ha1 the) already had 
a serious smoking-related i llness might be able to borrow aga111,1 their future ton a" Jrd> Ahhough none 
of those approaches would fully offset the overdetcrrence problem. 1hcy m1gh1 >1gnitican1ly reduce 11 
47 1 .  None of the costs that are borne by third panic> would produce overdetem:nce under either 
regime, if smokers did not take them into account. Econom1•l> 1yp1call) a>.:>urne !hat al lea>t >0me of 1h� 
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It bears reemphasizing that any concern with overdeterrence exists only 
insofar as there are smokers who are informed and who make rational 
decisions regarding the long-term effects of smoking on their life spans. As we 
argued in Part II, there are many reasons to doubt that smokers, in making 
decisions about whether to smoke the next pack, behave with such a degree of 
foresight. In addition, if, for reasons of administrative cost or political 
necessity, ex post incentive-based awards were limited to purely economic 
losses, the overdeterrence problem would be reduced. 
3. The Prevention of Unraveling 
An idealized enterprise liability regime (or some other idealized ex post 
incentive-based regulatory mechanism) would, in theory, move us closer to 
optimality with respect to cigarette-caused harms than the current and proposed 
versions of a cigarette excise tax would. Under an idealized ex post regime, 
manufacturers would have improved care level incentives because they would 
benefit directly through increased sales from efficient reductions in the 
expected costs (and hence the prices) of their own individual brands.472 
Moreover, the activity level inefficiencies would be corrected as well, 
inasmuch as the price of each pack of cigarettes would adjust to reflect that 
pack's full expected cost.473 Thus, an idealized enterprise liability would be 
a superior deterrent to a regime of excise taxes, even without considering 
double-deterrence concerns. 
E. The Advantages of Victim-Initiated over State-Initiated 
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation 
Enterprise liability is one example of a victim-initiated ex post incentive­
based system of product regulation. But what would a state-initiated ex post 
system look like? Perhaps it would be a fine imposed ex post on cigarette 
manufacturers for harms caused by past smoking; for example, a Pigouvian tax 
whose amount was determined ex post rather than ex ante. Or perhaps it would 
costs will be treated as internal to the smoker. We explained supra Subsection 111.C.2.a.i why that is a 
highly questionable (and, in any event, largely undefended) assumption and that in the cigarette setting the 
reverse assumption is usually more realistic. 
472. Thus, manufacturers would effectively be bonded, creating an incentive to produce truly safer 
cigarettes. See Croley & Hanson, Emerprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92; see also supra text 
accompanying note 459. 
473. The price of cigarettes would, under idealized enterprise liability, "inform" the consumer of the 
risks posed by the brand of cigarette she was purchasing. See Hanson & Logue, The First-Party /11s1mmce 
Extema/ity, supra note 40, at 175. More precbely, under such a regime, because consumers would be fully 
compensated for the risks of smoking, they would not need to make their own individual assessments of 
those risks. An excise tax, however, does not have the same effect. Because consumers will not be 
compensated ex post, they must make assessments of risk ex ante and therefore, in addition to paying the 
excise tax, may suffer from errors of omission and commission. 
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be a lawsuit (much like the state attorneys general lawsuitst7� brought by the 
government against manufacturers to recover for past cigareue-caused harms 
imposed on the government. In any event, the key elements of a state-initiated 
ex post system are (a) that the claims would be brought by the state; (b) that 
they would be brought ex post; and (c) that the proceeds from the system 
would not go directly back to smoking victims. 
In Subsection IV.D.2 above, we described one of the advantages of victim­
initiated, as compared to state-initiated, incentive-based systems. The idea is 
that a victim-initiated regime would avoid overdeterrence of those smokers 
who accurately estimate or overestimate the risks of smoking, as they could 
expect to get some of the ex ante cigarette tax refunded to them when they 
bring their claims. A state-initiated approach, on the other hand, could create 
overdeterrence for such smokers, because they could not expect a "tax refund" 
ex post-except only very indirectly through, for example, lower income tax 
rates. 
Another advantage of the victim-initiated approach is that the system itself  
would generate information about the harms of smoking, and this information 
could then be used to fine-tune further the regulatory system. Smokers would 
have an incentive to bring claims whenever their cigareue-related illnesses 
began to manifest themselves.475 Under a state-initiated approach, in contrast, 
there would be no such incentive for victims to come forward. Thus, the 
government's factual basis for its ex post claims/fines/taxes would have to 
come from some other source-perhaps, for example, from epidemiological 
studies of the effects of smoking on general populations. Such studies are 
certainly valuable, but they could be made available to any regulatory regime, 
including the victim-initiated regime.476 
One concern that is sometimes raised about victim-initiated approaches is 
that they can give victims the incentive to behave with "moral hazard." Thus, 
the argument goes, if the promise of an ex post award motivates victims to 
come forward with their claims (thus revealing all sorts of helpful 
474. See cases cited supra note 68. 
475. Some economists have argued that 111centl\ e-ba>ed n:gune> tend not to create mcentl\ c> tor 
parties to volunteer relevant information. For c>.amplc. con>1dcr the following quotation from St1ghtl 
Under both schemes [direct regulation and fine>] II 1> not m the mtcn:>t of a >tecl company to 
announce how much pollution 11 i> creating. Nor 1> 11 111 the 1ntcn:>t> of any of the U>er> of >!eel 
(to the extent that the marl.et is compcuuvc). >mcc an) line> unpo>Cd as a rc>ult of c�c�l\ c  
pollution o r  any expenditure o n  polluuon-control de' ice> mandated b)· n:gulauon> an: \Imply 
passed along to the user. And while 1t may be m the mtcrc>t> of consumer> collccu,dy to 
monitor, if monitoring is CO>tly none will be willing to do 11. We ha\e a clas>ic pubhc-good 
problem. 
STJGLJTZ, supra note 425, at 229. Our pomt m th1> >ect1on 1> that one of the potcnttal bcnclil• of >·tellm· 
initiated ex post liability is that it helps to overcome th1> pubhc good problem 
476. To the extent the state were to attempt Jo >tn:ngthen It> ca>.: for ex po>! Jinn, taxes. or award>. 
by offering inducements to smokers to get them to come forward 1qth helpful mformauon. \\C would then 
be moving along the continuum from a s1a1e-m1t1ated >)'>tern to a ' 1ct11n-1mttatcd >y>tcm Thal "ould be 
another type of hybrid regulation. 
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information), it can also give them an increased incentive to engage in the 
behavior-or a decreased incentive to avoid the behavior-that created the 
claims against the cigarette companies in the first place. Put simply, the 
availability of an ex post award-such as a tort award-may make people 
smoke too carelessly and too much.477 
This worry about the moral hazard effect on smokers of the availability of 
bringing an ex post claim, however, is largely unfounded. First, cigarettes do 
not pose a substantial consumer care level issue. There is not much that 
consumers can do, in care level terms, to reduce the costs of smoking. There 
is no "safe" way to smoke a cigarette, at least not as cigarettes are currently 
designed.478 Thus, it is difficult to conceive how the existence of a potential 
ex post claim would induce smokers to smoke each cigarette "less carefully." 
Second, even if smokers knew of, and could plausibly be expected to take, 
some care level precautions, a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system 
of regulation would not create a moral hazard problem inasmuch as the 
compensation that it provided would only substitute for compensation that is 
currently provided through public and private insurance mechanisms. That is 
true because current compensation is not adjusted to take into consideration 
smokers' care levels. A liability system, therefore, would merely replicate any 
existing moral hazard problem.479 Finally, ex post liability would largely 
eliminate activity level problems. As we have argued all along, if 
manufacturers are forced ex post to bear the full costs that their products 
cause, they will have to charge a price that reflects the full cost of cigarettes. 
Therefore, overconsumption in the hope of being able to bring an ex post 
claim against the industry is prevented by the requirement that smokers fund 
that ex post award up front in the form of increased cigarette prices.480 
477. Cf Cropper & Oates, s11pra note 38, at 692-93 (suggesting that a Pigouvian tax may be superior 
to a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime as a means of internalizing the costs of polluters 
because a Pigouvian tax does not involve behavior-distorting payments to the victim whereas ex post 
liability does). 
478. There may be ways in which smokers could reduce the risks of smoking. For instance, they might 
try to inhale the smoke less deeply into their lungs. Or they might avoid covering the tiny holes around 
the filters of some cigarettes that would otherwise allow some of the harmful constituents, including tars, 
to escape into the air. The problem, however, is that consumers are unaware of those potential precautions 
and, in any case, may not be consciously "deciding" how to smoke a cigarette. See supra notes 1 04- 1 07 
and accompanying text. Indeed, those precautions may be available to consumers primarily because 
consumers are unaware of their self-defeating characteristics and manufacturers seek to take advantage of 
that fact. See supra notes 1 04-1 07 and accompanying text; infra note 673. 
479. It might well be true, as several readers of earlier drafts of this Article have noted, that smokers 
could improve their long-term health-and, in essence, partially counteract the ill-health consequences of 
smoking-by improving their diets or exercise habits. But that point can be made of smokers and 
nonsmokers under the current regime. No compensation scheme of which we arc aware goes very far in 
encouraging potential claimants to cat better or exercise more. In addition. we arc unaware of any studies 
suggesting that diet and exercise have an especially significant effect on the health of smokers. Again, an 
ex post liability system for smokers would not create a moral hazard problem. 
480. Cf infra text accompanying notes 777-778 (responding to similar "personal responsibility" 
concerns with ex post incentive-based regulation). 
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F. Summary 
In this part, we reviewed the arguments for different types of regulation. 
Both command-and-control and performance-based regulation place huge 
informational demands on regulators, demands worsened by the perverse 
incentives under such regimes for manufacturers to conceal, or at least to fail 
to seek out, better information. Without perfect information, regulators will set 
prices too high or too low, and they will be unable to respond properly to 
changes in the amount of harm a product does. Manufacturers will thus lack 
incentives to make their products safer or charge prices that ensure efficient 
activity levels. Ex post incentive-based regulation, by contrast, would harness 
market forces and manufacturer information to avoid the inefficiencies of the 
other regimes. 
V. IMPLEMENTING A VICTIM-INITIATED EX POST 
INCENTIVE-BASED SYSTEM 
As we have shown in previous parts of this Article, a system of victim­
initiated ex post incentive-based liability has significant advantages over other 
forms of regulation in addressing the market failures associated with smoking. 
In this part, we explore in greater depth the concept of a victim-initiated ex 
post incentive-based regime. We begin by analyzing different alternatives to 
such a regime. Throughout this Article, our model for ex post incentive-based 
regulation has been enterprise liability. In this part, although we touch on 
enterprise liability, we focus more on an alternative. administrative regime 
based on the workers' compensation model. 
A. Alternative Victim-Initiated Ex Post Incenril'e-Based Systems 
So far, we have used an idealized version of enterprise liability to illustrate 
the virtues of a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime. Enterprise 
liability, however, is only one form of such a regime-one that relies on courts 
rather than agencies to do the relevant ex post damage determinations. In this 
section, we describe an alternative ex post incentive-based regime: smokers' 
compensation. Before doing so, however, we explore the idea of enterprise 
liability further, relaxing some of the assumptions we have been making up to 
now and addressing some anticipated objections. After discussing both 
enterprise liability and smokers' compensation, we describe a technology-the 
cigarette card-that could be used under either approach to allocate costs to 
specific manufacturers (and to improve the efficacy of any regulatory 
approach). 
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I .  Enterprise Liability 
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions that were explicitly and 
implicitly included in the notion of an "idealized" enterprise liability regime, 
and we consider some of the common criticisms that are made of enterprise 
liability as a system of deterrence. There are two types of criticisms that are 
often levied against an enterprise liability regime: first, that it does a poor job 
of measuring damages suffered by individuals481 and second, that it is an 
extremely costly system to administer.482 In our view, those criticisms are 
often overstated. 
The tort system, especially to the extent juries are used, is generally 
criticized for being an unreliable means of determining the amount of damages 
to be paid by defendants to plaintiffs.483 Some argue, for example, that there 
is a tendency for juries to award irrationally exorbitant damages, especially in 
cases involving wealthy, out-of-state, corporate defendants and sympathetic, 
local, individual plaintiffs.484 Such concerns, though perhaps valid in some 
circumstances, are often vastly exaggerated.485 Indeed, in the cigarette 
context specifically, juries have, if anything, been biased against individual 
smokers and in favor of corporate defendants.486 Nevertheless, if runaway 
48 1 .  See infra notes 483-487 and accompanying text. 
482. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 40-4 1 ,  127-48 
( 1 989); George L. Priest, The Currem Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 ,  1 560, 
1 587-90 ( 1987). Even the national tobacco settlement proposal seems to adopt the conclusion that the tort 
system, as a means of regulating cigarette risks, involves unacceptably high administrative costs. See 
Tobacco Settlemem, supra note 32, at 3 ("[C]ivil actions [against cigarette manufacturers] are complex, 
slow-moving, expensive and burdensome, not only for the litigants but also for the nation's state nnd 
federal judiciaries."). 
There is a third type of criticism of enterprise liability, which is related to the mismensurement of 
damages point, though the criticism is more of an insurance argument than a deterrence one. The claim is 
that enterprise liability, because it typically includes damages for nonpecuniary harms (so-called pain-und­
suffering damages), forces consumers to purchase insurance that they do not want and would not want, 
even if perfectly informed. See Priest, supra, at 1 552-53. This type of criticism, to the extent it applies 
anywhere, would certainly apply to the proposal set forth in this Article. The argument that consumers do 
not demand this type of insurance coverage, however, has, in our view, been drastically overstuted. A 
reasonably strong argument can be made that consumers do demand such insurance covemge and thlll 
enterprise liability is an appropriate means of providing it. See Croley & Hanson, s11pra note 22, at 1 857-
1 9 14. 
483. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 1 - 1 5  
( 1 988) (describing :he alleged failure o f  the tort system and attributing that failure, at least in part, to u 
desire by jurors to be generous to tort victims at the expense of wealthy defendants). 
484. See, e.g., id. at 1 1- 1 2  ("If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant . . .  , it will often 
settle for a merely wealthy one."); JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, 
INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 23-32 ( 1 987) (describing numerous alleged biases in civil juries' 
decisionmaking); Good Riddance to lotto Jury Awards, Bus. WK., June 3, 1 996, at 1 34 (extolling a 
Supreme Court decision striking down a $2 million award to an Alabama doctor who sued BMW for 11 
retouched paint job on his new sedan). 
485. See Stephen Daniels, The Question of J11ry Competence cmd the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: 
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 279- 8 1 ,  292-
3 1 0; Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. I 093, I I  09- 1 2  ( 1996). 
486. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 3 1 ,  1 39, 143-45. 
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juries in tort cases remain a concern, there are reforms that would respond co 
such concerns short of eliminating enterprise liabilicy as a policy opcion.m 
Critics of enterprise liability also point to its supposedly high 
administrative costs as a strong argument for choosing some alternacive system. 
such as a fault-based tort regime or a no-fault first-party insurance regime.�ss 
Those criticisms often misunderstand che full effect of an enterprise liabilicy 
regime. For one thing, because enterprise liabilicy would do away with che 
need for an expensive trial on the issue of faulc, it might accually be cheaper 
to administer than, for example, a fault-based tort regime.�89 ln addicion, co 
compare the administrative costs of a no-fault first-party insurance regime wich 
an enterprise liability regime is co compare apples wich oranges. A no-faulc 
first-party insurance regime is only that-an insurance regime. le focuses 
exclusively on spreading the risks of product-caused harms, providing no 
deterrence benefits to manufaccurers. Enterprise liabil icy, by contrast, provides 
both product-risk insurance and product-accident deterrence. And ic is the 
deterrence element-which includes a factfinding exercise to determine 
causation-that adds costs (though not necessarily costs in excess of the 
accompanying benefits)490 to the system. 
2. Smokers ' Compensation 
Notwithstanding the arguments just made in defense of enterprise liability. 
i f  there remains substantial doubt that a jury can accurately calculace damages 
and there remain concerns about the administrative cost of a tort-based regime. 
then alternative victim-initiated ex post regimes should be considered. One 
alternative to enterprise liability that may be more appropriate in che contexc 
of tobacco-related injuries is smokers ' compensation, an administrative 
compensation system. Under such a regime, instead of bringing a tort suit in 
court, smoking victims (which could include smokers, their families, and 
entities with subrogation claims, such as insurers)�91 would bring claims 
487. For example. po>>ible solution> might mcludc refomung JUC) ..:lcc110n .:ntcna tpc:rha� c\en 
placing some expens on jurie>). reforming JUry in•truc11on,. tal-.ing the damage> dcc1>1on from the JUry and 
giving it  to judges. placing cap> on puni11ve damage• and nonccononuc damage>. and the hkc To be 
absolutely clear, we do not recommend any of the": refonn' (e\ccpt. pc:rhap> . ...,, an .dtcmall•c to 
eliminating ton law altogether). 
488. See, e.g . •  Prie>t. mpra note 482. at 1 560. 1 587-90 1cn11cmng cntcrpn..: hab1ht) on tho-.: 
grounds). 
489. See Croley & Hanson. IV/wt Lwb1/uv Cmt> '. mpra note -10. at 15· I 6 Which >) >tcm "' ould be 
administratively cheaper would depend upon the rela11ve -izc of the CO•l·pc:r<� effect l "' luch "' ould make 
a fault-based system relatively costly) and the quan111y-of<a>c> cffcc1 (\\h1ch \\ ould make an cntcrpn-.: 
liability regime relatively costly). See rd. 
490. See id. at 1 6. 
49 1 .  We assume that victims of environmental tobacco >mol,.e ! ETS I  \\OUld not be able to bnng a 
smokers' compensa110n claim. For a d1>CU»1on of ho" a \ 1Ct1111-1m11atcd e� po>l inccnll\c·ba.cd n:g1mc 
could be used to respond to pubhc ETS expo>ure. >ee 111/rn Sub-cc11on V.C 3 A> \\e male dear below, 
for a smokers' compen>ation sy>tem to ha\e a -igmficant ad\ antage O\Cf ahcma11 ' c  t) pc:> of rcgula110n, 
the administrative body would need to mal,.e ,e,crnl cau,,;il dctcn111na11on> 1ha1 may not currently be 
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before an administrative tribunal. The tribunal would decide whether and how 
much the claimant was entitled to recover, basing its decision on (a) whether 
the claimant had a compensable claim; (b) to what extent cigarette smoking 
caused the injury; (c) what the claimant's damage award should be; and (d) 
how the compensable injury costs should be allocated among tobacco 
companies. The administrative factfinders would bring expertise to the 
adjudication of smoking-injury claims.492 Perhaps supported by a standing 
science panel,493 the agency would bring to bear the most current evidence, 
epidemiological and otherwise, regarding the effects of cigarette smoking. 
Research could be not only borrowed from private researchers, but also funded 
or conducted by the agency itself. 
Causation-based administrative alternatives to tort law are not strangers to 
the legal landscape. Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for 
employees injured on the job in every state.494 And alternative compensation 
systems have been used at the federal level on several occasions, including the 
Black Lung Benefit Program for miners suffering from lung disease,495 the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for victims of illnesses 
contracted from immunizations,496 and the Price-Anderson Act governing 
liability in the event of a nuclear accident.497 Indeed, the notion of an 
alternative compensation system specifically for smoking-related injuries is 
itself not new. Over twenty years ago, Donald Gamer proposed a system in 
which welfare agencies could exercise no-fault claims against cigarette 
manufacturers to recover direct medical costs and related transfer payments, 
such as social security disability payments.498 Gamer's system would involve 
a special tribunal with expert factfinders to manage any complicated scientific 
questions of causation.499 Claimants could invoke a rebuttable presumption 
feasible with respect to ETS·related hanns. 
492. Administrative alternatives are frequently proposed in situations that involve complex scientific 
or medical detenninations, long latency periods, and large numbers of potential plaintiffs. See, e.g., Robert 
L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compe11satio11 Scheme, 52 Mo. 
L. REV. 95 1 ,  952 ( 1 993). This description is usually applied to mass toxic exposures, but fits tobacco 
equally well. 
493. One model for a "Tobacco Disease Panel" is Ontario's Industrial Disease Standards Panel, which 
assists the provincial Workers' Compensation Board. Its mandate is to investigate potential diseases, to 
make findings about causal connections, to specify criteria for evaluation of claims, and to advise the Board 
concerning appropriate eligibility rules. The Board refers specific questions to the panel, but the panel may 
also investigate issues on its own accord. The panel may appoint specialist scientific subpanels on particular 
subjects. The full panel integrates the scientific findings with policy considerations to make 
recommendations to the Board. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00, at 335-37. 
494. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1 994 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS at vii 
( 1 994). 
495. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 90 1 -945 ( 1 994); see also PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: 
FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ( 1 987). 
496. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 0  to 300aa-34 ( 1994); see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60. 
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 22 1 0; see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60. 
498. See Gamer, supra note 48, at 3 14. 
499. See id. at 3 1 9. He suggests the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office Board 
of Appeals as possible models. See id. at 3 1 9  n.248. 
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of causation based on how long the victim smoked,500 and liability would be 
apportioned according to the approximate number of each manufacturer's 
cigarettes that the victim smoked.501 A presumption that all cigarettes are 
equally dangerous would be rebuttable by a manufacturer's showing that its 
brand is safer than others' .502 
Since Garner's article, legal scholars have continued to keep the notion of 
an alternative compensation scheme for tobacco in play. Richard Ausness, for 
example, recently proposed creating an administrative board with rulemaking 
and adjudicative authority to process tobacco-injury claims.51n As under 
Garner's system, Ausness's board would set presumptions of causation, 
perhaps even irrebuttable for certam diseases, and damages would be limited 
to economic losses.s04 Most recently, Paul LeBel advocated an administrative 
system involving broad, categorical determinations of causation and damages 
to minimize costs.sos The program would be open only to individuals with 
particular diseases and smoking patterns.SOI> who could collect only out-of­
pocket medical expenses.s07 LeBel would also allow a modest benefit to 
families of smokers who die from smoking-related diseases, primarily for the 
symbolic value.sos Both Ausness and LeBel would finance the payment of 
damages through an excise tax.s09 
Those earlier proposals were not designed to address all of the deterrence 
and cost-internalization goals that, in our view, should be central.510 The 
Ausness-LeBel excise tax, for instance, would impose costs on all 
manufacturers, irrespective of their causal connection. As we emphasized 
above, however, the goal of optimal deterrence requires that each man11fac111rer 
bear that portion of the overall cigareue-caused hamz that is attribwable to 
that manufacturer's brand.5 1 1  Only then will market forces lead 
manufacturers to design, produce, and market safer cigarettes. And only then 
500. See id. at 3 1 5. 
501 .  See id. at 3 1 6. 
502. See id. at 3 1 6- 1 7. 
503. See Ausness. Compe11sa1io11. supra note 48. at 1 1 24-25 
504. See id. at 1 1 27-29. 
505. See Paul A. I..cBel, Beginnmg the Endgame: The Search for an /11J11r..- Compe11so1w11 S)·stem 
A/1ema1ive lo Ton Liabiliryfor Tobacco-Relared Han11s. 24 N. KY. L. REV. 457. 474 ( 1 997) 
506. See id. at 490. 
507. See id. at 49 1 .  
508. See id. at 492. 
509. See Ausness, Compensarion. supra note 48. at 1 1 25; LeBcl. supra note 505. at 493. 
5 1 0. Alternative compensation systems generally ha,·e been propo-.:d 10 scne i nsurance. adnumstrauve 
efficiency, and corrective justice goals. See, e.g .• Ausnes�. Compensatwn. supra note 48. at 1088, 1 1 25 
n . 1 78; Rabin, supra note 492, at 95 1 .  LeBel's and Gamer's propo�b arc based in part on a cost­
intemalization goal, but both have other aim� that may pull in different d1rcc11ons. Su Gamer. supra note 
48, at 277 (advocating the removal of government �ub.id1c. of tobacco and encouraging �fety); LeBcl, 
supra note 505, at 466 (aniculating as goab compen�uon. enhancement of �fety, adm1ms1rative 
efficiency, and cost internalization). 
5 1 1 .  See supra notes 99- 1 0  I, 450-454, and accompanying text 
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will each brand of cigarette fully reflect its expected costs, thus leading to 
optimal activity levels. 
None of the actual or proposed causation-based compensation systems 
provides a perfect model for a smokers' compensation system. They do, 
however, usefully highlight some of the major considerations and tradeoffs in 
designing an ideal smokers' compensation system. In a forthcoming article, we 
(with Michael Zamore) provide a more fully formed, but still incomplete, 
model of the smokers' compensation idea.512 In this Article, we suggest only 
a few of the major substantive issues that must be confronted in crafting such 
a system.5 13 
In an ideal smokers' compensation world, three conditions would hold. 
First, all smoking-related injuries would be "signature diseases." They would, 
in other words, be caused exclusively, or nearly so, by smoking. Second, 
smokers would be steadfastly brand loyal, sticking to their preferred cigarette 
as long as they smoke. Third, all smoking-caused damages would be tangible 
and easily measured. Under these conditions, if a claimant had one of the 
signature diseases, the system would unerringly place liability on the 
manufacturer that caused the harm, for the appropriate amount. 
In many cases, this ideal may not be so far from reality. Certain diseases, 
most notably lung cancer and emphysema, are very rare among nonsmokers 
and might accurately be considered signature diseases.514 There is also some 
evidence that smokers are extraordinarily brand loyal.515 Moreover, a 
substantial portion of the costs of cigarette smoking are economic and may be 
easily and accurately measured.516 In many other cases, however, these 
factors might be more variable. For instance, although smoking is known to 
increase the risk of heart disease, there are many other common causes of heart 
disease. Many smokers do switch brands. And many forms of damage are not 
easily measured. As the real world begins to diverge from the ideal, it becomes 
necessary to weigh the value of increased accuracy in tracing injury costs to 
manufacturers and the administrative costs of achieving that accuracy. A 
similar tradeoff exists with respect to calculating real-world damages. 
5 1 2. See Hanson et al., s11pra note 40. 
5 1 3. Procedural questions may loom large as well. For example, one threshold question is whether u 
smokers' compensation system would partially or fully preempt tort law. 
5 1 4. The portion of all lung cancer deaths caused by smoking in 1 985 was 87%. See Patrick 
Remington, Presentation at the Conference on the So·Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications 
for Public Health and Public Policy, University of Wiscon�in-Madison Law School (Oct. 1 6, 1997) (outline 
of presentation on file with the Yale Law Jo11rnal). 
5 1 5. See Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Adverrising and Co11s11mption: Evidence of a Ca11sal Relationship, 
8 J. PUB. HEALTH Pot.'Y 492, 493 ( 1 987) ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of 
any consumer product."); see also Philip H. Dougherty, A.M.A. s Assa11l1 on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
1 2, 1 985, at D29 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes engender considerable brand loyalty."). 
5 1 6. We describe losses as "economic" or "pecuniary" if they are conventionally characterized that 
way. Many so called "economic" losses, however, are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily 
measured. See Croley & Hanson, s11pra note 22. at 1 857-6 1 .  
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a. Causation 
l. General Causation 
The first inquiry of a smokers' compensation board would be to determine 
whether c igarette smoking could have caused the injury claimed. To lower 
administrative costs, the system could be open only to certain claims. A 
threshold definition of a compensable injury under smokers' compensation 
might turn, for example, on the amount smoked and the type of disease. 
Claims for certain diseases with known, constant latency periods might be 
barred until a given period of time has passed. Finally, a determination that 
smoking could have caused any compensable injury would not necessarily 
imply that, in the given case, smoking did cause the injury. 
Workers' compensation has long struggled with this problem in 
occupational disease cases. It is often unclear, for example, whether a worker 
who was exposed to toxic fumes developed cancer as a result of that exposure 
rather than from genetics or environmental toxins. And, of course, long latency 
periods complicate the inquiry. Workers ' compensation systems generally 
consider a disease "occupational" if the victim was likely to have contracted 
it due to the nature of her work.5 17 A disease that may be common may 
nevertheless become occupational if the employment facilitates its 
transmission.518 Moreover, the workplace need not be the sole or even 
dominant cause of a worker's contracting a disease, so long as it contributes 
to the disease·s development.519 Despite these apparently liberal standards, 
the workers' compensation system does not always get high marks for 
responding to occupational disease. The American Law Institute reporters ' 
study on enterprise liability, for example, called workers' compensation 
"notably unsuccessful in delivering compensation" to occupational disease 
victims.520 
One option for addressing difficult questions of causation, often proposed 
for mass toxic torts, would be probabilistic recovery.521 In such a system, 
recovery would be discounted by the likelihood that smoking did not cause the 
smokers' injury. If, say, smoking has a 90'K probability factor of causing lung 
5 17. See I ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON°S WORKl:Jt�· CO\ll'E."SATIO" 7- 100 (de>I.. cd 1 976 & Supp 
1 997). The work may be dis1inc1ive m 1he lypc oi ml.. 10 " luch ll expo..:> worl..cr.. le g .  \\orlmg around 
toxic chemicals) or in lhe degree 10 which worl..cr> mu>t face C\ cryda) ml..> le g .  con1r.ictmg d1-.abhng 
conditions from handling ice all day). See 1d. al 7- 1 1 2  10 - 1 1 4 
5 1 8. In one case, for example, a lelephone operJlor who conlrJclcd 1obcrculo>1> quahlicd for \\Ork.er.." 
compensation because 11 was found 1ha1 1he clo>e-fimng mou1hp1ccc >he filed al \\Ori.. con1nbu1cd 10 her 
contraction of the disease. See id. al 7- 1 07. 
5 1 9. See id. at 7- 1 24. 
520. I AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00. al 1 1 1  
52 1 .  For an extended early di>cussion of an ex po>l mccn11vc-b� n:g1mc along the hnc> dc..cnbcd 
here, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Com11.-c1w11 111 MuH £tpomrt.' Cau:s A ""Public U.m ·· Vi$Wll of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 85 1 ( 1 984). 
1288 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63 
cancer in smokers,522 one out of every ten smokers with lung cancer would 
develop lung cancer without smoking. In theory, those individuals should not 
be compensated, since smoking did not cause their injuries. The individual 
attribution uncertainty of epidemiological evidence, however, makes it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify which ten claims should be 
denied.523 Probabilistic recovery would address this problem by allowing all 
claimants with lung cancer to collect damages-at 90% of their total. The 
industry would thus pay the full costs of the injuries caused by its product, 
albeit not to the exact victims.524 
A smokers' compensation system could adopt another commonly 
recommended tool for simplifying the causal determinations as well: 
evidentiary presumptions.525 Garner, Ausness, and LeBel all propose 
presumptions of causation for certain diseases depending on the claimant's 
smoking history.526 Moreover, presumptions of causation figure prominently 
in many of the administrative schemes set up by the current federal law, 
including the Black Lung Benefits Program527 and the National Vaccine 
522. Our hypothetical estimate may be reasonably accurate, as 87% of all lung cancer deaths in 1 985 
were caused by smoking. Remington, supra note 5 14. Presumably, the percentage of smokers whose lung 
cancer deaths were due to smoking would be well over 90% given that the rate of lung cancer among 
smokers is approximately 20 times that of nonsmokers. Id. 
523. Some might argue that making even the broad probabilistic determinations would be infeasible. 
See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 492, at 962 (suggesting that the assumptions of scientific certainty underlying 
probabilistic recovery are "problematic"). Some in the scientific community, however, are more optimistic. 
Troyen Brennan and Robert Carter, for example, argue that probabilistic recovery comports with current 
scientific thought. Science no longer looks for absolute, deductive explanations of occurrences, they write, 
but allows for probabilities. See Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probllbility 
of Cllusation of Cllncer and Other Environmental Disellse in Individuals, to J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 
33, 39 ( 1 985). Brennan and Carter acknowledge the difficulty of establishing a statistically precise 
probability factor, but they believe that with epidemiological studies and expert testimony factfinders could 
generally "arrive at some good estimate of the probability of causation in the individual case." Id. at 58. 
524. David Rosenberg has argued that underdeterrence or overdetcrrence is the likely result in the 
absence of a probabilistic recovery. The reliance on statistical evidence typical of mass toxic cases-and 
smoking cases-means that a strong preponderance rule, requiring "'particularistic' proof' of causation us 
to the individual, bars all mass exposure claims. Rosenberg, supru note 52 1 ,  at 857-58. A weak 
preponderance rule, one that allows statistical proof of causation provided the risk at issue accounts for 
more than 50% of the total risk, would have the same result in nearly all cases, since the toxic risk rarely 
exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858. Rosenberg cites cigarette smoking us an exception to the rule 
that the excess risk rarely exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858 n.40. But Rosenberg compares the 
risk associated with smoking against a background risk of exposure to asbestos. See id. We expect that the 
excess risk of certain common tobacco-related diseases (such as heart disease) from smoking over a general 
background risk is likely to be less than 50%. In those cases in which the toxic risk is so great, "imposing 
full liability is no more desirable than denying liability altogether: to hold a defendant firm accountable not 
only for disease losses caused by its own tortious conduct, but also for those attributable to background 
risk, might inflict a 'crushing liability."' Id. at 858-59. 
525. Depending on the system, such presumptions could be rebuttable or irrcbuttable. Failure to satisfy 
the conditions of the presumption could bar compensable claims from being brought, or it could simply 
shift the burden of proving causation to the claimant. 
526. See Ausness, Compensation, supru note 48, at 1 1 27-28; Gamer, supru note 48, at 3 1 5 ;  LeBcl, 
supra note 505, at 490. Rabin proposes the use of presumptions in some mass toxic tort cases. See Rabin, 
supra note 492, at 960-6 I .  
527. See 3 0  U.S.C. § 92 1 (c) ( 1 994). 
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Injury Compensation Program.528 The use of presumptions would reduce the 
costly obstacles facing claimants. It would also expedite the claims process by 
avoiding redundant litigation of scientific evidence. Although these 
administrative-cost savings would come at the expense of additional deterrence, 
such a tradeoff may be desirable. 
ii .  Specific Causation 
If a claimant smoked only one brand of cigarette, establishing general 
causation would be sufficient. When the smoking-related injuries must be 
divided among multiple brands, however, a smokers' compensation system 
would need to allocate liability. Ausness and LeBel do not address this 
question; under each of their proposals, damages would be financed by excise 
taxes.529 Liability, therefore, would effectively be determined by market 
share. The Black Lung Benefits Program530 and the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program531 are similarly funded by taxes, with liability 
allocated according to market share rather than causal share. In this subsection, 
we identify five possible methods of allocating liability among cigarette 
manufacturers other than market-share liability. We begin with the least 
accurate and (probably) least expensive and move toward the most accurate 
and most expensive. In presenting these methods, we remain agnostic as to the 
proper tradeoff between accuracy and administrative costs; our goal is simply 
to highlight a few of the possible options. 
First, responsibility could be divided equally among the manufacturers that 
produced cigarettes smoked by the claimant. This method would be the easiest 
to administer, as it would require only the knowledge of which brands were 
smoked and some basic arithmetic.532 Moreover, it is at least one step better 
than an allocation based solely on market share in that only those companies 
that manufactured the particular smoker's cigarettes would pay for that 
smokers' harms. If consumers are reasonably brand loyal, then manufacturers 
of relatively safe cigarettes should thrive and competition for safety should 
emerge. Nevertheless, the nexus between causation and payment of damages 
would be fairly attenuated, reducing the beneficial incentive effects of the 
system. 
528. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 3  to - 1 4  ( 1 994). 
529. See Ausness, Compensation, supra note 48. at 1 1 25; LcBc:l. supra note: 505. at -193 
530. See 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (b)( I )  ( 1 994). 
53 1 .  See id. § 95 1 O(b ). 
532. Although we do not address the problem here, claimant' under a 'mokc:r's compc:ns,auon system 
may, depending on the nature of the program, have: an mccnuve to over..tate the amount that thc:y smoked 
and to lie about the brands of cigarettes that they 'moked. A 'moker"s compens,auon program should, 
therefore, be designed with that possibility in mind. We take up 1hat issue: more fully m Hanson et al., 
supra note 40. 
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Second, rather than dividing liability equally, a smokers' compensation 
system could prorate liability according to the length of time a smoker 
consumed each manufacturer's product. This method would require the 
factfinder to establish additional information, and would thus add to the 
administrative costs of the process. Pro rata liability, however, would represent 
an improvement over the equal allocation method inasmuch as it would 
allocate damages in a way that more closely approximated the harm done by 
the respective manufacturers. This approach, too, may have problems. For 
example, insofar as smokers systematically smoke disproportionately dangerous 
cigarettes for disproportionately short durations, this equal-allocation-by-time 
method would not create optimal ideal deterrence. To help address any such 
problem, this allocation system could be combined with a rebuttable 
presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous.533 Manufacturers of 
demonstrably safer cigarettes would be permitted to rebut that presumption, 
thereby reducing their shares of liability.534 
A third allocation system would involve estimating the number of 
cigarettes smoked of each brand. Doing so would further refine the allocation 
process, but at much greater cost. It may be that a smoker smokes a half-pack 
of Brand X every day for ten years. If that person moves on to Brand Y for 
another ten years, while also increasing consumption to a pack per day, she has 
smoked twice as many Brand Y cigarettes, though the time frame for each 
brand was the same. Recognizing this problem, Garner suggests the per 
number means of allocating liability, coupled with a rebuttable presumption 
that cigarettes are equally dangerous.535 
Fourth, it may be desirable to allocate the damages in some way other than 
purely on a pro rata basis.536 The allocation could, for example, be structured 
on a "winner-take-all" basis. Such a system could assume any number of 
forms. For instance, the manufacturer who produced the most cigarettes 
533. Similar presumptions might be employed with any of the options described in this subsection. 
That is, any of the proposed rules could simply be rebuttable presumptions. 
534. Although the administrative board may lack information to judge adequately the relative riskiness 
of cigarettes, manufacturers probably do not. By placing the burden on manufacturers, therefore, the 
presumption forces the well-informed manufacturer to inform the poorly informed regulator. Furthermore, 
it does so in a way that pits manufacturers against manufacturers in contrast to the current regime in which 
manufacturers have common incentives to maintain one simple story-that there is no proof that any brand 
of cigarettes causes cancer and that smoking cigarettes is not addictive. A code of silence in response to 
a presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous, however, is certainly not unimaginable given the 
industry's history, and would partially undermine the primary motivational impact of ex post incentive­
based regulation by sharply reducing care level considerations from manufacturing decisions. While this 
behavior would not be in individual companies' best interests, oligopolistic decisionmaking might prompt 
such action, particularly if the industry felt that the smokers' compensation system could be dismantled if 
it failed to produce results. Even were it the case that manufacturers could not manage to cooperate in that 
way, however, administrative regulators might not be sufficiently competent to sort out any informational 
disputes and competing claims among manufacturers. 
535. See Gamer, supra note 48. at 3 1 6- 1 7. 
536. For example, if most long-term smokers tend to smoke the relatively safe brands of cigarettes, 
then pro rata allocation would inefficiently penalize makers of the safe brands. 
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smoked by the claimant could bear all liability. Such a method would reduce 
the administrative costs associated with inter-manufacturer disputes. Or the 
company producing the first brand smoked could bear a disproportionate share 
of the liability. This "first-brand penalty" could be justified on the grounds that 
first brands create the addiction and that their toxins linger in a smoker's body 
for the greatest number of years. 537 
The final general approach to dealing with brand-specific harm would be 
to establish a danger quotient for each brand of cigarette. A science panel, for 
example, could create a formula that incorporated output factors believed to 
lead to disease and epidemiological regression analyses by brand. Based on 
testing, each brand of cigarette would be assigned a quotient indicating its 
danger. After allocating liability, the tribunal would adjust the amounts based 
on the relative danger quotient of the relevant brands. To refine the system 
further, the panel could establish various danger quotients for each brand with 
respect to different diseases. This approach has obvious deterrence benefits 
over the other approaches, but those benefits may be outweighed by the 
additional administrative cost. 
The information-forcing effect of ex post incentive-based liability would 
refine any of the methods suggested above over time.m Though all of these 
possibilities force tradeoffs between accurate causation measures and 
administrative costs, any of them could feasibly be implemented, depending on 
the resource constraints faced by adjudicators. Another factor in the choice 
between the methods we have suggested is our initial estimates of how 
individualized cigarette harms are: If we had good evidence that smoking 
behavior was highly variable across smokers or that different brands varied 
substantially in dangerousness, we would have good reason to invest more in 
individualized causation determinations. 
b. The Cigarette Card 
The list of five options for allocating liability discussed in the previous 
subsection is hardly exhaustive. Moreover. each option has many strengths and 
weaknesses that we are unable to discuss in this Article. Nevertheless. in this 
subsection we suggest a possible means of overcoming, or at least reducing. 
many of the likely problems that implementation of the above options would 
create. In this subsection, like the last, our discussion is only cursory and 
suggestive. 
537. If it turned out that smoking co,ls were not linear. hab1hl) could '"'lead be \\e1gh1ctl according 
to estimated marginal damage. If. for ell.ample. II tumc-d out that "nokmg for li'·e ) ear. "en: n:lau•dy 
harmless, and that the cigareues smoked between years "x and ten wen: mon: de.trucll\e, lhe 'Y'll=m might 
put greater liability on the manufacturers of tho'c br.md' 'moked bet\\een )ears "" and ten CJ mpru note 
442 (describing the typical assumption of econom1>l' that polluuon ha:. mcrca:.mg marginal c°'t'J 
538. See supra notes 457. 475, and accompanying text 
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One method of overcoming the difficult informational requirements of the 
allocation models described above is by enacting a requirement that anyone 
wanting to purchase cigarettes must first purchase a "cigarette card." The card, 
which could be based on the same magnetic strip (or computer chip) 
technology used for credit cards and ATM cards, would be issued to any legal­
aged smoker who wanted to buy cigarettes and would have to be presented by 
the smoker each time she purchased cigarettes. The card could keep track of 
a variety of potentially relevant risk factors, such as the number of packs 
purchased by the smoker, which brands the smoker purchased, and the 
smoker's age at the time of purchase. If that smoker were later to bring a 
claim against cigarette manufacturers, the smoker's cigarette card information 
could be used to help resolve many of the potentially difficult causal questions. 
Moreover, the new data could be used by epidemiologists and biostatisticians 
to expand what is known about the effects of smoking, the effects of different 
brands (or ingredient mixes within those brands), the effects of different 
smoking patterns, and so on. Using advanced statistical techniques, we could 
learn a great deal more about the effects of cigarettes; that learning, in turn, 
could be used to hone further the agency's causal determinations and 
ultimately affect manufacturer product design. 
A drawback of the cigarette card is that it would create significant 
administrative costs. But the costs of this proposal seem less significant in 
comparison to the costs that would be imposed by the variety of regulatory 
restrictions that the national tobacco settlement proposal envisages. For 
example, the proposal would: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Mandate minimum federal standards for a retail licensin§ rrogram 
that federal, state, and local authorities would enforce; 3 
Impose penalties, both civil and criminal, for violations of the 
licensure requirements;540 
Impose licensing fees on sellers to cover administrative costs of 
issuing licenses;541 
Set a minimum age of eighteen to purchase tobacco and require 
retailers to check the photo identification of anyone under twenty­
seven;542 
Ban all sales of tobacco products from vending machines; ban the 
sale of tobacco products from opened packages; establish a 
minimum package size of twenty cigarettes; ban the sampling of 
539. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 1 2. 
540. See id. app. II at 44. Selling tobacco products without a license, for example, would be a criminal 
violation punishable at the federal level with a minimum penalty for individuals of $ 1 000 or imprisonment 
for six months or both; and for corporations, with a maximum penalty of $50,000. State and local penalties 
could be more severe than these. See id. 
541 .  See id. at 1 3. 
542. See id. at 1 1 .  
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tobacco products; and ban the distribution of certain tobacco 
products through the mail.5�3 
Such provisions pose restrictions similar to those entailed by a cigarette card 
system. Issuing the cards and creating a system that would collect the data 
from the cards would create significant administrative costs. to be sure. but 
not, we suspect, overwhelming ones. 
The case for the card system is even stronger when one considers its other 
potential benefits. For example, the use of the card could assist in imposing 
age requirements on the purchase of cigarettes. That is, cards would be issued 
only to consumers who are otherwise legally allowed to buy cigarettes.� To 
appreciate the potential ways in which a cigarette card might be helpful to a 
cigarette seller, consider some of the "smart-card" technologies that institutions 
concerned with correctly identifying people are beginning to employ. Some 
companies are developing a card that is e.mbedded with a microchip containing 
detailed personal information.�5 Representatives of the biometrics industry 
report that still better means of identification verification are now available and 
will soon be widely used.�6 Biometricians are deve:0ping better and cheaper 
ways of using unique human characteristics, such as fingerprints, hand prints, 
facial imaging, or retina patterns, to identify people.�' As the technologies 
i mprove and costs decrease, the benefits of a "smart" cigarette card. measured 
purely in terms of preventing underage smokers from buying cigarettes. could 
well overwhelm the costs of the system. 
There is a related potential benefit of a cigarette card. Any regulatory 
regime that prohibits underage smokers from buying cigarettes, and that has 
the effect of raising cigarette prices, will give rise to black market forces that 
543. See id. at 1 1 - 1 2. 
544. The idea of an identification card 10 as>1>! retai ler.. m avoiding ..:lhng 10 underage con>umer.. " 
nothing new. British politicians are currently com1dcnng whether na11onal 1den111y card> >hould be 1s..ucd 
in order 10 "stem the soaring crime rate and prevent minor; buying c1garcllc> and alcohol •· Helen Arnold. 
Mistaken Identity: Identity Cards, SUPER MARKETI1'G. Sept. 6. 1 996. al 20. MorcoH:r. 16 European 
countries already have identity card policies. I 0 of which arc mandatory. See id. ll1e grcate>l advantage 
of !he cards in those countries is that they provide credible photo 1den11fica11on of con>umer> Such earth 
would represent less of an advance in the United Stale>. howe,cr. ma.much a> photo 1denutica11on " 
widely held by consumers in the form of a dnvcr'> hcen..:. 
545. See Stephen Lynch, Life 011 the Li11e: Ba11k111g 011 ATM Cards. OKA!>.GE Cot ''TY REG !Cal J. Feb 
2, 1 997, at K8. A 256-byte memo!)' chip card " being u>ed. for e�amplc. m German)· '> health care .y>tcm 
See Dr. Otfrid P. Schaefer, /11troductio11 of Clup Tecluwlog_v to Healrhrn� 111 Gemwrn I' 1.iled July 22. 
1 997) <http://www.smartcard.co.uk/health.html>. The card comam> mform:mon >Uch a. the m>ured'> name. 
address, date of birth, status, the name of the m.urJnce provider. and the exp1ra11on dale ol the m>urance 
See id. For now, the primary goal of the chip card J> 10 lo\\er adm1m>trall\ e cost>. but the technology " 
also being developed to assi>! the heahh care >Y>lem m d1agno>mg and 1rca11ng 1 1lne>> Su 1d 
546. See Geoff Nairn, The Key to Your Jdem1rr Fallmg Cosrs Will Allow Fmgaprmr \'en/1carw11 To 
Be Widely Used, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 1 5. 1 997. at 12 .  
547. See id. ; see also Evan Perez. Changing rhe Face of Sernnn· S1·sre11u, CO\!. APPF.AL l�lemph1-. 
Tenn.), Jan. 2 1 ,  1 996, at 3C (describing a facial imaging >Y>lem that .. UM:> your face a> the key 10 accos 
automated teller machines and office building>. or check the 1den111y of \\clfarc rcc1p1ent� and computer 
network users"). 
1 294 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07:  1 1 63 
could undermine the goal of the regulation.548 The card could be used to 
assist in preventing or reducing black market cigarette consumption and 
production. It could, for instance, be utilized to limit the number of packs of 
cigarettes that any one smoker would be permitted to purchase over a given 
time period. If it were empirically determined that no individual smokes more 
than three packs per day, for example, then that maximum could form the basis 
of a buying cap for the month. To be sure, the adult might sell each of the 
ninety packs per month, but the adult would not be able to sell more than that 
amount. Moreover, the cigarettes would be purchased at the full, regulated 
price. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how a profit could be made by reselling 
those cigarettes, unless underage smokers not allowed to purchase cigarettes 
legally were willing and able to pay more than the fully internalized price. But 
such a possibility seems remote.549 On a more extreme level, anyone found 
carrying cigarettes that could not be accounted for on their cigarette cards 
could be subject to criminal penalties-analogous to the open-container laws 
in many states. 
The card could also assist individual smokers' efforts to quit smoking. 
That is, a smoker could ask to have self-imposed limits on her card that would 
prevent her from purchasing more than a specified number of cigarettes over 
a specified time period. Thus, the card could serve as a personal hand-tying 
technology for those smokers who want to cut down or ultimately to quit but, 
absent such a tool, have great difficulty doing so.55° Finally, the card could 
be used to help eliminate the alleged "positive externality" associated with 
smoking. With the card as a measure of people's conduct, pension plans could 
more easily charge less to smokers. 
Although the potential advantages of a cigarette card may be enormous, 
we have thus far ignored a difficult to quantify, but nevertheless real, cost. A 
reaction of many readers may well be that our proposal gives too much 
information to governmental agencies, therefore creating a "Big Brother" 
problem. We sympathize with that concern, but we believe the problem is not 
as significant as it may initially appear. First, it is not clear that the sort of 
information that the cigarette card system would generate is any different from 
the sort of information that the American public already routinely provides to 
governmental and private agencies. In other words, it may be too late to worry 
about the sort of privacy concerns that this proposal raises.551 Moreover, to 
548. See infra Subsection V.B.2. 
549. The cap, whether it be three packs a day or four or whatever, would be set at a high enough level 
that the cap itself would not create a demand for black market cigarettes. 
550. Cf supra text accompanying notes 1 90- 1 97 (describing smokers' common, but largely ineffective, 
hand-tying strategies). 
551 .  As one writer put it recently, "Stored in computer databases around the country arc profiles 
detailing what you buy at the grocery, where you spend your money, how much you paid for your home. 
Your medical condition. Your credit card and Soci�l Security numbers. Almost every trait lhat makes you, 
well, you." Sandy Smith, Instant Access, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 1 0, 1 996, at I F. 
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the extent that the "Big Brother" problem associated with the cigarette card 
system is viewed as extraordinary, the system could be tailored to reduce or 
eliminate the concern. For example, the means of identification could be 
selected so as to reduce the amount of information that would be kept 
centrally, information that might otherwise be used or misused against the 
consumers who use the cards.552 Further, Congress could create very strict 
controls and limits on what can be done with the information that is obtained 
through the program. 
Despite such modifications, some might object to any regulatory system 
that keeps track of who is buying cigarettes. To that very basic criticism, we 
have two responses. First, we suspect that, for some, it is motivated in part by 
a kind of status quo bias. Consider a different reference point-something 
other than the regulation of a currently unregulated product, such as the 
decriminalization of some currently illegal product (for example, heroin). If we 
were to lift the ban on such a product, the idea of imposing heavy point-of-sale 
regulation, including the collection of information regarding who is purchasing 
how much of the product, might not seem so extraordinary. Indeed, such issues 
would presumably be considered an essential part of any proposal to legalize 
a currently illegal drug. Second, for those still opposed in principle to 
mandatory regimes of this sort, we offer the possibility that the scheme could 
be voluntary. Those who wanted to use the card without having data collected 
regarding their purchases could do so. though at some cost. For instance, they 
might not be able to enjoy any of the ex ante savings to which they might 
otherwise be entitled through their pension plans. Similarly, they might be 
disallowed from collecting damages from the system for any smoking-related 
illness or injury that they experienced. 
c. Damages 
Assuming a claimant proves causation, how much should that person 
receive? There are two general sorts of losses that might be compensated, 
economic losses and intangible losses. Taking deterrence as our only goal. an 
ideal smokers' compensation scheme would, at least in an abstract world 
resembling an economist's model, award full compensation for both economic 
and noneconomic harms caused by cigarettes. In the real world, however, the 
picture is clouded by a number of complicating political and administrative 
considerations. In our forthcoming article (with Michael Zamore),551 we will 
lay out some of those factors and their implications for the types of injuries 
that should be compensable and the extent of compensation. For now, we 
552. For instance, representatives of manufacturer.. de' eloping tcchnologu:' for accurate: lingc:rpnnt 
verification claim that the data they collect cannot be nmu,c:d bccau� tingc:rpnnt> cannot be: gc:nc:ratc:d 
from the stored data. See Nairn, supra note 546, at 1 2. 
553. See Hanson et al., supra note 40. 
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simply want to avoid any potential confusion by reemphasizing that the $7.00 
per pack figure that we came up with in Part III does not represent an accurate 
measure of the cost of cigarettes. Moreover, we do not take that figure to 
represent an approximate measure of the damages that would be paid by 
manufacturers under a smokers' compensation system.554 
3. Summary 
In this section, we have explored two possible ex post incentive-based 
regulatory systems. One uses the traditional court-based tort model as its 
starting point; the other looks to workers' compensation as a model. Either 
type of system may be able to avoid many of the problems with conventional 
regulatory responses to market failures, particularly if the information gathering 
necessary to make the system work were enabled by something like the 
cigarette card. We now tum to a discussion of the effects of an ex post 
incentive-based regime on the behavior of cigarette producers and consumers. 
B. What Might the Cigarette Market Look Like in a World with Ex Post 
Incentive-Based Regulation? 
1 .  Safer Cigarettes and Safer Smokers 
If an ex post incentive-based approach-whether it be on the enterprise 
liability or smokers' compensation model-were to be successfully 
implemented, what might the cigarette market look like? There are many 
possible outcomes, and we do not pretend to be able to predict with any 
certainty which one would occur. Still, we can speculate about some of the 
possibilities. For example, if we assume that cigarettes can indeed be made 
substantially safer than they currently are, the cigarette market might look very 
different from its current form.555 Manufacturers would have an incentive to 
achieve the optimal mix of care levels (that is, investments in safer cigarette 
designs) and activity levels, which would be regulated through the price 
charged per pack. If the full costs of cigarettes were imposed on 
manufacturers, they might discover that the best means of achieving optimal 
product safety includes any of the following: 
• Substantially reducing nicotine levels in cigarettes so as to reduce 
the lifetime amount of smoking by any given individual (that is, 
to allow smokers to quit more easily) while also reducing 
554. Cf. infra note 579 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate measure of damages that 
cigarette manufacturers should pay). 
555. For an illuminating recent attempt to imagine what may come of the emerging market in cigarette 
substitutes, see Warner et al., supra note 1 06, at I 088-9 1 .  
1 998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 297 
somewhat the levels of carcinogens and other dangerous 
substances found in cigarettes; 
• Alternatively, substantially i11creasi11g nicotine levels, and 
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, to get the same result;556 
• Substantially reducing or eliminating the carcinogens and other 
harmful ingredients while only moderately reducing (or 
increasing) the level of nicotine; 
• Moderately reducing (or increasing) nicotine levels and 
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, but marketing cigarettes 
only to people over a particular age. Then, after a number of 
years, offering to help those smokers stop smoking or switch to 
some even less dangerous alternative "nicotine-delivery system"; 
or 
• Developing a nicotine-free tobacco product (which, because of its 
lack of nicotine and relatively high price, consumers would use 
only sparingly) and producing an alternative, nontobacco, 
nicotine-delivery system that would be sold in high quantities and 
at low prices. 
Which variant of those approaches manufacturers would pursue depends on a 
number of factors-such as the cost of developing technologies for removing 
nicotine and carcinogens from tobacco, the cost of developing alternative 
nicotine-delivery systems, and the effect on consumer demand of any change 
in cigarette design. Under an ex post incentive-based approach, the parties with 
the best information on all of those questions-the tobacco industry-would 
be given the incentives to make the right choices. 
In addition to giving manufacturers incentives to choose the optimally safe 
cigarette design, an ex post incentive-based regime would give them incentives 
to market cigarettes to those consumers who are less likely to suffer long-term 
harm from smoking. For example, given that smokers who start at a very 
young age are significantly more likely to suffer the Jong-term health effects 
of smoking,557 manufacturers might well stop marketing their cigarettes to 
younger consumers. Indeed, they may even make substantial investments in 
preventing underage smoking. 
If we combine both of these possibilities-safer cigarettes (whether they 
be less carcinogenic or less addictive or both) and safer smokers-we can 
imagine an ex post incentive-based regime dramatically reducing the costs 
imposed on society by cigarette smoking. Another, less likely possibility is that 
cigarettes simply cannot be made significantly safer and cannot be marketed 
in a way that is significantly safer than they currently are. If that were the 
case, even after the industry was forced to bear the full costs of smoking for 
some time, then the final outcome of an ex post incentive-based approach 
556. It might be that fewer cigareues overall would be >moked 1f each c1gan:uc provided more. ra1hcr 
than less, of the nicotine smokers crave. 
557. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra nolc 3. al 4-1, -15 fig.3 
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might be either that all cigarettes would be incredibly expensive (and thus 
consumed only by the wealthy, unless subsidized by the government) or that 
cigarettes would be priced out of the "legal" market entirely. In either case, the 
main remaining regulatory concern would be how best to deal with the black 
market for low-priced cigarettes. 
2. Black Market Cigarettes 
Some readers may be concerned that an ex post incentive-based regime 
would create a large black market in unregulated cigarettes. When cigarette 
prices rise once the full costs of smoking are imposed on manufacturers, there 
will be strong market incentives for someone to produce and sell illegal 
cigarettes that undercut those prices. For a number of reasons, we regard it as 
unlikely that an ex post incentive-based system would substantially increase 
black market concerns. 
First of all, we should note that the potential for black market effects does 
not distinguish ex post incentive-based regulation from any other type of 
regulation. That is to say, any serious effort to regulate the market for 
cigarettes through command-and-control regulation would suffer from black 
market problems at least to the same extent as ex post incentive-based 
regulation would. In addition, depending on what we mean by "black market" 
cigarettes, an argument can be made that an ex post incentive-based system 
would reduce rather than increase black market concerns as compared with the 
status quo. For example, all underage smoking today arguably involves black 
market transactions, given that there are laws against selling cigarettes to 
underage smokers. If that is the relevant black market, we suspect that shifting 
to an ex post incentive-based regime would substantially reduce rather than 
increase the black market. Given that illegal cigarettes under our regime would 
likely be more expensive than under the current system, there would likely be 
far fewer underage smokers. Similarly, under an incentive-based regulatory 
regime, manufacturers' incentives would change dramatically. Whereas 
manufacturers under the current regime have many reasons to encourage, and 
no reason to discourage, the sale of their cigarettes to underage smokers,558 
manufacturers under an incentive-based regime would have a strong incentive 
to ensure that purchasers of their cigarettes pay the full price so as to fund 
potential future damages claims. They would, in other words, seek to 
discourage black markets from emerging. Moreover, the threat of a black 
558. Cf John Schwartz, '73 RJR Memo Sought Youth Market, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.). Oct. 
4, 1 995, at A 1 (describing one manufacturer's considered strategy to attract young smokers). For similar 
reasons, tobacco manufacturers have an incentive to sell their cigarettes on black markets in other countries. 
See Raymond Bonner & Christopher Drew, Cigarelle Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in Smuggling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1 997, at A5 ; Cigareue Smuggling Probe Eyeing Employees at RJR, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
23, 1 997, at A5. 
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market would increase manufacturers' incentives to design and market safer 
cigarettes with lower total costs. Such cigarettes could be sold at a lower price 
and could therefore eliminate some of the profit that would otherwise sustain 
a black market. 
Perhaps the black market concern is not the effect on underage smoking 
but instead the effect of black market cigarettes on the efficacy of the ex post 
regulatory regime itself. On this view, the black market in question is the sale 
of c igarettes by companies that somehow expect to be able to avoid ex post 
liability for the harms caused by their cigarettes. If avoiding liability is 
possible, companies who expect to avoid liability would be able to undercut 
the prices charged by companies who participate in the system and who expect 
to pay their share of costs. As a result, the black market of unregulated 
cigarettes would grow and the legal, fully internalized market would shrink. 
How would manufacturers go about avoiding liability for the costs of their 
brands? For one thing, they might try to disguise the brand of cigarette they 
are selling (for example, by arranging to sell their cigarettes under a "front" 
brand name owned by a shell corporation of some sort, perhaps a foreign 
subsidiary), making it difficult to be identified. S imilarly, they might engage 
in a version of "hit and run"-that is, selling cigarettes for a number of years, 
pocketing the profits, and then leaving the market before the health effects of 
that brand begin to manifest themselves. 
Those types of black market concerns may not pose an insurmountable 
problem for ex post incentive-based regulation. First, both types of black 
market concerns are limited by the fact that consumers tend to be quite brand 
loyal559 and that entry into the cigarette market has long been notoriously 
difficult.560 Manufactures may be unable to create significant demand for a 
new brand of cigarette in time to profit from that cigarette before removing it 
from the market. And insofar as there would remain a brand-disguising 
problem, the obvious solution would be to monitor the major cigarette 
manufacturers closely (perhaps even to audit them continuously) to keep track 
of what brands they were selling and what revenues they were receiving from 
those sales and then to impose stiff criminal penalties on companies (that is, 
on management) for attempting to disguise brands.561 The hit-and-run 
559. See supra note 5 1 5  and accompanying texL 
560. See Howell et al.. supra note 254. at 9 (""The bamers con"'t pnmanl) of 1he m�'"e a<lvertmng 
expenditures necessary to achieve some level of brand recogmuon and the huge capnal e'pendnures 
necessary to achieve the production efficiency 'cale enjoyed b) lhe '1x major domesuc c1gan:tte 
manufacturers."). 
561 .  In countries 01her than the Uni1ed Slate,, 1hc pnnc1pal blacl. market concern appears to be the 
smuggling of i llegal cigarettes into 1he country. often from 1he United S1a1e,. Su Bonner & Dn:w. supra 
note 558. Given the sheer size and markel dominance of 1hc U S. cigarette manufac1urers � compared w11h 
foreign manufacturers, domesucally produced blacl. marl.el cigarette' .eem more hl..ely 1han foreign-made 
black market cigarettes. After 1he 1mpo"11on of a 'Incl ex po,1 mcenuve-� n:g1mc on domes11c 
manufacturers, however, there would be an mcrc:i.ed mcen11vc for foreign manufac1urers 10 sell lhcir 
cigarettes in the United States insofar a. 1ho'e compamc' m1gh1 expect 10 a'o1d hab1hl) for 1he harms 
1 300 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63 
concern, on the other hand, presents the issue of "judgment-proof' 
manufacturers and retroactivity, issues that are discussed below.562 Basically, 
to deter hit-and-run cigarette manufacturers, liability must somehow be 
imposed on those companies, perhaps even on their shareholders, for the harms 
their cigarettes have caused. Manufacturers could be required either to post a 
bond or purchase full liability insurance coverage.563 In addition, it may be 
possible to tie the amount of compensation that would be provided through the 
smokers' compensation program to the number of legal cigarettes smoked by 
each individual claimant.564 If so, then consumers themselves might be given 
some incentive to eschew lower-priced black market alternatives. Such a 
solution, although partial, would be responsive to all potential sources of black 
markets. 
Finally, note that the concern about black markets in cigarettes is in part 
motivated by the memory of Prohibition. The Prohibition analogy, however, 
is inapt. Cigarettes and alcohol are different in a number of important ways. 
To give one example, the production of low-cost alcoholic beverages can be 
accomplished on a reasonably small scale. Indeed, many people brew their own 
beer today, long after Prohibition's end. It is quite difficult (for us anyway) to 
imagine a substantial number of consumers being able to raise enough tobacco 
and manufacture enough cigarettes to be able to sustain even their own one-, 
two-, or three-pack-a-day smoking habits. Indeed, the work and money that 
such an operation would require would make buying the legal and regulated 
cigarettes (or just quitting smoking) attractive alternatives.565 In addition, 
cigarettes do not provide the intoxicating effects that help to explain the 
demand for alcohol and marijuana (even among those not addicted to them). 
If policymakers are nevertheless concerned about the potential of 
incentive-based regulation to create a black market, they could respond by 
reducing the amount of the ex post fine imposed on the manufacturers. This 
would, of course, come at the expense of some deterrence; such is the tradeoff 
necessary to determine how much, if at all, to reduce the payments. Moreover, 
so long as the relative costs imposed on each manufacturer varied according 
to the relative social costs caused by that manufacturer's brand, some of the 
care level and activity level deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based 
caused by their cigarettes. That problem is no different from the general issue of how to impose domestic 
product safety regulations (and products liability laws) on imported goods. Moreover, because under our 
proposed regime the giant domestic manufacturers would be hurt competitively by the lower prices of 
illegally smuggled cigarettes, they would have an incentive to assist in monitoring and preventing not only 
illegal smuggling of foreign cigarettes, but also illegal home-grown cigarette production. 
562. See infra Subsection V.C.2. 
563. See infra text accompanying notes 595-600. 
564. Such a program would be reasonably simple to implement, for example, if the cigarette card were 
adopted. See supra Subsection V.A.2.b. 
565. It might be argued that the widespread availability and use of marijuana is strong evidence that 
a black market in cigarettes would emerge. Many people do grow and smoke their own marijuana. But a 
marijuana smoker needs relatively little to satisfy her, unlike an addicted cigarette smoker. 
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regulation would be retained, even i f  the total amount o f  damages imposed on 
each manufacturer would be less than the total costs of that manufacturer's 
brand.566 
C. The Problem of Transition and the Case for S11ppleme11rary 
Ex Ante Regulation 
To this point, we have focused mostly on the disadvantages of command­
and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based regulation and on 
the advantages of ex post incentive-based regulation-with special emphasis 
on the advantages of victim-initiated ex post approaches. Now we consider the 
principal complaints about ex post regulation. The first is essentially a 
transition question. The other three problems would present themselves even 
after the transition had been made to the new regime. In the process of 
discussing these potential problems, we identify the circumstances in which 
such a regime might benefit from being supplemented with (though not 
replaced by) command-and-control or performance-based regulations. 
1 .  Making the Transition to Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation: 
The Retroactivity Question 
Even if we decide to adopt some type of ex post incentive-based regulation 
of cigarettes, how to make the transition to su1.h a regime will present 
significant issues of implementation. The biggest transition question is to what 
extent we should impose on cigarette makers the costs of past cigarette 
smoking-that is, smoking that occurred before the adoption of the new 
regime. Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article, we summarize the issue briefly here. 
One way of putting the question is this: To what extent should cigarette 
companies be made retroactively liable today and in the future for the hanns of 
past smoking? Surprisingly little has been written on the retroactivity questionS67 
566. If the cigarette card were adopted, there would be add1t1onal means of m1mn11zmg black. manets. 
See supra text accompanying notes 548-549. 
567. Defining the concept of ""retroact1vity"' in th1' context involves an clement of arb1tranncs,; For 
instance, retroactivity could mean applying the new regulatory regime to all c1garctte-causcd hanns that arc 
manifested after the regime i' enacted, even if tho'e harm' were cau� by c1garcttcs that wen: purchased 
and consumed before the new regime w� adoptL"d. That ver..1on of retroact1\'lt)' could =ult in payment• 
being made by manufacturer.. for harm' who'e 'ymptom' become apparent many ye� after the exposurc 
that gave rise to those harms. Alternatively. we could be 'omew hat ••Jes, .. retroocuve by n:qumng that the 
exposure have occurred within some 'ct period before the adoption of the new rcg1me Or we could go m 
the opposite direction, even further back in time. and apply the new rcg1me to all harrru. ever caused by 
cigarettes, even those harms that occurred and were manifested Jong before the regime w� adopted. but 
for which the statute of limitations h� not yet run. Of cou=. e\en the choice of a urne lmlll for the •tatutc 
of limitations is arbitrary. Finally. one could unagme a "completely" retroactive \·er..1on of ex post 
incentive-based regulation that would apply to all harm' ever cau�d by c1garencs. e\en for c= m which 
the statute of limitations has run and the victim j, Jong "nee dead. All of tho� option' nught reasonably 
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in the specific context of cigarettes,568 although that may change as Congress 
begins to focus more closely on the issue. One of the few scholars to have 
written on the topic, Gary Schwartz, has argued that applying a rule of 
absolute manufacturer liability retroactively in the cigarette context would have 
no beneficial deterrence effects and would instead have the negative 
consequence of bankrupting the tobacco industry. He acknowledges that 
prospective absolute cigarette-manufacturer liability (that is, liability only for 
harms caused by cigarettes produced after the adoption of the new rule) might 
have some deterrence benefits.569 But, he argues, there would be no 
additional deterrence benefits to applying the rule retroactively.570 Indeed, he 
argues that applying absolute liability retroactively would only destroy the 
cigarette industry, thus eliminating future cigarette sales as a potential source 
of compensation for those harmed by smoking.571 
We have two general responses to Schwartz's conclusions. First, he seems 
to ignore the deterrence benefits of the precedent that would be set for other 
industries. The precedent would be that in circumstances such as this-when 
it is determined that a product causes an enormous level of externalized 
harm-the manufacturers of that product will be forced to internalize those 
costs, even if those costs occurred in the past. If the government could adopt 
such a rule, and could credibly commit to apply it to all future situations that 
fall within the scope of the rule, the effect would be to force manufacturers to 
take into account the full social costs caused by their products.572 
be called retroactive. Where one chooses to draw the retroactivity line will depend on issues of practicality. 
We do not attempt to defend one of these versions of retroactivity over the others in this Article, though 
we would probably agree that the practical problems associated with the most extreme versions of 
retroactivity outweigh whatever benefits those approaches might provide. 
568. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Ausness, Cigarel/e Company Liability, s11pra nole 48, al 
950-52 (discussing the retroactive liability of the industry in the context of the failure-to-warn cause of 
action). 
569. See Schwartz, s11pra note 28, at 1 57. 
570. See id. 
57 1 .  See id. ; see also Gary T. Schwartz, New Prod11cts, Old Prod11cts, Evolving Law, Retroactive u11v, 
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 825 ( 1 983) (arguing that applying strict products liability for harms caused by 
products manufactured in the past has no deterrence benefits). 
572. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 527-35 
( 1 986). Kaplow was the first to provide a detailed argument for the proposition that, in all situations 
involving legal transitions, there is a strong efficiency argument favoring full retroactivity. See id. at 6 1 5-
1 6. One way of putting the argument is that uncertainty about future government policy is no different from 
market risks of various sorts. Because we generally allow market risks to be allocated through private risk· 
transfer and risk-sharing arrangements, we should do so as well with respect to government risk, unless 
there is a good argument for doing otherwise. That would mean no special transition relief to protect parties 
from the effects of changes in government policy. See id. at 550-66. Kaplow's analysis applies to all legal 
transitions; shifts in common law tort rules are but one example that he discusses in particular. See icl. at 
598-600. 
As Kaplow points out, however. his thesis explicitly relies on a number of important assumptions. 
See, e.g., id. at 520-21 (stating his assumptions that the transition policy was well-known in advance and 
will be followed consistently in the future, that the reforms themselves arc desirable, and that substantive 
policy decisions are not themselves affected by the choice of transition policy). In addition, throughout most 
of his efficiency analysis, Kaplow assumes away a number of "institutional concerns" that could serve as 
justifications for transition relief in some conlexts. See id. at 566-76 (relaxing some of those assumplions 
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The principal incentive benefit of applying our proposed ex post incentive­
based regime retroactively would not be the effects on the tobacco industry 
itself, but the effects on nonrobacco industries that are watching the handling 
of the tobacco situation by Congress and the courts. A decision in the tobacco 
case to apply the new regime retroactively would send a message to 
nontobacco product manufacturers. The message would be something like the 
following: "If you manufacturer a product that is someday discovered to 
produce anything like the external harm caused by cigarettes, this could happen 
to you too."573 Given the existence of uncertainty regarding whether their 
particular products might become subject to significant government regulation, 
all product manufacturers would have a greater incentive to make optimal 
investments in product safety and to charge the appropriate price for their 
products.574 
It may be, of course, that how the proposed incentive-based regime treats 
the harms of past smoking will not be taken as a precedent for how other 
industries will be treated. It may be, for example, that the circumstances in the 
cigarette context are sufficiently unusual as to blunt any deterrent message for 
nontobacco industries. On the other hand, it may be that, precisely because the 
cigarette industry is involved-with all of its lobbying clout-the deterrent 
message to other industries would be especially strong. Again, this is a very 
complex issue, and we do not attempt to resolve it here. As a practical matter. 
however, even if our handling of the transition issue in the cigarette context 
were to provide some precedential effect, we would not advocate trying to 
impose all of the past harms of cigarette smoking on cigarette 
manufacturers.575 Nevertheless, it is of critical importance-for incentive 
and suggesting that future analyses of legal 1ran>1t1on> 'hould focus on 'uch m>lltuuonal concern') 
573. Cf id. at 599-600 (describing the mcenll\e benefit> of applymg e\O)\ lng ton law pnnc1pb 
retroactively in the product coniext). 
574. That these incentives would be effic1en1 a.sume>. of cour>e. that the regulatory >h1ft-1oward c\ 
post incentive-based regulation-is a move m the cflic1en1 d1recuon. If "e grant that a....ump11on. Kaplow 
would seem to reach the same conclusion a> we do-at lea.I regarding a >h1f1 from no rcgulauon to a 
system of victim-initiated ex post incentive-ba>ed regulation >Uch as enterpn..: hab1h1y 
Common law evolution of ton doctrine . . .  'eem' be't ..:rved by a uan>1l1on pohcy providing 
no relief or mitigation for past inve>tmcnis and acuon' The cconon11c amily''' of mccnll\ c. 
presented . . . suggests that such a pohcy would promote efficiency. and the addlllonal 
consideration of market imperfecuons and '"'tllut1onal factor> doo not appear to " arrant a 
contrary conclusion. 
Id. at 602 (footnote omitted). I f, however. the anuc1pa1cd >h1f1 in regulatory regime. " thought 10 be 
inefficient, the optimal transition rule would be " hate\ er mo'l mh1b11,, and min1m1z<:!> the effects of. the 
shift. See id. at 521 .  Given, therefore. that the dc>1r.1b1hty of a retroacll\e tran>ll1on pohcy depend> on the 
desirability of the proposed change. the 1mt1al dctenmnauon that the nc\\ rule " 'upcnor to the old rule 
assumes added imponance. 
575. See supra note 567 ('ugge,ting that we ,hould not adopt the mo't extreme. 1 e . m0>1 back.ward 
looking, definition of retroactivity). To get a rough 'en'e of the 'taggenng >1ZC of the ham1 .:au..:d by 
smoking over the year>, the following thought cxpcmncnt might be helpful. We calculated rnpm Table I 
the full social cost of a pack of cigarette' at the current lcveb of production 10 be nearly S7 00 
Approximately 24 billion pacb of cigarette' are 'old m the United Stale> each ) car Sa Tobacco 
Settlement Hearings, supra note 442 ('tatemcni of Jeffrey Ham>) TI1a1 amount. to S l 68 b1lhon m cost. 
per year. If we took just the past ten years of c1garene con,umpuon. then. and a....umcd that cigarette 
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reasons-that we impose at least some of those costs on the manufacturers, in 
addition to a substantial portion of future costs. That is, without an effort to 
impose some of the past harms on cigarette companies, the promise to apply 
such a transition policy on other, future cases loses credibility.576 
Schwartz's second objection to holding cigarette companies retroactively 
liable involves the likelihood of the industry's bankruptcy.577 At least from 
a theoretical deterrence perspective, however, that possibility is not an obvious 
problem. In fact, the eventual bankruptcy of the current cigarette companies 
may be necessary in order to produce the sort of deterrence effect for other 
industries that we just described. That is, if existing cigarette companies simply 
do not have sufficient assets to cover the liability that is imposed on them by 
the new ex post incentive-based regime, those companies should probably be 
forced out of business. If the demand for cigarettes after the shift to an ex post 
incentive-based regulatory regime is sufficient to maintain the market for 
cigarettes notwithstanding the increase in prices, the bankruptcy of the current 
companies would mean only a change in ownership of those companies. The 
change in ownership might be from the current shareholders to the claimants 
(that is, the smoking victims) themselves. Or it might be from the current 
owners to some new group of investors. Either way, such a result would have 
the beneficial effect of sending a message to stakeholders in other industries 
that they run the risk of losing the entire value of their investment if their 
product is found to have caused large-scale harm for many years.578 
Whether the current bankruptcy laws are the most efficient way of dealing 
with companies that become insolvent is a separate question on which we do 
not here take a position. The relevant question instead is whether there should 
production in the United States has remained roughly constant over that time, that would amount to $ 1 .68 
trillion of costs. Trying to shift an amount that large from one set of parties in our economy (i.e., the 
cigarette manufacturers, their shareholders and creditors, their insurers, and their employees) to another set 
(i.e., smokers, families of smokers, first-party insurers of smokers, and the like) would present insuperable 
judgment-proof problems as well as administrative problems. In any event, it seems clear that a /11//y 
retroactive shift to ex post incentive-based regulation is simply not a politically practical possibility. 
576. Interestingly, notwithstanding his arguments against holding cigarette makers liable retroactively, 
Schwartz would not seem to have "fairness" qualms with doing so. For example, he observes both that the 
evolution in tort law toward enterprise liability has been much more gradual than some commentators have 
suggested (such that expansion of liability to include product manufacturers could hardly have caught 
product manufacturers entirely by surprise), see Schwartz, supra note 57 1 ,  at 797-8 1 1 , and that judicial 
decisions in tort cases have almost always been (and generally continue to be) applied retroactively, see 
id. at 8 1 6- 1 7. Thus Schwartz certainly does not view retroactive application of products liability Jaw 
generally as unfair. See id. at 8 I 9 ("[M]ost of the retroactivity implicit in product liability opinions is not 
vulnerable to the charge of having subverted justified reliance."). 
577. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 57 ("A rule of absolute liability, to the extent that it is applied 
retroactively . . .  would quickly wipe out all existing cigarette companies."). 
578. It is conceivable that this possibility has already been taken into account ex ante by inveMors in 
cigarette companies, in which case the relatively low prices that they paid for their shares (nnd the 
relatively high returns they have enjoyed in the meantime) were compensation for the likelihood of the 
outcome that we are recommending. One reason, however, that the market may not have capitalized this 
risk into the price of cigarette shares is that investors may have been (and may still be) betting on the 
extraordinary political clout of the cigarette industry. See supra note 1 1 .  
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be some additional protection, besides the normal bankruptcy laws, for 
companies whose largest liabilities happen to result from ex post inccntive­
based damage payments (such as products liability claims). We sec no obvious 
deterrence reason that such special protection would be warranted. 
Of course, political reality may require that, for any new regulawry regime 
to be adopted, some protection must be given to the existing cigarette 
companies. If that is so, an ex post incentive-based regime could be adjusted 
to accommodate that aim. For example, the damages assessed against 
manufacturers could be reduced to the amount necessary to avoid the 
companies' bankruptcy. One could ask how much the existing domestic 
cigarette companies could afford to pay and still stay in busincss.n9 So long 
as, within the appropriate annual cap, each manufacturer paid its relative share 
(based not only on its market share but also on the relative harm caused by 
that company's brands), the deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based 
regulation could still be achieved. 
Perhaps, however, the bankruptcy concern is that, if the tobacco industry 
were put out of business, we would lose the principal source of revenues for 
579. Some have suggested that 1he maximum amount "ould be: S7 6 billion per yc.ir. which 
approximates the industry's current annual profil, Su Jeffrey E. Ham,. Amt'nw11 C.gur<'ll<' 
Manufacturers' Ability To Pay Damages: 01·en·1<'11' und t1 Rough Ct1lrnlu11011, 5 TOllACTO CO,lltOL 292. 
292 ( 1 996). As Professor Harris ha. observed. however. S7 .6 b1lhon drarnaucally undcr,1<110 " hal lhc 
industry could afford. Moreover, he 'how' that. 10 am\c al an accurate C>llrnalc of the rndu>try's real 
ability to pay. we must take into account lhc indu'tl) \ ab1lny lo r.u-e 11.!> pnco in roporu.e 10 1h1• nc" 
liability. See id. According lo Harri.\ rough calcul.it10n,, the ··monopoly profiHna"unmng pncc of 
cigarettes in the United States is currently about S4 per pad. Al •uch a pnce. annual pre-tax prolih would 
exceed $32 billion annually." Id. These calculauon' arc ba-ed on a»urnpuon' about the 'hape> of 
consumers' demand curves for cigarettes and on the a.'ump11on that the CX1'llng domc,uc pro<luccn would 
not face competition from new market entr.mt,. See 1d. at 293 If the new regime allowc:<l compeuuon by 
new market entrants, competition would limit the ex1'ting compamo" ab1h1y 10 ra1-e 1hc1r pncc• lo fund 
the ex post payments. 
Even Professor Harris's calculation'. however. ma) m"' the point Fint. he ..,,umcs that the indu,try 
will be allowed to engage in monopoly pricing. Ahhough we concede that perfect compc:u11on in th•• 
market is unlikely in any event, our hope still " to encourage compeuuon among c1garcttc companies a,; 
much as possible, along all dimension' including '3fcty Second. and perha� more 1mponant. "' he= 11 
may be the case that $32 billion per year (or 'ome 'mailer amount a.>>uming cornpeuuon t> allowc:<l and 
encouraged) roughly approximates the 111axi11111111 ummmr of T<'l'<'lll•<' that can be: collected from the c1garcttc 
industry via ex ante or ex post liability. the maximum pnce per pad, al which c1garcttcs could trade wnhoul 
completely bankrupting the industry i> probably much higher than $4.00 (indeed. cigarette pncc• in .omc 
countries have been reponed 10 be a. high a> $7 00 per pad. m recent year. Su 111/ra note 58:! ) Pncc 
higher than $4.00 per pack may nol maximize the cigarette rc"enue> available 10 be: u-ed lo compen"1lc 
injured smokers or for whatever purpo>e. but 1ho-e pnce> n11gh1 more full)· reflect the c'pected c�b or 
cigarettes. And that-internalizing tho>e cost>. or corning a> clo-e 10 doing >0 a> " " can-1• "' hat our 
proposed ex post incentive-based regime is intended 10 do. h ., nol intended lo max1m1Lc lax revenues from 
cigarettes. 
We do not mean 10 suggest that. under our propo-ed regime. c1garcne pnces "'ould necc."1nly me 
higher than $4.00 per pack, ahhough that i• a po»1b1h1y. The cqu1hbnum pnce of c1garclto under our 
proposal-if the only goal is 10 achieve a. much deterrence a. I> pracucally and pohucally p<>»tblc-would 
be a function of a number of factors. such a. how re>pon>t\'e cigarette compame> arc 10 the inccnuvc 10 
make safer cigarettes. At the very least. 1f maximally ach1e\able deterrence t> the only goal. 11 ., unclear 
!ha! the ultimate equilibrium price of cigarette> would be: the pnce that rnaxumzc> re\ cnuc 
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compensating claimants who smoked before the industry failed.580 Thus, if 
the industry were rendered bankrupt by the claims of those whose injuries 
were, at the time of the shift to the new regime, already manifest, there would 
be no smoking revenues available to provide compensation for future 
claimants, whose injuries were not yet manifest. (It should be noted that, under 
our proposed regime, victims of smoking would not be able to recover from 
companies who never sold them cigarettes-for example, new market 
entrants.)581 
Our response is twofold. First, a bankruptcy court could, in theory, protect 
future cigarette claimants to some extent by setting aside a portion of the 
bankrupt company's assets (including future income potential) to cover such 
claims. Second, insofar as those assets are not sufficient to satisfy all of the 
claims, the excess liability could be covered through some compensation 
regime other than the ex post incentive-based system-for example, through 
some type of private or public first-party insurance. Thus, any such excess 
liability poses a question of choosing the optimal system of compensation 
rather than the optimal system of deterrence, which has been our focus. 
Schwartz's bankruptcy concern might be that the prospective effect of 
absolute manufacturer liability would mean the end of the cigarette industry 
altogether. If that is so, our reaction is again twofold. First, it seems extremely 
unlikely. It is true that new entrants into the cigarette market (if we structure 
the system to allow new entrants) would have to charge a price that would 
include the full expected costs associated with their brand of cigarettes. At 
least initially (before safer designs were developed), this would be a sizeable 
amount. But even at that price, it is conceivable that there would continue to 
be a legal market for cigarettes.582 Moreover, as manufacturers brought safer 
designs to market, the price would drop commensurately. Alternatively, it 
might be the case that after the adoption of the new regime and the 
580. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 56 (describing problems with liability-based compensation 
schemes, including the problem of companies going out of business after the liability regime is 
implemented). 
5S I .  It is worth emphasizing this point: The retroactive portion of the new ex post incentive-based 
regime would, in theory, not be imposed on new entrants into the cigarette market. A new company would 
nonetheless be affected by the new regime because liability would also be applied prospectively. Hence, 
a new company-in making its decisions regarding what investments to make in producing safer cigarettes, 
how much to charge for its cigarettes, and how to market them-would be induced by the new regime to 
take into account all the expected harms that its products will cause. 
5S2. See Harry Berkowitz, Jolt in Cigarette Price Eyed as Teen Cure: Senators Ready Bill 011 
Immediate $1.50-Per-Pack Hike, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 1 997, at AS I (noting average prices of cigarettes in 
various countries: Denmark, $5.07; United Kingdom, $4.40; Australia, $4.0S; France, $3.5 1 ;  Canada, $3.34; 
and Switzerland, $3. 1 6);  R.C. Longworth & 1im Jones, If Tobacco Deal Becomes the u1w, Questions 
Abmmd on Who Will Pay, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1 997, at C l  I (noting that the average price of cigarette� 
in Norway is $7.00); John Mintz. Prices of Tobacco Company Stocks Surge 011 Report of Negotiations: 
Threat of lawsuits Had Depressed Shares of Cigarette Makers, WASH. POST, Apr. 1 7, 1 997, at AS (noting 
that there is no lack of smokers even though the average price of cigarettes in Europe and some Third 
World countries is $4.00 to $5.00 per pack); Susannah Vesey Rauscher, Tobacco Under Fire, ATLANTA 
J. & CONST., Sept. I ,  1 996, at SD (noting that the Canadian price was $5.53 per pack in 1 99 1 ). 
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development of new, safer cigareue designs, consumers would not be will ing 
to pay the price of cigarenes. Such a scenario would, indeed, spell the end of 
the legal United States cigarene marker. That result, in and of itself, would be 
fine. In  fact, i t  would be precisely the desired outcome (given the 
unwillingness of consumers to internalize the costs).m 
2. The Judgment-Proof Problem 
Perhaps the most troublesome disadvantage of an ex pose incentive-based 
regulatory system is the so-called judgment-proof problem. Whenever 
manufacturers do not have sufficient assets (net of non-tort liabilities) to cover 
all the p0tential harms caused by their products, those manufacturers are said 
to be judgment proof. To the extent manufacturers are judgment proof, any ex 
post incentive-based regime-such as enterprise liability or smokers ' 
compensation-could not have its full deterrent effecr.siµ Thus, enterprise 
l iability or smokers' compensation can provide opcimal accident-prevention 
incentives only if manufacturers have assets at least equal in value co the 
magnitude of the loss they can potentially cause. If the value of those 
companies' assets is smaller than the magnitude of the threat of loss they pose, 
then the companies' care level analyses would be skewed, their incentives to 
invest optimally in accident prevention would be impeded, and activity levels 
would be nonoptimal. 
583. The real problem in such a scenano would be 1hc poH1blc me of an illegal or unri=gula1ed 
cigarecte market As we discussed supra Sub,cciion V 8.2. howe\ er. 1hc adopuon of e\ pos1 mcenu •e­
based regulation is more likely to cause a nonln\'lal pnce increa..e in c1gan:11cs • .omc ,;ifcl) inno• auon on 
the part of cigarette companies, and some rcduc11on in over.ill c1garc11c consumpuon Then: m1gh1 be. under 
such a system, some increase in certain kinds of illegal c1gan:11c �le:.; but 1hen: al.o m1gh1 be a dccn:asc 
in orher types of illegal cigarettes-such � c1garcnc' being 'old 10 ch1ldn:n S.-.- rnpra note 558 ""J 
accompanying 1ex1. That outcome seems quue plau.,blc:. and con>1derabl) >Upcnor 10 1he curren1 srare of 
affairs. Moreover, some versions of el( ante. cornrnand·and-con1rol. or pcrformance·ba.>Cd regulauon could 
be used to supplement the ex po,1 mcenu\e-b;i,,cd >) 'tern to addre» 1he 1mmnce> of illegal c1gan:11e ... 1c, 
584. See SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 1 67-68 (Ob>en mg 1ha1. \\hen m1un:n cannot pay fully for lhc 
losses !hey cause, "[!]heir incenrive> 10 rake care may then:fore be inadequate. >mce the) \\ Ill rrear loHe> 
that they cause and 1hat exceed their a.>cr. a. 1mpo>mg hab1l111e:' only equ.il 10 1hc1r .i.>e1>' 1 Allhough 1hc 
basic idea of the judgment-proof problem had been undentood al >omc fc,el pnor lo Sha,c:ll"> " orl. 1u 
Wittman, supra note 423, al 204; Comment. The Case of thr Dm1ppear111g D.-f.-11J11111 An Ewnonm· 
Analysis, 1 32 U. PA. L. REV. 145 ( 1 983). it w� Sha"ell \\ho formahu:d 1he argument and coined lhc lcrm 
·�udgment proof problem," SHAVELL, supra nole 423. :11 1 67-70. 1 79-8:?. S !c•cn Sha•cll. fJ1e )11Ji:mm1 
Proof Problem, 6 lNT'L REV. L & Ecol\. 45 ( 1 986). Many 01hcn ha\e dt>eu>>Cd lhc: problem "nee Sa. 
e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman. Tmr nrd U11l11111r.-d Sl111r.-lwlda lwbilm for Corpornte fort1. 
l 00 YALE L.J. I 879, 1 882-90 ( 1 99 1 )  (cxplam111g care lc'cl and a.:11\ tt) lc\el 1nefrk1cnrn:' a>.wc1.:i1ed " Hh 
the judgment-proof problem cau,cd by lim11ed >hareholder hab1hl) ) . K) le: D Logue:. 50/1 11111 th.- J111Ji:mm1· 
Proof Problem. 72 TEX. L REV. 1 375, 1 375 & n.2 ( 1 994 1 (de.cnbmg 1he JUdgrnenr-proof problem and II> 
relation to !he deterrence and m'urance goal, of tort la\\ ). L) nn M LoPud.1 . Tlie Deurli af Liabtlm. 1 06  
YALE L.J. I ( 1 996) [hereinafler LoPucl.1, The Death of uabi/11\ I (dc:-cnb111g numerou> >lr.11eg1c>. including 
parent-subsidiary owner.hip >lructure. !hat firm> arc U>mg to render 1hem>eh e> 1utlgmc:nt proofJ. fame> J 
White, Corporate Judgment Prooji11g: A Respo11se w l.11111 l0Pm l1 'J Tiu: Dca1h ol L1.ib1h1). 1 07 Y -'Lt 
L.J. 1 363 ( 1 998) (providing evidence that LoPucl.1 dr.1>uc·all) O\ !!l">lale> !he e\lent of rhe 1udgmen1-proof 
problem); Lynn M. LoPuck1, Virtual llldgmelll Pmo/mg A Rr;1m1J.-r, 1 07 YAU. L J  14 1 3  < 1 998) 
(responding to White'' claim' poinr by pomt). 
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If one were to get serious about applying the new regime retroactively in 
the strongest possible sense (that is, holding cigarette manufacturers liable for 
all of the past harms of smoking), those manufacturers would almost certainly 
be judgment proof with respect to a large fraction of those costs. The sum of 
the costs of all past smoking is almost beyond comprehension.585 And the 
value of the assets of existing and past cigarette manufacturers would be tiny 
in comparison, perhaps only the value of the companies' machinery and 
equipment in the hands of the new entrants to the cigarette market, who, not 
being saddled with the liabilities for past harms, would likely be the highest 
bidders for those assets.586 
But the judgment-proof problem does not arise only in the case of 
retroactive liability. A significant judgment-proof problem could arise in 
connection with the transition to an ex post incentive-based regime even if that 
regime were applied only to harms arising from future cigarette consumption. 
In that situation, there would be a strong incentive for new entrants in the 
cigarette market not to maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover their future 
regulatory liabilities. Since those liabilities would require payment (sometimes 
far) in the future, the incentive would be to enter the market and sell relatively 
cheap cigarettes-that is, cigarettes that do not include the premium for future 
ex post damage payments-for a number of years and then, when the first 
claims against the company under the ex post regime began to roll in, to 
declare bankruptcy. A company following that strategy could price its 
cigarettes at a substantial discount compared with the cigarettes of other 
companies and could conceivably generate enormous profits before the jig was 
up-before the first ex post claims were actually filed against it.587 For the 
plan to work, the companies would have to pay out the extra earnings over the 
years in the form of dividends to their shareholders. Protected by the doctrine 
of limited shareholder liability, these shareholders would be able to pocket the 
money without worrying about the company's impending future regulatory 
liabilities. 
This judgment-proofing strategy is not just a theoretical possibility. Indeed, 
the existing tobacco companies-like some other industries-have, at least to 
some extent, already exploited the corporate form to limit the extent of their 
potential liability.588 Moreover, the temptation for existing cigarette 
585. See s11pra note 575. 
586. Thus, bankrupting the existing tobacco companies would provide more deterrence thun not 
bankrupting them would, but i t  would provide less deterrence than if those companies had nssets surticicnt 
to cover ull of their liabilities. 
587. We discuss this possibility briefly s11pra text accompanying notes 56 1 -564. 
588. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584, at 1 88 1 .  Tobacco firms have publicly ucknowlcdgcd 
that the purpose of organizing themselves as subsidiaries has been to evade tort liability. See id. at 1881  
n.3 .  It was reported that Phillip Morris, for ex.ample, created i ts  holding company "to better insulate euch 
business from obligations and liabilities incurred in unrelated activities." Id.; see crlso LoPucki, Tire Delllli 
of Liability, s11pra note 584, passim (describing numerous strategies, including parent-subsidiary ownership. 
by which finns can, and according to the author do, render themselves judgment prool). 
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companies to take steps to judgment proof themselves will increase as smoking 
plaintiffs begin to have more success in courtrooms and as Congress begins 
seriously to weigh alternative regulatory regimes. 
It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is less 
susceptible to the judgment-proof problem than is ex post incentive-based 
regulation.589 The justification for this view is straightforward: Command­
and-control regulation can be enforced by means other than ex post liabi lity or 
fines. For example, a command-and-control regulator can impose care level 
standards on a manufacturer ex ante and then enforce those requirements 
through some type of ex ante fine or injunction. perhaps backed up with a 
threat of criminal punishment None of these mechanisms is as susceptible to 
the judgment-proof problem as are ex post damages.590 
Before we describe the ways in which the judgment-proof problem might 
be mitigated, we should first make one important. often-overlooked. 
observation: Ex ante forms of regulation suffer from a judgment-proof problem 
akin to the one associated with ex post regulation. I f. under a command-and­
control or performance-based regime, the regulated manufacturer knows that 
its assets are considerably less than any potential ex ante tine. the judgment­
proof problem would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to abide by the 
regulations. Insofar as the regulator has alternative, nonmonetary means of 
punishing such a manufacturer (e.g . .  shuuing the firm down or imposing 
criminal sanctions), however, and insofar as the regulator can detect the 
manufacturer's violations before injuries occur, the judgment-proof problem 
will not be as significant for ex ante regulation as it is for ex post regulation. 
In any event, there are a number of potential responses to the judgment­
proof problem that, if successful, would strengthen the case for ex post 
incentive-based regulation (and that, given the potential judgment-proof 
problems associated with ex ante regulation, should be considered in any 
case).591 One solution would be to eliminate or weaken the doctrine of 
589. See. e.g .. SHAVELL. supra note 423. al 279-82. Sha\ ell, mpra note -12.l. "' 160-61 . .169 70 
590. See SHAVELL. supra note 423. al 279-82. ShJ,elf. rnpra note -123. JI J6 1 -6.1 Sh,l\dl Jlw 
demonstrates that, under cenarn a>>urnptlOn>. an e' po>l comm;ind-Jnd-c:ontrol Jpprwd1-n.11ncl). J J.iuh ­
based tort sy>tem--can po>e le>s of a judgment-proof problem than doc> a no-fault 1or cntcrpn-c hJbthl} I 
system. See SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 28 1 -82. 
59 1 .  There is a possibility that >ome pon1on of the 1obacco rndu>lf) "  po1cnl1.il hab1hl) \\Oufd be 
covered under its propeny-ca>uahy rn>UrJnce pohc1e>. allhough there " contro\cr'y on lhh porn! Srr 
Michael Prince, Louisiana Hopej /murers' Def<•nsr Srmgl Big Tob11c co. Bt s J-.� . �!Jr 3 1 .  1 997 . .ii I .  
see also Leslie Sci>m, Tobacco Negorwrors M11l Tn- Tu Tcirgrr lnrnrrn. W-'l.I. ST J .  �IJ) 28. 1 997, JI 
AJ (reporting that �late anomey> genernl have e>tabh>hed a comnuncc 10 1m ouga1c the c\tcnl of propcn>· ·  
casualty insurance coverage o f  c1garene compantc:> · po1c:n11JI hJb1h11e>) Propcrt) -ca>u.illy m'urJncc 
companies insist that the liability policte> they ha\ c >old to 1obJcco compame> o\cr the: p.t.>l 30 )t'af\ 
contain exclusions that clearly preclude covernge for the hann> cau.cd 10 >mol..cf\ .ind 1hird PJrllt'' by 
cigarene smoke. See Sci>m, supra. Moreover. ll  ha> been >Uggc:>ted that the Co\ cragc "'°<' 111'1) be fc.,. 
clear with respect 10 >Uib brought by >late" than " llh rt'>pt'Cl 10 pcr..onJI inJUf) 'u11' brought by 
individuals. See Prince, supra, al I .  In any event, few 1f any United Stale> tobacco c:olllPJOI<'' h;i\c yet 
>ought product� liability coverJgc from their tn>UrJncc earner. Srr Sc:1>111. mpm Ac:c:ordmg lo wmc 
insurance executives, however, the rea>on tobacco compame> ha' e not 1m oh ed 1hc:1r '"'urer.. m the r<:<:cnt 
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limited shareholder liability. Cigarette claimants could then go after the assets 
not only of the cigarette companies themselves but also of the tobacco 
company shareholders. Such an approach would, of course, require a dramatic 
change in current corporate law. Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman, however, have made just such a proposal, advocating a form of pro 
rata unlimited shareholder liability on efficiency grounds.592 Their proposal 
would, among other things, reduce the incentive-dulling effects of the 
judgment-proof problem in some contexts. Implementing such a regime, 
however, would pose sizeable administrative difficulties, not the least of which 
would be the problem of identifying which shareholders to go after (current 
shareholders, past shareholders, or both) and then locating and securing 
judgments against all of them. That problem would be especially acute given 
that shares in publicly traded companies frequently change hands on the open 
market.593 Whether or not the benefits of unlimited shareholder liability 
would outweigh the costs as a general matter (a matter on which we do not 
express an opinion), such a rule is, in our view, extremely unlikely to be 
adopted.594 Therefore, we do not consider the option further here. Instead, we 
consider briefly two other reasons that the judgment-proof problem, at least for 
future cigarette-caused harms, may not be an insurmountable problem for the 
transition to an ex post incentive-based regime. 
First, the judgment-proof problem, at least for future harms, may not be 
as large as we have been suggesting. Specifically, accountants and nonequity 
creditors play an important role in monitoring companies and in preventing 
potential judgment-proof problems.595 To the extent cigarette manufacturers 
have to borrow money from banks (for example, to finance the purchase of 
equipment or inventory), those manufacturers' abilities to judgment proof 
themselves would be substantially limited. The lenders, whose interests are 
more aligned with those of the smokers' compensation claimants than with the 
interests of the tobacco equity holders, could protect themselves by insisting 
on loan covenants allowing them to put pressure on the companies if their 
liability-to-asset ratios rise too high. To enforce the covenants, the lenders 
litigation is that doing so would require them to relinquish some control of the lawsuits, including decisions 
regarding settlement, to the insurers. See id. Regardless, the stakes of this controversy are large. 
592. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584. 
593. Hansmann and Kraakman are aware of these administrative-cost objections to their proposul. us 
well as other objections. They suggest reasons that those objections arc overstated. See id. at 1 899-90 I .  
594. J n  fairness, Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal i s  not entirely unrealistic in  the cigurettc contel\t, 
if the rule of unlimited shareholder liability is, as they recommend, applied prospectively only. St:e id. ut 
1 923. It is conceivable to imagine that, if Congress were to adopt a system of Cl\ post incentive-bused 
regulation of cigarettes (especially a smokers' compensation regime in which damage� were limited uml 
relatively certain), it would also adopt a rule that required all future �hareholders in cigarette companies 
to be, in effect, excess insurers on a pro rata basis for the tobacco companies. There would �till be 
administrative costs to keeping track of shareholders, but that problem may not be in�urmountublc. 
595. See White, supra note 584, passim (giving reasons that Lynn LoPucki's claim that corporations 
are judgment proofing themselves on a large scale is overstated). 
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could rely on periodic audils lo monilor lhose ralios.596 If lhose ratios were 
to rise, the lenders at some point would insist that the companies retain more 
of their earnings to fund the future smokers' compensation claims. If the 
companies refused, the lenders would resort to lhe remedies in their loan 
covenants. Ultimately, the cigarelle companies who try this "hit-and-run" or 
judgment-proofing strategy may still go bankrupt, but, because of the presence 
of the monitoring lenders, that bankruptcy would come much sooner than 
otherwise, a fact that would reduce the overall profitability of the judgment­
proofing strategy.597 
To the extent a judgment-proof problem remains, there is a potential 
regulatory response short of unlimited shareholder liability. All cigarette 
companies wishing to sell cigarenes in this country could be required to show 
proof of financial responsibility for the potential harms that their products 
might cause.598 Financial responsibility could take the form of a bond posted 
with some agency of the government to be invested and held in trust on behalf 
of future victims of smoking-related il lnesses. Or it could take the form of a 
liability policy with a highly rated property-casualty insurance company, a 
policy that would be required to include language specifically and fully 
covering any ex post liability imposed on the cigarelle manufacturer.5'"1 Most 
simply, financial responsibilily could require that a company wishing to sell 
cigarettes show that i t  has sufficient capital to cover the expected costs 
associated with ils product over time.600 If, in the end, despite all the 
potential reform efforts, the judgment-proof problem persists, it may be 
596. Under our proposed smoker..' compen>at1on regune. at lea>! 'ome pomon of the compam"" ' 
liabilities would be fairly predictable, based on the volume o( .ab and the a\ allJble Jata on the hnk 
between smokmg and various 1 1 lne"e'. Therefore. the lender.. >hould be able to detemune hab1ht) -�t 
ratios, at least roughly. 
597. Because cigarelle compame> gener.l!e >Uch enonnou' ca'h re\enuo. II mJy be th.it tho.c 
companies tend not to be heavy borrower... and therefore there nught be le" mon11onng b) lendc� th.in 
occurs in other industrie>. 
598. Hansmann and Kraakman 'ugge>t th1> option as a 'upplement to !but not a 'ub>tllute fon 
unlimited shareholder liab11ity. See Hammann & Kr.ial.man. rnpro note 58-1, at 1 927 
599. It could be argued that cigarene compame> \\ OUld ha\e difficult) tindmg hab1ht) '"'ure� " ho 
would be willing to wnte >Uch pohc1e>. See supra note 591 1d1-cu"mg the fact that e�i>tmg h.ib1ht) 
policies owned by cigarene compame> contain >pt.'C11ic exclu>1on' for 'uch claun,J One o( the reawn, that 
insurers in the past may have in>i>ted on >uch an e�clu>1on. ho" e' er. 1' the uncemunt) " 1th regard to the 
overall size of the potential liability. Under a >mol.er..' compcn.at1on regune. the \Ile of the cornpamn" 
smoking-related liabilitie> would be more predictable than under the current regime; therefore. '"'ure� may 
be more willing to write the coverage. It may be the case that legal uncenamty 1' not the reason for the 
exclusions in previous and exi>ting liability pohc1e> . The reason for 'uch exclu,1on> might be the lad. o( 
demand from cigarene companies, who expect u ltunately to be judgment proof. Su Sl!A\'ELl.. wpm note 
423, at 240-42 (ob,erving that being judgment proof undercut' the rncent1\ e  to pun:h:l.\C hab1hty 1n.orancc 
and suggesting that mandatory liability in,ur.mce may be an appropnatc rc-pon>el 
600. This son of capitalizatmn requirement I> not unu>ual Vinual l)· all corporation> in European 
countries are subject to capitahzauon requirement,. See Clark D Stith, Fed.-rulum 1111d Co111p<11n la» A 
"Rad to the 80110111 " in the European Co11111111111t\. 19 GEO L.J 1 58 1 .  1 58-1 n 9  t 1 99 1 J  In the lJmtcd 
States, in,urers are >Ubject to >1m1lar re>cne requirement,. See S S  Ill !:B'l:.R ET At . PROPLKn A'D 
L!ABIUTY INSL"RANCE 607- 1-l (3d ed. 1 982). 
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appropriate to supplement ex post incentive-based regulation with some type 
of ex ante regulation. 
3.  Widely Dispersed Harm: Dealing with Public ETS Exposure 
Another potential disadvantage of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based 
regulation is the possibility that the harm caused by the product may be so 
widely dispersed that no single victim would have an incentive to incur the 
comparatively large costs of bringing a claim ex post.601 If that were the 
case, the deterrence benefits of such a regime would not be realized. Perhaps 
the clearest case of a widely dispersed harm problem would be air pollution. 
The costs of air pollution resulting from automobile and other types of 
emissions could not conceivably be internalized to polluters through a victim­
initiated ex post regime. Who would have an incentive to bring such a claim? 
And against whom exactly would they bring it? To deal with the external costs 
associated with many types of pollution, therefore, some form of government­
initiated ex ante regulation is necessary. The widely dispersed harm problem, 
however, should not generally be a serious concern in the cigarette context, at 
least with respect to the harms resulting from smokers' illnesses and deaths, 
because the magnitude of the harm caused to smokers themselves and to their 
family members would often exceed the costs of bringing the claims. In 
addition, under the type of regime we are imagining-where causation and size 
of damage are the only factual questions-the litigation costs for such claims 
may be reduced. 
Nevertheless, with respect to some of the harms associated with public 
ETS exposure, such as the increased incidence of asthma, the dispersed harm 
problem may be substantial. The standard way in which victim-initiated ex 
post regimes respond to the dispersed harm problem is by the use of class 
action lawsuits; the dispersed harm issue therefore becomes an issue of civil 
procedure.602 To the extent that the dispersed harm problem cannot be 
eliminated through the aggregation of claims, however, some state-initiated 
601 .  See Shavell, supra note 423, at 363, 370. 
602. See Rosenberg, supra note 521 ,  passim (arguing that a class-based proportional liability rule 
should be used to resolve mass exposure cases). One potential problem with the class action solution, 
however, is that it may often pose a deterrence problem like that posed by excise taxes: Because the class 
action mechanism would aggregate the claims of smoking victims (for example, victims of public ETS 
exposure) and would also likely end up apportioning damages to the cigarette industry according to market 
share, there would be the standard care level unraveling effect described above. See supra notes 450-454. 
Although the industry in the aggregate would be forced to pay for those smoking-related harms, 
manufacturers would have little or no incentive to invest in developing ways of reducing those costs 
because the costs would be distributed pro rata across the industry (rather than according to brand-specific 
causation). An alternative victim-initiated ex post approach in this setting would be to allow the claimants 
to recover against either their employers (in the case of workplace ETS exposure) or the proprietor of the 
public venue at which exposure took place (in the case of nonworkplace public ETS exposure). 
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regulatory approach may be a useful supplement to a victim-initiated ex post 
regime.603 
There are other potential problems that arc peculiar to the case of public 
ETS exposure. Indeed, the harms caused by ETS exposure in public 
settings-such as the workplace, restaurants , bars , movie theaters. and the 
l ike-are different in two important ways from the harms suffered by the 
smokers themselves:604 First, with public ETS exposure, it is considerably 
more difficult to determine brand-specific causation. A person exposed to ETS 
in her workplace or in restaurants will have greater difficulty demonstrating 
what portion of her overall ETS exposure was attributable to a given brand of 
c igarettes than, for instance, a person exposed to ETS in the home. whose 
exposure comes from one or two smokers and their brands. Thus brand­
specific cost internal ization to manufacturers for public ETS exposure may be 
ext1emely difficult.605 For this reason as well, therefore, there may be cause 
to supplement ex post incentive-based regime with other regulatory approaches. 
Second, in most public ETS exposure situations. there arc at least two, and 
potentially more, "deterrable" parties-that is. parties who would be responsive 
to having smoking-related costs imposed on them: ( 1 )  the manufacturer; and 
(2) the owner of the relevant business (which would be the employer in the 
case of workplace exposure or the proprietor in the case of non-workplace 
public exposure, as in a restaurant). The presence of more than one detcrrablc 
party with respect to those risks raises the question of which party should be 
forced to bear those smoking-related costs. We might try to impose the public 
ETS exposure costs directly on the cigarette industry. either through a 
smokers' compensation or enterprise liability approach. Alternatively. we might 
place the workplace ETS exposure costs on employers, and the non-workplace 
ETS exposure costs on the relevant business proprietors, thereby giving 
employers and proprietors the incentive to develop and introduce cost-effective 
restrictions on smoking in "public" settings (i.e., those outside the home) or to 
603. One pos,ible state-inuiated ex ante command-and-control altematJ\ e \\ould be go,emment· 
mandated restriction' on 'moking in pubhc 'ettmg' That altemau'e might alw rc•pond 10 concern' that. 
under a regime where the pubhc ETS cxpo,ure co'b arc unpo>ed on employer-propnetor. m>tead or on 
manufacturers, the employer. and proprietor. might be Judgment proof. Whether >Uch emplo)er·propnelor 
judgment proofing i> likely to be a problem would depend on the extent to " h1ch employer' ha\c an 
incentive to provide an adequately funded (either through ou1;1de m>ur.ince or through internal. >elf· 
insurance funds) health care plan for their cmplo) �-C> and on the extent 10 \\ h1ch propnelor. ha\c an 
incentive to carry adequate liability in,urance. Cf supra text folio" mg note 590 (e>.pl.immg th.it Judgment· 
proof problems may abo reduce the efficacy or command-and-control and perfomiance·ba.>cd rcgulanon>J. 
604. When we u'e the tcmi ··workplace ETS expo>urc." \\c mean the cxpo>urc or emplo) CC> in the 
workplace to the pas,ive 'mokc produced by other emplo) ee' or b) patron> or the emplo)er When we >ay 
"nonworkplace public ETS cxpo,ure:· we mean expo;urc or patron• al rc•taur.int> and the hl.e 10 pa.>M \ e  
smoke produced b y  other patron' o r  b y  employee>. 
605. Tub difficulty of dctemiming br.ind-,�-c1fic cau;.iuon m pubhc ETS expo•un: >llu.mon> may be 
somewhat reduced (though not eliminated) 1f the cigarette card. d1>eu>>Cd mpru Sub>CCuon V A  2 b. "'ere 
introduced. 
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provide a separate, well-ventilated space where all public smoking could take 
place. 
The choice of who should bear those costs depends upon who, as between 
employer-proprietor and manufacturer, would be in a better position to develop 
and implement cost-justified means of reducing public space ETS exposure. 
The employer-proprietor might be in the better position. On the other hand, if 
public ETS exposure costs were imposed on manufacturers, they might have 
the needed incentive to find a cost-effective means of removing all toxins in 
cigarettes, including those that contaminate passive smoke.606 Adding the 
public ETS exposure costs to the price of cigarettes through manufacturer 
liability might also have enough of an activity level effect that additional 
public-smoking restrictions would be unnecessary. Choosing between those two 
general approaches is, needless to say, not an easy call.607 Either approach, 
606. This manufacturer care level effect is possible even though the public ETS exposure costs 
probably could not be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis. Although there might be 
some unraveling effect (and hence we are unlikely to see the development of cigarenes that emit no ETS), 
there could still be a beneficial manufacturer care level effect, given that all of the other cost� of smoking 
would be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis. 
607. Interestingly, to the extent that employers are already providing health, life, and disability 
insurance coverage to their employees through group plans (and most employers do), it muy be the cru.c 
that a large portion of workplace ETS exposure costs are already borne to some extent by employers. With 
respect to workplace ETS exposure costs, employer-provided first-party health, l ife, und disability coveruge 
approximates a form of voluntary (market-generated) ex post incentive-based regulation. The problem with 
relying purely on the market, with no government intervention, however, is that, given the existence of the 
market failures we described supra Parts II-III, we cannot be sure that voluntary employer-provided 
insurance arrangements will fully internalize all of the costs of workplace ETS exposure. For example, 
under the current system, employer-provided insurance generally fails to cover the nonpccuniary harms of 
workplace ETS exposure, which means those costs arc not internalized to the employer at ull. Cf. supra 
notes 292-295 and accompanying text (arguing that the market alone cannot be expected to internalize 
workplace ETS exposure risk). 
To the extent that employer plans currently operate as an ex post incentive-based form of regulating 
workplace ETS exposure, it is understandable that some employers arc already voluntarily attempting to 
restrict workplace smoking. Of course, as we indicated above, employers effectively bear many of the other 
smoking-related costs, too. See supra notes 247, 270, and accompanying text. Thus, it may also be in part 
to reduce those costs, and not just to reduce the workplace ETS exposure costs, that employers have 
voluntarily introduced workplace smoking restrictions. With respect to tho�c other smoking-related costs, 
however, it �eems clear that manufacturers, rather than employers or proprietors, arc the cheapest coM 
avoiders. The main reason is that cigarene manufacturers, through care level and activity level adjustment�. 
are in a position to minimize the costs of all smoking-related harms, not just the harms caused by smoking 
on the job or in other public spaces. 
With respect to non-workplace ETS exposure-such as the ETS exposure of patrons of restaurants 
and bars-there is nothing approximating an ex post incentive-based approach to deterrence, either for 
pecuniary or for nonpecuniary harms to patrons. Thus, if we wanted to impose those costs on proprietors, 
we would need to adopt something along the lines of a "patrons' compensation sy�tcm" or "proprietor 
liability regime." Again, we would not expect the market alone to internalize this sort of public ETS 
exposure, for all the reasons discussed supra Part II and supra Section Ill.A. Moreover, even if  those 
particular market failures did not exist, it might still make sense to regulate public ETS risks. It may be, 
for example, that the loss of customers due to ETS is not large enough to make it worthwhile for many 
proprietors to do anything about smoking. In a world in which there is smoking al lowed in mo�t business 
establishments, firms will have an incentive not to become one of the few that impose smoking restrictions. 
New nonsmoking customers might not bother to shift to the smoking-restrictive bu�incss even if they were 
well-informed, because so many of the other public spaces they frequented would �till be full of passive 
smoke. On the other hand, if a number of proprietors and employers could all agree to ban smoking, or 
to confine it to certain places, the strategy might work. But collective action problem� may prevent that 
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however, could have substantial benefits over the command-and-control 
alternatives-such as banning smoking in all nonresidential buildings61Js_ 
because they both rely on parties with better cost-minimizing information than 
regulators have. 
D. Summary 
This part considered two possible ex post incentive-based regimes and one 
specific method for getting the information necessary for effectively 
i mplementing any regulatory regime (but particularly an ex post incentive­
based one). After briefly outlining the changes in manufacturer and consumer 
behavior we would expect under our proposed system. we suggested some 
ways to ease the transition to a new regime. cabining i f  necessary the full 
retroactive sweep of liability. We concluded that. to the extent there are factors 
that can weaken ex post incentive-based regulation as a means of correcting 
market failures, alternative approaches-such as command-and-control, 
performance-based, or ex ante incentive-based approaches-may be useful 
supplements. If, for example, we thought that judgment proofing might be a 
problem for some c igarette manufacturers but not others, it might make sense 
to supplement an enterprise liabil ity or smokers ' compensation regime with 
some minimal ex ante command-and-control rules.WI If such a mixed system 
were to be adopted, however, the key. in our view. would be: ( 1 )  adopting and 
maintaining a strong ex post incentive-based system in order to get all of the 
deterrence benefits described throughout this Article; and (2)  coordinating that 
incentive-based system with whatever other regulatory regimes were in 
operation so as to avoid underdeterrence or overdeterrence."w 
from happening as well. ju,tifymg \Ome fonn of e\ ante regul;itwn 
608. See, e.g., Smoke-Free Env1mm11ent Act of 1 993. H R  3-B.t. I O:ld Cong 1 1 99-l J 
609. Another ;ituauon in which C\ po'! rnccntl \ e·ba,ed regul;iuon nia) be 1nlcnor 10 e\ ante 
command-and-control regulation " when the nonnal a"umpllon thal m.1nufac1urer. an: beu.:r mfonned 1h.1n 
regulators about the costs of (and the markcb for) their pmduch Joe, not appl) Srr Sh;l\ ell.  rnpm note 
423, at 369. For example. a panicular product market nugh1 c·on'"t enurely of 'm.111. moni -.md -pop 
operations that have neither the resources nor the C\p<!nl•C to tn\ e•t rn detenmmng 1he long-run -afc:l) and 
health effects of !heir produch or altcrnatl\ e de,1gn' for their produch A regulator " ho 'pc:ctahte• tn the 
regulation of such product> might ha\'e better mfon11.111on about 'uch lhtng•. 111 \\ tu.:h ca..c: wme type: of 
ex ante regulation might be a u,cful 'upplcment to e\ p<1'l h.1b1ltt) Srr 1</ A lthough th1' '1luallon could 
be imponant in other context>. it would 'c-em relatl \ cly tnapphcable tn the ca..c: of lhe tobacco 1ndu,1ry. 
given the cigarette manufacturer,· enonnou' '17C and l.irgc re'e.1rd1 budget' It \\ould be rclc\ .int 111 1he 
case of public ETS C\po;urc. ho\\e\ cr. '1ncc the gO\ ernment nugh1 po>..:" better tnfonnallon .ibout 
reducing risks as;ociated wnh 'uch C\p<J,urc than p<Jtent1al delcnd.m1' •Uch '" '111.111 emplo)er. or 
restaurant proprietor... In any C\'Cnt. 'uch dire-ct rcgulatwn 'hould be u-cd a• a 'upp lcment. not "' .1 
replacement. for an ex po;t mcenuve-ba.,cd 'Y'tem 
6 1 0. A number of ;cholar.. have argioed thal 1he op11m.1l .ipproach to contrulltng n,I..  c'pc:c1.1l l) tn the 
area of product safety. hkely entatb a mt\ture of rcgul.itoi;.· re,p<m-c, Srr. r � .  ShaH :ll .  mprct nolc -123. 
at 365 (arguing that a ··complete ,oJuuon to the problem of the con1rul of n,1,. ,hould 1n,uhc lite JO•nt 
u;e of liability and regulation"') For an extended d1-cu"mn ol ho\\ Jn c\ p<J'l tn(Cllll\c-b.i.c:d ') 'tern .:ould 
and ;hould respond to the ex1'tencc of alternatl\c  ') 'tenh of detcm:ncc ('uch J' .:omrnand-.ind-.:ontrul 
regulation or ex ante incent1ve-ba;ed rcgulauon ) to J\'Otd under- Jnd O\ cr-delcm:ncc. \CC l lan,on & Logue. 
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VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 
On the basis of the forgoing analysis, we believe a strong case can be 
made for instituting a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system of 
regulating cigarettes-whether that system be an enterprise liability regime or 
a smokers' compensation regime of some sort. Thus far, however, our analysis 
has been fairly abstract. In this part, in an effort to be more concrete and 
responsive to current events, we apply the framework that we have developed 
to the proposed national tobacco settlement. 
Although ours is the first law review article to analyze the proposed 
settlement, we enter the debate as relative latecomers. Because of the salience 
and significance of the agreement, many academics, commentators, and 
policymakers have already weighed in.61 1 As opinions have solidified on the 
question of how, if at all, the proposed settlement should be amended, a 
powerful consensus has emerged among opinion makers that the settlement 
proposal, or a modified version of it, represents the best hope for providing 
meaningful regulation of cigarettes. With some tinkering, these parties have 
argued, the proposal should be adopted, even (or especially) if doing so would 
significantly reduce any role of tort law.612 Our goal in this section is to 
Tort Law in Context, supra note 40. 
6 1 1 .  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7, 22; sources cited i11fra note 6 1 2. 
6 1 2. While there is disagreement among President Clinton's advi,ers, for example, those advbo� have 
relatively minor objections to the President's support of the pact. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Donna Shalala, rumored to be among the most skeptical of the Prc,ident'' advbcr,, nevertheless reportedly 
sees the agreement "as an opportunity to get some things from the industry-a focus on nonsmoking that 
goes beyond teenagers to all Americans, and substantial money for public health-that greatly exceeds whut 
the administration would have achieved solely with its FDA regulations." Michael K. Frisby, Oppo11e/lfs 
of Tobacco Pact Face Big Hurdle: Cli111011, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1 997, at A l4; see also Laurie McGinlcy 
et al., The Se11leme111: Foes Vow To Toughe11, Nor Trash, Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1 997, ut 
B I  ("[V]irtually no one who matters is vowmg to kill the deal. Even those who arc most critical of lhc 
terms seem[] determined to amend them, rather than try to 'cuttle the entire package."); Jeffrey Taylor & 
Hilary Stout, Cli111011 Pa11el likely To Bless Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1 997, at A3 (predicting 
that a panel convened by the President would recommend that the Prc,ident embrace the basic den), with 
some minor changes). Some key players who arc opposed to the deal in its current form also believe lhc 
pact's shortcomings arc surmountable. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and former FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler, for example, arc critical of the limits placed on FDA authority in the 
agreement, but suggest that they might support the agreement if it were modified. See John M. Broder, 
White House Sees Adverse Ef ects i11 Tobacco Pla11, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1 997, at A I .  More importantly, 
none of the key critics was, until perhaps very recently, 'ignificantly concerned about the tort lnw 
implications of the proposal or about the type of regulations that the settlement would rely upon. S1•e, e.g . .  
id. (stating that Dr. Koop thinks "that a broad settlement with large payments for public health prognnns 
and strict limits on cigarette advertising and promotion could outweigh the costs of limiting the industry's 
legal liability"); Jeffrey Taylor, Cli111011 Urged To Review Tobacco Papers, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1 997, 
at A3 (explaining that Koop and Kes,lcr do not view industry immunity from punitive damages in civil 
liability suits as a "deal breaker"). Indeed, 'ome of the advbcrs said things to suggest that they may prefer 
a settlement that reduces the role of tort law. See, e.g .. Taylor, S11pra ("Dr. Kessler 'aid he doesn't oppose 
proposals to compensate farmers for 'ettlcment-related lo,ses. 'I would much rather sec money going to 
them than to lawyers' for smokers who have sued tobacco companies, he said."). As this Article goes to 
press, however, antismoking groups and public health advocate,, including Dr. Koop, may be approaching 
a consensus view in oppo,ition to tort immunity for the tobacco industry. See Alissa J. Rubin & Myron 
J. Levin, Ami-S111oki11g Groups Appear To Close Ra11ks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at D3. 
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destabilize that consensus view and to persuade readers that if any reform is 
to improve upon the status quo, it would m:cd to look very different from the 
reform envisaged in the settlement proposal. It would need to look more like 
the tort system that the current proposal would. in essence, supplant. 
Before beginning our analysis. we should note that the proposed seulement 
appears to be premised on the assumption that the cigareue market is subject 
to many of the very same market failures that we identified in Parts I I - I I I .  For 
instance, a variety of the proposal 's provisions, including enhanced warning 
requirements,6 1 3  are intended to respond to the problem of imperfect 
information. The agreement also reflects a concern about the sons of 
externalities that we identified. For instance. one provision is directed at 
reducing ETS in workplace settings61J-a noninsurancc externality. Insurance 
externalities seem also to have played some role in the agreement. Indeed, the 
very cases that Jed to the seulement-the cases brought by state auorneys 
general to recover Medicaid expenditures for smoking-related 
injuries615-were themselves motiYated by the fact that public insurance 
programs do not adjust tax rates according to each potential claimant's 
smoking status.616 Moreover. several provisions regarding specific regulation 
of cigarette designs and recipes appear to reflect a more general assumption 
that the largely unregulated cigareue market fails to encourage safer 
cigarettes.617 In short, the proposed regulations appear to be motivated by the 
same sorts of concerns that we presented in Parts I I - I I I .  
Unfortunately, however. the regulatory instruments and devices that the 
proposed resolution would employ are. roughly speaking, precisely the opposite 
of what the basic lessons of Parts IV-V suggest. That is. the seulement would 
rely almost entirely upon command-and-comrol regulations. to a lesser extent 
upon performance-based regulations, and arguably not at all on ex post 
incentive-based regulations. Rather than auempt an exhaustive analysis of the 
agreement, we concentrate in this pan on key provisions that appear intended 
to address the information and externality problems that we have identified. 
We employ the framework and lessons of Part IV to categorize each provision 
and to identify a sample of its predictable flaws. Also in this part, we examine 
the proposed settlement in terms of how well it addresses the transition issues 
that we described in Section V.C. 
6 1 3. See Tobacco Serrlemelll. supra no1c 32. at I 0. 111/ra Sub,ccllon VI B I 
6 14. See Tobacco St•rrlemelll. supra nolc 32. al 30- 3 1  
6 1 5 .  See ca>.e' cited supra nole 68. 
61 6. Cf Sugannan. '"P'" nole 277. al 1 6 1  ( noung thJI 'oc1JI 111'UrJncc progrJn1' fJ1l 10 wrt b) 
'moking 'tatu,). If 'ocial '"'ur.ince progr.im' dmrgcd lughcr prcnuum' or la\c' 10 ,molcf\, 1hc 'tJlc 
attorney' gener.il would have been unable 10 ,Jio" dJmJgc' 
6 1 7. See, e.g .. Tobacco Serrlemelll. 'Uf"" nolc 32. JI l -l - 1 6. 111/ra Sub...:c11on \'I D I 
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A. The Complete Rejection of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the proposal from our perspective is 
its nearly complete rejection of the ex post incentive-based approach. It rejects 
this approach in two ways. First, it substantially weakens the threat of tort law 
and, in any event, eliminates any beneficial deterrence effect that tort law 
might have. Second, it does not adopt any alternative form of ex post 
incentive-based regulation. 
1 .  The Proposal's Civil Liability Provisions 
The preamble of the proposal promises that the legislation, if enacted, 
would "reaffirm[] individuals' right of access to the courts, to civil trial by jury 
and to full compensatory damages."618 The details of the proposal, however, 
tell a different story. Among the most important effects of the agreement on 
tort law would be the following: 
• Attorneys general actions, class actions, and all addiction-based 
claims are settled;619 
• "[A]ll other personal injury claims are reserved";620 
• For cases regarding past conduct that are not settled by the 
agreement, no punitive damages are allowed (such damages are 
included as part of the settlement),621 only individual trials are 
allowed (no class actions and no aggre�ation of claims 
whatsoever without the defendant's consent), 22 and "protocol" 
companies623 are to share liability costs, but will not be jointl_x 
and severally liable for liability of nonprotocol manufacturers;6•4 
• A damage cap is imposed for judgments and settlements, equal to 
33% of the annual industry base payment (that is, a damage cap 
of $5 billion in most years), subject to the following conditions: 
• If judgments and settlements exceed that cap in a given year, 
the excess does not have to be paid in that year and instead 
rolls over to the following year;625 
• Any judgments or settlements run against defendants but give 
rise to an 80% credit against the annual payment in the year 
the money is paid to plaintiffs;626 
6 1 8. Tobacco Set1/e111em. supra note 32, at 2. 
619.  See id. at 39. 
620. Id. 
62 1 .  See id. 
622. See 1d. 
623. Protocol companie� include the five tobacco companie� that were parties to the agreement, as well 
as future industry entrants who opt into the protocol. 
624. See Tobacco Set1/e111e11t, supra note 32, at 39-40. 
625. See id. at 40-4 1 .  
626. See id. at 4 1 .  
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• I f  an individual judgment exceeds $ 1  mill ion. then any 
amount in excess of $ I  mill ion will not be paid that year 
unless every other judgment or settlement can be satisfied 
within the annual aggregate cap. The excess would then roll 
forward to the following year;02' 
• "In the event that the annual aggregate cap (of $5 billion ) is 
not reached in any year. a Commission appointed by the 
President will determine the appropriate al location of the 
amount representing the unused amount of the credit.""2� 
These provisions, taken together. would quite clearly work an enormous 
change in the status of tort cases, potential and actual. surrounding cigarettes. 
2. The Effect of Cii·il liability Pr<Jl'isions 
To appreciate ful ly the effect of those provisions on cigarette lawsuib, it 
is helpful to recall, briefly, the history of tobacco litigation. As many legal 
analysts have observed, lawsuits against the industry were brought in two 
"waves," both of which ultimately failed to overcome the industry's formidable 
defenses.629 Among the factors thal combined lo provide near immunity for 
the industry were the huge success of the assumption-of-risk and other 
plaintiff-conduct defenses, the federal preemption of warning-based claims. the 
difficulty faced by individual plaintiffs in proving specific causation. and the 
relatively low potential compensatory damages that individual plaintiffs could 
expect to receive even if they won."io 
In recent years, however. a number of changes have 1 mpro\ ed the 
prospects of tobacco plaintiffs. For instance. evidence has emerged from 
previously undisclosed industry documents suggesting that manufol.:tun.:rs may 
have known and manipulated the addictiveness of cigarettes. actively targeted 
their advertising at underage consumers. and publicly denied evidence that they 
had regarding the health consequences of smoking.6\1 That evidence has had 
a variety of interrelated effects. First. it has improved plaintiffs ' prospects of 
winning punitive damages. Second. in part because of the potential for 
increased damage awards. the new evidence has also given rise 10 a number 
of new substantive legal theories. many of which hold the promise of fi nally 
defeating the industry's heretofore invincible plaintiff-conduct defenses.'''' 
In addition to the new substantive legal theories. there have been significant 
627. See id. 
628. Id. 
629. See supra no1e 14.  
630. See Kelder & Daynard. supra no1c 3. a1 7 1 .  Rabin & Sugannan. "'f'm nolc 28, .11 1 6, Sch\\anL. 
supru no1e 28. at 145. 1 53. 
63 1 .  See rnpra nme' 144. 1 6 1 . 2 1 9. and acco111pan} 1ng: IC\I. ,,... u/10 KdJcr & O.i) n.ird. '"flm nolc 
3, at 64, 72-74. 76-80: Schwanz. >t1pra nolc 28. at 1 45.  1 5 .\  
632. See Kelder & Daynard. supra no1c 3 .  a 1  64. 12 · 7.t. 76, S0-85 
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procedural innovations-such as the class action lawsuit-that permit plaintiffs 
to cooperate and coordinate their efforts in a way that makes litigation against 
the tobacco industry begin to look like a fair fight.633 Those developments 
have given rise to what legal scholars call the third wave of tobacco litigation. 
Indeed, it is primarily because of those evidentiary, substantive, and procedural 
developments-and, more generally, the threat posed by the third wave-that 
the tobacco industry was, for the first time in its history, willing to negotiate 
a possible settlement. 
The limits on civil liability contained in the proposal would essentially 
return plaintiffs to the position that they were in five or ten years ago, at the 
end of the second wave. First, the proposal would eliminate punitive damages 
for past industry conduct.634 That one change alone would dramatically 
reduce the chance that any individual smoking plaintiff would ever bring a 
case against the industry. The compensatory damages in the typical case 
involving an individual smoker are relatively low,635 and most lawyers would 
be unwilling to mount a challenge against an industry notorious for its 
overpowering and relentless litigation style without any prospect of punitive 
damages.636 Moreover, without the potential claim of punitive damages, a 
plaintiff's attorney has little ability, and even less incentive, to bring into 
evidence many of the recently released (and yet to be released) documents 
detailing the most deceptive and culpable conduct of the industry. Without 
those documents, jury antipathy toward, or lack of sympathy for, smokers may 
place plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage in the courtroom.637 
633. See id. at 64. 
634. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 39. 
635. That is true simply because many smokers experience the worst or the i ll-health effect� or 
cigarettes later in life, often after a smoker ha� retired and the smoker's children arc grown. 
636. The roll-over caps on compensatory damages, see Tobacco Settleme11t, supra note 32, ut 40-4 1 .  
may also discourage plaintiffs from initiating �uits. O n  the other hand, the fact that liability would not 
substantially increase a manufacturer's coM�-a point developed below, see infra note� 640-64 1 und 
accompanying text-may remove or reduce manufacturers' incentives to defend aguin�t individuul claim\. 
In other words, plaintiffs may be more likely to win a suit under the proposed �cttlement, ull ehe bcmg 
equal, because manufacturers may be less averse to losing. 
637. The elimination of punitive damages under the settlement seems to have been ju�tified on two 
grounds. First, manufacturers thought that eliminating punitive damages would provide greater prcdictub1lity 
in their liability payouts, since punitive damages arc alleged to be especially difficult to predict. See 
generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes 011 Cog11itio11 am/ Vttlm1/w11 
in !Aw), 1 07 YALE L.J. (forthcoming May 1 998) (discussing the reasons behind wide variation> in jury 
verdicts for punitive damages). Second, us part or the settlement, the industry would be required to pay a 
sizeable chunk of money that is understood by �ome to take the place or punitive damages. Sa 'J'obm·rn 
Se/llement Hearings, supra note 442 (statement of Gale Norton), available i11 1 997 WL 1 4 1 5062 1 .  
I f  those are indeed the justifications for limiting punitive damages, however, there urc other means 
of dealing with tho�e concerns that better serve deterrence goals. For example, the �ettlement might have 
provided specifically that tobacco plaintiffs could 1101 recover punitive damages but that they could put on 
evidence of past industry conduct. Such an approach would give the indu�try the predictability with re�pect 
to punitive damages that it �eeh; the approach would also increase plaintiffs' chances or winning 
meritorious cll!>es against the industry, however, by reducing the effectiveness or plaintiff-conduct defense�. 
The settlement, as currently written, arguably would permit evidence of pu�t indu�try conduct on bsue� 
other than punitive damages. After all, the agreement merely say� that, for pa!>t conduct cu�e�. no punitive 
damages will be allowed. It says nothing about excluding evidence or past conduct for other purpo�es. See 
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Even without the carrot of punit ive damages. plaintiffs might be wil l ing 
to bring claims against manufacturers if they could continue to combine. and 
thus lower the average cost of, their  relat ively small  claims in the form of class 
actions. But that option, too, is e l iminated by the senlcmenl,61� and with it 
many of the legal theories that were economical ly viable only in class action 
form.639 
Even i f  smoking plainiiffs were somehow able to overcome the forgoing 
obstacles to bring successful individual cases against cigarenc companies. those 
suits would have virtually no deterrence value under the propo!>al because of 
the way damage payments and defense costs would be al located. According to 
the proposal, defense costs and 80CJc of l iabi l i ty costs would be d istributed 
among the tobacco companies on the basis of market share.1H0 Any inceniive, 
therefore, to develop safer cigarenes would be substaniially reduced, because 
of the unravel ing problem described above.(>.1 1 Moreover. most of those civi l  
l i abi lity costs would have been paid out by the industry even if  no member 
were held civil ly l iable. From each manufacturer's perspective, those costs arc 
fixed and therefore have no effect on ex ante accident-prevcmion incentive!>. 
If the proposal were adopted. tort law would hereafter have no beneficial 
deterrence effect in the cigarene market. 
Tobacco Seu/ement, supra note 32. at 39. (E' 1dence of pa,1 conducl \\ uuld pn:,um.ibl) be .idn"'"bk lur 
any theory of liability thal required a 'howmg of 'c1en1er on the p.in of mdu•tl) olli.:1.il>->ud1 ... , f raud 
claims.) It is nevenhele" e3'y 10 unagmc the mdu'tl) · , la\\ ) ei> r.11>111g culur.ibk obJC:Cl1u11> 111 rn.in) .:a..n 
when plaintiff' anempt 10 get 'uch evidence adm111ed Another .1pproad1 tu adlle\ mg 1hc .... me dclcm:n,·c 
and predictability objective' would be to eh1111na1c or .:.ip pum m e  d.1111age> . ... , 1hc: 111du>lr) \\ Jiii>. bu1 
simultaneously to eliminate all pla1 1111ff-cunduc1 .md \\ Jm1ng-b.1.>ed deh:n>e> 10 mdu>ll) h.1b1hl) 
Perhaps the argument 1ha1 really underl ie> 1he propu,.iJ", 1n:aunent of pumll\e d.im.1gc> " 1h.11 1un 
law punitive damages are. a' a gcnerJI pulic) mailer. unde'ir.ibk Jnd •huuld 1101 be rcqum:d ol .in) 
industry. Although that argument ha' 'omc plau,1b1hl) . \\ e  ulumalcl) find 11 unpcr>u.i"' "  hr>I. lor 1hc 
re3'ons already mentioned. 1f puniuvc damage> arc chn11na1cd. other ch.1nge> •hould .il'o be m.idc to cn,ure 
that plaintiffs will still have incentive' tu bnng clam1> Mon:O\er. from .in cffo:1enq pcr,pt.-.:11,e. 1111, m.i) 
be a context in which punitive damage> arc c'pcc1.ill) appropn ;uc .ind >huuld. 1hcrclurc. not be clun111.11cd 
The principal economic ju,tificauon fur pumuve dam.1ge> I> ba>ed on the d1fli.:uh) ul dclc:ctmg .ind 
attributing hann. Thu,, under thi' r.it1onalc. pumt1\C dam.1ge> (or d.image• 111 e\ce"' of the h.inm .:.1u-cd 1 
are appropriate only in circum,tancc> m which tho'e ham1> Jn: unhkcl)· 10 be delc:<:led or .in: unM.cl) tu 
be linked to the defendant who cau,ed them. 5, • ., Wn.l.IA\t M LA'\t>l:.S &. RtCltAIUJ ,\ l'O\'\I K. Tiii. 
EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 60-61 ( 1 987). A l\111.:hel l  Puhn•I.) & Ste, en Slw,cll. l'wumr 
Damages: An Eco1101111c A11alysis. 1 1 1  HAR\'. L. RE\' 869 ( 1 998) ll1u>e wn> uf dcl<Xl1un·.1\ u1dance 
concerns would seem to be pre,ent m the c1gan:11e collle\t G1,en recent n:' da11un, abuu1 1he c1g.m:ne 
companies' concerted effort, to 1.eep hidden mfunnallun .1buu1 1he hannfulne>> .1nd .iddicll \enc" ul 
cigarenes, the argument for allowing punitive damage> lllJ) be e'pt.-.:1.il l) >lrong " 11h rc,pc:cl 10 lhc p.i'I 
hanns caused by cigarene,. 
638. See Tobacco Setti<'ment . . 111pra note 32. at 39 l ie 'elllemelll .ign:ement oiler> no de.1.r rJllun.ilc 
for thb provi,ion. A' far a' we can 1cl l. 11 n:pre,en1' an effort .imp!) tu reduce the ch.1n'e' 1lw1 1hc 1ub.icco 
companies will ever lo,e a ton ca.,c. 
639. See supra note 68 (di"u"mg cla" acllun' brought 111 "hu;h 1he .iggrcg.111on ol clJlllh .ind 
lawyers' fee, would mal.c the c\pcn'c of ligh11ng the 1ob.1cco comp.ime' \\ urtlm lu lc 1 
640. See Tobacco Settlemenl, .111pra note 32. al -1 1  
641 .  See supra Sub,eciion l V.C.2 (de,cnb111g the unr.i,chng problem .:n:aled b) e \  .inte t.i\"' ' ·  "'I"" 
notes 99- 1 0 1  and accompanying 1cxt (dc>cnbing the unr.1,chng problem cn:alcd b) .i I re.:  m.irlct \\ hen 
consumers have only generic ri'I. mfonnauon); rnpra no1e 602 (de..:nbing 1he pu1en11.il unr.i\ehng problem 
in class actions). 
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In place of tort law, or some alternative form of ex post incentive-based 
regulation, the proposed settlement would rely almost entirely on command­
and-control and performance-based regulations to address the market failures. 
For example, in response to the problem of imperfect information, the 
agreement would implement the following: new warning requirements,642 
new marketing restrictions,643 and a "look-back" provision designed to create 
incentives to reduce underage smoking.644 In this section, we describe each 
of these proposed regulations and argue that each of them is deeply flawed, at 
least as compared to an ex post incentive-based regime of regulation. Their 
central flaws relate to the insight of Part IV above: that command-and-control 
regulation (and, to a slightly lesser degree, performance-based regulation) relies 
heavily on regulators to recognize the pertinent tradeoffs and how best to make 
them, whereas incentive-based regulation relies instead on the regulated entity, 
which is usually better informed than regulators. In analyzing the various 
provisions of the proposed settlement, we attempt to highlight a few of the 
ways in  which that somewhat abstract drawback of command-and-control and 
performance-based regulations would likely manifest itself in the proposed 
regime. 
1 .  Warning Requirements 
a. Summary of Provision 
The proposal's most obvious attempt to ensure that consumers are well­
informed is its requirement that each of the following warnings be included on 
cigarette packaging and advertising (on a rotating basis): 
• "WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive"; 
• "WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children"; 
• "WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease"; 
• "WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer"; 
• "WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease"; 
• "WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby"; 
642. See Tobacco Settlemellt, supra note 32. at 1 0- 1 1 . 
643. See id. at 8-9. 
644. See id. at 24-25. Categorizing these provbions poses a slight challenge. If tho•e regulatory 
responses were fully successful, they would solve the underlying consumer-information market fai lure und 
would meet all the information-related deterrence goals that we seek to obtain through victim-mitmted el\ 
post incentive-based regulation. Thus, those categories of provisions arguably ;hare the more ambitious goul 
of incentive-based regulation: transforming a malfunctioning market into a well-functioning market. Decuu•e 
the provisions take the form of command-and-control regulations, however, they constitute •Omewlmt of 
a hybrid between command-and-control-style regulation and incentive-ba•ed regulation. However they arc 
categorized, they contain all the drawbacb of pure command-and-control regulation•. 
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• "WARNING:  Smoking can kill you" ; 
• "WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung d isease in non­
smokers'·; 
"WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks 
to your health."645 
Those warnings would appear in white lettering on a black background and 
would occupy at least 25% of the front of a cigarette pack. near the top.(>.16 
b .  Critique 
Although the proposed warning requirements arc doubtlc�s an 
improvement over the current ones.1..:7 that is not say ing much. Like the 
current warning requirements, the proposed warning requirements would be 
largely ineffective as a means of overcoming the various sources of imperfect 
consumer information. 
For instance, most of the proposed warnings are phra�ed to influcncl! 
general, not personal. beliefs (thus fail ing to overcome the third-pl!r�on 
effect648). Those warnings directed al the indi\' idual smokl!r. ml!all\'-' hik. 
leave room for considerable doubt (and may e\'en crl!ate doubb l rl!gardrng th!! 
relative risks posed.649 Furthermore. the warnings do not specify qualitativdy 
or quantitatively the actual risks posed by cigarettes in ll!rm� of l!ithcr 
probabi l ities or magnitudes. In short, the proposed warnings appear unlikdy 
to convey any health-risk information that most smokers do not alrl!ady havl! 
(which is not to say that consumers are now adequately informed of th!! ri�"-� >. 
S imilarly, the problem of addiction is not addressed by the warning).. Only 
one warning even mentions the addictiveness of cigarettes, noting simply that 
645. Tobacco Se11/e111e111. supra note 32. at I 0. 
646. See id. at I 0- 1 1 .  In addition, the FDA " ould be required under the propo'-11 to promulgJte J rule 
governing the dbclo,ure of tobacco smoke con,t1tuen1,. Srr ul at 1 1 .  1 9-20 :O.lanul .u:tun:r' " ould nc:i:d 
to dbclose to the FDA all ingredient> added to their c1garene>- :O.loreo, er. the) \\ OulJ need to J1...:l<h<: 
ingredient information to con,umer.. � food manufacturer.. no\\ mu,1 d1-.: lo..e food JJJ1tl \ e' Su id 
647. See infra note 649 (li,ttng the current warning requirement. I 
648. See supra Sub,ection 11.B. I .  (de,cnbtng the tlurd-pcr..on effect and 11' 1111plu:J1101h 1  
649. Cf. HILTS. supra note 1 2. a l  1 2- 1 3. 1 7 - 1 8  <dc1a1ltng the rndu,tr) » u..e o f  .1 111.1"1\e public 
relations campaign addre,,ed bo1h to doctor.. and 10 ordrn.1� ci111en' .inacl.rng the ...:1c111111o.: dJtJ Jnd lhc 
scientisls behind it � a mean, of r.ii'1ng doubt aboul the haL.ard, of c1g.1renc•l 
Previous warning' were 'UbJeCt to 1he ,ame cnt1<·1>111' 111e ongtnal \\ amrng 111.1nd.11c<l m 1 965 J1J 
refer to the con,umer directly, bu1 w� qu11c unemphanc tn 11' me"age ··c .1u11on C1g.111:ne Smol..tng :0.1.i) 
Be Hazardou' to Your Health."" Feder.ii C1garene Labeling and Ad\C:nt'1ng A.:t of 1 965. Pub L �o 89·92. 
§ 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (codified a, amended al 15 l' S C  § 1 3 33 d 99-l 11 I n  1 98-1. the n:quin:ment ""'' 
expanded to four rotating warning': ( I )  ··smol..ing C .iu":' Lung C .in•er. I le.irt D1...:J...e. Emph) ...:111.1. And 
May Complicate Pregnancy'": (2)  ··Quilli ng Smol..tng !'o" Gre.itl) Redu.:e, Scnou' R1,1.., 10 Your l leJhh'". 
(3) .. Smoking by Pregnant Women May Rc,uh in Fc1al lnJu�. Prema1ure Birth. And Lo" Birth Wc1g111··. 
(4) .. Cigarette Smoke Contain, Carbon Mono'1de ·· Compn:hcn, l \ e Smol..mt: Etlu•.111on Act of l lJ�. Pub 
L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200. 220 1 -03 ( 1 98-l ) (co<l1hcd at 1 5  l" S C  � 1 3 3 3 1  Of the lour. onl) one 
refers to the con,umer"' personal n,1.. Moreover. 11 " not ckar \\ hclher lhat \\Jm111g .1'1u.1 l l)  d1...:ouragc' 
smoking. See supra no1e 1 57. One of the warning' addre"c' 11.ell onl) to .1 group 1pn:gnJlll \\ u111en1 111.11 
exclude' mo,1 con,umers. 
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"[c]igarettes are addictive."650 Acknowledging that cigarettes are addictive, 
however, does little or nothing to respond specifically to the addiction 
problems that we described in Subsection II.B.4: the problem of path 
dependence, the problem of myopia, and the problem of multiple selves.65 1 
Indeed, one of the warnings continues to emphasize that serious health risks 
can be reduced by quitting. As we explained above,652 such a warning could 
have the perverse effect of lowering the impact of all the other warnings. 
Finally, the greater number and more prominent display of warnings could 
encourage smoking, particularly among children, by enhancing cigarettes' 
image as forbidden fruit.653 Cigarette manufacturers would continue,654 as 
best they could, to promote that image through their marketing and would 
otherwise attempt to downplay the risks of their products. For those sorts of 
reasons, the proposed warning requirements are likely to be ineffective or, 
worse, counterproductive.655 
2. Marketing Restrictions and Antismoking Advertising 
a. Summary of Provisions 
The second general way in which the agreement seeks to address the 
information problem would be to "drastically curtail[]" the "advertising and 
marketing of tobacco products"656 and to require the industry to spend 
millions annually on antismoking advertisements targeted at young consumers. 
650. Tobacco Settlemellt, supra note 32, at J O. 
65 1 .  Moreover, the meaning of the word "addiction" may be unclear to some polential �moker�. Set• 
supra note 256. 
652. See supra note 1 57. A related problem may be created by the proposal'� empha�is on the 
financing of smoking cessation programs. Lowering the perceived exit co�ts ha� two effects. Some people 
will exit while the going is good. Others will smoke more because they will have greater confidence tlmt 
they will be able to quit when they want. 
653. There is growing evidence that warnings may actually give a product an enhanced glos� and 
induce consumers, particularly young consumers, to purchase it. For example, seveml studies huvc 
demonstmted a "forbidden fruit" effect of television parental advisory warnings for violent �hows. Set'. e.g., 
Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit Versus Tai11tecl Fruit: Ef ects of WC1ming u1bels 011 
Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 207 ( 1 996). Similar �tudie� on the 
labeling effects on alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks also support the theory that the warning it�elf may 
serve to make the product appear more attractive. See, e.g., John M. Springer & Craig T. Nago�hi, Magirnl 
Thinking ancl Alcohol labels, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 767 ( 1 99 1 ). 
654. The forbidden fruit effect of warnings is probably not news to cigarette marketers. See, e.g., RJR 
Memorandum, supra note 16 1  (concluding that "a new bmnd aimed at the young group should not in uny 
way be promoted as a 'health' brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk" and stating that "the 
warning label on the package may be a plus"'). 
655. The warning requirements would likely abo have a preemptive effect on civil liability cluims 
inasmuch as they would produce de jure preemption of inadequate-warning claims and de facto prccmpllun 
of other producis liabilily claim�. Cf Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 ( 1 992) (plurality 
opinion) (finding failure-to-warn claims preempled by fedeml law); supra note 9 (de�cribing the irony of 
the Cipollone decision in thi� regard). Manufacturers' assumption-of-risk defenses would be even more 
robust, if that is possible, than they have been lo date. To the extent that tort law would have any beneficial 
deterrence effect under the propo�ed regime that effect would be further attcnualed. 
656. Tobacco Settleme/11, supra note 32, at 8. 
1 998] The Costs of Cigarettes 1 325 
Among other things, the new regime would. consistent with the FDA's tobacco 
regulations of 1 996: 
"Restrict permissible tobacco product advertising to black text on 
a white background except for advertising in adult-only facilities 
and in adult publications";6�7 
"Require cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertisements 
to carry the FDA-mandated statement of intended use ( 'Nicotine 
Delivery Device' )";658 
• "Ban all non-tobacco merchandise. including caps. jackets or bags 
bearing the name, logo or sel ling message of a tobacco 
brand";659 
• "Ban offers of non-tobacco items or gifts based on proof of 
purchase of tobacco products";('°° 
"Ban sponsorships. including concerts and sporting events. in the 
name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand . . .  1. • .t. i  
Going beyond current FDA regulations. the new regime would also: 
• "Ban the use of human images and cartoon characters-thereby 
eliminating Joe Camei and the Marlboro Man-in all 1oba,co 
advertising and on tobacco product packages·•;(><·� 
"Ban all outdoor tobacco produce advertising";""' 
• "Prohibit tobacco product advertising on the Internee unless 
designed to be inaccessible in or from the United Scates·· ;'".: 
"Establish nationwide restrictions in non adult-only facilities on 
point of sale advertising with a view toward minimizing 1he 
impact of such advertising on minors";6M 
"Ban direct and indirect payments for tobacco product placement 
in movies, television programs and video games'' ;61.i. 
"Prohibit direct and indirect paymems to 'glamorize· 1obacco use 
in media appealing to minors. including recorded and live 
performances of music";6<·7 
0 "[R]equire that the use . . . of words currently employed as 
product descriptors (e.g., ' l ight' or ' low tar ' )  be accompanied by 
a mandatory disclaimer in advertiscmenls (e.g .. 'Brand X not 
shown to be less hazardous than other cigarettes · )  . . . .  •>M-\ 
657. Id. at 8 (citing 2 1  C.F.R. § 897.32(a)-(bJ ( 1 997)! 
658. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(c J). 
659. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)). 
660. Id. (citing 2 1  C.F.R. !I 897.34(b l)  
66 1 .  Id. at 9 (cuing 21  C.F.R. !I 897.34(c)) 
662. Id. 
663. Id. 
664. Id. 
665. Id. 
666. Id. 
667. Id. 
668. Id. 
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In addition to the limitations placed on advertising, the proposal would 
require the industry to fund "a $500 million annual, national education-oriented 
counter-advertising and tobacco control campaign seeking to discourage the 
initiation of tobacco use by children and adolescents and to encourage current 
tobacco product users to quit use of the products."669 As with most of the 
advertising limitations, this provision evinces a special interest in discouraging 
underage smoking.670 
b. Critique 
The goal of the marketing restrictions is not to inform consumers but to 
protect them from being misinformed by manufacturers. The command-and­
control approach to the problem, however, contains all the predictable and 
classic regulatory flaws. For instance, the restnct1ons may prevent 
manufacturers from effectively marketing healthier cigarettes, thereby reducing 
the companies' incentives to develop such cigarettes.671 In contrast, if 
manufacturers were forced to internalize the costs that their products pose 
through, for instance, an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, then 
advertising restrictions would be less necessary since manufacturers would 
market their cigarettes in a way that minimizes the total injury costs of 
cigarettes.672 So long as manufacturers bear the total costs associated with 
669. Id. at 3; see also id. at 37-38 (describing the public education campaign in slightly more dctui lJ. 
670. The preamble strongly implies that the primary goal of the settlement is to dbcournge undcrngc 
tobacco use. See id. at I .  Nowhere does it explain, however, why that goal should have priority over other 
potential goals. One expert has slated that it is likely that the prioritization of underage �moking renccb 
the history of the politics of smoking. Antismoking groups have long recognized lhal their �lrongcM 
political playing card has been underage smoking. There were already laws against it, law� lhul were 
largely unenforced. The fact that virtually all smokers pick up the habit when they arc minors and the fuct 
that smoking is addictive and dangerous h� made the case against underage smoking e�peciully easy to 
support. Interview with Richard Daynard, Chair of the Tobacco Product� Liability Projecl, Norlheu�lern 
University School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (July 22, 1 997). 
67 1 .  Cf V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 47-48 (arguing that governmental advertbing reslrictions huve 
discoumged safety innovations in cigarettes). 
672. See Croley & Hanson, E111erprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92. Many commentators agree 
that safer cigarette designs are viable. See, e.g., John Freeman, '60 Minutes' Stokes Cigarelle Co11trcll'ersy, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIS., Apr. I ,  1 994, at E l 4  (describing u 60 Minutes episode lhal charged Philip Morri� 
with hiding for years its capability to produce a cigarette that could have prevented thousand� of fire-re luted 
deaths and injuries); cf George Rodrique, 'Safe ' Cigarelle Ignored, Researcher Says, D1\LLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 1 7, 1 997, at I H  (quoting former Philip Morris researcher Victor DeNoble alleging thul for 
decades tobacco companies have rejected plans to make cigarettes safer); John Schwartz, New Cigarelle 
Clears the Smoke, bw the Heal Is Still 011, WASH. POST, May 27, 1 996, at A3 (quoting u former Brown 
& Williamson research director alleging that tobacco companies have been rejecting de�igns for �ater 
cigarettes due lo fear of legal liability). Critics of the tort system and defenders of the cigarette indu\lry 
place blame for the fuel that those designs have yet to be marketed �uccessfully on existing products 
liability laws. See, e.g., Norihiko Shirouzu, Low-Smoke Cigarelle Catches Fire in Japcm. WALL ST. J., Sept. 
8, 1 997, at B I  ("[l]f the liability issue gets settled, many expect the U.S. makers to devise new products 
with safety features."). According to this argument, if manufacturers were to produce u �afer cigurcllc, then 
that cigarette would be used as evidence against them to prove that their older de�ign was defective. Cf. 
Freedman, supra note 1 6 1  (reporting the whistleblowing testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, in which he 
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their products, they have a significantly reduced incentive to mislead 
consumers with respect to the risk properties of cigarettes.673 Manufacturers 
would have to pay for the costs that they understate. and. in that sense. their 
claims would be bonded. Moreover. even if they understate the risks. cigarette 
manufacturers would still have to charge a price that reflects true risks. The 
price would, in effect, inform consumers and. at least potentially. counceract 
false claims. 
Similarly, though cigarette manufacturers would still seek to target 
consumers, their motives in targeting consumers would be very different than 
they are now. Under an incentive-based regime, manufacturers would direct 
their marketing to low-risk smokers.674 There are a number of ways in which 
consumers may be low-risk. For example, some consumers may be more 
l ikely, other things being equal. to quit smoking before suffering many of the 
ill-health effects of long-term smoking. There is some evidence. for example. 
that quitting rates increase as education levels and age of initiation 
increase.675 Different, identifiable groups may be more (or less ) likely to 
suffer serious ill-health effects of smoking. For instance, the younger a person 
is when he or she starts smoking, the greater will be that person's chances of 
developing lung cancer, other things being equal.676 Thus, under an 
described how he was told by the CEO of Bro\\ n & W1Iham,on. for whom Wigand w'" wort..mg .it the 
time, that ""there would be no funher d1"u"1on or cffon, on any "'uc' n:latc<l to a ..ifcr c1gan:nc:· 
because ""[a]ny re,earch on a ,afer c1garcne would clearly e:..po-c every other product '" un..ife .ind. 
therefore. present a liability i"ue m tenm of any type of h11gal10n°0). Whether or nol lhc argument " \'ahd 
with respect to the current produci. liabiluy rcgnne. II " clear 1ha1 an cntcrpn-c hab1ht) n:g1mc. or wme 
other ex post incentive-ba,ed regulatory mcchani,m. \\ould gn:all) cncourJge .afcr c1gan:ll<:<> The 
manufacrnrer would be !table for all c1garcne-cau,cd hann,. regardlc" of the dc.ign of the c1garene Thu' 
manufacturers could lower their total co't' only by mal..mg co,l-JU'llfiablc: .afcl) nnpro, emcnl' 
673. See supra Sub,eclion IV.D.3. The hi.loncal mart..c11ng 'lr.ilcgy of ··10" tar c1gan:no." J<'<' 
VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 37-4 1 .  i' a perfect example of the problem' that ma) an-c \\hen manufacturer' 
lack the incentive' to take co't' mlo their calcula11on,. See supra note' I 02· I 07 and accompany mg text 
A' Hilts points out. the ··Jaw tar cigarcne·· did not \\orl.. '" a hcallh concc:pl. bc:cau-c ''(p)uffing I� or 
differently on a high tar cigarene might well be more effoc11vc:," HILTS. rnpm note 1 2. al 6 1 .  but 11 wa.. 
nonetheless manipulated by the indu,try for 11' innately appealing ··ad' c:m"ng concept," rd Thu" ·1110-c: 
most concerned about genmg le" tar may not get le" tar. but they feel bc:nc:r about u .. Id 
674. See supra Sec11on VB. I .  
675. See Teen Smokers Find Halm Hard To Br!'a( S11td1 Sau. Pl!OE,I\ GAlJTTl. tAn1 J .  Feb 1 6. 
1 996, at AS (quoting a 'tudy finding thal the quilling rJte \\.!' 4 4"< for people: \\ ho began 'mol..mg before 
age 14, 9.6% for people who 'taned between age' 14 and 1 6. and 1 3  69< for tho...: \\ ho 'ianc:d Jftc:r .igc 
1 6). Lloyd D. John,lon, the director of a ma1or ,1udy of lt'Cnagc: 'mol..mg . .ard that ''the )Ounger people: 
'tan smoking, the more likely their habit " to 1al..e hold ·· Don Colburn. Rue 111 fan SmvJ.1111: I/tu 
Erperrs Vexed, WASH. Posr. Sept. I O. 1 996. at Z7. The Surgeon Gener.ii" Progn:'' Rc:pon tracb qu1111ng 
r.ite' between 1 966 and 1 985. See Sl"RGEO'-' GE�ERAL0S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpm nolc: 3 Tiic: 'ludy nolt:' 
that quitting in 1 985 W3' h1ghe't among college gr.iduate' (6 1 I � >  and much Jo\\cr among 1ho..c: \\ llh wme 
college education (46.0%). high 'chool gr.iduale' wuhoul college: 140 59< l. and lho..c: " uhoul a high -chool 
diploma (4 1 .3%). See td. at 287 tbl.9. The rcpon aJ,o noic' a ··mc:hefold d1ffc:n:nce rn 1he r.i1c: of decline: 
in 'mol,.ing prevalence between the mo'l and lea'l educated group' rn our ">Crcl) ·· Id JI 2 7 1  
676. See Sl!RGE0:-1 GE:-.ERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpra nolc: 3. J l  44 ("'Tht ml.. o f  de,c:Joprng lung 
cancer was greatest for tho'e who began 'mokmg al an earl) age: '"). Lur' G E\Cobc:do. Sporrs 
Participation, Age at Smokmg /111111111<111. and rhr• Rtlk of Smol.mg Among U S  l/1gh 5< lwol S1111frn1J. 269 
JAMA 1 39 1 .  1 393-94 ( 1 993) (""It i' abo known 1ha1 lung cancer monaluy " h1ghe,1 among .iduli- " ho 
began 'making before age 1 5  year...""). 
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incentive-based regulatory system, manufacturers would not only lose some of 
their incentive to target children, they would also have an incentive to 
discourage children from smoking. 
Without some type of incentive-based regulation, however, advertising 
restrictions merely create incentives for manufacturers to find loopholes 
through which they can continue to target underage smokers or otherwise 
"disinform" consumers.677 Indeed, a common critique of the proposal is that 
manufacturers would still be able to advertise effectively to kids.678 That 
critique has significant empirical, as well as theoretical, underpinnings. In 
countries that have previously adopted advertising restrictions equivalent to, or 
greater than, those envisaged in the agreement, cigarette manufacturers 
continue to target young smokers successfully.679 Similarly, although many 
commentators appear to have a strong intuition that current industry marketing 
practices have had an effect on the number of underage smokers, the evidence 
supporting that intuition is, at best, spotty.680 Evidence regarding the effects 
of antismoking advertisements or public service announcements of the sort that 
677. See supra Subsection JV.D. I .  Arguments have been made that the industry relic� heavily on its 
underage consumer population. As one author expressed the point, "[l]f ii were true that the companies 
steer clear of children, as they say, the entire industry would collapse within a �ingle generation." HILTS, 
supra note 1 2, at 65. In fact, a look at past effort� of manufacturers 10 deter underage smoking indicate� 
that many of the company-initiated programs were "useless and silly on their face. For example . . .  'Puck 
notices. We will place a notice on all of our pack� and carton�: "Underage �ale� prohibited.""' Id. at 99. 
To the extent that manufacturers would be prevented from advertising under the proposed regime, retailers 
may be able to step in and fill  that marketing void. Although there arc l icensing requirements in the 
agreement that would appear 10 require sellers lo comply with the terms of the agreement, it is not clcur 
whether conditioning a license on the licensee's consent lo give up FirM Amendment privileges b 
constitutional. See Hearings on the Global Tobacco Settlement Before the Semite Judiciary Comm., I OSth 
Cong. ( 1 997) (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe), available in 1 997 WL 1 1 234937 [hcreinartcr Tribe 
Testimony]; Douglas J. Wood, Will Bans on Tobacco Ads Pass Muster?, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1 997, at B9. 
678. Interview with Richard Daynard, supra note 670. 
679. See. e.g., Brion J. Fox et al., Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of the United States Tobacco 
Litigation 35 (Aug. 20, 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Jmmw/) (describing 
common advertising practices in other countries with �ubstantial advertising restrictions and concluding thul 
"(!]he advertising restrictions [in the settlement] are . . .  unlikely to significantly reduce the pervasivcnes� 
of tobacco imagery in society"); John R. Garrison, CEO, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at the News 
Conference on Potential Tobacco Settlement (June 1 7, 1 997) (asserting that "(l]he ability of the tobucco 
industry to reinvent itself and circumvent . . .  restrictions" on targeting children is "remarkable"). In 
reaction to the proposed settlement in this country, advertising finns arc said to be working already on new, 
effective ways to advertise within the limits of the settlement. See Yumiko Ono, Firms Scramble for lVc1ys 
To Sell Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1 997, at B l  I .  
680. According to some commentators, what little evidence there is suggests that the principal effect 
of current marketing is on consumers' choice of which br.mds lo smoke rather than on whether or not lo 
smoke. For example, Douglas Wood argues: 
[N]o study has been conducted that prove� advertising motivates any child 10 take up smoking. 
Studies that have been performed show that peer pre�surc and sibling and parental examples ure 
primary reasons a child begins to smoke. 
Nor, to date, is there any study �howing that advertising cau�es children who have cho�en 
10 smoke 10 continue doing so. Although advertising may cau�e someone to switch brand�. 
banning certain advertising methods 10 avoid brand switching, let alone the complete bun of 
certain media proposed by the settlement, would probably not with�tand conslilulional muster. 
Wood, supra note 677. For a summary of the evidence suggesting that advertbing does encourage underage 
consumers to smoke, sec Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, al 65-66. 
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would likely be implemented in the proposed regime is also mixed.M1 
California enacted a counter-advertising campaign in 1 990, which served as a 
model for the settlement proposal.6s: Teenage smoking rates in California, 
however, have increased, not decreased. since 1 990.t.si As with warnings. 
counter-advertising may even enhance underage demand for cigarelles insofar 
as they bestow on cigarettes a forbidden fruit quali1y.t-..i As much as 
proponents of the agreement might believe 1ha1 the advertising res1rictions will 
substantially reduce underage smoking. 1here is li111e e\ idence to support 1ha1 
belief.685 Indeed, the evidence suggesls 1hat by far 1he be�I means of 
lowering underage smoking is a price incrcase."M• which. of cour�e. is whal 
an incentive-based system would yield. 
We have a more fundamen1al concern aboul 1he child-cen1ric na1ure of 1he 
marketing restrictions (and of the ''look-back" provisionM-). Even assuming 
that the proposed strategies would be complc1ely cff ective. it remains a 
significant problem in our view that many of the underage consumers who 
would have started smoking before the strategies were implemented might. 
once the strategies were implemented. begin a few years later. Supporters and 
opponents of the deal have argued that the trick to preventing people from ever 
smoking is simply to make certain they do not begin smoking before they arc 
eighteen, because under the current regime most smokers begin well before 
they are eighteen.688 That argument. however. is based on an unproven and 
68 1 .  See John Schv.,anz. Officwl> St•t•J.. a P<11h fo Cut 11110 Ila:<' of fo11th SmoJ.111�, lh<" llo110111 l111<" 
No One Knows \Vhm \Vorks. WASH, POST. Nov. 2. 1 997. al A l  (""De,pne all of lhe Jlll1- 1obacco effort, 111 
recent years, teenager..· altitude' tov. ard 'mol..mg are gro\\ lng more l)()"t" e " 1 
682. See Adehon. s11pra note 1 63. 
683. See id. 
684. See id. ('"[S]ome expen' note that the more "nol..ing come' under Jltad. b) Jdult,, 1he more: 
attractive or 'cooler" it become' to many teen-ager- "" >. >1tpra note 6)3 Jnd accornpan) mg tc:\t 1 d1-cu'"ng 
the concept of "forbidden fruit"' in the context of the 'cnlement\ \\am111g pro' "'""' 
685. Similarly d1,couraging re'ult' have recent I) been reported " nh ropccl 10 1hc c:flort• 111 
Massachusens to reduce underage 'mol..mg by more 'tnngcnl l) enfotnng la\\ ' prol11b11111g �le. lo nuno� 
See Nancy A. Rigoni et aL, The Effect of Enforrmg foba« o·Saln LJ.111 l "" • .\do/"" <'lllJ ' . .\n <"H lo 
Tobacco and Smoking Beha1wr, 337 NEW E�G- J MED 1 04-1 t 1 997 I trepomng 1he rc:,uli. of J mo·) eJr 
study 3'Ses,ing 'ale' of cigarene, to mmor.. and ) Oung people", JCCe" to. and u..: of, c1gJ1c:1t.:. 111 
Massachu,en' communit1e' and concludmg that \\ ell-enfon:ed JobJcco �1c, IJ" ' did not Jlter nuno�· 
perceived acces' to cigarette' or their con,umpt1on Jc:,cl,I  
686. See Schwanz. supra note 68 1 :  ><'<' "'"' Richard Toml..111,, Afrn lh<' Smol..t' llm Clt'<JT<'d flt<' 
Tobacco /nd11s1ry May Ha1·e Gor off Llglrtfl 111 /1> Pmpmc-d S<"lll<"m<'lll 11 11/r l "  S Swrn. Ft' .\'Cl.\t Posr 
(N.Y.), June 25, 1 997, at 8 (notmg that other countnc' ha'c found ljrge pnce mcrea.c' to be parttculJrl) 
effective at reducing the demand for cigarette' among 1hc ) oung I 
687. The look-back provi,1on, v. h1ch " 'ummarw:d and cnt1qucd 111/m Sub..:cuon \'I B 3. •late' tlwt 
'"[a] central aim of thb leg"lauon '' to ach1c\'c drJm.1tic jnd 1111mc:d1J1e rcducuon' 111 1he number of 
underage consumers of tobacco product>." Toba« o 5,,11/c-mc-111. >1111m note 31. at :!-I 
688. See. e.g . •  Thoma' W. Mernll .  Financial Pcnah1e' for Youth S111ol..111g 3 1 1 997 1 <unpubll,hcd 
manu,cript, on file with the >tile law Jounw/) (""We 1..no" thJt fe" Jdulb •tJrt ,mol..111g Jfter the age of 
2 1 .  So if the tobacco companic' agree to a progrJm that " ould jCtual l) reduce the 111c1dence of underage 
'moking by 60%, thi' would put them on a path pounmg to\\ ard the C\ entual d.:.1ruction of 1hcir dome.lie 
market."); Gerald J. Thain, The Fir..t Amendment and Re,tncuon' on Cummemal Speech m the "Tob.icco 
Settlement": An Analy'i' 2 (Oct. 1 6, 1 997) (unpubl"hed 111Jnu,cnpt. on tile \\llh the fofr um Jmmw/J 
('"There is overwhelming evidence [that] the con,u111pt1on of c1garenc' " 1 11 dee I me dr.unallcJll) 1f ,mol..111g 
doe' not begin until the age when n " legaL") 
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dubious premise. Evidence of when smokers start under the current regime 
reveals nothing about when they would start under the proposed regime. If one 
assumes, as many industry critics do, that marketing efforts have been partially 
responsible for encouraging underage consumers to start smoking,689 and if 
such marketing were successfully curtailed under the agreement, it seems likely 
that manufacturers would begin targeting slightly older consumers. Advertising 
and selling cigarettes to eighteen year-olds are perfectly acceptable activities 
under the agreement. And if manufacturers can successfully target fourteen 
year-olds, it seems plausible that they will be just as successful at targeting 
eighteen year-olds.690 Indeed, the most recent Camel advertisements suggest 
that that is precisely the strategy that R.J. Reynolds plans on adopting. The 
animated Joe Camel campaign has been recently replaced with a variety of 
other advertising campaigns, including explicitly sexual imagery.691 
Finally, although we understand and agree that protecting children from the 
dangers of smoking is felt to be an especially strong need, the information 
problems that we described in Part II do not apply exclusively to children. 
Although some of those information problems may be more significant with 
respect to underage smokers (for example, the problem of myopia), none of the 
problems is age-specific. Thus the proposal's tendency to draw a bright line 
at the age of eighteen creates distinctions that are legalistic and irrelevant. One 
benefit of an incentive-based approach, by contrast, is that no such arbitrary 
lines appear. Any distinctions in advertising practices under such a regime 
would be based on the total costs caused by the cigarettes as marketed to a 
particular group.692 
689. See, e.g., Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 65-66; Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy und 
Public Health, Final Report 5 ( 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Journal); suprtt 
note 25 and accompanying text. 
690. Under the current regime, there may be a sort of race to the bottom of the age groups of potcntiul 
smokers. If a manufacturer can hook a young child, that manufacturer not only gains revenues of thul 
smoker for the following three or four years, while the smoker is still a minor, but also for the years 
following the time that the smoker reaches majority in which the smoker continues to smoke lhut 
manufacturer's brands. Thus, the targeted marketing of manufacturers may nol be motivuled by an ultempt 
to hook the only age group that is potentially hookable, but to hook the hookable people at the eurlie�t 
possible moment. Assuming that the regulations succeed only in postponing the age at which many long­
term smokers initiate their habits, those regulation� may still have u benefit. Specifically, �moker� who Murt 
at a later age may be, on average, le�s adversely affected by their habit. See suprtt nole 676 und 
accompanying text. 
69 1 .  See Yumiko Ono & Bruce Inge�oll, RJR Retires Joe Camel, Adds Sexy Smokers, WALL ST. J., 
July 1 1 , 1 997, at B I .  R.J. Reynolds decided to end the Joe Camel campaign six weeh after the FTC 
brought an unfair-advertising complaint against the company. See id. Some antismoking advocates claim 
that the decision was made in an effort to avoid turning over certain internal documents. See id. 
692. See supra Subsection IV.D. l .  To be clear, we do not neces�arily object lo a regulatory regime 
that includes some command-and-control regulations and some performance-ba�ed regulations to help 
prevent underage consumers from smoking. Instead, we object to a regulatory regime that relics exclusively 
on �uch regulations as opposed to one in which they serve to supplement incentive-ba�ed, co�l-internalizing 
regulation. 
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3. The "Look-Back" Provision 
a. Sununary of Provision 
To supplement the command-and-control regulation that we have thus far 
described, the proposal includes a so-called "look-back" provision, which is a 
form of performance-based regulation designed to reduce the level of underage 
tobacco use.693 The performance targets are roughly as follows: Underage use 
of cigarettes would have to decline by at least 30% by the fifth year after the 
proposal is enacted, 50% by the seventh year, and 60% by the tenth year.69-1 
Those targets would be measured against the estimated underage smoking 
levels that have prevailed over the last decade according to the University of 
Michigan's Monitoring the Future study.695 If the targets are not met, the 
proposal would authorize (and require) the FDA to impose a surcharge on the 
tobacco industry in an amount that would approximate the "present value of 
the profit the industry would earn over the lives of all underage users in excess 
of the target," subject to an annual cap of $2 billion.696 
b. Critique 
The look-back provision was designed to ensure that, even if the other 
proposed regulations aimed at underage smokers (for example, the advertising 
restrictions) do not have their intended effect, the industry would nevertheless 
have a powerful incentive to reduce underage smoking to acceptable 
levels.697 To use the taxonomy of this Article, the look-back provision can 
be understood as a form of state-initiated ex post performance-based 
regulation.698 The look-back provision-or perhaps a modified version of 
693. See Tobacco Se11leme11t. supra note 32. app. \' at 5 1  (>ummanzmg the ··1001.-bad.'' pro' 1'10n) 
694. See id. at 52. 
695. Although we focus. for simplicity. on c1garcnc>. >11111lar target> \\ould be unpo...:tl for •molclo.s 
tobacco products. Based on an analy>is of the look-back pro' l>IOn in the propo>al and of the �lonuonng 
the Fucure study. Professor Hams estimate> the ''ba>e percentage" of underage d:ul) >molen l!he 1 986-
1 996 historical average) to be 1 5.2%. See Jeffrey E Ham>. Prepared Remans al the Amcm:an Cancer 
Society's Press Conference on the Proposed Tobacco lndu>tf) -W1de Re>olu11on 2 (Jul) 24. 1 9971  (tran...:npt 
on file with the Yale Law Journal). Thu>. for example. the fi \ C-) ear goal of a 30"C reducuon from the ba>c 
percentage would mean a target rate of 1 0.6% underage >moken. That target. a> Ham' points out. \\ould 
amount to a 58% reduction from the current 1 996 le\ cl of underage >mokmg. \\)11ch I> 1 8  2'7< Sa 1d. 
696. Tobacco Se11le111e111, supra note 32. at 24. Under the agreement. the >urchargc \\ould be S80 
million for each percentage point difference between the target percentage rcducuon of underage •mok.mg 
and the actual percentage reduction. See 1d. app. V at 53. 
697. See id. at 24-25. 
698. Presumably the provision is mouvated either by the >Ort> of con>umer-mformauon mark.ct fo1lun" 
described infra Part II or by a political or ph1lo>oph1cal dcc1>1on that people under the age of 1 8  •imply 
should not smoke. We are by no means again>! rcgulauon> motl\·ated by a de>1re to provide >pcc1al 
protection 10 children. To serve that goal. we arc not a\ er>e to >upplcmenung e� po>! mccnU\e·ba5Cd 
systems of regulation with other types that are >pcc1fically directed at protccung duldrcn Jn many c=. 
as in this one. however. we believe that ex post mccnu vc-ba.cd rcgulauon> bener >en c that pamcular goal 
than do the alternatives. 
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it-is considered by most policymakers and analysts to be the most promising 
means of ensuring that underage smoking is curtailed.699 That makes some 
sense, in light of the weaknesses that we have already highlighted with respect 
to the command-and-control regulations intended to limit underage smoking. 
Unfortunately, however, all of the sorts of flaws in the proposed command­
and-control regulations afflict the performance-based look-back program as 
well. 
As we described in Section IV.B, performance standards may seem to 
require less information on the part of the regulator than command-and-control 
regulation does. When one considers the information necessary to choose the 
standard in the first place, however, it becomes clear that fully efficient 
performance-based regulations require all the same information that is required 
of command-and-control regulations. To make this point clear, consider the 
target reductions in underage smoking-30%, 50%, then finally 60%. Where 
did those numbers come from? Why not target reductions of 1 00%, or 80%, 
or 23%? As we indicated in Section IV.B, with performance-based regulation 
the first necessary step is to justify the performance target. If the target 
percentages in the proposal come from some political or philosophical 
conclusion that a 60% eventual reduction in the level of underage smoking is 
the best achievable end state, it would be helpful to have that spelled out along 
with the arguments and the evidence behind those conclusions.700 In any 
event, the look-back provision would provide absolutely no incentive to reduce 
underage smoking rates by more than 60%, even if the costs to manufacturers 
of encouraging further reductions were quite low. 
If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the target levels of underage 
smoking were well chosen, that does not imply that the proposed regulation 
will generate the target outcomes. Indeed, a close examination of the look-back 
provision reveals numerous reasons that it will almost certainly fail to achieve 
the target goals. First, as some critics of the agreement have indicated, the 
penalty imposed for failure to meet the targets is inadequate.701 The proposed 
$80 million penalty for each percentage point by which the target is missed 
represents an underestimate of what it is supposed to reflect, "the present value 
699. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 688, at 2 (noting that the look-back program appears "to be the 
crucial variable in deciding whether the global senlement is a tremendous breakthrough"). 
700. The fact that no one, as far as we know, has challenged those numbers is not nccessurily evidence 
of the fact that they are optimal percentages. More likely, the lack of criticism reflects the fuel that no one 
knows the optimal percentages, a fact that itself contributes to our case for an ex post incentive-bused 
regulatory approach. 
701 .  See, e.g., Do11't Revise Pact, TtJbacco Firms Tell Cli11to11, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1 997, ut A20 
(quoting Bruce Recd, President Clinton's top advber on tobacco is�ues: "We've made clear we wunt to 
�trengthen the penalties . . .  [since s]trict penalties for failing to meet reductions in �moking ure absolutely 
essential"): Michael K. Frisby, Tobacco Ojjicwls Balk tit Cha11ges Proposed To Beef Up Settleme11t, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 1 5, 1 997, at B6 (summarizing a White Hou�e opinion that the surcharges were inudcquute): 
Jeffrey Taylor, Task Force Asks for Stiffer Tobacco Pem1/ties, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1 997, ut A2 
(summarizing a similar view of the Koop-Kc��lcr Comminec). 
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of the profit the cigarette industry would earn over the life of underage 
smokers in excess of the required reduction."70� The arbitrary $2 billion per 
year maximum also renders inadequate the surcharge's bite.703 As some 
analysts have observed, if the maximum surcharge were spread across all 
cigarettes sold, the cost of noncompliance would be less than a dime per 
pack.704 
Even assuming that the amount of the surcharge reflects what it is 
supposed to reflect, that surcharge would not eliminate manufacturers ' 
incentives to market to underage smokers. When faced with the question of 
whether or not to target underage consumers. manufacturers would realize that 
if they did market to children, they would enjoy at least 40C:'c (and, because of 
the cap and the abatement scheme described above, probably more than 40%) 
of the profits that they currently enjoy from sell ing to kids. Although the 
incentive to attract underage smokers to their brands might not be as strong, 
it would still be present.705 The problem stems from the fact that the target 
is set below 100%. 
But even if the target were set at I OO'K . the surcharge. properly measured, 
would not create an incentive to discourage smoking. At best, it would make 
manufacturers indifferent between selling to minors and not doing so.706 And 
the problem is even more serious than just that. Even if the surcharges were 
increased to provide some incentive for manufacturers to meet the targets, they 
would possibly still be too low. It is not costless for the industry to prevent the 
sale of cigarettes to people under the age of eighteen. To the extent there arc 
any costs associated with that effort (whether they be advertising expenses or 
702. Tobacco Seu/eme/l/, supra note 32. at 53; see also Su.an Page. C/1111011 Etpecte<I To Talk Tough 
011 Tobacco Paci, Child Pro1ec1io11, USA TODAY. Sept 16. 1 997. at 6A ('The admtm>trauon analysts 
shows that the proposed penalties would be largely off>el by the prolit> compame> "'ould male from a 
higher level of cigarette >ales to teens."'); Carl T. Ro\\ an, Se11/e111m1 Co11111111es Tobacco's Dem.J1<11w11, 
HOUSTON CHROl\., June 25, 1 997, at 22 ('Tho>c who dt>lrmt big tobacco . >.a)' 11 " 111 be more prolitable 
for the industry to go on addicting teen-ager> 10 far more CO>ll) c1gare1te> and pay the line> "') 
703. See Merrill, supra note 688. at 9. Tim dt>CU»ton •> intended to 1llu>tratc the more general point 
that designing a performance-based regula110n require> the .ame amount ol infonnauon ilS de>tgmng a 
command-and-control regulation. See supra Scxuon IV B. In the ca>e of the lool-bacl. pro\ mon. the unuy 
between the two types of regula11ons i> especially clear, becau>e the lool.-bacl. provt>ton contains a 
command-and-control exception that could well swallo\\ the pcrfonnance-ba.>cd rule Under the proposal. 
if the performance targets are not met and the surcharge t> 1mpo>Cd on the indu>tr). any manufacturer who 
has paid its share of the surcharge can pelttion the FDA to have up to 75"C of the >Urcharge "abated."" 
Tobacco Seu/ement, supra note 32. at 24. According to the abatement procedure>, the manufacturer tn such 
a situation must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 11 t> ent11led to an abatement-\\ h1ch would 
depend upon. among other things. the manufacturer >howing that 11 had "pur>ucd all rea.>onably •1'atlable 
measures" to achieve the de>ired targets. Id. at 56. Thu>. for up 10 75� of the surcharge amount, the look­
back provision is 1101 a performance-ba.>ed regime at all. but t> an e� po>l command-and-control regime 
instead. 
704. See, e.g., Fox et al.. supra note 679, al 14 .  
705. See Merrill, supra note 688, at  9- 1 0. 
706. We are assuming here. a.> do the proponent> of the propo><:d ><:nlement, su. <' g • �lemll. mpra 
note 688, at 3; Thain, supra note 688. at 2. that >mol.er> who do not begin before the> are 1 8  ) Car> old 
will no! begin smoking at all. 8111 see s11pra note> 689-69 1 and accompanying te:1.t (qu�uomng that 
assumption). 
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forgone profits from older smokers discouraged from smoking by the effort), 
the amount of the total surcharge must be greater than just the profit 
attributable to the level of underage smoking in excess of the target level. 
To take that point to its logical extreme, suppose that no plausible amount 
of investment on the part of the industry in marketing and restricting youth 
access would produce the target levels of underage smoking. In such 
circumstances, the best way to achieve the targets (perhaps the only way) may 
be through a price increase for all cigarettes.707 If that were the case, the 
amount of the surcharge would need to be large enough such that the price of 
cigarettes sold to all consumers would reach an equilibrium at which the 
quantity of underage smoking would approximate the target level. According 
to one economist, achieving that effect would require an enormous payment 
by the industry, a payment not only many times larger than the maximum 
amount under the surcharge, but also almost double the total payments 
required under the entire settlement proposal. 708 
Perhaps the most profound problem with the look-back provision has 
nothing to do with the total amount of the industry surcharge, but rather with 
the manner in which it is apportioned across the industry. The surcharge, like 
virtually all the payments required by the proposal, is allocated among 
companies according solely to their shares of the cigarette market.7o<J To sec 
707. This scenario assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that manufacturers cannot chc11ply price 
discriminate among smokers and charge significantly higher prices to underage consumers. 
708. Professor Harris estimates, based on an analysis of the overall settlement proposal (including the 
look-back provision) and plausible assumptions about the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, thut the 
sum of all the payments expected to be made by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over 25 
years, see Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34-would result in an implicit (or "virtual") unit tux of 
S0.62 per pack of cigarettes. See Jeffrey E. Harris, Comments on Proposed Reso/111io11 (last modified June 
26, 1 997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/ACScomments.html>, at 1 -3 & tbl.2; see also Harris, s111m1 note 
695, at I .  The implicit tax would be $0.4 1 per pack initially, and then rise to S0.62 per pack after the first 
five years. See Harris, s11pra, at 1 -3 & tbl.2. Professor Harris has shown that the face value of all the 
payments to be made by the industry, once the "volume adjustment" provision in the agreement is taken 
into account, is $304.3 billion. See id. at 3. He further calculates the present discounted value of those 
payments (assuming a 7% discount rate) to be S 1 94.5 billion. See id. at I .  In arriving at these numbers, 
Harris explicitly assumes that the marketing restrictions and the antismoking campaign directed toward 
underage consumers would have no effect on the level of smoking. Instead, he assumes that the recent 
historical trend of a 0.6% annual decline in overall smoking would continue. See id. at 3. He docs. 
however, run a sensitivity analysis, assuming a I %  annual decline in smoking. which produced total 
industry payments of $289.3 billion, with a present discounted value of S 1 86.4 billion. See icl. According 
to Harris's calculations, however, such an implicit tax would not be nearly enough to achieve the target 
levels of underage smoking set forth in the look-back provi�ion. A tax of S 1 .50 per pack (indexed to keep 
pace with inflation) would, by itself, reach those targets. The face value of the total industry payments that 
would be necessary, under the current proposal,  to produce such a unit tax on cigarettes would be $653.2 
billion over 25 years. See Harris, s11pra note 695, at 2. He also determines that the surcharge would reach 
the $2 billion cap. See id. at 3 n . 13 .  Note that Harris's calculations regarding the optimal unit tux for 
achieving the performance target ignore the potential effect of �afcr cigarette designs. If Harris hud tried 
to take that possibility into account, and to imagine how alternative product designs would affect the 
demand for cigarettes, his task would have been much more difficult. In fact, to do the analysis completely, 
he would have required all the same information that would be needed to determine, on a commund-und­
control basis, what the optimal cigarette design should be. This observation �hould serve to reemphasize 
the benefits of an ex po�t. as compared with an ex ante, incentive-based approach. 
709. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 54. 
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the problem with that system of allocating the costs. suppose the aggregate 
amount of the surcharge accurately measures the profit at1ributable to underage 
smokers in excess of the target and that, except for those forgone profi ts, 
manufacturers can costlessly meet the target. Under those assumptions, the 
surcharge would still not produce the incentives necessary to achieve the target 
reductions, because of an unraveling problem of the son that we have already 
encountered.710 Each company would bear all of the costs of an investment 
in curtailing underage smoking of its cigaret1es. In contrast. the benefits of its 
efforts would be shared by the entire industry; it would enjoy. at most. only 
its market share of those benefits.7 1 1  Thus. even were it in the industry's 
collective interest to lower underage consumption of cigarelles 10 target levels. 
i t  may not be in each company's interest to reduce underage consumption of 
its own cigarettes. Because all the companies face roughly the same incentives. 
they would all end up selling to underage consumers. The industry as a whole 
would end up bearing the maximum surcharge. Given this unraveling problem. 
the performance targets would not be met unless the targets and surcharges 
were tailored to specific companies.7 1 2  or unless the surcharge were 
drastically increased.7 1 3  
7 1 0. See s11pra Subsection I V.C.2. 
7 1 1 .  The manufacturer may not enjoy even that much When: mdu>lr) cffon> lall >hon of 1hc 1argc1. 
no company will get to enjoy any benefit> of 1i- mve>llllCnt> l11c ex po>l command·and-contrul e\ccpuon 
may be i ntended to mitigate 1hat problem. See s11pra nole 703 In hght of th<: d1fficuh) 1hat lhe FDA would 
likely have i n  implementing that exception. however. 1 1  ma) cn:ale mon: problem> 1han 1 1  ,ol\ e, Where 
the i ndustry overshoots the target, no company will enJO) 1he benefit> of 1he O\cnn, e-lment 
7 1 2. The Koop-Kessler Commince apparently noticed the potenual unrJ\Chng problem and. JI lea..t 
initially, called for a change in the propo>al >O 1ha1 the FDA would a>..:>> pcnalt1c' on a compan y-by · 
company basis. See Taylor. s11pra no1c 70 1 .  We have >een \ er) hnle recent mention of 1hc unra\ehng 
problem with respect to any of the propo>al\ prov1>1on>. 
7 1 3. The size of the ncces>ary incrca>c will depend on the number of manufacture� an the indu,1ry 
and their market shares. The fewer the number of manufac1ure�. 01her lhtng> being equal. lhc lo"er \\ Il l 
be the necessary increa>e in the surcharge. Cf Croley & Han.on. \l'har Llt1b1/m Cnm '. "'I'• " no1e -10. 
at 1 02-03 (making an analogou> point with n:•pcct 10 1he >1Le ol the tn>urance pool,) 
Also wonh mentioning arc two potenual enforcement-related llaw > w 11h the lool.-bad. pro\1'1on l·o\ 
et al. have pointed out that the propo>ed >Clllement en' 1>agc> relying on da1a regarding 1hc pre' .1lcnce of 
.. daily smoking," despite the fact that there arc man) undcr.ige >mol.e� w ho do nol >mol..c d.111). bu1 ,mokc 
"frequently," and eventually become adult >moker.. See Fo\ el JI . mpra nolc 679. al 1-1 Con...:qucntl).  
reductions i n  the daily smoking rJte> of underJge >mol.cr. would. under 1hc propo...:d regum:. alml>'>t 
cenainly over.tale the actual reduction> m 1he number of youth> >11101.mg. s .... 1J A' 1hc) cApl.1in. "II lhc 
industry can keep frequent >moking rnte> n:la11vcl) high w h1le dclJ) ing dail) >mol..mg for JU•I " )Car or 
two, they will evade the surcharge> completel) . with hnle change an the O\ Crall number of people \\ho 
initiate smoking as youth and go on to become addicted •mokc� ·· Id JI 1 -1 - 1 5  
Second, it >eem> likely that underJge >moker> wil l be affcc1cd by man) of 1hc 01hcr pro\ "'°n' i n  the 
propo>ed senlement intended to di.courage them from '11101.tng A' already md1c.11cJ. nc .ire duub1tul 1h.11 
those effort' will succeed in >Ub>tant1ally altcnng underJgc .mol.mg behJ\lor :\c\ crthclc'>>. 1hey 1111gh1 
influence the way underage 'urvey re>pondcni- dc>cnbc their beha\lor to ,un C) IJl.c� We can ca,11y 
imagine, for example, that the potential ··forbidden frun .. dfec1 of 1hc planned .int1>mol.ing .1J,cm...:men1, 
and warnings. see s11pra note 653 and accompanying 1cx1. 1111gl11 '1multaneou'I) increa...: )Uulh ,mol..ing 
and decrease the wilhngne» of youlh> to adm11 10 adult, that they are 'mol..c� For 'uch re.uun-. any 
apparent reduction in underage >mokmg may. under 1he propu...:d regunc. O\ c�t:uc 1hc lruc n:ducuon CJ 
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. mpra note 3. al 265-66 (\UllllllanLmg C\ ldcncc regarding lhc 
effect of the ···,ocial acceptab1h1y· bia. in >Clf-n:poncd data'"). 
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Finally, even if the look-back prov1s10n were to work flawlessly, and 
underage smoking rates were eventually to decline by 60%, it seems entirely 
possible that smoking rates of legal-age consumers could increase to offset the 
decline in underage smoking. As indicated above, we are quite skeptical of, 
and concerned by, the widely held view that the current average age of 
initiation is somehow predetermined by nature.714 
As we detailed in Parts IV-V, under an ex post incentive-based approach, 
in contrast to the look-back performance-based provision, most of these 
problems would not emerge. There would be no need to decide ex ante upon 
a target level of underage smoking or upon the appropriate level or allocation 
of surcharges. Instead, the tobacco companies would be liable ex post for all 
the harms caused by their products, and the market would do the rest. 
4. The Proposal's General Price Effects: The Excise Tax Model 
a. Summary of Provision 
Most analysts estimate that the sum of all the payments expected to be 
paid by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over twenty-five 
years715-would cause cigarette prices to rise by about $0.60 per pack.7 16 
It is possible, therefore, that, as a de facto excise tax, the proposed settlement 
would internalize some of the costs that consumers otherwise underestimate or 
externalize. 
b. Critique 
For a variety of reasons, the de facto excise tax will fail to internalize all 
the costs to consumers and manufacturers. First, the amount of the payment 
(and resulting price increase) is far too low. As we detailed in Part Ill, the 
expected costs of cigarettes total, on average, approximately $7 .00 per 
pack-at least ten times greater than the predicted price effects of the proposed 
regime. Moreover, our $7.00 estimate, which we believe is conservative on its 
own terms, completely ignores the past costs of smoking, some of which 
cigarette manufacturers should be required to pay.717 
7 1 4. See supra notes 687-69 1 and accompanying text. 
7 15.  See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34. Jeffrey Harris has argued that the uctuul amount 
paid will be significantly lower than that. See supra note 708. 
7 1 6. See, e.g., Lauran Neergaard, Deal Seen To Gfre Big Profits for Tobacco: US Treasun· Does 
Audit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1 997, at A I (di\cu��ing a recent internal Trca�ury Dcparlmcnt uudil, which 
placed the figure at S0.62 per pack); Harris, supra note 708, at 1 -3 & tbl.2 (e�timating 1hu1 cigurclte prices 
would rise S0.62 per pack after the first five years). 
7 1 7. The is�ue of whether the agreement doe� or �hould deal with past co�t� or only fulurc co�I� 
presents all of the tran�ition bsues raised supra Sub�ection V.C. I .  We dbcu�� the propo�ul in terms of 
those transition i�sues in some detail below. See infra Sub�ection VI.E. I .  
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According to Professor Harris·s calculations (applying a 7'/c tfocount rate, 
taking into account the "inflation protection .. provi�ion in the proposa1:1\  and 
assuming Medicaid costs will grow by a nominal rate of 5'7c annually ), the 
$368.5 bill ion over twenty-five years may be just enough to cover the states' 
future cigarette-caused Medicaid expenses. m The proposal includes no 
payments to cover any past smoking-related costs to the Medicaid system. Nor 
does the proposal include any additional payments to cover the past and future 
smoking-related costs borne by the Medicare system. which Harris believes 
may exceed those borne by the Medicaid system."=0 In fact, viewed this way, 
the agreement provides no cost-internalization payments for pa�l or future 
smoking-related health care costs borne by private insurers or by 1 11div iduals. 
no payments for ETS harms to third parties. and no payments for the 
nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers· famil ies and loved ones who must 
see the smokers suffer smoking-related illnesses and bury the smokers before 
their time. 
Even if the average per pack price effect were of adequate size. there 
would remain, in this context too. a significant unraveling problem. The annual 
payments are fixed and allocated to manufacturers according to market share. 
Because those costs do not vary according to the risks of each manufacturer's 
cigarettes, those costs will create no incentive to design safer cigarettes. In 
sum, although $368.5 billion is. by almost any measure. a lot of money. it 
comes nowhere close to internal izing the full costs of cigarette smok111g. 
C. The Proposal 's Attempt To Reduce No11i11s11ra11ce £tternalirie.1 
The proposal makes one direct attempt to deal with nonin�urance 
externalities. In a provision l imiting smoking in public places. the proposal 
provides an ex ante command-and-control response to the external costs of 
public ETS exposure.n1 That proposed regulation would have the predictable 
drawbacks of all command-and-control regulations. For in�tance. I l may 
prohibit smoking in some workplaces where ETS costs are de minim1�. �uch 
as those with especially good ventilation systems or tho�e where workers 
themselves are widely dispersed. Less obviously. the command-and-control 
7 1 8. See Tobacco Se11/e111en1. supra note 32. at 3-l 
7 1 9. See Jeffrey E. Harn,. Wrinen Te,11mon) Before the Senate Ju<l1c1JC) C'onunmcc l kJnng, on the 
"Proposed Global Senlement : Who Benefii-�·· I (Jul) 30. 1 997 1 1011 Iilc \\llh the fofr Lm Joumull A' 
Harris shows, however, the real face value of the total p.l) OU! under the Jgrccmen1 " no! SJ6ll 5 bi l lion. 
but a much smaller number (roughly $30-l.3 b1lhon l. once \ olume Jdju,1men1' Jrc !Jken 11110 Jccoun1 Su 
Harris, supra note 708, at 3.  
720. See Harri,, supra note 7 1 9. at  3. A"uming thJ! uni)  5"< of �lc<l1cJn: e\pcn<l11urc' Jlc Jl!nbutJblc 
to smoking (which he 'aY' " a con,en all\e e,111nate l. l !Jrn' .:JlculJh!> the J\ erage JllllUJI �lc<ll(Jlc 
expenditure for cigareue-related il lne"e' (during 1 995- 1 9961 to be S9 J b1lhon ""PruJcclc<l o\er J 2 5 - ) eJr 
period, the pre,ent d1'counted value of 'uch expcn<luun:> "Oul<l .:omc lo $ 1 92 _; billion ·· Id J! -I :-;one 
of tho'e cost' b covered under the propo>al. 
72 1 .  See Tobacco Sellft'm<'ll/, supra note 3� . •  u 30- 3 1  
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prohibition may reallocate or even increase the ETS costs borne by 
nonsmokers. For instance, a ban on smoking in public settings would likely 
have the effect of increasing the level of smoking at home, which would have 
ETS-related health consequences for smokers' family members. The proposal 
does nothing to respond directly to the problem of ETS exposure in the home 
or to the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs borne by family and friends of 
smokers on account of the smokers' ill health and premature death.722 
One of the benefits of applying an ex post incentive-based approach to all 
the costs of cigarettes (not just ETS costs) is that overall smoking levels, 
public and private, would likely decrease dramatically (because of the price 
effect) and cigarettes would likely become substantially safer, thereby reducing 
the need for, as well as the cost of, command-and-control or performance­
based responses to public and private ETS exposure. Alternatively, 
policymakers might consider something along the lines of the employer 
liability plan (for workplace exposure) and patrons' compensation plan (for 
non-workplace ETS public exposure) described in Subsection V.C.3. Under 
those systems, the employers and the proprietors of public spaces themselves 
would be given incentives to seek the least-cost means of reducing public ETS 
exposure. If, however, any of the problems for ex post incentive-based systems 
were to be present-such as the judgment-proof problem or widely dispersed 
harm723-something comparable to the proposal's public-smoking restrictions 
may be warranted. 
D. Specific Provisions Intended To Improve Manufacturer Care Levels 
None of the provisions that we have examined thus far seems likely to 
have a significant positive effect on encouraging manufacturers to design and 
market safer cigarettes (that is, on manufacturer care levels). The proposed 
settlement, however, contains a number of command-and-control and 
performance-based provisions for regulating the design of cigarettes and the 
manufacturing processes of cigarette manufacturers. 
1 .  Command-and-Control Regulations 
On the command-and-control side, the FDA would be given the "authority 
to mandate the introduction of 'less hazardous tobacco products' that are 
722. For a rough and, we think, conservative e�timate of the current per pack co�ts associated with 
all of the�e negative externalities, see supra Table I .  
723. See supra Sub�ections V.C.2-3. 
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technological ly feasible.'·'14 This potential for command-and-control 
regulations contains several drawbacks. at least when compared to an ex po-;t 
incentive-based regulatory approach. For instance. it is not at all clear how the 
FDA is supposed to recognize a safer, technologically feasible cigarette that 
is currently unavailable. The suggested solution to that problem appears to be 
that the FDA will rely on manufacturers to provide such designs. -z� At first 
blush, that makes sense because manufacturers arc much better informed than 
the FDA with respect to such options. Under closer inspection. howe\'cr. the 
policy does not make sense because it assumes that manufacturers wil l  disc lose 
information about potential designs and perhaps produce (or l icense !>Omeone 
else to produce) cigarette substitutes that they otherwise would not.'!t. 
Consequently, the policy could create a strong disincentive to produce such 
c igarettes, to disclose information about such cigarettes:z7 or 10 create the 
designs in the first place. 
There are a number of factors that might explain a manufacturer's 
unwillingness to design and produce viable cigarette substitutes under the 
proposed regime. For instance, a manufacturer could. by offering an a lternative 
design, substantially destabilize the market for cigarettes. Cigarette substitute!> 
woul d  supplant traditional cigarettes and the market share of each manufacturer 
woul d  be threatened. Insofar as the tobacco industry is aptly charactenLed a!> 
engaging in some form of tacit or express collusion.n� such a destabil iLing 
act on the part of one manufacturer would be actively discouraged by other 
industry members.719 Perhaps only new entrants into the market-or 
724. Tobacco Serrleme/lf, mpra note 3'.!. at 14 l iat 1'  true onl) ··aftc:r .1 fonn.il rule: m.ilang ,UbJc.:t 
to the Administrative Procedures Act ( 'APA" ). wnh the right of JUd1ci.1l n:\ le\\ .. Id n1e ptopo"11 \\OUld 
also provide for greater FDA oversight over the manufactunng proce" to pn:' c:nt con1.1m111.111on .ind en,urc 
compliance with quality standard>. See 1d. at 1 8  
725. See id. at 1 4  ("The manufacturers " 1 11 be n:qu1n:d to nollf) FDA of an) tedmolog) th.it the) 
develop or acquire and that reduce> the mk from tobacco product> and. for a comrnen:1.1ll) re.bon.iblc Ice. 
to cross l icense all >uch technology. but only to tho>e cornpame> al>o CO\ c:n:J b) the -.arne obhg.1t1on, ·· 1 
726. The agreement provide> m pcnment pan: 
[T]he Agency >hall have the authority to mandate that a manufactun:r >Ub)cct to tlm A.:1 " ho 
owns such technology (at >uch manufacturer» elcc11on ) either introduce: >Ud1 produ.:i-. or .11 
a commercially rea>onable market r.ue. hcen>e >Uch K-chnolog) 10 a rnanuf.icturcr " ho .igrcn 
to bring the technology to market an a rca>onablc lime lr.ime In the: e\C:nt 1h.11 no m.inul .ic lurer 
or licensee introduce> >Uch "le» ha1.ardou> tobacco product,:· " llhan a re.iwn.ibk tune lr.ime 
set by [the] FDA. then the U.S. Public Health Service ma) produce: either n-.cll. or through .i 
licensing arrangement. any >Uch product. 
ld. at 1 5. 
727. With respect to past mdu,try mfom1at1on of tlm >on. the propo.al purport' to ··er1>urc th.it 
previously non-public or confidential [document> from) the tile> of the tob.icco andu'tf) - andudmi,: uncrn.il 
[health research) document>-are d1>clo>ed to [the] FDA. pm ate ht1gan1>[. and the pubh.: ]  ·· Id .it I S  For 
the detaib of tho>e arrangement>. >CC rd. app. VIII .  For a col lccuon of cnuque> of tho-.c .irr.ingement>. ""' 
Tribe Testimony. supra note 677: Hubcn Humphrc) Il l . Tc,umon) Befon: the Sen.ite Commerce 
Committee (July 29. 1 997) (on file with the foh• Lan Jounwll. Al.in Momwn. Senou, Fl.i" ' 111 "lob.icco 
Deal (July 23, 1 997) (unpubh>hed manu>cnpt. on tile \\ Ith 1hc fo/r Li11 Jmmw/1 
728. Cf Anthony Flint, Col/mum 011 Tobac co 111 6./ H1111rd R.-port Sa" Co111pw11n }0111.-d 111 
Srraregies To Prorecr Documems. BOSTO' GLOBE. Oct I .  1 996. at A I 
729. Cf DOL'GLAS F. GREER. hDLSTRIAL 0RGA,l/..ATI0' A'l> Pl Ill.IC Poun 27S 1 2J eJ 1 9S-1 1  
(noting that ""it i >  not >Urpn>ang that many cane!> attempt 1 0  ,tandard1Lc: their product. re,tnct .id,em>1ng. 
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relatively small players with little to lose-would be willing to take such a 
chance. For reasons discussed below, 730 however, the proposed regime 
greatly discourages new entrants. In addition, there would be a disincentive to 
produce safer cigarettes to the extent that tort claims remain viable and 
evidence of safer cigarettes encourages courts and juries to find that the 
manufacturers should be liable for harms caused by traditional cigarettes.731 
Moreover, even if the FDA could somehow manage to identify a safer 
cigarette design, that does not imply that it should require that design to be 
manufactured and sold. Even if a "safer cigarette" is, other things being equal, 
safer than a traditional cigarette, other things may not be equal. As the 
experience with low-tar or "light" cigarettes amply demonstrates, a design 
change can lead to numerous changes that are difficult to anticipate and 
measure, particularly when the "safer" alternative is still in the design phase. 
Smokers may switch to the "safer" substitute and smoke more cigarettes, take 
more puffs per cigarette, or inhale more deeply the smoke of safer cigarettes 
than they did of the traditional cigarettes.732 Nonsmokers may begin smoking 
and smokers may be slower to quit smoking because of the "low-risk" 
alternative. For those sorts of reasons, it is easy to imagine that the risks posed 
by the seemingly "safer" alternative would be as great or greater than those of 
traditional cigarettes. To put this point in economic terms, cigarette costs 
depend not just on manufacturer care levels, but also on activity levels and, in 
a way, consumer care levels. The forces of command-and-control regulation 
would likely affect manufacturer care levels a_lone. Under an ex post incentive­
based approach, however, the market would yield the optimal mix of care 
levels and activity levels by internalizing the costs in the price of cigarettes 
and creating a market for safer cigarettes. 
2. Peiformance-Based Regulations 
The proposed settlement also provides that, so as to "insur[ e] that the best 
available, feasible safety technology becomes the industry standard, [the] FDA 
will have the authority to promulgate Performance Standards . . .  that require 
the modification of tobacco products to reduce the harm caused by those 
products."733 Although the goal is ambitious, a closer reading reveals just 
how anemic the FDA authority would be. For a minimum of twelve years, the 
and regulate technological change, for standardization and stagnation are mo�! conducive to coopcmtion"). 
730. See infra Subsection VI.E.2. 
73 1 .  One provision in the proposed agreement provide� that "(t]he development or 'reduced rbk' 
tobacco products after the effective date or the Act is neither admbsible nor dbcovcmble." Tobm·,·u 
Se11/eme111, supra note 32, at 40. In light or that provision, manufacturer�· liability-ba�cd dbinccntive muy 
be reduced. To the extent that courts or jurie� are already aware or �arcr cigarettes, however, they muy on 
their own dmw the inference that older de�ign� are unre�onably dangerou�. 
732. See supra notes 1 02- 1 07 and accompanying text. 
733. Tobacco Se11/eme111, supra note 32, at 1 5. 
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FDA's ability to regulate nicotine would be limited by the following 
conditions: 
• Nicotine yields may be reduced but not elimina1ed; "l.: 
• Traditional 1obacco produces may not be prohibi1ed ;m 
Tobacco products may be modified. bu1 only when 1he 
modification ( I )  will resull in a signitican1 reduciion of 1he heallh 
risks to smokers; (2) is 1echnologically feasible; and ( 3 )  will not 
result in the creation of a significant black market;'\(, 
The authority to require modification can be exercised only upon 
a complex and multidimensional showing of ··subslantial 
evidence. "737 
Most critics of the proposal have emphasized 1ha1 this set of procedural 
hurdles effectively weakens the FDA's currenl authority to regulate 
nicotine.738 Indeed, that appears to be the primary objection of, among 
others, President Clinton and the Koop-Kessler Committee.�w We suspect 
that the problems with the performance-based rules will run deeper. Even if the 
FDA could implement performance-based regulaiions on a whim. there is little 
reason to believe that such regulalions would be efficient. Again. the FDA 
simply does not have the information 1ha1 ii would need to design efficient 
performance-based standards. Indeed. !he fact that the FDA has not. under its 
current authority, implemented any form of signilicanl cigarette design 
regulation can be seen as an implied acknowledgement on the par! of the FDA 
of its own inability to regulate effeciively. ��0 
734. See id. at 1 5. 
735. See id. 
736. See id. at 1 5- 1 6. 
737. Id. at 1 6. A, the agreement explain,. 
[A] shO\�ing of ··,ub•tanllal e\ ldencc[ ]"" [mu't be] ba,t-d upon .111 .1d1111111,1ratl\c nxord 
developed through a formal rule mal.mg ,ubject to the Adn11m,1r.1t1 \ e  Procedure' Act. \\ llh the 
right of judicial review. and any 'uch mod1lica11011 'hall be \UbJcct to the cuncnl J>roccdun::' 
of the Regulatory Refom1 Act of 1 996 to pr0\ 1dc tune .ind .1 pron:" for Congn:" tc 1ntel'cne 
should it •o choo•e. In the event a pany 'ub,equent l) JiJc, .1 pc1111on �l.111g Jll Jdm1111,trJll\c 
review of whether a mod1 1icat1on ha.,. 1 11  f.ict. rc,uJted 1 11  the crc.111011 of J '1gml1c .1111 Jern.1nd 
for contr.iband or other tobacco produci- th.11 do not mt-ct the \Jlel) ,1.1nd.1rd .md [the! 1·0 -\ 
denies the petition, the petitioner 'hall ha' e the nght to •t:el. JUdic1.1I rc\ lc\\ ol the Jcm.11 ol the 
petition. 
Id. The proposal abo provide• for the creation of .1 ··sc1cn111ic AJ\ l,OI") Com111111.:c'" tu ,1ud) the cllcch 
of nicotine. Id. In addition, it provide' for the rcduc11on of 1.1r Jc, cl. m .ill c1g.1rc11c' to I� n11ll1granh. J\ 
currently measured by the FrC. See 11/. Although 'omc of the ,ub,tantl\c and pru.:cdur.11 rnnd111u11' of 
FDA regulation would be reduced after I'.! ) Cal"\. ><'<' rd . the rc'tnc11011> \\oulJ cont111uc 10 be qu11c 
sub•tantial. 
738. See, e.g., Freedman & Hwang. lllpra note 7. Lmne �kG111lc). fobm w Oral Jiii• ll111dle "" 
FDA Role, WALL ST. J., June '.!6. 1 997. at A3: Diel. Pohnan. The Fme Pmrt uxmu li.m:r "'a S1110�111i:. 
SAN DIEGO UNJON-TRtB., Sept. 7. 1 997. al G� 
739. See Fri,by. rnpra note 701 ('umman11ng the Wl111e l lou-.c cn11quc1. BJl"T) �kier. Cl1111tm 
Officially Rejects Limitl 011 F.D.A. 111 Toba« o Ple111. N Y  Tl\U:.!>. Jul) 1 0. 1 997 . .11 :\�O 
740. Unfonunatcly. 11 " impo"1blc for u' to be more ,pct·1 1tc 111 our cm1c"m' ol thnc pro\ 1,1011' 
bccau�e the propo•al ,ay• nothmg about the 'pcc1fic tcmh of the po»tblc pcrlonn.11Kc·ba...:d rcgul.111011' 
that the FDA might try to implement. 
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E. Transition Issues 
The proposed settlement agreement raises a number of vexing transition 
issues, along the lines of those discussed in Section V.C. What is distressing, 
however, is that the proposal, in some places, appears to be completely 
oblivious to the transition issues it raises. In other places, where transition 
issues are at least recognized, the agreement appears terribly confused about 
the appropriate response to those issues. In this section, we highlight a few 
such examples. 
I .  The Distinction Between Past and Future Harms: 
$368.5 Billion for What? 
Under the proposal, the industry would pay out a total of $368.5 billion 
over twenty-five years741 (not taking into account the effect of the volume­
adjustment provisions742). Although this is far more money than most of us 
are accustomed to contemplating, it is impossible to determine whether or not 
it is the right amount of money without first asking: What is that $368.5 
billion supposed to cover? Is it a payment by the industry for the past harms 
caused by cigarettes? Or is it a series of payments designed to correct the 
market failures in the cigarette market on a purely prospective basis? Or is it 
something in between? The answers to those questions are critical to resolving 
the transition issues posed by the proposal. Unfortunately, such answers cannot 
be found in the text of the agreement. 
One approach, discussed above,743 would be to regard all of the 
payments as being designed to cover the future smoking-related Medicaid costs 
(that is, as a purely prospective correction of the Medicaid insurance 
externality). A rationale for taking this view would be that the amount of the 
payments does roughly approximate the amount necessary to achieve that 
future deterrence objective, though all the other past and future costs of 
smoking would be left unaddressed, at least by the payments required under 
the proposal. But, of course, the coincidence of the amount of the payments 
under the agreement and the amount necessary to cover future Medicaid costs 
could be just that-pure coincidence. It could be that the payments are 
supposed to be in part for past and future smoking-related Medicaid costs, in 
part for past and future Medicare costs, in part for past and future private 
insurance costs, and so on. Either way, there is no doubt that the $368.5 billion 
741 .  See Tobacco Set1/ement, supra note 32, at 34. 
742. If the volume-adjustment provision is taken into account, a plausible c�timate of the total indu�try 
payouts under the proposal would be roughly $304 billion. See supra note 708. 
743. See supra text accompanying note� 7 1 8-7 1 9. 
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is far less than the amount necessary even to internalize fully the past harms 
alone caused by cigarettes. 744 
Perhaps the uncertainty about where the $368.5 billion figure comes from 
and what specific harms it is supposed to cover stems from a deeper confusion 
that characterizes the agreement: the apparent failure to understand the 
distinction between punishment for past harms and the regulation of risk of 
future harms, a distinction that is essential to optimizing both general and 
specific deterrence goals.745 As we noted earlier. political reality may require 
that any new regime protect the existing manufacturers (or at least some of 
them for some period of time) from bankruptcy.746 Therefore. full cost 
internalization may be impractical. But $365 billion over twenty-five years is 
plainly inadequate, even taking into account bankruptcy concerns.7�' 
2. Barriers to Emry 
The proposal seems designed not only to protect the ex1stmg cigarette 
manufacturers (at least the ones who were parties to the settlement agreement) 
from bankruptcy, but also to protect them entirely from serious competition 
from new market entrants. Although this portion of the proposal is especially 
cryptic, the section dealing with "non-participating companies" would appear 
to impose the following requirements on any cigarette manufacturer that is not 
a party to the settlement agreement: 
• They would be subject to all the same "access restrictions" and 
FDA "regulatory oversight" that would be imposed on 
participating companies;m 
• A "user fee" would be applied to their products to cover their 
portion of the payments required under the agreement to fund 
public health programs and state enforcement of access 
restrictions; 749 
To avoid constitutional challenges, they would not be subject to 
the advertising and "corporate culture" provisions7� that would 
be imposed on participating companies, which have consented to 
such restrictions;751 
744. Cf .111pra note 575 (C•timatmg roughly the co,t> of cigarette• O\cr JU>t the pa>t 10 yea� to be 
considerably m exec" of S I  trillion). 
745. See sa1m1 Sub•cction V.C. I .  
746. See supra text accompanying note 579 
747. See Harn,. mpra note 579, at 292 (•ugge•ttng that the tobacco mdu>try could afford to pay 
roughly $32 billion per year, ba>ed on plau.ible a.•umpuon>J 
748. Tobacco Se11/e111e111. supra note 32, at 29 
749. See id. 
750. Id. at 2 1 .  The•e provi•t0n> c»enually rcqmrc thJt compamc> comply " nh the >ptnt ii.> "ell a. 
the letter of the •ettlemenl. 
75 I .  See id. at 28-29. 
1 344 
• 
• 
• 
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 1 07:  1 1 63 
They would receive none of the .grotections from tort suits 
afforded to participating companies; 52 
To ensure that these companies would not become judgment 
proof, each nonparticipating company would be required to "place 
into an escrowed reserve fund each year an amount equal to 
1 50% of its share of the annual payment required of participating 
manufacturers," exclusive of that portion of the payment allocated 
to public health programs and federal and state enforcement, and 
the manufacturer would be allowed to reclaim unpaid funds, with 
interest, thirty-five years Iater;753 
"[T]he exemption from civil liability applicable to distributors and 
retailers of the products of participating manufacturers will not 
apply to distributors and retailers who handle tobacco products of 
non-participating manufacturers."754 
The effect of all these requirements is that any nonparticipating company, 
presumably including any new market entrant, would have to pay one-and-a­
half times the amount that participating manufacturers would be required to 
pay, even though new market entrants may have had no responsibility for the 
past harms of smoking.755 As if that were not enough, nonparticipating 
manufacturers would effectively be prevented from selling their products 
through existing distribution channels because any distributor or retailer who 
carries their products would lose its immunity for tort suits provided under the 
agreement. Thus, to compete with the participating manufacturers, a 
nonparticipating company must be prepared to provide its own distribution 
system. Both of those requirements obviously act as barriers to entry into the 
cigarette market, thereby serving to protect the existing, "participating" 
cigarette manufacturers from suffering the competitive consequences of failing 
to take into account, ex ante, the possibility of a transition to an ex post 
incentive-based regime of regulation.756 By creating barriers to market entry, 
752. See id. 
753. Id. 
754. Id. at 29. 
755. The justification given for the large escrow payments required of nonparticipating manufucturers 
is to avoid a judgment-proof problem-that is, to ensure that funds will be available to cover whatever tort 
liability those companies end up having ex post. That is certainly a desirable goal. See suprt1 Subsection 
V.C.2. The problem with the provbion as written, however, is that while it prevents judgment-proof 
companies from entering the market, the settlement overall lets exbting manufacturers off the hook for past 
harms, sending the wrong general deterrence message to manufacturers in other industries. 
756. Perhaps these provbion� help to explain the fact that the stock prices of the major participating 
tobacco companies fell only briefly when the settlement agreement was announced. See James F. Peltz & 
Myron Levin, The Tobacco Settlement: How Will Firms Fare?, L.A. TIMES, June 2 1 ,  1 997, at D I .  Indeed, 
"(t)he consensus among tobacco equity analysts is that a settlement would �ignificantly boost tobacco stock 
prices." Stuart Rossmiller, DMG Comments 011 Nabisco Holcli11gs Corp., Nov. 25, 1 997, available i11 
Bloomberg, RJR Nabbco Holdings Corp. Current News File. Of course, without a sophbticatcd event 
study, it is impossible to know with any confidence whether the proposed settlement agreement hus hud 
any effect on tobacco stock prices. And even if we could identify a significant effect, it would not be clcur 
what such an effect would mean about the market's interpretation of the settlement agreement. It would 
depend on, among other things, what the market expects the eventual outcome of the tobacco litigation (und 
threats of FDA regulation) to be. In any event, it seems fairly clear that the market does 1101 expect thut, 
1 998] The Costs of Cigarenes 1 345 
a primary source of new ideas for developing safer cigarenes-the new, start­
up tobacco companies-is eliminated. 
F. Assessing the Proposal from a Distance 
We have focused thus far mostly on indi\'idual provisions of the 
settlement. From that perspective. we ha\'e concluded that the proposal is 
fundamentally flawed. The chief proponents of the proposal-particularly the 
attorneys general who have endorsed it-ha\'e asserted that our vantage point 
is inappropriate. They urge critics lo step back and view the proposal as a 
whole package.757 They point out further that the selllemenl represents a 
hard-fought negotiation against a savvy and wealthy industry that had yet to 
pay a penny to anyone injured by cigarenes."K There arc. of course, some 
imperfections in the agreement, they argue, but that 1s the nature of any give­
and-take process. And when one looks at the proposal pragmatically and 
realistically, they claim, it is evident that much more was gained in the 
negotiations than was lost.759 In the conclusion. we will take up the question 
of whether, in fact, the settlement is preferable to what has been the status quo. 
For the remainder of Part VI, we want to respond to the claim that the 
proposal is somehow more attractive from a distance than it is from up close. 
When one reads the entire proposal without focusing on the details. it is 
hard to deny that it reads as though the selllement would, if enacted. usher in 
a new age in the cigarette industry. In addition to the specific examples that 
we provided already regarding the bright promises of many of the sclllemcnt's 
specific provisions, the agreement has big-picture language of the sort that 
at the end of the day, the ex1>tmg tobacco compame' " il l  be held full) hable for all th<: ham1' cau..:d by 
their cigarcnes in the pa't or that they will be left unprolcctc:d Jgam,1 unfonen:d compcuuon from ne\\ 
market entranb if a >elllement 1> reached. 
757. Christine Gregoire. Anomey GenerJI of Wa,hmg1on. 'aid 111 dden..: of the ..:nlement ··1 t  "n"t 
perfect, but it\ the be'! anyone ha. put forward."" J.ime> Broo�e. Allomru Gr11rml Or/r11tl L.111tlmm{ 
Tobacco Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 25. 1 997. at 06 Grant \\'001h. Antona'> Anome) General. Jdmon"hcd 
'"You' ve got to keep thi> thing in pcr-pcctl \e  Thi> '' the b1gge>t public heJlth and corporate 
settlement in the hi>tory of th1> country."" /ti. Tom Mil ler. Auome) Gener.ii from Jo\\a and ,upponer of 
the senlement propo>al, conceded that there ma) be 'ome problem> \\ Ith ob1a1mng full d1..:lo,ure of 
tobacco company document>, but urged cnu" nol to lei tho>e problem> '"dl\en anenuon from th<: broader 
settlement." Barry Meier, M11111esora Ojficwl /i11·m•s Ccmgrr>S1t111t1/ Sc rn11m of TulnIL' o /111/1urn Ftlr>. � Y 
TIMES, July 28, 1 997, at A 1 0. 
758. See, e.g . •  Scon Har-hbarger. 11'/wr \\�· mm /11 Tobtt« o Orttl. BoSTO' Gt.0111:.. Jul) 5. 1 997. al 
A 1 1  (arguing that ··congre»1onal crit1c1'm of our \\O� 1> >ome\\hat h�e a group of AWOL wld1er. 
explaining how the wJr could have been won bener or fa>ter'" and concluding that "(1]h1> " an opponunll) 
that we mu>! >eize with both hand>''). An unnamed tobacco repre>entall \e  reccntl) >Jld of the deJI "It'> 
not perfect. but it'> far bener than \\ hat the ahematl\C:> Jre .. SJundrJ Toll). \1(1nwu1 A 111wur [)rim. 
Tobacco Aides Defend $368 811/um S<'lllt•m•'lll. WASH PO�I. Jul) I S. 1 997. at A 1 0  
759. It  i>  1 lluminaung to con,1der. for '"'lance. 1hc 1m11al reac11<in' to. and cnuci,ni- of. th<: ..:lllcment 
made by Dr-. Koop and Kc"ler before the Senalc C'onuncrcc C'omm111c:c: Koop and Ke,, Jcr lir't Jrgued. 
in effect, that the >ettlemcnt 'hould be 'cr.ippcd and thJI C'ongre" 1t-.c:lf >hould draft J belier ..:t of 
regulation>. Supponer- of the agreement argued m re>pon>c that >uch propo>ah \\ ere '"npl) unreah,uc Jnd 
that the agreement repre>ented a nece,,ary compronH>e. Su Sht:r) I GJ) Stolberg. Krulrr m1tl Koop l'ri:.­
Co11gress To Do Awtt\" w11h the Tolwcco St•11/1•mt•111. N Y  Tl\tl:.S. Jul) 30. 1 997. al B7 
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suggests something fundamental is about to happen to the incentives and 
mindset of the captains of the cigarette industry. For instance, the opening 
paragraph of the preamble reads as follows: 
This legislation would mandate a total reformation and restructuring 
of how tobacco products are manufactured, marketed and distributed 
in this country. The nation can thereby see real and swift progress in 
preventing underage use of tobacco, addressing the adverse health 
effects of tobacco use and changing the corporate culture of the 
tobacco industry.760 
Similarly, Title I of the proposed settlement is named "Reformation of the 
Tobacco Industry,"761 and Section G of Title I is called "Compliance and 
Corporate Culture."762 In that section, the proposal begins by observing that 
[a] key element in achieving the Act's goals will be forcing a 
fundamental change in the way the tobacco industry does business. 
Accordingly, the Act will provide for means to ensure that the 
industry will not only comply with the letter of the law but will also 
have powerful incentives to prevent underage usage of tobacco 
products and to strive to develop and market less hazardous tobacco 
products.763 
The message in all of this seems to be that because of this agreement, the 
industry can now be trusted. The culture of denial and deceit will be 
fundamentally reformed.764 Manufacturers will want to comply not just with 
the letter of the law, but also with the spirit of the law because the proposed 
settlement, if enacted, will change their basic incentive structure. 
The fairly close reading that we gave to some of the settlement details 
suggests that claims regarding a change in corporate culture are grossly 
exaggerated. But, as we have said, in this section we want to step back, if that 
is possible, and take a more distant view of the settlement. If one imagines the 
range of regulatory options that we have described in this Article as lying 
along a continuum-with ex post incentive-based regulation at the left end, 
command-and-control regulations at the right end, and performance-based 
regulation somewhere in-between-and if one were to imagine stacking each 
of the settlement's provisions on top of that continuum according to the 
category of regulation that it represented, one could get an illuminating overall 
760. Tobacco Set1/e111e111, supra note 32, at I .  
76 1 .  Id. at 8. 
762. Id. at 2 1 .  
763. Id. 
764. For gener.il accounts of the tobacco culture, �ee HILTS, supra note 1 2: and KLUGER, supra note 
9. See a/lo supra notes 1 1 - 1 3  and accompanying Jext (describing the industry's ba�ic �trutegie� to avoid 
meaningful regulation). 
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picture of the proposed settlement. Because the vast majority of provisions are 
command-and-control rules, the right side of the continuum would be stacked 
high. The left side, in contrast, would be flat. In between. there would be one, 
maybe two, examples of performance-based regulation, but even they would 
be located well toward the right end of the continuum. That landscape, as we 
have already stressed, is precisely the opposite of what would be ideal. 
What makes this skewed landscape especially troubling, however. is that 
i t  is probably no accident. It is, from the tobacco industry's perspective, ideal. 
As we have emphasized throughout, command-and-control is the least effective 
form of regulation. It requires the regulator to have an enormous amount of 
information about the product, information that the regulator often must rely 
on the industry to provide. Insofar as the industry is the source of the 
regulator's information, it becomes relatively easy for the industry to 
manipulate the process and to avoid really having to internalize the costs of 
their actions.765 Furthermore, the regulations themselves are severely limited 
by the inability of the regulator to anticipate every countermove that the 
industry might make in its attempt to save the money that would otherwise 
have to be spent in complying with the spirit of the regulation. As we have 
argued in this part, those criticisms certainly apply to the settlement's 
numerous command-and-control regulations. To be sure. the agreement also 
contains some elements of performance-based regulations, which, in theory, 
might pose somewhat of a regulatory threat to the cigarette industry. As we 
have noted, however, the performance-based aspects of the settlement arc 
rendered quite anemic by substantial ex ante and ex post loopholes and the 
poorly calibrated and relatively minor surcharges for failing to meet 
performance targets.766 
Considering the big picture, therefore, we have no trouble rejecting the 
suggestion that the proposed settlement would somehow substantially alter the 
culture or incentives of the tobacco industry. To the contrary, the basic 
incentives of manufacturers would remain. They would still seek to find and 
to create loopholes in the regulations. They would still seek to misrepresent the 
risks to consumers and regulators. Under the proposed regime, their options 
may be fewer, but not by that much. And we sec nothing in the agreement 
itself to indicate that there has been any sort of fundamental transformation in 
the industry mindset. There was no public admission regarding the health risks 
and addictiveness of cigarettes (except by the one manufacturer that was not 
party to the agreement).767 There has been no apology for past conduct and 
765. That phenomenon " known. generally. ;i,, the problem of .. capture:· See W. Kii' V 1sn s1 1:.1 AL. 
ECONOMICS OF REGL1LATION AND Al-mTRL•ST 38-39 (2d c:d. 1 995). 
766. See supra Sub,ection VI.D.2. 
767. Bennett LeBow, CEO of Liggett'' parenl company. " regularly char.ictenLc:tl "' a tobacco 
industry maverick for settling with the 'tate attorney' general and for conceding that c1gare11e� l..111 and arc 
addictive (and that cigarette manufacture� in1enuonally targctL-d 1111no�). See John M Broder. 2U Swte> 
Ask the White House To Spare One Cigareue Mal.er, N.Y. TIMES. Aug 2 1 ,  1997. at A l 9  Jn \ cry recent 
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no admission of wrongful conduct. Indeed, in the time since the proposed 
settlement was made public, it has been business as usual for the industry: 
Witness Camel's recent advertisements,768 the introduction and advertisement 
of Winston's new additive-free cigarette,769 manufacturers' strong resistance 
to any regulations requiring that they disclose additives and total nicotine 
content,770 and their attack on Dr. Stanton Glantz.771 
Our very strong sense at the end of the day is that the proposed tobacco 
settlement would accomplish precisely what previous efforts to regulate the 
cigarette industry have accomplished. Specifically, the proposal would create 
depositions in Florida, two tobacco executives made headlines by admitting that cigarettes may pose a 
health risk. Geoffrey Bible, chainnan and CEO of Philip Morris admitted that about 1 00,000 Amcric11ns 
"might have" died from smoking-related diseases. Philip Morris Chief Says Smoking Deaths Mt1y Number 
100,000, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1 997, at A4. The following day, Steven F. Goldstone, chainnan of the 
company that owns the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, testified that he believed that smoking plays a 
"part in causing lung cancer." Barry Meier, Chief of R.J. Reynolds Says Smoking Ht1s Role in Ccmcer, N. Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1 997, at A7. These recent admissions may have been intended to avoid outraging the 
Florida jury by continuing to deny that cigarettes have ill-health effects in the face of, among other things, 
LeBow's admissions to the contrary. See id. 
As this Article went to press, there were reports that executive� of the leading tobacco companies, 
including Geoffrey Bible, had admitted in testimony before the House of Representatives that nicotine is 
addictive, "as the tenn is commonly understood." Barry Meier, Tobacco Executives \far Penitent Before 
House Panel in Hopes of Preserving Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1 998, at A l 5. The executives 11lso 
conceded, "in dramatic contrast to the testimony of tobacco officials four years ago," that smoking either 
causes lung cancer or is a risk factor in the disease. Id. The executives' concessions were apparently 
intended to "rally support for the embattled [settlement proposal]." Id. 
768. See supm text accompanying note 69 1 .  
769. R.J. Reynolds very recently introduced a refonnulated Winston cigarette, apparently i n  response 
to the growing public awareness of the nearly 600 additives-including licorice and ammonia-that 
cigarette manufacturers commonly include in their cigarettes. See Sucin L. Hwang, Het1lth Grou11s 
Challenge Winston Ad Clt1ims, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1 997, at B I .  Public health groups have criticized the 
ad campaign launching the new cigarette-a campaign that asks smokers, "What the heck have you been 
smoking?"-as misleading and amounting to a health claim. Id. They view the campaign as "evidence th11t 
the i ndustry is still doing business as usual." Id. 
770. Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to require manufacturers to reveal additives, 
including total nicotine content, in cigarettes sold in the state. According to Gregory Connolly, head of the 
Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program of the state Department of Public Health, the industry is "playing 
games" in an effort not to comply. Richard Saltus, Makers To Reveal Cigarette Additives; Mass11c/111setts 
Order ls First in the Nation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1 997, at B I .  
77 1 .  I n  July 1 997, the National Smokers Alliance, a new citizens group funded mostly by the tobacco 
industry, filed a suit charging Dr. Stanton Glantz, a statbtician and professor of medicine at the University 
of California San Francisco, with scientific misconduct in an influential �tudy concluding that smoking b11ns 
in 1 5  communities produced no adverse economic impact on restaurants. Dr. Kenneth Warner, an economist 
and public health expert at the University of Michigan and one of the original peer reviewers of Glantz's 
study, made the following observation: 'This seems like a two-sided strategy by the tobacco induMry . . . .  
They're playing good guys in the settlement negotiations with the government, and they're playing the 
game harder than ever with Dr. Glantz." Bill Richards, Pro-Tobt1cco Groups Step Up A/lacks 011 Cl 
Longtime Foe, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1 997, at B l ;  cf. Suein L. Hwang, Fire Fight: Doctor Whose Swdy 
Tied Joe Ct1mel to Kids Takes t1n Odd Journey, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2 1 ,  1 997, at A l  (describing R.J. 
Reynold's aggressive and litigious reaction to Dr. Paul Fischer's famous study). Dr. Glantz's motion to 
dismiss the complaint has been granted. See Tobacco litigation lit " Glantz: A lc1ws11it To Silence 1111 
llldustry Anwgonist Is Thrown out of Court, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1 997, at A20. For a de�cription of 
how the tobacco industry ha� financed a variety of "fake grassroots ('astroturf') organizations," sec Kelder 
& Daynard, suprn note 3, at 70. For another example of how the industry is employing those organiz11tions 
in an effort to push the settlement, �ee Tatiana S. Boncompagni & Jill Abramson, Tobacco-Funded Group 
Gives Legislators Free Trips, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1 997, at A20. 
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the i llusion of regulation (at least initially) while simultaneously protecting the 
industry from having to internalize the costs of cigarettes.m In the words of 
C. Everett Koop: "The tobacco industry has always been able to get around or 
hurdle over measures we set up to try to stop them . . .  to make victories of 
steps we thought would set them back . . . .  We don 't want that to happen 
again here."773 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have attempted to offer a largely economic defense of 
a number of claims. First, the cigarette market is characterized by severe 
market failures-namely, information problems and negative externalities. 
Consequently, immediate government intervention is required, especially given 
the magnitude of the harms caused by cigarette smoking. Second, the best 
regulatory response to those market failures is generally to rely as little as 
possible on command-and-control regulation and to adopt some fom1 of victim­
initiated ex post incentive-based regulation, such as enterprise liability or 
smokers' compensation. Third, to the extent it is politically feasible. the 
adoption of such a regime should be made retroactive so as to internalize not 
only the harms caused by cigarettes in the future. but also the harms caused 
by past smoking. Finally, the recently proposed tobacco settlement agreement 
takes precisely the wrong approach in recommending the adoption of numerous 
command-and-control, and l imited performance-based, measures and by 
eviscerating the only existing ex post incentive-based approach (tort law) 
without proposing any alternative such regime. 
Based on the analysis contained in this Article, we recommend that 
Congress reject the settlement proposal and start over from scratch, this time 
beginning with the following question in mind: How can we design an 
effective ex post incentive-based response co the cigarette problem? This 
Article contains the framework for beginning that analysis, although much 
work on the details obviously remains to be done.m 
Those who are interested in the cigarette problem might also a!>k, however: 
What if the apparent momentum in Washington to enact a comprehensive and 
preemptive federal regulatory response to the cigarette problem should die, and 
we should return to the status quo of a few months or a few years ago? Based 
on the arguments in this Article, if product-accident deterrence is our 
overriding goal, we would strongly prefer existing products liabil ity doctrines 
to the proposed settlement. 
772. That was 1he effecl. for example. of the t\\o mo't '1gmlican1 pnor effon, 10 n:gulale c1gJrc1te 
manufacturers. See supra note 9. 
773. Taylor. supra note 6 1 2. 
774. We take a ,tep toward filling in 'omc of thc,e dctJ1b 111 lfari.on et JI . >1111ru note -10 
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In contrast to this view, much of the recent discussion about whether and 
how to regulate cigarettes seems to be based on the assumption that products 
liability law-or, for that matter, any form of victim-initiated ex post 
incentive-based regime-should be dropped altogether. For example, to the 
question of whether cigarette manufacturers should be liable to smokers 
through one or another mechanism, a common response is that smokers should 
not be permitted to foist the consequences of their own decisions onto others. 
Richard Epstein, for instance, recently argued that cigarette manufacturers 
should not have to pay a penny to anyone and that, instead, "smokers should 
own up to . . . their actions."775 Robert Samuelson expresses a similar 
sentiment: "I don't smoke and would fight my children if they start. But 
otherwise, people have a right to choose. Punishing them for their choice 
denies their freedom. Rewarding them for the ill effects of their choice denies 
their responsibility."776 
That sort of "take responsibility" rhetoric is powerful, particularly in the 
United States, where we have long taken pride in our national ideal of rugged 
individualism. (This is, after all, Marlboro country.) If the goal is to make all 
parties "own up" to their decisions, however, several arguments can be made 
that the appropriate policy response would be to adopt enterprise liability or 
some other such victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulatory system. 
First, although the critics of products liability currently seem to exercise 
exclusive rights to the "take responsibility" rhetoric, it is not at all clear why 
that rhetoric could not be deployed at least as effectively by defenders of tort 
law. For example, a strong argument can be made that, without products 
liability or some other type of ex post incentive-based regulation of cigarettes, 
tobacco manufacturers would be allowed to avoid responsibility for their 
actions.777 Indeed, some analysts have calculated that the proposed settlement 
would, if enacted, increase the industry's net profits.778 Second, even if we 
are worried primarily about individual rather than corporate responsibility, the 
only way to be sure that smokers take full responsibility for their actions 
would be through the implementation of an ex post incentive-based regime of 
775. Epstein, supra note 22. 
776. Samuelson, supra note 22; see also Chapman, supra note 22 ("The war on the tobacco industry 
is also a war on the right of individuals to make their own choices-and their obligation to take 
responsibility for the consequences."). 
777. See supra notes 1 2, 144, 1 6 1 ,  2 1 9, and accompanying text (providing examples of the industry's 
most culpable conduct); cf Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our C11lt11re of Irresponsibility, 3 1  
WAKE FOREST L .  REV. I 075 passim ( 1 996) (discussing several recent Supreme Court decisions o n  products 
liability and calling for the Court to reconsider doctrine that encourages irresponsible munufucturer 
conduct). 
778. See John M. Broder, Industry Windfall Seen in Tobacco Deal, GREENSBORO NllWS & REC. 
(N.C.), Sept. 23, 1 997, at A l  (describing an FfC study finding that "the tobacco companies could reap us 
much as S 1 23 billion in additional profits in the next 25 years if the settlement plan is adopted as drafted"); 
see also Peter Passell, Tobacco Might Thrive with a $/.50·a-Pack Rise for Cigarettes, N.Y. TtMllS, Sept. 
25, 1 997, at 02 (describing a study by a Stanford economist indicating that even if President Clinton's 
proposed S 1 .50 per pack tax were adopted. the market value of tobacco stocks would increa�e). 
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regulation and its effects on the price of cigareues. Otherwise, smokers would 
continue to externalize substantial costs in the fonn of environmental tobacco 
smoke, higher insurance rates, and the like. 
Under a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system, there is no doubt 
that smokers would be responsible for their decisions. For starters, they would 
have to pay when purchasing each pack of cigarelles, in the form of higher 
product prices, for their right to make a claim when a smoking-caused illness 
occurs. The arrangement is virtually identical to the arrangement that exists 
between insureds and their first-party insurers. Thus, they would not be gelling 
something for nothing and could not evade responsibility. Even to the extent 
smokers or their families receive compensation for their harms. it is difficult 
to say that the dead or seriously il l smoker would ever fully evade the ultimate 
responsibility for her smoking decisions. 
That is not the only misconception about the role of civil liability laws in 
the cigarette context. Indeed, critics and supporters of the proposed seulement 
share two flawed premises, which nevertheless seem to be dictating the terms 
of the policy debate. First, both sides assume that the primary purpose of 
products liability law in this context is not to serve public health goals, but 
simply to compensate those injured by smoking. Second, both sides seem to 
agree that civil l iabil i ty laws have, to date, failed to serve that or any other 
worthwhile goal. Consequently, most participants in the debate have indicated 
in one way or another that the elimination of products liability law would be 
no big loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The proponents of the proposed 
settlement, for instance, point out that, even if $368.5 billion does not cover 
all the harms caused by cigarelles, it is a lot more than nothing, which is what 
manufacturers are often said to have paid in tort damages to individual 
plaintiffs to date.779 Critics are typically less explicit. They make their views 
known either by not mentioning the effect of the seulement on tort law or by 
indicating that they would not challenge that effect if only the seulement could 
be adjusted to serve public health goals beuer.780 
Arguably, however, the principal goal of products liability law is, broadly 
speaking, public health, not compensation. In the cigarelle context in particular, 
the question then becomes whether the public health goal is beuer achieved 
through products l iability law or through the types of regulation envisaged in 
the proposed settlement. Those who would sacrifice products l iability law to 
accept the settlement implicitly assume that the public health benefits of the 
latter would outpace the public health benefits of the former. But, perhaps 
because of the general anti-tort sentiment in this country, that presumption has 
779. See, e.g., Benjamin Wie>er. Tobacco 's Trwls. \VASii PO�'T. Dec 8. 1996. § W !Magazine). at 
1 5  (stating that, of 800 >Uit> filed again>! tobacco compame>. only 1 2  weni to ma! and none re-,ulted in 
the payment of damages to a plaintiff). 
780. See supra note 6 1 2  (de>cnbing the con>en>U> view that the ton la" 1mphcauon> of the ..:nlcment 
proposal are of little >ignificance). 
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been largely unexamined and is, for several reasons that we have already 
noted, highly questionable. 
Products liability law comes far closer, at least in theory, to providing an 
ex post incentive-based type of regulation than any alternative form of 
regulation now being considered (other than the smokers' compensation regime 
we are proposing). Moreover, products liability law could have more than just 
a theoretical impact. It is true that no substantial tort judgments have been won 
against the tobacco industry. Nevertheless, products liability law is currently 
in a state of flux or disequilibrium. In our view, the growing inevitability of 
many large civil judgments against the industry helped push the manufacturers 
to the negotiating table and thus made the $368.5 billion settlement off er 
possible. In other words, to say that the settlement agreement would produce 
$368.5 billion while tort law has produced nothing is to misunderstand what 
motivated the agreement in the first place. 
It would be more accurate to claim that command-and-control regulation, 
not products liability law, has failed those who have been harmed by cigarette 
smoking. The FDA has long declined to exercise its authority in this area, 
presumably because of the political power of the cigarette industry781 and 
because of the FDA's lack of expertise regarding how best to regulate. 
Furthermore, it has been administrative regulation that has effectively derailed 
otherwise viable tort claims against cigarette manufacturers.782 For example, 
the FTC-promulgated warning labels have given rise to the preemption 
defense783 and greatly strengthened the assumption-of-risk defense in tort 
law. Those defenses have until very recently proved an insurmountable barrier 
to tort recovery. Thus, in light of this past experience with administrative 
regulation, it is not clear that we should have much confidence in the expanded 
role for administrative regulation contemplated in the settlement proposal. 
Indeed, the American public should be troubled (though not especially 
surprised) by the fact that the settlement proposal, which the tobacco industry 
fully supports, would adopt a mix of regulation (lots of command-and-control 
provisions, some limited performance-based standards, and essentially zero ex 
post incentive-based regulation) that is entirely consistent with the interests of 
the tobacco industry. 
Although we believe the case for ex post incentive-based regulation to be 
quite strong, we would not be surprised to learn that our analysis has 
overlooked some important considerations that may weaken the case.784 
78 1 .  See supra note 1 1 ; supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
782. See supra note 9. 
783. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-3 1 ( 1 992) (plumlity opinion); supra nole 9. 
784. Some readers may find our arguments persuasive but nevertheless reject our policy 
recommendation. The biggest source of that turnabout seems to be the classic slippery slope problem. If 
we adopt this form of regulation for 1obacco, !he argument goes, why not for alcohol, chocolale, und fuuy 
foods? One commentator has caplured Iha! argument as follows: "Plcnly of companies make money selling 
goods and services Iha! carry serious ri�k�including 1 30-proof whbkey, trips up Mt. Everesl und cu� 1hu1 
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Nevertheless, at the very least we hope that our argumenb have been 
sufficiently provocative and developed to convince those in a po�ition to enact 
policies to slow down and consider all the regulatory alternatives. Cigarettes 
and their immense ill-health costs have been, and will likely continue to be, 
with us for many years. Now is no time for legislative myopia. 
can travel twice the legal 'peed limit. But we don"t let the fanul) of a Cor.cnc O\\ ner 'uc Che-rulet 
because he got killed trying to take a tum too fa>t."" Chapman. "''"" note 2:!. ut" t1lw ttl ("'.\kOonald', 
and B urger King sell fat-drenched fare that many people lind 1mpo"1ble to ="t e'en though 11 m.l} 
someday kill or cripple them."). 
To that sort of challenge we have a vancty of rc'pon.c• 11ierc arc. in our \ Jc\\ , man) rdc,.int 
distinctions between cigarenc' and other produc1>---<l"11nc11un' thJt. \\hen tal..en together. add up tu J 
relevant difference. First, the magnitude of c1garene ml> arc far greater than the mh po.cd b) an) other 
consumer product. See supra notes 1 -4  and accompanying text S<-cond. " h1le there " nu .cnuu' argument 
that a lifetime of smoking, even if done in moderation. actually unpru' e' one" heJlth. Ur' J/wltlt Ct1rt" 
Refonn Hearings, supra note 330. at 3 1 9  ('tatement of Jcffrc) Ham,) (rc>pond111g to 1111, "'me ,Jippcry 
slope argument and asserting that ··c1garcne' are 10�1c to all >mol..ers at c\ ery do..:"'1, EPA. S!Tn'-G Tiii. 
REcORD STRAIGHT, supra note 4, at 6 (>lallng that there " no e\ ldence of a thr�huld bclo"' "' hich 
smoking will not cause cancer). recent >tud1e> >uggc>t that moderJte alcohol con,umpuun 111.iy h.l\c 
healthful effects, see Marion Ne>tle, Alco/to/ G111tle/111es for Clmmtc DHt'CISt' Pr..• t'ttlw11 From Pml11b11w11 
to Moderation, NUTRITION TODAY, Mar. 1 3. 1 997, at 86 Tho..: mo rca'°"' add up tu a tlunl By m.il..ing 
cigarette manufacturers pay, there " Iinlc or no n>I.. of actually cau>ing con,umcrs to "' nch to more 
dangerous activity. Fourth, there i' good evidence (though there could be much bcncr brand-,pcc11ic 
evidence) regarding the causal link between c1gare1te> and the pamcular di.ca..:> the)' cau.c f'11'th. the 
number of cigarette manufacturers h limited, and the >Ource of a \ 1Ctm1" inJune' " rdatl \cl)  eJ.>Y tu 
identify, thus facilitating a brand->pcc1fic cau>al analy>1> In cuntr�t. II I> nut po,>1ble to 1dent1 ly  the 
particular health effects of the fat and chole>terol that >Ome con>umers dem c from cJting .it .\kDonald" 
or Burger King. Sixth. almost all of the relevant harm> of c1garelle' arc tcmporall) d1,tant from mo.t ul 
the benefits. While that may abo be true of chocolate. 11 " le" true of Jkuhol Jnd e\en le" true ot other 
risky activities-for example, 'ky-d1V1ng or motorcycle nding SeH :nth. c1garcn� Jrc chcmu:all) Jddictl\c 
See supra note 1 44. Finally. the tobacco indu>try h;i,. acll•cl) nmrcprc.cnted the underl) 1ng n,i.., of 
smoking. See supra note' 1 2, 58, 769. And after all " 'aid and dune. to the e\lent there Jrc other produc1' 
that come close to cigarenes on a number of the above·h>t<'<I drmen>1on,, \\ e ha\e no problem \\ llh ,Jiding 
down the slippery slope. See supra note 262. 
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APPENDIX: A CLOSER LOOK AT VISCUSl'S SURVEY DATA 
In Part II, we attempted to rebut the commonsense notion that consumers arc well-informed of the 
risks of smoking. In addition, we responded to the arguments and evidence presented by some cfficiency­
minded legal scholars (principally W. Kip Viscusi) that purport to buttress that commonsense notion. At 
the time, we postponed a more detailed critique of Viscusi's data and methodology. We take up that 
critique now. In particular, we examine in some detail the Haws in the survey data on which Viscusi 
primarily relies. 
A. A Questionable Reference Poi/If 
In Section II.A, we described some of the findings of Viscusi 's survey research (and his analysis 
of tobacco industry survey data) on the question of what consumers estimate the risks of smoking to be. 
One of Viscusi's central findings was that, to the question "(a]mong 1 00 cigarette smokers, how many 
of them do you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?".7"' the average answer from survey 
respondents was 43%.786 This percentage is much larger than what Viscusi estimates to be the true 
reference point (the actual risk of lung cancer to smokers), which he puts at 5% to 1 0% per year.787 
Thus, he concludes, smokers may actually be overestimating, rather than underestimating, the risks posed 
by cigarette smoking. 788 
Even if one were to accept Viscusi's summary of estimated risks as described in Part II, there is 
reason to suspect that he significantly understates the actual risks that consumers believed they were 
estimating. Viscusi calculates the reference point for assessing lung cancer risk by dividing the annual 
smoking-caused lung cancer mortality figure in 1 982 (93,500) by the number of people who smoked in 
1 985 (52.9 million).789 The average amuwl risk of lung cancer mortality, by that measure. i� 
approximately .00177 per smoker. But the average annual risk figure is not a plausible true-risk reference 
point. The survey respondents were asked how many of JOO "smokers" would get lung cancer because 
they smoked. Although the survey respondents were not told what the survey question meant by the term 
"smoker,"m it is unlikely that they would have had in mind the risks faced by an average smoker in 
785. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 155. 
786. See id. at 68. 
787. See id. 
788. See id. at 1 45. 
789. See id. at 68 & n. 1 9. Careful readers may have noticed that respondents in the national survey 
were not asked about lung cancer mortality; they were asked only about lung cancer (fatal or not). See icl. 
at 64. For this reason, Viscusi's true-risk reference point may be too low. Viscusi conducted two smaller 
surveys in Durham, North Carolina. In one, he asked 53 respondents the same question as was asked in 
the national survey. In the other, he asked 206 respondents about cleath from lung cancer. The average 
response in the former survey was that 4 1  % of smokers would get lung cancer because they smoke; the 
average response in the latter survey was that 38% of smokers would die from lung cancer because they 
smoke. See id. at 76-77. The difference was not statistically significant, and Viscusi concludes "that the 
assessed lung cancer fatality rate from smoking is very similar to the assessed lung cancer incidence rate." 
Icl. at 77. 
790. In describing one limitation of the underlying studies, Viscusi writes: 
The character of the data requires the analysis to focus on static consumption decisions. What 
are the individuals' risk perceptions and tastes, and how do these affect observed �moking 
behavior? The nature of the data analyzed consequently docs not permit consider.ttion of 
changes in smoking behavior, such as decisions to quit smoking. 
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any single given year, inasmuch as the term implies a contmumg status and would 001 be hkcly to c:hc1t 
a one-year risk estimate. 
Viscusi nowhere explicitly acknowledges 1his key dcfimt1onal problem w11h lhe survey daia. bul 
he does implicitly acknowledge it in the following way: In hts calculations to obtam a range for the 
true-risk reference point, Viscusi multiplies the average annual nsk figure (.00 1 77) by the total number 
of years that a "smoker" might smoke. He chooses thirty years for the low end of the: range: ( 05). and 
sixty years for the high end (. 1 0).791 It is this thirty- to s1xty-yc:ar nsk figure that he: compares wuh 
respondents' risk perceptions. In other words. Viscus1 undc:rstands that. to compare the actual nsk of 
"smoking" against the respondents' estimates. the annual nsk figure had to be mult1phc:d by a substantial 
number to reflect the fact that survey respondents hkc:ly unagmc:d "smoker'' to rcfc:r to a long-tem1 
smoker (i.e., someone who smokes for thirty to sixty yc:ars). V1scus1's solution to the: dc:linmonal 
problem, however, is inadequate. If survey respondents did undc:rstand "smokc:rs" to mc:an "long-tem1 
smokers," then it is necessary to do more than simply multiply the: avc:ragc: annual mk figure by some: 
"long-term" number of years. Recall that the average annual nsk figure 1s calculatc:d wnh 11// smokers. 
including short-term smokers, in the denominator. Short-tc:rm smokc:rs. howc:ver. face a much lower 
annual risk of lung cancer than do long-term smokers.191 Conscquc:ntly. lhc: avc:ragc: annual mk figure 
on which Viscusi relies significantly understates the nsk of smokmg to long-tc:nn 'mokers ,.,, 
There is another reason to suspect that Viscu"'s rcfc:rcnce pomt understatc:s the mk 1hat sun·cy 
respondents believed they were estimating. The survey qucsuon askc:d only about the: mk of /1111g mm·a 
Many survey respondents might have, when answenng the: muluple-quc:st1on, fi,c: nunute ic:lc:phonc: 
survey,.,.. estimated roral mortality risks (including. for example:. the nsk of hc:an disease)."' Vtscw.t 
Id. at 87. Contrary to this statement. the studies rc:portc:d by ViscuM do not mc:murc: "obscrvc:d smokmg 
behavior." Indeed, they do not even measure reported smoking behavior. thc:y mc:asurc: sclf-rc:portc:d slatll.'!I 
as a "current smoker," a "never-smoker," or a "fonnc:r ctgarcne smokc:r." Id. at 1 55. Each respondent was 
asked to characterize himself or herself, abstractly. in a way that he or she: possibly had nc:vc:r co�toll.'!lly 
done. Complicating mailers further. both the risk-percc:ption and smoking "beha' tor" quc:suons were: 
presented as if there were no difference, in tenns of risk or sclf-dc:tinnion. betwc:cn smolang a pack per 
week or three packs per day, see id. , a variable that can have: a Mgniticant c:ffc:ct on a smokc:r's health. su 
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPoRT, s11pra note: 3, at 43-44. 
791 .  See VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68. Our calculations. basc:d on ViSCll.'!lt's numbers. md1ca1e that 
the range is from .053 (30 years) to . I 06 (60 years). 
792. See s11pra notes 1 39- 1 40 and accompanying texl (descnbing c:v1dc:ncc: !hat many smokc:rs do 
manage to quit); supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing c:v1dc:ncc: that qunung rc,c:rsc:> man)· of ihe 
ill-health effects of smoking). 
793. Viscusi reports more recent evidence suggesting that 1 1 7.000 people dte yc:arly from 'mok.mg­
induced lung cancer. See VISCUS!, supra note 49. at 84 n.20. Viscus1 opts not 10 � ht> reference poml 
on that updated infonnation because "[i)mposing such a standard rctroacuvely ts an mappropnalc: standard 
for judging the soundness of earlier decisions." Id. at 67. We: d1sagrc:c. In our \'IC\\, the: rc:lc:nml quc:suon 
in this context is whether consumers are well-infonned of the: undc:rlymg mks of smoking If !hey arc not. 
then the market will not lead to the efficient outcome and enterpm.c: hab1hty (or some other fonn of 
incentive-based regulation) may help overcome that market failure:. Su supra Section II C lhmg 1hc 
updated mortality figures, Viscusi calculates a lung cancer ml. r.inge of between .06 and 1 25 Sa VtSC'lSt. 
supra note 49, at 68. 
794. See VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 1 53. 
795. This possibility seems especially likely given the: order and phrasmg of the sunc:y quc:suons 
Immediately before the lung cancer question (Question 3). respondents were: askc:d quc:suons pertammg to 
cigarenes' total risks. Question I read: "When 1 menuon c1garcnc:s. what comes 10 your nund"' PROBE: 
Anything else?" And Question 2 asked if respondents had heard (even if !hey J1d nol agree) 1ha1 smok.mg 
"will most likely shorten a person's life," "is dangerous to a person's hcahh," "is bad for a person·� health. 
but not dangerous," and "is not bad for a person's health." Id. at 1 54-55. The fact 1hat Question 3 ask.c:d 
only about lung cancer was a subtle change of orientation that mighl have gone: unnouced by the: telephone 
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implicitly acknowledges that possibility (as well as the possibility that consumers are more l ikely to 
underestimate the less salient risks of smoking).796 To correct for it, he calculates the "total smoking 
mortality risk" to be a range between . 16 and .36-"roughly triple the lung cancer mortality risk."707 
Other scientists using different methodologies, however, have estimated that the mortality risks of 
smoking are significantly higher. For instance, a 1 962 Royal College of Physicians study summarized 
mortality studies indicating that approximately half of all adult smokers would die from a 
smoking-related i l lness.798 A 1 992 study found that "in each 5-year age group from 45 to 74 the death 
rates of the smokers are more than double those of non-smokers," suggesting again that roughly half of 
all smokers die of smoking-related causes.799 Those figures suggest that Viscusi's subjects 
underestimate the relevant risks, and may, in Viscusi's words, "necessitate a change in the nature of the 
discussion."800 In sum, Viscusi's "true-risk reference point" is probably too low, and his claim 
regarding consumer overestimation of smoking risks is l ikely overblown. Moreover, it is really not 
possible to construct an accurate true-risk reference point absent much better information regarding whut 
survey respondents thought they were estimating and regarding what the risks truly arc to the specific 
group of "smokers" that survey respondents had in mind.801 
respondents, in part because lung cancer is the most salient risk associated with cigarettes. For u summury 
of why lung cancer risks are the most salient, see id. at 77. 
The order and wording of the �urvey, furthermore, likely biased respondents' estimates upward by 
reminding them of negative information about cigarettes and encouraging them to commit to u negative 
evaluation early on, before hearing other questions (including the lung cancer question). See ge11erall_l" 
HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATitTUDE SURVEYS: 
EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT 23-77, 179-201 (rev. ed. 1 996) (discussing 
the possible effects of survey wording and ordering on outcomes); id. at 203-30 (discussing "ugrceing­
response bias" or "acquiescence"). 
Viscusi recognizes the potentially biasing effects of question order. See V1scus1, supra note 49, ut 
88. Moreover, he emphasizes the "overwhelmingly adverse sentiment" that the first question elicited "even 
among current product users." Id. For whatever reason, however, Viscusi nowhere considers the possible 
biasing effect that those extremely negative answers might have had on subsequent answers. Cf infra note 
824 (explaining that the absence of a "don't know" option may have had a biasing effect). 
796. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 69-70. 
797. Id. at 70. 
798. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, supra note 60, at 44. 
799. R. Peto et al., Mortality from Tobacco in Developed Cou111ries: lllclirect Estimation from Nt11io11al 
Vital Statistics, 339 LANCET 1 268, 1 270 ( 1 992). The authors of that study explain further that "(i]f, 
conservatively, it was assumed that 'only' two-thirds of the observed more-than-twofold mortality exce�s 
is caused by tobacco then the [National Cancer Institute] study would still suggest that about 40% of ull 
regular cigarette smokers would eventually be killed by their habit." lei. 
800. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68. Survey respondents might also have, for the same sort of reason, 
been estimating total smoking-caused mortality and morbidity (including, for in�lance, emphy�ema), u 
possibility that Viscusi does not consider. If �o. that probability would likely be substantially higher thun 
50%. See Medical-Care Expendit11res Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United Swtes, 1993, 43 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 469, 472 ( 1 994) (noting that indirect losses associated with 
morbidity totaled $6.9 billion in 1 990); see also Jan J. Barendregt et al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking, 
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 052, 1 053 tbl.2 ( 1 997) (concluding that smokers have a �ignificantly higher 
chance than nonsmokers of contracting many serious dbeases). 
80 1 .  Viscusi acknowledges that "(h]ow one asks the risk-perception question can be of substantial 
consequence," and that "whatevt:r risk perception question wording is chosen should be well wulerstood 
by responde/1/s." V1scus1, supra note 49, at 74 (emphasis added). To determine whether results of the 
national survey provided "a reliable index of smoking risk beliefs," Viscu�i conducted u number of 
telephone surveys in the Durham, North Carolina area to explore "the sensitivity of the risk responses to 
variations in the question formulation." Id. at 76. Based on his summary review of those studies, Viscusi 
concludes that they were probably reliable. St•e id. at 82-83. 
For a variety of reasons, however, we remain concerned that the wording of the question did indeed 
affect the outcome and that Viscusi's sensitivity tests were inadequate. First, many of the other survey� thut 
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There is a fair amount of survey data regarding con,umcn." mk pcrccpllon' of c1gan:nc' For 
instance, Gallup conducts annual surveys that lrJck consumer awarenc'' of smoling "'�-....: V1...:u,1. 
however, downplays lhe significance of those survey' for lhc following n:"-'<>ns 
The wording of the questions penaining to 1hc mi.. doc, not clu:n a 'pec1hc probab1lny 
judgment regarding the hazards of smoking. . . The 'urvcy quc,uon' �cnain " hcihcr 
respondents believe that cigarenc smoking " "hannful " However. the ml-. 1hrc,hold "" 10 
what constitutes harm may differ aero'' ind1v1duab 'o thal the unphcauon' of dc"gnating 
any particular risk as harmful are not nccc"anly umfom1 aero" n:'pondent' In .idd111on. 
even for any particular respondent we do not know whal n mean' for a product 10 be 
"harmful."803 
For those reasons, Viscusi concludes that "(a)cro"-person compan,on' of quahtall\c "'" van.ibJc:, 
may be invalid.""°' They "cannot re,o)vc the "'uc of whether the ab,olulc level of n'k pcrccpuon, 
Viscusi conducted did not vary the 1.-ordmg of the quc,uon a. much a. tlic) "med lhc •111ntw11 bcmg 
asked. (We have not seen the actual 'urvcy,; we ha\ c 'L-Cll onl) V.-cu"" CU�I) dc...:npuon ol tlicm J 
As far as we can tell, there were only 1wo survey' that reworded 1hc quc,uon a.led on 1hc n.iuon.il ,ur' e) 
In one of them, respondents were a.kcd "how many among lhc 2 nulhon c1gan:ne 'mol..cr' m ll:orth 
Carolina would gel lung cancer becau'e 1hey 'mokc," and 111 another 1hcy \\ere a.,ked "ho\\ 111.in) among 
1 ,000 cigarette smokers would get lung cancer oc-cau'c lhcy "nuke " lei. al 76 Vi,..;u,1 doc' nol 1cll rc.tdcr' 
what the numerical responses were to tho'e quc,uon,. ln,tead. he n:pon- onl) thal n:,pondcnl' !ended to 
give their answers in percentage tenn,. See 1d. That fact, he md1cate" 'uggl!'>t' that the \\Ording of the 
national survey is appropriate. Perhap' ,o, but, e'pec1al ly  given that n:•pondent' 1r.in,Jatcd thc11 """' er' 
into the same tenn,, it would be intere,ung to !-.now \\hat their n:'pon� \\ere If 1hc rc>pon� \\crc 
significantly lower than the an,wer. prov1dL'<l m the national 'urYcy. thal \\Ould lend to ca.>t doubt on 
Viscusi's conclusions. Moreover, Vi.cu"'' olher 'urvcy ' ana11011' ..:cm la.rgcl) , 1( nol cnurcly, 
unresponsive to the basic critique m 1h.- 'L-Cl10n-d1at "· 1ha1 lhc \\Ord .. ,mol..cr" " "' no\\hcrc defined 
802. See id. at 48. 
803. Id. at 48 (footnole omincd). Vi•cu" purport• lO offer "(a]n add1t1onal problem" " nh qu.ihtauvc 
risk assessments-specifically. "that 1hc 'UbJCCll\'C ml.. cutoff, for labeling an acll• ny n'I..) ' .ii) acr�, 
individuals." Id. For example, college-educated worl..cr. dc,cnbcd )Ob, " 1th an an nu.ii lnJUI) r.ite of 06 
as "dangerous." while worker. who had not gone to college labeled a JOb " nh .in lllJUI) rate of 09 
"dangerous." See id. It is not clear to u' that there " a difference bcm ccn lh1' "add111onal problc:rn" .ind 
the first problem that Vi'cu'i 1den11fic,-1hat 1" that '"the ml.. thre,hold a. 10 \\hat .:on,tnutn harm lllJ) 
differ across individuab." Id. In any event, although V1"u" lind' 1h1> \ anauon a<:rfu' cduc.illon le•cl, 
"sub,tantial,'" id., it is arguably msub,1antial. The cndcncc 'uggc,l> a d1ffc:n:ncc of uni) three pcrcc:111.igc 
points between college-educated worl..er. and worl..cr. who did no1 go to college " 1th rc,pc:cl 10 " hc:thcr 
a workplace was con,idered dangerou,. 
804. Id. at 48. Despite h1' critici>m' of quahtauvc •tud1c" V1...:u>1 argue' that the:) ne• enlicln' ··pro• 1de 
a mechanism for tracking the development of n>I.. perccp11on' o\cr tune: " Id at -19 lie: JU,11 1in th.ti d.urn 
by assening that "compari,on over lime for relauvcly 'table populauon group' >hould be mun: n:hJblc:" 1lun 
"[a]cross-per.on compari,on' of qual11at1vc ml-. ' anablc' ·· Id. al -18. If V1"u'1 •> corn:cl 1hat the quJhlJll•e 
surveys are unreliable acros' per.on,, however. then there " no rca>on to bche• e that tlicy arc n:hablc: o\·cr 
time. Contrary to hi> a.'enion. n i> doubtful thal populauon group, ha•e been all that >t.tble . .it lc.1.>t m 1cm1> 
of the variables that he >ugge,ts might be "gmficant aero-. md1\ 1du.1b. For m>tancc, a• cragc: educauon 
levels. income levels. and age leveb have changL'<l "gmlicantl� •mcc: 1 95-1. \\hen V1"u'1·, companwn 
begins. In 1 960, 4 1 . 1  % of tho'e 25 and older had completed at lca>t four yc.ir. of high ...:hool Su 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TilE UNITED STAlCS. supra note 269, at 1 59 lb) 2-1 I Per capna d1'po>able 
per.onal income wa. $8660 a. mC3'ured in con>tant J 992 dollar., ><'<' 1</ al -1-18 tbl 692 . .ind the: med1.in age 
of the resident population wa. 29.5. ue 1d. at 1-1 tbl. 1 3. By 1 995. 8 1  7q, of tho>e 25 Jn older h.id cornplc:ted 
high >chool, see id. at 1 59 tbl.2-1 1 .  while di>po,ablc per.onal income: had n>en 10 S I S.757, ,..,. 1</ .it -1-18 
tbl.692, and the median age of the re.idem population had incn:a,ed to 3-1 3.  s...- ul .it 1 -1  tbl 1 3  
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is sufficient. Perceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of u perception that smoking is 
'harmful. ""'0s In contrast, according to Viscusi, the quantitative surveys on which he bases his 
conclusions create "a meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric."'06 
To that line of argument, we have several responses. First, there is considerable evidence from 
previous surveys that is not qualitative, and, hence, is invulnerable to his criticisms. For instance, one 
of Viscusi's own tables reveals that us of 1 98 1  (the lust year summarized). nearly one-third of all 
cigareue smokers polled believed that smoking was not "one of the causes of lung cancer.""" In the 
same year, over two-fifths of smokers believed that smoking was not one of the causes of heart diseuse 
and two-thirds believed that smoking was not one of the causes of birth defects."°" One-fifth of 
respondents did not think that cigarette smoking was even harmful.""' More recently, a 1 990 survey 
in Canada put to respondents the following question: "To the best of your knowledge, what, if uny, are 
the health hazards related to smoking?"810 Only 44% of the 1 030 respondents included lung cancer in 
their answers, and only 20% included heart disease.'" Such survey results suggest that for a substantial 
portion of the smoking population, underestimation of the risks of smoking is a significant problem.m 
Second, although Viscusi claims that he has measured consumer risk assessments with u 
quantitative, "meaningful, well-defined probabalistic metric,"813 the precision his datu appear to provide 
is likely an illusion. To be sure, respondents' answers to the survey questions were numerical. In that 
sense, Viscusi is correct to claim that the "wording of the questions pertaining to the risk[s) . . .  elicit[s] 
a specific probability judgment" from respondents.'14 Those numerical responses, however, arc unlikely 
to be any more precise-and may be less precise-than are respondents' judgments regarding whether 
cigarettes are "harmful." Cognitive psychology suggests that most people do not typically assess risks 
805. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 48. 
806. Id. at 49. 
807. Id. at 49 tbl.3- 1 .  Nearly one-third also believed that smoking was not one of the causes of throat 
cancer. See id. 
808. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2. 
809. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2. 
8 10. Environics Research Group Ltd., Awareness of Heahh Hazards Due to Smoking tbl.22C (Dec. 
1 7, 1 990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Joumal). 
8 1 1 .  See id. 
8 1 2. In anticipation of this sort of response, Viscusi offers the following reply: 
The fact that some small segment of the population does not believe that smoking is harmful 
docs not mean that they equate not being harmful with being risk-free. One can view each 
respondent us having some threshold risk value, above which u product is classified ns hurmful. 
The fact that cigarettes may not be above this threshold implies only that the respondents 
believe the risk is not so great that it passes the harmful-risk cutoff. 
V1scus1, supra note 49, at 50-5 1 .  In our estimation, however, such a view is implausible. II strains the 
English language to suggest, us Viscusi seem� to, that those respondent� who answered that smoking is not 
harmful may well accurately estimate or even overestimate the risks of smoking. Viscusi's claim, recull, 
is that "[p]erceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of a perception that smoking is 
'harmful."' Id. at 48. 
The view �eems even less plausible when one considers the �ubstantial percentage of the sume group 
of respondents who did not believe that cigarettes were one of the causes of lung cancer, throat cancer, 
heart disease, or birth defects: Nearly one-third of smoking respondents did not consider smoking to be one 
of the pos�ible causes of lung cancer-which "has long been the be�t documented and most highly 
publicized risk of smoking." Id. at 5 1 .  In any event, the view that re�pondents have some threshold below 
which they classify a product as nonharmful does not alleviate the problem created by consumer oplimism. 
If the risk does not clear a consumer's harmful-risk threshold, it seems doubtful that the risk will innuence 
that consumer's consumption choices. 
8 1 3. Id. at 49. 
8 14. Id. at 48. 
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in precise probabilistic terms. For example. one re'earchcr 'ummar1zc, 1hc Jucr.uun: a. follows 
Intuitively, we seem to unders1and only four degree' of probability for an cvcnl vcl) likcl). 
somewhat likely (more likely to happen 1han not). 'omcwhal unlikely (more lil-ely nol 10 
happen), and very unlikely. Inside 1hosc four compartment' all ., gray No d1ffcrcnce make, 
any difference. [For example. a) 6 percent probability appear. 10 u' already sufficiently .. ,.cl) 
unlikely" that the significantly inferior probab1lil) of I percent ., JU'I "1hc .amc ..... 
Given that dynamic, it seems unlikely thal 'urvcy respondcni- truly con,1den:d the problem in prcc1">C 
numeric terms. More likely, they simply attempted to lr.m,Jatc 1hc1r vague qualuau\ c  ml- J.SSC">'mcnl' 
into numeric equivalents. Because thi' proce's of 1r.in,Ja11on would only have been rough. n:spondcnl' 
would have been likely to lranslate their estimate' into well-known. "focal" numbers If one ''ere 10 
begin with the four-category hypothes1,, one might predict that anw•crs would be d1,proport1ona1cly 
clustered at focal numbers representing the edge' of the four quarters of JOO ... For in't;incc. tho">C 
who believed that smoking poses virtually no nsl- nught have cho\Cn zero (or pcrhap' some other low 
focal number such as 5% or 1 0%). Tho'e who believed that .rnol-ing po'Cs a n:lauvcly 'light ml- nught 
have translated their estimate to 25'i<. Tho'e who believed thal 'moking P<J">C' a rned1u111-,1Lcd n,J- nught 
have chosen 50%. And tho'e who believed th.u '1110king pn:">Cnh a vel)" '1gmlicant ml- nught ha\c 
chosen 75% or even 1 00%. 
With that sort of prediction in mind. II I' 11luminaung 10 examine with 'omc .:arc \C\ cral notable 
features of the survey evidence on which V1,cu'1 relie,. The lirst que,uon on 1he 'un ey w a.  wh.it 
Viscusi describes as "an open-ended memOI)' probe regarding 111d1v1dua1' · n:acuon' 10 cigarette' ... , • 
To summarize the responses to that que,tion. Vi,cu'i d1v1dc' "reacuon•· into twenty-1wo categonc,, 'uch 
as "causes lung cancer," "shorten' life, k1lb," and "tl)·inglhavc med to quu.''"' V1..cu'1 report' the 
percentage of respondents who gave answers in each ca1egOI)' a.' well a. "the mean Jung cancer n'k 
assessment . . .  corresponding" to each category.'" A' V1.cu'1 'tre'\C'· 1he "adverse ">Cnurnent .igain't 
the product" is "stunning." even "overwhclnung.''';,,' For our purpose,, 1hc mo't 11lu1111na1ing timhng 
is that I .3% of respondents indicated that they did not believe. or at Jca.,l wen: skeptical of claim,, that 
cigarettes are hannful.'21 Among those nonbelievers and 'kepuc,, the average probabah,uc n'k 
assessment was approximately 25%.'11 The fact that even lhose ind1' 1duab m·cn:,umatc the "true n,k" 
of smoking by a factor of between two and live should give pause 10 anyone who would treat the 
respondents' numeric assessmenL� as anything more than Joo,e prox1e' for qualitauvc Judgment' Thal 
point becomes especially clear when one carefully con,1der; the d1,tnbuuon' of probabali•a1c 'un·c> 
responses. Viscusi summarizes those dbmbuuon' a' follow' 
8 1 5. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. Proba/11/rn· Blmdness · N.-11hu Rt11w11al nor Caprrt 1mu, BOSTO'-IA. 
Mar./Apr. 1 99 1 ,  at 28, 32-33. 
8 1 6. Cf THOMAS C. SCHELLl1'G, THE STRATEGY OF CO,FUCT 1 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1 980 cd ) !d1..:u"ing focal-
point solutions). 
8 1 7. V1scus1, supra note 49. at 88. 
8 1 8. Id. at 89. 
8 1 9. Id. at 88. 
820. Id. 
82 I .  See 1d. at 89. 
822. See id. (The mean mk pcrcepuon of 1ho'e re>pondcnt> " a> 26 6q. Currcni >mol.cr. w 11hm thal 
group estimated 23.5o/c. See 1d. ) 
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TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER RISK PERCEPTIONS 
FOR CJGARETIE SMOKING82-' 
FRACTION WITH RISK PERCEPTIONS 
IN INTERVAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER FULL SAMPLE CURRENT 
RISK PERCEPTION (RISK) SMOKERS 
RISK < .05 .052 .092 
.05 ::; RISK < . 1 0  .046 .05 1 
. 1 0 ::; RISK < .20 . 1 17 . 1 30 
.20 ::; RISK < .30 . 1 36 . 146 
.30 ::; RISK < .40 .090 . 1 14 
.40 ::; RISK < .50 .052 .050 
.50 ::; RISK < .60 .239 .228 
.60 ::; RISK < .70 .Q70 .056 
.70 ::; RISK < .80 .084 .050 
.80 ::; RISK < .90 .042 .027 
.90 ::; RISK < 1 .0 .041 .028 
RISK = 1 .0 .D30 .026 
Mean RISK .426 .368 
(standard error of mean) (.005) (.009) 
Sample size 3 1 19 779 
Unfortunately, Viscusi's distributional categories do not permit us to determine the precise extent 
to which estimates clustered around quartile cutoffs. Nevertheless the distributions do appear consistent 
with the four-category prediction. Moreover, several points that Viscusi makes in his description of the 
distribution indicate that, in fact, the distribution of survey responses is strikingly consistent with tlmt 
four-category prediction. For instance, Viscusi concedes that there is "clustering of responses around 
salient risk levels, such as .25 and .50."m Viscusi's only response to this clustering is thut "the 
823. See id. at 69 tbl.4-2; see also id. at 1 24 tbl.6-3 (including numbers for respondents aged 1 6-2 1 ). 
824. Id. at 68. Complicating matters further (and making Viscusi's data even less precise), the 
clustering around 50% (approaching one-quarter of all responses) may partially reHect an attempt on the 
part of some respondents to answer "I don't know." Cf. SCHUMAN & PRESSER, s11pra note 795, ut 1 14 
(explaining that significant random or systematic errors may be created by respondents "who really have 
no views on the issues under inquiry and simply Hip mental coins in order to satbfy the interviewer's 
expectation of an answer"). 
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direction o f  bias imparted b y  such rounding 1 s  unclear."•:.• Thus, Viscus1 ' s  mterpretauon o f  the 
evidence seems to be that the respondents did have precise quanuues m mmd. quanuues that they merely 
rounded off for purposes of the survey. Our cl:um. m contrast. 1s that the respondents did nol operate 
with precise quantitative risk assessments. Instead. they had only foggy quahtauve assessments that they 
forced into numeric tenns for purposes of the survey. Insofar as our version 1s accurate. the numenc 
responses do not mean what they appear to mean. 
Viscusi unwittingly endorses our interpretauon of the d1stnbuuonal data when he anempl.s to 
explain "[a]n intriguing aspect of' the distnbu11ons-spec1fically. that a "reasonably large fracuon of 
smokers . . .  believe the risk level is 1 .0 yet continue to smoke:"=• V1scus1 explains "[A) contnbuung 
factor [to this outcome] is that the assessed cases of lung cancer per 100 smokers lend 10 be clustered 
at salient numbers. Respondents assessing a RISK of 1 .0 may beheve that lung cancer 1s highly hkely 
but not necessarily a certain outcome."•27 Viscus1's pomt seems to be exactly ours. Respondents may 
well have chosen numbers that reflect nothing more than a rough approxm1auon of their qualnauve nsk 
assessments. 
If, indeed, that was the tendency of survey respondents. then all of the problems that V1SCus1 
identifies with qualitative surveys were present wnh hts "quant11a11ve" sur•ey One cannot detemune 
whether a person who gave 25% as a response (because she beheved that c1garenes pose only a shght 
risk of lung cancer) is pessimistic or optimistic. Par.iphr.tl>mg Viscus1. the nsk threshold as to what 
constitutes "a slight risk" may differ across individuals. makmg the 1mphcauons of such Jes1gnauons 
unclear and not necessarily uniform across respondents. 
In light of the evidence regarding how individuals assess nsh. the ··qual11auve·· sur•eys that 
Viscusi disparages may be superior to his favored ··quanrnauve" surveys, on at least two grounds. First. 
such surveys better reflect the qualitative categones that many people use when asse�mg nsk. and they 
do not create survey noise by forcing respondents to tr.inslate those categones mto a less fam1har 
language. Second, they do not create the potentially dangerous illusion of havmg employed ··a 
meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric:·m 
825. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68. 
826. Id. at 1 24. 
827. Id. at 1 24-25. 
828. Id. at 49. 

